BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

N. A. SASTRI
We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order: (1) Sarvyajasiddhārka, (2) Bhavarthasiddhi Karika, (3) Snātiparīkṣa, (4) Anyagopī-vicāra, (5) Isvarabhāva-gārakarika. Of these the second, viz. Bhavarthasiddhi, Tib. phyi.rug.gi. don grub, pa is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (asustup) counted for convenience into 188 verses. The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, to refute the Yogacāra idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiśhāsikā. Vasubandhu, for example, in his Pimatsāka elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaishesikas. Dignaga again in his Alambanapurāṇika confirmed Vasubandhu's opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations. Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of Suhopalānttha-nīyam, concomitance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaibhavika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise, takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaibhavika masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Satyarakṣa and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta's premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (Bakaratkaparīkṣa) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Punjika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.
This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhāguceta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmaśrīt (600 A.D.) and Santarakṣita-\(\text{nājīśa}\) (600-80 A.D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, a Jain author (c. 700 A.D.) since the latter quotes the former in his Nīṣyāviniśaiya the ver: saha-sahabhedā loketā miśa, etc. (Bhāṣyaratna, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A.D. (Cf. T. Sangnaha, Intro. XXXIV).

**REVIEW OF TOPICS**

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favor of idealism is the example of dream experiences. Subhāguceta refutes it by pointing out the differences between the wake experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the contention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusory, the author replies that some knowledge may even on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. ver. 31 with note).

Dignaga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, i.e. non-cognition of atoms in isolation (saikiṣa-apariśuddhā) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they lose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our consciousness?—he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusory and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being congealed into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-substances (40).

Vasubandhu’s criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial distinction (śīla-hiṣṭabhedā) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (nayatā) is also illogical. If you
consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-unit on the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become conflated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (Amarakavresasa) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (dharma-sakti) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spiritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of Sahaj-amblakripa remarks that the knowledge is only cognizant and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the said how reason has been pointed out to be defective in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term sahi 'together' always implies a companion and if there is really Sahaj-amblakripa, 'together-cognition', the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by some other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of Sahaj-amblakripa, according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously produce the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed Sahaj-amblakripa (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuratively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not plead, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of assuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-
knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in the knowledge (95). This image-theory is not favoured by the advocates of Cittamatra, idea alone in the ultimate plane of existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He makes his position further clear by saying that the consciousness which is imageless and formless comprehends (paricoid) through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. (105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness—form is accepted to be shared by the form of an object, how does it mean that the consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to it a creative function (92). The author’s realistic outlook is quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of cognizing the external things is the same with the saints as with the worldlings, with this much difference that the former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision (Sarvathathyā dhīya) whereas the latter by coveous observation of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author conceives a special privilege to Buddha whose power of knowledge cannot be interrogated whether it comprehends simultaneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared by the Sastra-nika who is not in favour of allowing any exception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a gradual process. Note Vasubandhu’s clear-cut exposition of this law: Svāsāsaṃ saṃsvaṭhāvat vartā gokh sarva-vdi: moh/ Tathā sarvaśāravād evavya na saṅki sarva-vedaya/ Kksakarika, IX, 1.

The Kṛtāvedana is also the opinion of Harivaran. Satya-siddhi, Chaps 15, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastu-Vibhasa, p. 27 (Vism-Bharati Annals, X).

It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example cited in favour of Svāsāsaṃvedana theory has been turned by the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp illumines itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge illuminates the selves of two or more alambanas of the same kind
(106). Therefore according to Subhāgucpa, the visual consciousness, e.g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range; thus our cognition of several colours in a carpet (citraśrana) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (grahya) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathāgata's sayings like everything is impermanent, etc. do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (sakti) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any Sakti is experienced in our sensual consciousness (120-21).

It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (vijñāṇasampratī) (129-31); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerning other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (pariccheta). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an im-describable form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's theory of Svabhāvata, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cogniz- ing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cogni- tion is generally believed to have been propounded by the Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later
The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally then alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159). The Buddhahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). There are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of cīttratatā must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddhā has declared (cīttratatā) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine of no-sośi has been preached with respect to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worklings addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldlings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (kālapita), something fancied (vikālapita) and Dharma. The inferred (kālapita) is nothing but bhava, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and Dharma finally is the self-substance (Svākāsa). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e. Vikālapita as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the Vaibhāsikas.
Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on *Buṣan hgyur* collection of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Nurthang edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sāstraic) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa Tshul khrim, a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the VisvaBharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

N. A. Sastrī
The original Sanskrit verses of the Bhayartha Siddhi identified so far

भीमसेनवं ऋषिके गए नागाध्यात्म शास्त्रम्।
विज्ञानविभेदिः परमेष्टकुलीयः।। २५ ॥

twovi: glāva-āsānādātā yathā niśaśtrāvifūm:।
abīnaśu: lāttāmābādeśāyë stātē, nītāvahvām:।। २५ ॥

प्रक्षेपकमापुरोऽवस्थाएवपर्युपासावर्गः।
तत्सांत्विंशति वाक्योऽहोर अप्रासिधियोऽविभिसः।। २४ ॥

नारायणीति वाक्यो शास्त्र, परम्पराकेष्वर्यिक्षितः।
आत्म भूतोविश्वविभिसः, निवर्तयः।। २५ ॥

पक्षनविवेकः: संप्रदायनेत्तरः।
निविदानेव हेमी सर्वविश्वभाषाः।। २६ ॥

सहायदृष्टं ताष्ट्रेपाद्यृतं तन्त्रसणेन विनयः कर्मः।
विधिऽवदं तस्य हेमी विद्विषा हायस्यकुलः।। २७ ॥

guṇakā्यसं त सादाध्याय विश्वभाषाय।
साधनविष्कृतपुरुषः उपोऽस्त्र विश्वभाषाय।। २१ ॥

साक्षरायनवेदः प तत्तत्त्वावधाय वेदाः।
साक्षरेदेण स वषादो विश्वासाद्वर्तेन भवेद्।। २७ ॥

कर्म तादाहारां स्वाभाव तत्त्वाकर्ष्यविश्वाय।
विशेष तत्त्वाद्वर्तेन कर्म लोके क भंति।। २८ ॥

साक्षर वा विनिर्द्वानं तत्त्वाकर्ष्यविश्वाय।
इति साक्षरायणवेदाश्रये क विश्वाय वाक्यानि।। २९ ॥

वयस्च न ध्वस्तां कर्म निर्माणानि स्वर्गः।
वेत्य प्रात्यभाष्यामार्न्तः सम्बन्धः सर्वेन न।। २१ ॥
BAHYARTHA—SIDDHI

Establishment of Objective Reality

1. One\(^1\) who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (\textit{Gruhika}) as well as duties beneficial to other living beings; to him I salute in order to achieve the success (\textit{artha-siddhi}) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.

2. \textit{(The Idealist says:)} The\(^2\) external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real); \textit{(Reason):} because it is a \textit{(mere)} idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, \textit{(example)} just like a dream-thought and the double-made idea.\(^3\)

3. Thus\(^4\) the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. \textit{Now,} we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted\(^5\) in our daily life (\textit{avisayinvaladasti}).

4. The\(^7\) alternative proposition, that either the object-cause (\textit{glambana}) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.

5. One\(^8\) experiences in dream one's own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage?

6. \textit{If}\(^9\) you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading\(^9\) of a waking person and his bodily exsanguination resemble a dream experience, \textit{why} are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.

7. \textit{If}\(^10\) you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but \textit{there is no perversion}\(^10\) in naming things, \textit{A knowledge which is non-illusive is never contradicted.} What is contradicted is always illusive.

8. A knowledge\(^11\) of a material thing which differs from neither space\(^14\) nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusive (\textit{abhrreta}). \textit{This alone is the characteristic of non-illusive knowledge and nothing else.}

9—10a. The\(^n\) person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the \textit{Saint} (\textit{Yogi}). \textit{(In case of absolute denial of external things)}
the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not get double sided release\(^{16}\) (abhayatobhaga-vimukta) and thus Buddhahood would also be contradicted.

10. \textit{bd.} (The Idealist continues\(^{19}\) Even our truly apprehension (vishayapraniti) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does)?

11. \textit{?} (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions (vasana), why are not the dreamy things also explained (in the like manner \?) hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.

12. The\(^{20}\) mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (vasana) are all momentary; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of fruition.

13. For\(^{21}\) him who opines that the knowledge of one\(^{22}\) taste does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.

14. If\(^{23}\) it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit? The cause of fruition (vipaka) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.

15. Just\(^{24}\) as something seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.

16. In\(^{25}\) whose opinion the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for perceiving, (for him) the fruition will repeat endless even after its destruction.\(^{26}\)

17. Why\(^{28}\) do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (vasana) of non-contradiction? If you say: because the material and other external things are unlit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).

18. If\(^{29}\) non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of \textit{arsya} (= Alayavijñana) why is it
not (like this) that as long as there is eye-disease (simtir) as basis (aṣṭaṇā), so long there is non-contradiction? 

19. Suppose the Yogacarins (pāramittā) on the notion of mind alone (Cittamātra) and on the presumption of the all ālambanā as false; when in the interval the notion of Cittamātra is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (avīśamvadā) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.

20. The Saktis matured (patipāka) for āropa, assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.

21. And the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No vāsana is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.

22. Things are made fragrant on account of an act produced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the Jali flowers.

23. Here the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their āpādāna consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.

24. Therefore the theory of vāsana needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti. 

25. Nevertheless, if you say the knowledge of odhīghama (rtogs-pa), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (svatattiyad) and this my opinion may be compared with the fact of the seed which being sowed matures of itself.

26. This opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its āpādāna consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it means a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (aprona aṣṭaṇā). 

27. -28a. This defect is absent in the system which holds that Saktis that are imputed (āropita) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some Vīsaṇa, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.
28 b-d. But there is a system of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named upadana (Alaya-vijnana) and this is quite irrelevant.

29. When the proposition of Cittamatra that is to be established the proof or argument (sadhana) is the knowledge itself (Joanata); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (vijatiya) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be sesavar (i.e. sesamand-amamou).

30. A close scrutiny (lego-dayat) joyfulness (dgah myur) engagement (praviti) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.

31. Certain sensual knowledge errors on account of some impediment (this is possible). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error creates an absolute darkness in the universe.

**ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.**

32. Others say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is an external object (corresponding to the sensual consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable object is what is produced internally from one's own mind but it is not a visible object (rupa) (existing externally outside of the mind).

33a-c. The proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (samanthya); because each atom does not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge. So says Dinnaga.

33d-34. (Hetu-Reason) would become doubtful (sandightha) when it is applied to Citta and Caiita, mind and mental-phenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understand ing of Tathagata.

35. (The author continues:) Just as the illusive idea of permanence appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms.
36. When we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness.

37. Therefore the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our consciousness is totally unfounded.

38. What a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (drya) and resembles the double moon (says-Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its hetu, prebams is not at all proved as valid one.

39. The atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed Sankta, integrated.—to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (adraya)?

40. They (atoms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.

41. The philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated colours (Citrapatata).

42. In certain place, when an image of certain object (rupa) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (asraya) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms.

43. Ac atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge?

44. Atoms cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.

45. Vasubandhu’s criticism of the atoms on the basis of their spacial distinctions is successful. For, the term, space (dikṣabada) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.
46. Hence by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several other atoms but never the atoms are constituted of parts.

47. When one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.

48. Where the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.

49. A (gross) form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms.

50. If, as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (aranyān) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived also (i.e. one indivisible time-unit)?

51. Since knowledge continues to exist for two moments its uninterrupted existence (pratāntara) is possible, yet the form of one unit (aranyān-pa) is not permissible on the knowledge; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms also.

52. By virtue of a peculiar relationship (patyusotti) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts.

53. The shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun.

54. Just as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atom can produce such phenomenon.

55. Therefore what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (piṇḍa) is impossible to exist, since the distinction between the
atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (kudacika) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).

56. The atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.

57. By virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (anyayata) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (vajra) and other such things.

58. Certain atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (druvara), just like the evil spirit (pisaca) the serpent and others are subdued by force of mantra-nakti.

59. But there are many other atoms having very little power and strength (to appear in life).

The person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (acala) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. with their numbers and other distinctions.

60-61a. Therefore it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (bhrama) then your understanding that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number ‘eight’ on the aggregate of eight atoms.

61b-62. If you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Pradhana and Purusa, etc.?

63. You may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Pradhana is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (gunatisaya) (like salva,
raja and tamas). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).

64. Therefore the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other the sages living in a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible

65. When two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once.

66. There is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.

67. If the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise.

68. If the term saha is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. Sahrupalambha) becomes indefinite in all respects (saikantika) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (jneyacetas) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (citta-caitatsa).

69. If the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures: how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost, hell and others is an illusion?

70. If, even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejoinder is based again on illusion.

71. The term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (hetu—Sahrupalambha) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.
72. If the term *Saha* 'co-existence' is taken to mean one and the same thing (*ekartha*) then *hetu* would be unproved (*asiddha*) for other party. For example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?

73. If every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (*ekena upalambara*)?

74. That object-cause felt by a person internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (*hetu*) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other's cognizance (*svabhara-viprakaraṇa = non-lohika bhikal bha*).

75. If the reason (*hetu*) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party who plead for the doctrine of mind alone (*cittamatra*).

76. If you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (apprakśhavā), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (*sakara-praṇavāda*) would not dispute here in this matter (thus leading to *siddhavāda*).

77. If you conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge?

78. Suppose, for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (*artha*), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion.

79. If certain imaginary form (*kalpatu-rūpa* i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced; therefore the reason (*Sakṣa-pālambara*) is not proper to set up.

80. For this reason two forms of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is
looked on by some. Thus the author's (Dharmakirti) statement of "one" (ahheka) becomes unfounded.

51. The causal factors (cāyagri) of the preceding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (rūpa) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive cognition (sahavādana) would become justifiable.

52. When the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (puravapara) the term co-cognition (sahavādana) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (sahavādnam na arthatāḥ).

53. Since the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined.

54. Since it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content (jñānaṁ satīti), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself it is considered as cognized.

55. Thought the term 'cognized' (cāyveda) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its import is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc., e.g. are not regarded of the (same) terms, visam, horned figure on account of the usage of the term, cow, etc.

56. There are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (suduṣmatāna) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (Sāryajna). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient. If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient?

57. In the system of the image-invested knowledge (of the Sautrāmatika) the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (siddha-adhikarita).

58. The external thing (artha) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is
considered as perceived figuratively. The external thing is not as all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.

89. If you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciousness) considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (lat parichedha laksana) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?

90. (In the system of the Sautrantika-Yogscaras) an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (artha-parichedhaka)?

91. Consciousness (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object.

92. The consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object (vrittimatra), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (samaropa).

93. Just as a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (prana-rupa), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.

94. No distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects (Sarvakaranadh).

95. Do we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively. "Akasa-vada disproved"

96. What image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (rupa), etc. but it is assumed to exist in the knowledge.

97. It is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations (avasana); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (tanmatra-sana)?
98. Our intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced, for example in the case of eye-disease etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.

99. Likewise one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.

100. The assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (Kalpana). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to visesa, individual characteristic of the observed object.

101. You plead that the knowledge which is in fact imageless experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.

102. There is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (advayajñana). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.

103. If you argue that the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory; otherwise how could it be an assumed image?

104. Hence consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (paricidal) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fit things whether existent or non-existent.

105. If you say that just as the lamp illumines the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two alambhanas (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.

106. However the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various sense-organs; hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.
107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) alambana.  

107b-9a. A knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing:—this contention is a simple illusion; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the part of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.  

109b-10a. In every mind the knowledge form is uniform if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.  

110b-c. When this (knowledge) illuminates the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its context (visaya).  

111-12b. If while the knowledge lights up last a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).  

Grahyas aspect criticised  

112c-13. The Tathagata’s saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (grahya visaya).  

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (alambana) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (as content).  

114. How does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction? That idea is only a fancy of your mind (citasaavatsara). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself.  

115a-b. If there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all desired (as content)?
Discussion on the actual object

115c-166. The simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (arga) each. How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished?

116c-176. The knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of alambara, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (alambara) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).

117c-186. The opinion that a similar knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper; for, no knowledge flashes up (bhati) immediately after a similar knowledge.

118c-190. If the knowledge in the form of a visible object (rupa) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of rupa be similar to the alambara, i.e. sound?

119c-206. Some consider that a force (sakti) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause. This opinion is also improper; for, no force, sakti is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.

120c-216. If (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (artha) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as alambara exists indeed though not expressly stated.

121c-226. If you say that the knowledge of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (artha). If it lacks the characteristic (of alambara) how can it be alambara?

122c-236. (Thus) it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means.

123c-246. The objects like desirable and undesirable never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind; this contention is absolutely irrelevant.
124c-25b. On** certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (he experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefit/action on account of varied causes.**

125c-26b. Certain** knowledge relating to an object (artha) reflects (the same object) as a patch of blush (visālaka) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (nekhaṃsarīpāti) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.

126c-27b. Feelings** like joy, sorrow and dullest are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things—i.e. this is your contention; how is it proper?

127c-28b. (The Idealist continues) All you refutations are made on the assumption (of external things) (apropa); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no alabham in the externa? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (arthaśrīpa) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.

128c-30c. If you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action** is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (viparyaya-jana).

130d-31c. But** again as a result of seeking the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (kriyamātra)** is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (vibhramā) of some thing present for something absent.

131f-132c. As** to the argument based on the sexual act (kama-cāra) in dream we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions) ?

132d-133c. Since** the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (rāga) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extremes love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.
133-134c. If in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

134d-135c. If in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

135d-136b. The semen being discharged out of extreme passion (regha) the purpose of life is fulfilled:—this idea is not a happy one.

136d-137b. For example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act, the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.

137c-138e. Since there really exist the keepers of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admirable nor is any purposeful action in dream possible. Therefore the doctrine of Cittamahara “mind alone” becomes unproved.

138d-139e. When different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings?

139d-140c. Similarly the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (anagrapa) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) remains true in his promise.

140d-141b. In the absence of preliminary rites efficient act can not be accomplished; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.

141c-d. Why is the knowledge of the others’ thought-discerner is untrue (ayathagira)?

142. When other’s mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.

143b-c. The grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge would arise.
143a-144b. So also is the case with the knowledge of one's own mind.\(\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\) (In both cases) the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. pariccheda-laksana).

144c-145b. The\(\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\) memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing. What is directed towards the past (bhava= yan-dag) is not a cognition\(\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\) (graha) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.

145c-146d. The\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) non-dual form (advaya-ropa) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (Sambuddha) is not cognizable to us and therefore\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) untrue (avyarththa). What is said to be untrue, is unsatisfactory because of the non-dual nature (advayatva) of the knowledge.

146c-147b. The\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\)

147c-148c. To\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask:) What\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other's mind can be comprehended?

148d-49. Then\(\text{\textsuperscript{22}}\) there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (niralambara). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient?\(\text{\textsuperscript{22}}\)

150-151b. By\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) comprehending one's own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (svatmyavedana).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realization of the mind alone (cittanatra-darsana).

151c-152b. If\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content?

152c. (If\(\text{\textsuperscript{27}}\) you say again, that) when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects—this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (grahaka-ropa) (the entire universe).
153. There is not any person known to us as omniscient—say, self-styled wisdom amongst the so-called learned persons: but this saying reveals his dull intellect (sva-durmait) being engrossed in it.

154. As the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed.

155. But there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all worldlings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.

156. The knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this is void (sunya)' is related to (if entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote?

157. Just as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.

158. Assuming in the mind an idea of entity one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has not any purpose (nirvartaha) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.

159. The contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence (a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (no a reasonable proposition).

160. The person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice.

161. Therefore the state of well-faring (Saukata-pada) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (samas krira-avitiya).
162. When†† one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfil the preliminary duties such as charity, etc., in the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.

163. If†† you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle†† of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by perception, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.

165. When†† one practices repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.

166. Even†† if innumerable thoughts (manaskara) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.

167. In†† doing out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (arthamana=arthasvarupa) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain†† things (viz. three garments, etc).

168. There†† was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are with us; how can they be products of the mind-alone†† (lit. paramatma)?

169. If†† these things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (lo\'ayata).

170. A†† man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics)?

171. If†† (you say) it is produced by succession (prabandha) of people life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance†† (parinirvada)?
172. It is the sealed fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.

173. When a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause. This rule is also not permissible (in your system).

174. Thus (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.

175. If you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (sakti) in the mind, wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction?

176. If the cause immediately preceding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (concomitant) with the mind of smoke.

177. When the concomitance is completely unproved, how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: this result arises from that cause?

178. Therefore the doctrine that the whole universe is Chittamatra, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (kalptan asriya) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist.

179. For what (object) one may display desire and other passions. Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (kalpita-Vikalpita) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things in order to remove all such passions (dosa) of the worldings.

180. Similarly in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldings. Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldings).

181. Since some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment
towards an agent as real the idea of agent as real is necessarily to be negated.\footnote{10}

182-183. In\footnote{10} other places it has been likewise declared thus: There is something inferred (kalpta) and some other thing fancied, vikalpta (≡ parikalpta). The true form of dharmata (dharmatavāpa≡gaṇesvāpa≡svarūpa) has been explained thus: dharmata is svalaksana, self-essence. What is kalpta is no other than a basic reality (bhavamatra), and the vikalpta is its diversity (bheda). This diversity of dharmata will be inappropriate in the absence of bhava\footnote{10} (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).

184. If\footnote{10} the Rupa is declared to be sūpa (devoid of rupa-nature) how the term rupa is employed on it? If you argue that it is done on the assumption of the rupa-nature, what is the ultimate objective (phala) gained\footnote{10} (therefrom)?

185. Of\footnote{10} what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing\footnote{10} (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as is the dream.\footnote{10}

186. The\footnote{10} advocates of the external reality point out to the Idealist (citāmaṇḍita-vadin) thus: Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not,

187. But\footnote{10} I have no wonderful (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.

188. The\footnote{10} wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Henceforth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.
1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit:

परिवृंह न स्त्राय परस्य सर्वानां संसारम्।
ब्रह्मसन्न ज्ञानान्वितज्ञानम् निश्चयम्॥

2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, svartha and parampara as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Pram. Sam. I, ver. - 1, with vritth. v. my Review in ALB.) and the author of the Sutralankara (=Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata Institute, Tirupati, 1941).

3. स्मस्मपुराणानां स्वरत्च न परायतः।

प्रामणिर्वृत्तिगती किम् अवस्थानामात्मासामस्य।

a. lit वृत्तिगताः—Innatva as Sadhana, reason is referred to in the verse 29 below.

4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimśatika and the Alambana-pariśka.

5. ब्रह्मसं: सापये नेति ब्रह्माण्यान्वितविद्वात।

अविश्वासार्तपदार्तविश्वासास्य बच्चे।

6. Dharmakirti’s definition of premanga is: प्रमाणानि सारं प्रामाणम्, अर्थं स्म सारं प्रामाणम्। Prem. varitika, I, ver. 1. Subhagupta’s one of the arguments to prove his externalism is avinavadatta; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, II, 20, ff.

7. शास्त्रम् कृष्णयान्त्रकारपरा सीतामति:।

अन्यन्त्र अविश्वास्य ब्रह्मसं: कस्मसे ये ऋषिवंशः।

8. स्मस्मांत्रदेशस्य दश:। स्त्रये [42] हि अविश्वासि।

भवनिभुजालोहि भक्ति गुहासम दश्ये॥ ॥

az the word it is used to bring out the Tib. expression: mi.gyur-ram implying a simple query.

9. ब्रह्मचारपीति: विश्ववृत्तियो चोषे स्वयंप्रेरण मद्यान्।

इति शुचं हे जुराहन्त मन्यन्तर विक्रङ्गयो।

10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, generally raises such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to compare a European parallel: Dr.
Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's philosophy by kicking a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, Mysterious Universe, the Bridge series, p. 71).

11. भगवान श्रीकृष्ण ने माति नामाध्यक्ष:।
अभ्यासात्मविविध सैन: 0 अभ्यास निर्माणार्थ ॥ ॥

a - विनिर्माण भ्रमर्षित ।

12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things; e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.

13. देवानु कलाधार्यमेश्वर एव विनिर्माण ।
सत्यानां पूजनानं नामाधार्यमण्डलम् ॥ ॥

14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the material things, i.e., atoms; cf. Nya. binda-pradipta p.24, नीति संहि महात्म वैनानां देवः नागरो देवः कवितावर्गेण । and Pram. va.

15. तुषपुत्रुकालसमाप्त । योगीतितु ह भिनोनिति ।
अतिकिर्त: यथोर्लेखोपयोगूपरः ॥ ॥

16. A partly definition of yogin.

17. This is explained in the Puggalapannatti, p. 145: श्रेष्ठो दुर्भ्रूत: विनिर्माण: कविता नृसिंहि हृदितः। जसस्मि पुष्या स्वयं आज्ञा परमेश्वरी नृसिंहि हृदित:। अत: पुनः दुर्भ्रूत: उभयो भाविविद्योऽग्नि। Abh-kosa (Poussin, VI, p. 278); One who is entered in Nirdhānasamāpṭi is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of prajña and Samadhi he is delivered from kleśa-avarana and vinoksa-avarana (cf. 8溟oksa in VIII, p. 205). Satya siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary). If he gains both, he is ubhayat–bhaga–vinoksa; for the delimitation is one part and the element hindering dhyana-concentration is another part. (also chap. 8, end) V. Magga (XXI pura 78).

अश्रुन्ते पूजन भविष्यति च वत्ति उभयों भावों विसृज्यति ति कथयो भाविविद्योऽग्नि ॥ ॥
18. भौतिकविश्लेषण अथवा, त्रिविद्यासाधन: कुदः। ॥ ॥
a=अनशीत व्यापाराभिषेकः।

19. ग्रन्थललितकार अथवा ग्रन्थललितकारः ग्रन्थललितकारः। ॥ ॥

20. अभिन्नावृक्षहितकारत्वादिविगतिकारः।

21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadins who make a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (v. Abh. Athasan, IV. 86, Kosambi’s Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentary-theory the Vaibhasika maintains that karman produces its fruits through avijnapti which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (v. Kosa, l. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.

22. सध्य वाजविकल्पितविश्लेषणात प्राप्त।

23. Ekaraas-jnana=advaya-jnana of the Yogacara which is dichotomized into subject and object due to premodial force, (anadi-vastava). It is somewhat similar to the Sutrantika’s ekaraas-ekavada-jnana, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 with note 1.

24. ज्ञानकोमलात्मकता हेतु कविकरो न विद्यु।

25. इति कविकरो विज्ञानविद्यु: इति विद्यु: इति विद्यु:।

26. a=Read in Tib, gan. gi for gan-gis.
27. The idea seems to be this: when the Yogacara deities the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: वेतस लोकसुक्तिका भाषामिलता प्रस्तुते। Pramāṇa, va. ver. 220.

28. अभावन्यसारत्व मित्रे व बुद्धमात्र। भावसारत्वाविद्याविशेषत: वेतस वाच्यविवरणम्। ॥ २५॥
   a = धार्मिक वाच वाच्याम।
   b = See the verse 29.

29. महत्वाकाशात्मकतां वनवः प्रोक्ते। धार्मिकान्याविशेषत: वेतस वाच्यविवरणम्। ॥ २६॥
   a = गणम बाव अविव प्रार.

30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (tāmiri) is, however, contradicted at once.

31. नासन मया तु भ्रून: भ्रातात्त्वकालाधीनता। नासन मया तु भ्रून: भ्रातात्त्वकालाधीनता। ॥ २६॥

31a. cp, Nya, bindu-Tippani, p. 19, सर्वेव वाच वेतस वाच्यसार। भावसारत्वाविद्याविशेषत:। Every perceptual knowledge is illusive so far as its object is concerned.

32. भावसारत्वाविद्याविशेषत: वेतस वाच्यविवरणम्।

33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other external causes.

34. भावसारत्वाविद्याविशेषत: वेतस वाच्यविवरणम्।

35. This is probably anadikālikasamāsa accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation *cfr*, Madh avatara, VI, ver. 46 with Bhāṣya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabuddhi’s comment: Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8.
36. जानकारोधं श्रीपाराश्वसति कर्मवाद साधते कथा।
उत्तरशुद्धिः संपूर्णवान् गये तथापि केवलि॥ २२॥

37. जाति फूलवर एक कारण मिलते स्मृति कर्मवाद कामिनी।
उत्तर शुद्धिः संपूर्णवान् गये त्रिधरिः॥ २३॥

38. विशेषतः कारावजीवनवात्यो भवनान्यवाद।
वत्त विशेषतः आरोपे लिखितमानि निषिद्धवै।॥ २४॥

39. अति सवाराज्बराज्यो भवो नानादीति वाचते।
साधनो वर्णवेणेः हर्षान्वेण।॥ २५॥

40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Sautrantika. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensuous, one nonsensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their egadana consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness of the yogacarins. The Sautrantika contrasts the vasma theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind = Alaya-consciousness, or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, v. Et. Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme, p. 673; and Masuda, Sects p. 68. The kosa speaks of the seven types of vijnana in this line: सेवदश्मालस्वतः। (1, 16).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the Yogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vacapi's Vaivakamika: (The Yogacara:) (The external object is superfluous, there is in the internal) Biotic force which accidently becomes mature and evokes an idea; this is also accidental (and changing concurrently with a change in its cause), (The Sautrantika:) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in the continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, Bud. Logic, II, p. 367-68). One interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed here: श्रीशाराज्बराज्यं धर्मवाक्यायं भवनान्यवादः। (मथवालाय संभासाः बधिशतन्त्रं न परिधिभिष्कृतामेति।) आर्थविश्वासय Sutratika. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioned by Samskara, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things; cp. the ver. 27 below the same idea.
41. यदैव च तद्विद्यां स प्राणीयः स श्रीयो तदनुष्ठीतं स एव च ॥ २१ ॥

42. नहीं ॥

43. सत्ववाचक विचारणपुष्टिदिव्यः ॥ २२ ॥

44. Pravṛtti-ijnana depends on upadana-ijnana and the latter again on the former to produce k.

45. सत्वविद्याः सत्त्वसुन्त्मकाः विद्याभोजनों ॥ २३ ॥

46. This is the Soutrantika's standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.

47. ग्रहण सत्त्वसुन्त्मकाः सत्त्वविद्यां विद्याभोजनों ॥ २४ ॥

48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trimsatika, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Sthiramati.

49. भौतिको वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै ॥ २५ ॥

50. तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च ॥ २६ ॥

51. तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च तत्त्व च ॥ २७ ॥

52. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.

53. अन्य विद्यां विद्याडीविद्याः समं छ ॥

54. वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै वै ॥ २८ ॥
55. This and the following are the opinions of Dīgācāra, v. Alan. prakṣa, ver. 6.

56. अमृतिः सत्त्वनामवेदान्तविश्वासः।
    नात्मानानुविश्वासः भूतः।
This is the main argument set up by Dīgācāra in favour of his idealism, v. Alan. par. ver. 1.

57. विषयाविद्याविश्वासः।
    विविध्विद्याविश्वासः।
This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied ṣaṅkarahṛdaya.

58. तुष्णापं दीर्घविश्वासविश्वासः।
    अविविध्विद्याविश्वासः।
Tattv. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading नूनविश्वाससिद्धिः. The Panjika further quotes his comments thus: सन्तानां का सन्तानं दीर्घविश्वासविश्वासविश्वासः। का नूनविश्वासविश्वासविश्वासः।
It is interesting to note the difference in readings. Kamalajala thinks that sāla is empirically real from the Sautrantika standpoint of view but sāla is unreal. Subhaga, on the other hand, thinks that sāla is a real substance rather than sāla, a quality, derivative element.

59. अत्यविद्याविश्वासविश्वासः।
    सन्तानां नूनविश्वासविश्वासः।
The idea may be clear if we look into the discussion in Kosala, IV, 8-12 on Samkhya.

60. दुर्पादं हृदं अविन्दिताविद्याविश्वासः।
    विविध्विद्याविश्वासः।
The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tattv. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive is ver. 592-4 (ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.

61. आभासपर्यथा अविन्दिताविद्याविश्वासः।
    अविन्दिताविद्याविश्वासः।
The opinion of Vassabandhu, Vīmaṇṭaka, ver. 11, and al. of Dīgācāra, Alan. par. ver. 1.
64. सतीत्र [२०४] नाति इत्यादादिकरातः।
दद्विन मयोऽहा ना वा चान हक्किबीयः।
॥ ३५ ॥


66. चित्तुः दित्ये कतः वा गत्येक्षित्याख्यातः।
वे विनिबाप्ति इत्योपूर्ण प्रक्ष्यारायणम् ते मुखः।
॥ ३६ ॥
a = Tib. hidus. pa,

67. The author thinks that सामात्रिक is darsya, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his आन्यापोहः-विचारः, ver. 2. The logical school of द्गुगा following the सुत्तात्िक्षिक वार्ता defines darsya as one capable of discharging a perposive action: आन्यापोहः-केशाकुन्या भान्त्यवाहना. v. Tatt. pan. p. 750,
(18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-7) cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195,
वार्ता-सत्यायकिनकेन न कतात वेदाहारमपेत
इत्यादि, इत्यादि,

It may be noted here that the opinion of सामात्रिक in its object of consciousness is attributed to the Neo-
Sarvavatevac, (Sanghabhadra) by Kuei. chi. v. my forthcoming
edition of the Alam. par.

68. सामात्रिक्यालः न भावायते विदितः।
विवर्णाय: प्रविष्टाः न भाविकासुत्पत्तिः।
॥ ३६ ॥

69. The same idea in the author's आन्यापोहः-विचारः, ver. 7.
प. Tatt. pan. ver. 870.

70. सतीत्र एव हि ज्ञातव नोऽर्थम विचारात हि विचारात।
with Pan citing the Bhavesankrti, ver. 9; तस्य वेदस्य हि कारणः
मा तत्त्वस्य न वा भावस्य न वा कारणं
भाविकासुत्पत्तिः।

71. This very instance compels the Yogacara to declare that the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all
false (ालिका) v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 2037; सत्यायत्तिनिर्वाचनयानम्

मोक्षः।

यथा वाचनिल्लम् नामभवेतस्वरूपः।

एवाराज्य-निर्वाचनयानम् भावनेत्

एव सामात्रिक्यालः विदितः।

॥ ३७ ॥

p. 271, cp. p. 181,
A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratnakirti in his *Citra-adhastapa-kalpa-rada* (v. Ratnakirinimbodha. K. P. J. Instituts. Patna, 1957.

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. Pram. var. *nātā-pānaḥ* v. 3, *visāyā-pānaṅkha*. *visāyā-pānaṅkha* avamādārī maṇḍalī. v. *vers.:* Ibid., 297-201; Tatt. san. v. 1253; v. 3, *sārṇa* v. 297-291; *maṇḍala* v. 1253; *maṇḍala* v. 297-291; *sattā-pānaṅkha* v. 3, *sāmāyakārya* v. etc.

Another explanation is offered in the following lines:


Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition: kāśi bhāṣya tārtaḥ: *śāntikālanāma* kāśi. Bhāṣya: *v. Pram. var. III., 222, Bhāṣya*: *mahāsāmāyakārya* kāśi. *pravahakramam-bhāṣya*: p. 296, Kosz. (IV, 10) also refers to the *citra-adhastapa* problem. v. Note. 178 for the author’s solution.

72. तत्त्वविद्याम् नातापानांकहस्त्रवं देहित "तत्त्वविद्याम् नातापानांकहस्त्रवं देहित "

73. A similar explanation in T. Panj. v. 571, l. 16, e. note 178 below the passage: *asamādi-vānapaṅkha*...śūnyatāḥ "


75. Atoms appear and disappear together: *sūtra kṣetraṅkāraṃ śūnyatāḥ "*

This is what the Sarvastividra-Valbhāsikas conclude. It is further made clear in the next verse, *cp. kosa*, l. 35, l. 35, l. 18-26, and Viś Mag.: *pravahakramam-bhāṣya* v. 290.

A. ...
my paper on Nilakesi, Annals of Research Institute, Tirapati, IV, p. 61. Tatt, sangraha defenes that the atoms though invisible individually, become the object of perception; µ ver. 570.

76. अथ विद्वेदभाव वैविद्वेदार्थप्रपर्यं:।

याप्रमाणं परमात्माोहाराज्यादि:॥ २३॥

This verse is cited in T. Panji, p. 551, l. 21: अथ विद्वेदभाव वैविद्वेदार्थप्रपर्यं याप्रमाणं परमात्माोहाराज्यादि:॥ २३॥

The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. panji, p.356, cp. n. 79 below.

77. अथ विद्वेदभाव वैविद्वेदार्थप्रपर्यं:।

याप्रमाणं परमात्माोहाराज्यादि:॥ २३॥

The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. panji, p.356, cp. n. 79 below.

78. The author refers here to Vasubhandhu's criticism of atomic theory in his Vima. ver. 12, 14: परमेष्यं पुष्यमिष्यं तत्सायिकोऽप्रर्थत।

मण्डलमुखार्का देवं च शाश्वतस्मात!॥ २४॥

विज्ञानयोजकोऽविस्तारत् तत्सायिकोऽप्रर्थत।

Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the kośabhāsa, I, ver. 43. śū. pp. 81-84. and the Yaībhasīka's defence.

79. विज्ञानयोजकोऽविस्तारत्:। श्रुतिः: विविधातिः।

यदैव आलोचनाे न तु तत्सायिकोऽप्रर्थताः:॥ २३॥

cp. T. panji, p. 555: परमेष्यं पुष्यमिष्यं तत्सायिकोऽप्रर्थत। एवंत्यादी: शाश्वतस्मात! मण्डलमुखार्का देवं च शाश्वतस्मात।

The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. panji, p.356, cp. n. 79 below.

80. The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cp. note 14.

81. एकोसंधारे एवं विविधात:।

परमात्माः समस्यान्तः समस्यां न विविधाताः॥ २४॥

cp. Vima, bhasya: एको हि परमात्माः शाश्वतस्मात।

The present verse answers this objection.
82. The idea of the verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n. -79. This explanation suggests the idea of manifoldness on the atom as imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate.

83. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also will be so.

84. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments, V, Abh. San. IV.

85. Atoms, though existing in an uninterrupted series are not conceived as one arayavida on the analogy of knowledge.

90. This is in reply to Vasubandhu’s criticism: कथान वातावरणसन्धानविहारात् मनोयजः यथा निष्ठुलविहारात्। यथा निष्ठुलविहारात् कथान वातावरणसन्धानविहारात्। This answer implies that the author is a Sattva-paramanavadin.

91. अत्यधिकेति मोहः वात्सल्यम् सन्धानम् बिकृते। यथा निष्ठुलविहारात् कथान वातावरणसन्धानविहारात्। This answers Vasubandhu’s query: दोषाभास्कर कर्म भाषम्। 14.

92. प्रत्ययाम वात्सल्यम् कर्मनिरुचिः न विकृते। यथा निष्ठुलविहारात् कथान वातावरणसन्धानविहारात्। यथा निष्ठुलविहारात् कथान वातावरणसन्धानविहारात्। This answers Vasubandhu’s query: दोषाभास्कर कर्म भाषम्। 14.
95. अतो निःश्लेषित विष्णुस्य कार्यितं।

96. a—parinama=

97. cp. Vinasa. 12d. विष्णु: स्मार्य मूलसार।

98. अस्त्रोपयोगार्थं अनालाम अनुभवम्।

99. रात्रिकोटि निम्बर उपरिपालितः।

100. द्वीपोपशस्यज्ञानयुक्तं मेंग।

101. ।

102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into combination and to form any visible object.

103. The Yogin can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression: acauladighah is again used later in ver. 64 below.

104. अतो नागीलित से रूपः।

105. The idea may be amplified thus: If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with equally be illusive. Here the author's reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprehended by the outer senses. "Cp. the Saying: नीर्विकार्याः कस्य सूचिस्त अनुभवितस्न सत्यतः। cited in Nya-Tapani, p. 26.
106. शरीरत्वम् श्रोत, तथा।

वहि स्वप्नस्कर्तः प्रार्थित्विविधों विनाशु। \( \text{२५} \) \( \text{२१} \)

प्रायम्योद्दराकरणम्, शरीरत्वम् कर यहि।

कौशिक एव आदित्योऽऽण । \( \text{प्रभातं} \) \( \text{पञ्चमुपदिवसं} \)

केषाववगुक्त्य प्रकटि पण्डितासारामसम्पर्वः। \( \text{२६} \) \( \text{२२} \)

\( a=\text{lit.} \) विवाहं \( b \) \( \text{केश} \) \( \text{will be a better reading.} \)

107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.

108. The Yogacara’s conception of the hell is well explained in the Vijnana-bhushya ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the text with notes from Vinjada’s comments (Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1964).

109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusha as illusory?

110. तदन्तः च गदाच गुहातित्वभवतः।

विधायुक्तः श्रवणं न त्यागं पूर्वक जान। \( \text{२३} \) \( \text{२४} \)

111. अन्य तस्मादेक्रिय अवस्थितिः।

तत् अनुचरतः तत् अनुचरितः! \( \text{२५} \) \( \text{२६} \)

112. The same expression previously in Ver. 59. \( \text{५} \) \( \text{३} \) \( \text{१०३} \)

113. कृतेन सम्बन्धाय नान्नो शुचितः।

कृतेन सप्तविधाय नान्नो शुचितः! \( \text{५} \) \( \text{५} \)

114. T. Panjii. explains Jnana-Jnaya-sabda-saba as: विद्याग्रहार्थमात्र विद्याग्रहार्थमात्र विद्याग्रहार्थमात्र विद्याग्रहार्थमात्र विद्याग्रहार्थमात्र।

सत्त्वतः अनुभवं अनुभवं अनुभवं अनुभवं अनुभवं अनुभवं।

\( \text{लोकाविज्ञातासन्तिकोऽवतरित्ता} \) तात्त्विकमाप्नान्वातः।

तथा हि साधनं न गुणाविवादांगन्वातः।

चेतो अतिवार्त्त। \( \text{१६४} \) \( \text{११५} \)

115. नान्नो शुचितः।

कृतेन सप्तविधाय नान्नो शुचितः।

\( \text{५६९} \) \( \text{५६९} \)

This is cited in T. Panjii. v. note. 194. end.
116. अप्रायकः स विषयाय जान का विवरण मिला।
तथा तथा तथा सब्ज युक्ते नामाय पुनः || ७३ ||
a) lit. सवालकः।

117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz.
in the absence of either of the two, knowledge or the object
no cognition flashes out and that is the reason why they are
felt simultaneously.

118. एकाकालिकविचारत् सहस्राणणके लोकः
विशंबरशरीरः हतुष्टि समस्तानिकोः न । ॥ २८ ॥
This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 558, l. 4) in prose: अष्ट रसायु एकालिकाविचारत् सहस्राणणके लोकः
तव दुविशंबरशरीरः हतुष्टि समस्तानिकोः न।
संग्रहिता है। इसका साथ उपयुक्त यथाविशंबरम्
सऽधारणानि सहस्राणणके लोकः, तव दुविशंबरशरीरः
हतुष्टि समस्तानिकोः न।

119. अत्रेयम् विषयाय बृहस्पति अधिकारत् न उद्धुर्।
विषयाचारकारीनां सां ज्ञात सदृश भवम् ॥ २९ ॥

120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the h'1, etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you
say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?

121. अत्रेयन् समझे विषय सुकुमरः
ब्रह्मचर्यामिनित्वं परिहर्षं वच्चारत् ॥ ३० ॥

122. सहस्राणणके लोकः न सर्वसम्म विषया विषयम्
विशंबरशरीरः हतुष्टि समस्तानिकोः ॥ ३१ ॥
Kamalasila introducing this verse remarks: अष्ट रसायु एकालिकाविचारत्
सहस्राणणके लोकः विषयाय बृहस्पतिः।।
This objection is also noticed by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam. par.

133. एकाकः सहस्राणणके बृहस्पति तथा
विषयाय चार्येन न सदृशम् ॥ ३२ ॥

124 T. Panji. refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus:
पुरुषः एष विषय सहस्राणणके नामाय तथा हृदेन्द्रियः।
तव नामविशंबरम्
दुविशंबरशरीरमात्रश्रीरसम्पादनः।
तव दुविशंबरशरीरम्
सहस्राणणके लोकः न सदृशम्।
सहस्राणणके लोकः न सदृशम्।
सहस्राणणके लोकः न सदृशम्।

125. अप्रायकः स विषयाय जान का विवरण मिला।
तथा तथा तथा सब्ज युक्ते नामाय पुनः || ७३ ||
125. The idea expressed in this verse is well stated in T. Panj. passage cited in the previous note. 

126. The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panj. passage cited in the note 124. 

127. Thus the reason becomes avyātara-avidhā. 

128. For the advocate of sākara jnāna, the image is a part of the knowledge. To prove it is useless. 

129. The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the black shell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since the black colour cannot be attributed to the knowledge, there ought to be something black material other than the knowledge. The classical example is: pitāh sāndhā. This example of bhārata jnāna seems to be purposely employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz. black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge. 

130. This example of bhārata jnāna seems to be purposely employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz. black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge.

137. गृहीतन । ऐसा है कि गृहीतन निराज्ञ प्रकट है। गृहीतनकुलापुत्री, देवभूमि स्वतंत्रता है। गृहीतनम्, ॥ ॥
This verse is cited in T. panji, p. 569, il. 16-17 along with the verse, गृहीतनिनन्दा तु, n. 114.

138. Sanvagri. according to early Buddhist includes three factors: (1) चिकित्स को indriya, and (3) सम्बन्ध, manas and it gives rise to a sensation, sparsa, which is followed by feeling, vedana, and then image, sanjina, v. Bud. logic. ii, p. 311, Table, Cp. Kosa. i, p. 63. 23.

139. Here the term sāha is in the sense of immediate succession: cfr. the next verse.

140. पुराणेण वश गृहीतनिन्दा विद्यानीतिः।

141. वै गृहीतनिन्दा गृहीतनिन्दा, गृहीतनिन्दा, गृहीतनिन्दा, गृहीतनिन्दा, गृहीतनिन्दा।

142. That is, the reason is doubtful, (v. ver. 74 above.) Sandīgha-jñāna.

143. पृथक्कारणयात्रात्मना वेदचिदन्तसाधनात्मकृत्व।

144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p. 570, l. 18, ff.

145. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji, p. 570, l. 30, ff.
This defect of *anaikantika* is explained in T. Panjji, *v. note* on *ver. 68*.

*This verse is cited in T. Panjji p. 570, *II 20-4* with this introductory remark: * aggravated by the attempt* *is* the *Sakra-Jnana-vadin* the *Sautrantika.*

*a* *samvedana* *gauna* *sautrantika* *brahma* *va* *bhakti* *yad* *yatra* *na* *daya*

T. Panjji. (p. 561, *I 11f*) cites this verse with this remark: *that* *knowledge* *sautrantika* *brahma*.

*Definition of pariccheda, *v. ver. 92* below.*
151. This is probably the author's criticism of the *savaya* theory of the *Saunadika*-Yogasutra.

152. अर्था विविधकुलिन्ति विवाचनस्तु ।

कथन सत्यात्म अत वैदिकयुपकरणाष्टुतः ॥ ६२ ॥

153.

154. विवाचन सत्यात्मा व विबधि सत्यात्मा ॥

विवाचनानि कारणेऽपि सत्यात्मानि ॥ ६३ ॥

155. Thus the above stated *panchchede* of the ver. 89 is simply *vittanatra*.

156. भवते उत्तर व भनिति न भनिते न्यायः ॥

भवते उत्तर व भनिति न भनिते न्यायः ॥ ६४ ॥

a=sas. pa. gzugs=knowledge-form,

157. सर्वस्य तद्विषयं न भेदो भावाभावं ॥

परोपकारविभाग सवे भवाभावाभावाभिषेकः ॥ ६५ ॥

158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things; *sarvakara-prana* is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, r. kosa 1X, ver. 1.

159. बाहारा र शुक्लानां नूतनसाधनायकः ॥

इन 
विशिष्ठे 
गीते 
प्रत्येकः 
मानने ॥ ६६ ॥

Cited in the T. Panji. p. 578, I. 7 with the explanation: ना महाकालिं नानोषितो न विद्यानां सत्यम् पुराय सत्यम् विद्या सत्यम् 

1. तथा महाकालिक 

नेतृत्वम् 
हृदं 
प्रत्येकः 
कहि 
न 
विद्याम् 
a Read bsaan. pa for byis, pa.

160. Sakara-vadin is the Saunadika, and nīnakara-vadin Vaihāsika. The Yogaśāra is tulya-kala-vadin and the Vaihāsika and Satyasiddha are *āditya-kala-vadin=Krama-vadin. Similarly Vasubandhu, a follower of the Saunadika school pleads for *ādityakala-vadin*, a Successive comprehension even of omnipotent Buddha thus:

सत्यालोक समयप्रथम विषयम् च तत्तद्धिकारः ॥

तथा सत्यप्रत्येकः न तदंसमस्मिताः ॥ Kosa IX, 1.
161. अनावरण स्वतन्त्र समाकृत्य नातीकः। अन्तर्ग्र : नश्नु पूर्ववस्तु प्रारम्भः। ॥ ७७ ॥

162. We experience different things in different shapes. some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaibhasikas are external and real belonging to the conglutinated atoms. The Sautrantika and Digambara school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind's construction.

163. व्याप्ताकादे दृश्यम् कन्ये न नार्तः। व्यं सं म्रेतापमुक्तागम् हस्तविनाश्याम॥ ७८ ॥

164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, klesa and jñeya-avarana would not have any idea of external things. The author ridicules this point, ep. T. Panj. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.

165. निर्रुस्त्रपक्षेष बृहुः सत्त्वं कालरङ्गानः। एवमहार्थविवेचाराद्। a : lit. अयुक्तसंस्काराद्।

165a. The avisarga-argument has already been stated in ver. 3. v also ver. 185. Here we may note the passage cited in T. Panj. 576, ll. 20, 21 मनोधम्यात: प्रमाणादिको हस्तविनाश इत्यहि विवेचाराद्। यथा विवेचाराद्। तत्त्वानामात्माश्च निर्रुस्त्रपक्षत्वं सत्त्वादि तत्त्वादि सत्त्वादि तत्त्वादि सत्त्वादि तत्त्वादि। This prose passage may be from his last commentary on the kathaka.

166. नियुक्तसंस्काराद्। ॥ ७९ ॥

167. अयुक्तसंस्काराद्। ॥ ८० ॥

The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.
169. तत्ता हि भवतार्य सारं निर्मातार्यः तस्माः
बैरत्स साधुमातार्य सृष्टेऽस्ते तेन्तं ॥ १०२ ॥
This verse is cited in T. sm. p. 572.

170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, aditya as stated in the next verse and imageless, *cfr.* T. Panji. p. 182: औषधिमात्रवर्णितार्याः विज्ञानमार्गार्याः भौतिकार्याः अभिव्यक्तिः। The imageless produced by anadi-vocana or saktis formed out of knowledges produced by the sensuous object for the Sautraññika. *v.* ver. 27. above.

171. बैरत्स अज्ञातं नागपुरं निरीक्षणार्याः अभिव्यक्तिः
अक्षरं बैरत्स अन्त्यप्रपचयं अभिव्यक्तं वर्णं ॥ १०२ ॥
â ॥ In the sense of a separate image, prthik akara.

172. अन्त्यप्रपचयं हि अज्ञातं नागपुरं निरीक्षणार्याः
[207a] अज्ञातं नागपुरं निरीक्षणार्याः अभिव्यक्तिः ॥ २०७ ॥
a or निरीक्षणन्

173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says; this is accepted by the author himself, note बैरत्स अज्ञातं नागपुरं in the ver. 101.
The author, however, stated it as kulpita by way of prasanga.

174. सृष्टेऽस्ते तद्वर्णं निरीक्षणार्याः अज्ञातं
वैभविको देवोपन्यासार्याः गौतमावैभवित्तल्लूः ॥ २०७ ॥
a=३॥ वैभवित्तल्लूः

175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs, for the Vaiśhākiya, are derivative material elements; but for the Yogacara they are some forms of Sakti, v. Alambanap. ver. 7, with Vinitadeva's *tika*, *cfr.* Sayayisidhi, chap. 45, they are nominal. *Particulata* is explained in ver. 89-92 above. Yogava- an object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.

176. धीरेर्कृतान्त्यप्रपचयाऽवस्थायो नावार्याः
धीरेर्कृतान्त्यप्रपचयाऽवस्थायो नावार्याः ॥ १०३ ॥
निरीक्षण: कॉमलतिः नैस्तिः
This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense.

177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautraññaka-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of *svatanvadana* which is criticised in Mad. Iarika, VII, 8 and Madh. avatara, my Sanskrit text,
p. 60: The early Sautrantikas, i.e., Darshantika, does not accept the theory of swasamvedana, cfr., Kosa, IX, p. 231, n. 4; Vyakhyā, p. 698, 2-3; Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68-71, 2. The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, cfr., ver. 84, n. 144, cp., ver. 90, 144 and 147, also! In case of the accepting swasamvedana, how the memory is possible is explained in Bodhi-avatāra IX ver. 246, my Epitom. p. 39, AIB. 1955.

178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several colours in the case of cittarutāna is quite permissible, v. T. Panji, p. 571: द्वारा मानन्ते संयज्ञातोपग्रहणोपाय व अन्तः स्वाण्वतान्तरकारण एवं स्वाभवायांदायिनिष्ठौ ब्रजस्वाज्रायां नोक्ताचार्यान्तरम्यादिति. तथावतः एको निदर्शति। तदात्तुपालानी आश्चर्यानी वादी नामार्थं वेदं वादीं त्वात्तीयं विद्याध्यात्मकार्याणवर्णयाः वेदत्वं शासनं कृतं गेन्ति। तदात्तुपालानी आश्चर्यानी वादीं नामार्थं वेदं शासनं कृतं गेन्ति। Kamalasāla probably means some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are simultaneously experienced in the case of cittarutāna. But Subhāgaśā may not agree with this opinion, as a senseless knowledge, according to him can comprehend several homogeneously objects at once.

179. कब्जानायनस्यन्यात् विभिन्नेऽवस्तुमण्योऽसरः। तेन ते द्येक्षाः सन्यड्याऴनाय न च। 180. cp. M. I. 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242; Savvyasiddhi, chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, sound, etc., cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respective sense organ-says the Vaibhāṣika. The Yogacāra on the other hand, think that simultaneity of different non-construcive consciousnesses is possible as T. san, says; स्नाविष्ठाध्यात्मकाविशेषां वेदो नामार्थं। तु वेदं सन्यधितं विधेयं न पशु।।

181. कृतं सत्यं न वेदत्वं विधेयं न पशु।।

The same in Praṇam, var. 131, 186-37. सत्यं न वेदत्वं विधेयं न पशु।।

कृतं सत्यं न वेदत्वं विधेयं न पशु।।

cp. Ibd. 208: सत्यं न वेदत्वं विधेयं न पशु।।

Prajñātāra's Bhṣya: विशेषाय परस्परं एवं नामार्थं विधेयं। तीन्त्रार्थतत्त्वी।
54

The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. cp. again T. san: अनिवार्य इति सहस्य। Panji. p. 241: नैपेक्षिकांश्च विभक्तिः युक्तिविश्लेषण गमनेन। See also note 71 above.

181. अद ्पु। II 101।
विशेषधारणाय आपातस्थलविन्यासं शरणपु।
a=dnig, pa.

182. यत उपलब्धेन श्रद्धा, भावं बुद्धि तदनावर्तमानं II 103॥
विशेषधारणाद्वारा भावसमाधयते। II 104॥
श्रद्धा नित्यं निपटतेन न, विशेषधारणात् सत्यतं II 105॥
सारसर्वेवेन।

183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effectuated in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (puññikalpa) is effectuated with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. legic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment’s pure sensation.

184. शरणपु। सारसवतः।
श्रद्धापुरुषं मनो सत्यं विशेषं सिद्धान्तन् II 106॥
न सारसवतं काल्पिकस्तुपुरुषं [विशेषं]

185. Jnanakara, for this author, is Grabhakara, cfr. n. 165n.

186. अविच्छेद-प्राक्षेपार्थवादस्य।
नामनां हर्षं नाति विशेषं तु प्राक्षेपं II 108॥

187. cp. T. San. ver. 2039. सारसवतं श्रद्धार्थवादस्य।

188. नीतिविवधानानां श्रद्धा नीतिविवधानस्य।
तदनावर्तमानं बुद्धं तदा तविवधानं हि तद्भव II 109॥
तदा श्रद्धाविवधानं अविच्छेद सत्यं न तुष्टं।
190. Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.

191. The kind of nirvikalpa mind that is pleaded by the Saunakya-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The Valbhakina conception of nirvikalpa is explained in kosa, 1, ver. 33, with Pounsin's note.

194. This argument is set up by Dignaga, v. Alambanap, ver. 1-3.

195. The idea seems to be that the knowledge first becomes similar to its object and this simulated knowledge becomes the object of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its predecessor. In Tib. or after sao-sao stands for objective case governed by the verb had, pa.

200. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next
moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your Sarvpary theory. Therefor it is not well founded.

202. कैवित्तानुसारसंस्कृति  
b व यथसिद्धि । ॥ १३१ ॥

203. वीत T. San. ver. 2083: साधारणतः हाने मधुपावी विन्यासितः ।

204. पानी विनतितः विनायकः । ॥ १३२ ॥

205. नामात्मिक क्रियाविधि कै दीर्घे तिथिः ॥ १३२ ॥

206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality and objectivity. Sakti may fulfill the first but not the second.

207. वेदिकीयां हेतु हार्दिककल्पः कृ। ॥ १३२ ॥

208. नमो त्रियो में यो में स्वाभाविक पुनः ॥

209. विद्वानिनविविधिः अस्वाभावस्विनिविधिः ॥ कव। ॥

210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the external like desirable or undesirable ; for, what is desirable for one person is undesirable for another, v. Bhavasatika, p. 39.

211. ज्ञातिसिद्धे कौमित्रिशिल्पः ज्ञातिः ॥ १३२ ॥

a ∼ lit. गणनाशी यह—The case-ending is not in Tib.
212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this: The Yogacara thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power or aditya, ep. Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. चन्द्रक्षेत्र विसोगिता रूपस्मिनेऽस्मि न च कन्यायोगिन्योऽस्मि

213. अयोध्या निवासिनिध ज्ञात साधारणस्वरूप। H 123 II
अयोध्याः निवासिनि ज्ञात साधारणस्वरूपाः

214. तदनाय निवासिनि ज्ञात साधारणस्वरूपाः। H 129 II

215. आयुष्य स्वरूपाः, उप: 127 II

216. अयोध्या निवासिनि ज्ञात साधारणस्वरूपाः। H 129 II
दत्त किम्या अयोध्यायहिन्दृष्टिरुपाः पृष्ट ।

217. Svapnaprāpañcaka, v. note 221 below. The Sautrāntikas' definition of reality is: स्वप्नोपसाधनः श्रावणिकाः, तत्त्वतः। Nyayasūtra, I, 15; T. Panji, p 730, l. 16: सीवास्यविवेकं।

218. नवाचिन्हारोऽयोध्या न II 179 II

219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse.

220. [208a] चन्द्रक्षेत्र निवासविशेष । H 129 II

221. This is given as a rule to disprove externalism by Vasubandhu in his Yimaṣa, 33. 3 a: चन्द्रक्षेत्रविशेषविशिष्टविश्वासः। Bhesya: चन्द्रक्षेत्र निवासविशेष । यद्य चन्द्रक्षेत्र निवासविशेषविशेषविश्वासः।
222. सार्वजनिक गुणावलम्बी || १३२ ||
कथासंग्रह व्याख्यानम् संख्यारूपः कामात्म विषयः।
यथा दैविकसनादः।

233. कालिम्या दस्ये अधिः || १३३ ||
कालिम्या व्याख्यानम् संख्यारूपः हस्ताक्षरः श्रवणालब्धः।
तस्मादकालान्तरादित्तिः।

244. विनिमयाभिषेक योगी || १३४ ||
तं सामाजिक गुणानुप्रेरितं सहाय्यात्मकः हस्ताक्षरः।
तत्र बोधित्त्वात् कालान्तरित्तिः।

255. युक्तिः युक्ति जस्ते पूर्णः संभावे || १३५ ||
युक्तिः युक्ति जस्ते पूर्णः संभावे।

266. Bio-y-don zuddher arilbah probably is the same as kamartha previously stated in the ver. 132, note, 220, i.e. purwaartha purpose of human action.

277. विश्वासम् यथा नंको वास्तवार्थम् है || १३६ ||
सारात्मः तस्ये अथवा विश्वासवुप्रेरितं श्रवणः।

288. The definition of action is : चेतो वर्णित सर्व्रूपतिः च corresponding to pali A. III. 415. Ref. Kasavaththu, p. 393. Madh. kar. XVIII, 2-3, Madh. Av. VI, ver. 89. cited in Boch. Panji. p. 472-Poussin, kosa. IV, n. 3. since there is no cetana, will in dream, there is no real action.

299. पूर्वांक्षुभविभाजिता यथा || १३७ ||
सतो विनिमयाभिषेकः ते क वार्तालोकितः सतो विनिमयाभिषेकः।
विनिमयाभिषेकः विनिमयाभिषेकः।

300. The author refuses the Vinsa, ver. 4. . . . . . . सकारात्म || १३८ ||
सबै निर्धारित दृष्टेचं दैविकः अथवः।
Bhaya : यथा निर्धारित निर्धारित दृष्टेचं दैविकः निर्धारित दैविकः।
भाषात्मकोपनीयतामान्तरालाभनियोगितिः- लखविविधानि विनिमयाभिषेकः तथा निर्धारित विनिमयाभिषेकः निर्धारित दैविकः।

311. न्यायाध्यायाभासः || १३२ ||
सत्तानिर्धारितानि निर्धारितं तथापि नु।
परस्परः कृद्दा नामितः,

233. यथा निर्मलस्तोलम्। ॥ ३३१ ॥

234. Reference is probably a Carada-mastra promising the boon.

235. त्रिवेद-दीपित श्रद्धा। ॥ ३३२ ॥

236. Paratantra, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.

237. सर्वदिनहिं नानादक्षरं ग्रहयेदाः। ॥ ३३३ ॥


239. ध्यायितं तत्परं राजः गरिमां विनिमयं विना शतु।

240. This is said from the standpoint of the Saurantika-Yogacaras.

241. अवस्थाशालिकायायात् ब्याख्या पद्धति न क।

242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika’s theory of of *rastu* moving towards the object much criticised in the Suttra-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed. *bhavata* (*yavapana*) for Dignaga, Pram-sam I, 9, T. Panji. p. 399:

243. *स्वप्नं भवं स्वेच्छं। ॥ ३३४ ॥

244. *Sva-citta-jnana*, knowing one’s own mind is possible in the same manner as *para-citta-jnana* is. This is not, however,
sva-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.

240. *Moolatantra* [section 4] 

Memory is not a perceptual cognition (graha), *Samyuktasiddhi* chap. 91, same explanation of memory.

247. *Sarvadarsana-cintaniprakasha* 

A = *Tib.* don-ba'i-min. The same expression in *Visnu*.

248. *Visnu* p. 10: ..., etc. 

This is the *Vaihavasika’s conception of Sutasuka*.

250. *Anuyoga* p. 101: ..., etc. 

252. Dignaga’s theory of *amāryusa* in *Samyuktasiddhi* 1:5.

254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it *v. n. 249-50.


256. *Sarvadarsana-cintaniprakasha* 1:21
257. भवनेव भवसुधूरेण समीरेष्यक्रेषांगमि ॥ १५३ ॥

dhitam bhavasana 

citam bhavasana

a. a lit. समीरेष्यक्रेषांगमि।

258. भवनेव गैतिः गैतिः काँभयं ॥

a. dh. der. sdg. so.

259. This probably refers to Kumarila's objection.

260. गद्धवादन्वस्तिनयां अल्पलब्धकोद्रुहयाः।
रामविद्वेदस्वायम् विना

a. a lit. विना

261. भवनेव बायाहसम्मुखः विद्वानस्वायम्।

a. a lit. विद्वानस्वायम्

262. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.

263. ॠणानां भवसस्ते राजस्तो न ॥ १६२ ॥

dh. ag. dh.

264. ॠणानां भवसस्ते राजस्तो न ॥ १६२ ॥

dh. ag. dh.

265. इत्य भावावाश्यम् [200g] नरायणविद्वानस्तु।

a. a lit.

266. It is interesting to note that the author's statement to the effect that our idea of one entity (dhāva) in as assumption on the discrete atoms.

267. अवसविभासिता हि भवसविभास्य वेदार्थशबदार्थे।

a. a. add. b. ag.

268. यवनिपरिवर्तिततः सर्वायपि व निघितत।

a. a lit. निघितत।

269. निमित्तावस्तिनयां अल्पलब्धकोद्रुहयाः।

a. a lit.

270. ॠणानां भवसस्ते राजस्तो न ॥ १६२ ॥

a. a lit.
269. It is historically true that the Buddha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yoguesa.

270. अथः सच्यार्थं कला तत्त्वत्त्वमुत्त्वः पुनः ।
तत्‌तत्ित्त्वत्त्वमुत्त्वश्रीलोकं पद्मपिनयः ॥ १५१ ॥

271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

272. कमः विश्वामात्रार्हे दानाहितसाधुनारुपः ।
धेयं नै विवेकः तस्मिन् कुदालां न सम्पर्यः ॥ १५२ ॥

273. कण्योपयोजनादेव विकत्तितिसपोषः ॥
दानाहितसाधुस्त्रवरस्त्रवर्जतः ॥ १५३ ॥
तत्त्वत्त्वत्त्वधातुधातुधातुमात्रासमाधिति ॥
तत्‌त्त्वम् कलावत् वेदवत् परिचितीन्नम् ॥ १५४ ॥

274. cp Vimsa. ver. 18: काल्याणवित्तितिष्ठनं विकत्तितिनिमो विषयः ।

275. दानाहितसाधुस्त्रवरस्त्रवर्जतः ॥
सत्त्वम् कन्यापितः विषयः ॥ वाराधिकरोक्षम् ॥ १५५ ॥

276. अस्मातो मनस्करेऽपि वायुपितः विषयः ॥
नै दु:स्त्रवर: स्त्रवरस्त्रवर्जतः ॥ १५६ ॥

277. अस्मातो मनस्करेऽपि वायुपितः ॥
अस्मातो यत्‌ विषयः कलावत् परिचितीन्नम् ॥ १५७ ॥

278. See Bodh. vat. V, 86 and Panji, citing the authority of the Bodhisattva-pratimoksa.

279. परिचितीन्नम् कर्म अनुभूतं मुक्ताक्षरः ।
- रत्नेऽहितव्रतः तत्र स्त्रुतं परालकाः ॥ १५५ ॥


281. अधिक विकत्तितियां विषयः विकत्तितियां कर्मात्रः ॥
- सान्यासक्षारः सदृशां मार्गलक्षणम् ॥ १५९ ॥
a: sūtra bāla-vāla = sīn-tu-hījīg-tīen-dhīl.

282. भवतुम्न विनित्तिपुरा मूल्यादि बीत्तारः ।
श्रवणं श्रवणं च तद्या च क्रमादितेऽव ॥ १५० ॥

284. यदि प्रकृति, जीव: भविष्य: [209]॥ विज्ञ हृदयात्।


286. अयस्मात् वेदांतश्चैव विद्याविद्यायाम्बहारणम्।


288. cp. T. Panji, p. 180: नरियलाकरण मात्र बलित तद्वन्न क्षीणितपरिह।

289. नरियलाकरणात् शुद्धिः विलं महानाशितं।

290. यह prasanga has been made, because the knowledge of smoke is not concomitant with the knowledge of fire; this will become clear from the just next verse.

291. अपारमी सत्त्व नेव अति भुक्त भूतत्व॥ ॥

292. इति निजद्रश्तानि भुतिविचार वर्णः।

293. *pratikshepa* से कथामार्थार्थ एकेषा।

294. भवन: हरिवदनायिनः विलासनां नित्यस्वस्य।

295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpretation of those passages which speak of *cittamārga*.

296. *a-z lit*. विशमे।

297. विशम रसायने तत्त्वा: बहुविध्य त विस्मयः।

298. *a-z lith. विशमे।

299. इति दशस्म शब्दाणां दिनायत्वमेव॥ ॥

300. This is the author's explanation of *Dharma-cairatmya*, a Mahayanic idea of the external things. Thus, according to
hin all the passages declaring dharma-nairatmya are to be understood in the manner indicated here.

297. अन्यायत्तम सम्म सेरे यथा कार्तिकेयिनरनि।
बाध्यमात्र संकुल हृदि; कल्पना, विकल्पना॥ २०॥

298. cp. ver. बाधो न विद्यते भासे यथा कार्तिकेयिनरनि।
वासनावृत्तिः विवाहवीणा मात्रत्॥ २०२॥


299. कृतार्थेनित्याग्य कार्तिकेयिनरविद्यतात्।
कृतास् परिधिः, न्यायावलोके कथाने॥ २०३॥

300. Pudgala-nairatmya is also accepted by the Sarvastivadi-Vai-bhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for accepting it.

301. तथोपत्यावरण्य कृतास्ते विकल्पिनय।
अयोध्यानां परिवहनं पर्यता तु स्वलक्षणाम॥ २०४॥

cited in Subh. sangreha.

302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris
tics, (lakṣana), viz. Parikalpita, parantarita and pariniganna. Likewise this author enumerates three thing, viz kalpita, vikalpita and dharma, of which the last one is explained as svālaksana corresponding to Pariniganna of the Yogacara. Kalpita, a basic entity, i.e. a bhava-śūnya may correspond to Parantarita and Vikalpita, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to parikalpita. Thus according to this Vaiśesika author as in the case of the Yogacara, two things, Kalpita and dharma are true whereas vikalpita like parikalpita of the Yogacara is untrue. That the vikalpita is untrue has already been pointed out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much as fancied by worldly people, cp. ver. 40. विकल्पिन्यविवाहविन्यानि न नातिनिक्षेपितिः। Dharma is an eternally true as it is the same as svālaksana, an everlasting svabhava. (svabhavah sarvamastipasti. . . .) Kalpita that is explained as bhavanatvara, a basic entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the various things are fancied. Atoms are kalpita, i.e. inferred, v. ver. 64, (n. 111): why the separate atoms are not cognized is made clear by the author in the ver. 44 (n. 76), though the aggregate atoms are cognized in their svālaksana, v. ver. 37. (n. 62).
303. यदि वर्ण सत्त्वमुक्त करिलय: करानिरदेश।
करानिरदेश द्वारे चंद्र कलदाहात्सिद्धिन्ते ॥ १८९ ॥

304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika
standpoint.

305. गतचारी यथा (२१०a) वासन में तत्त्व भव एव सः।
अन्यत्र ज्ञात सर्वस्य अनेकाण्वस्य स्वविशेष ॥ १८५ ॥
a Tib. dnigsmayin.

306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external
things is avisonvade, a non-contradicted experience, v. verr.
3, (n. 5) 19 (n. 31) and so. (n. 168).

307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may
also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and
therefore) are non-existent.

308. गातार्थपालितम्: समुपयो अभिवर्धनिनिन्य।
किन्तु नामस्वायत्ते वा विविर्त==वि: परिविशा: ॥ १५६ ॥
a kl. विविर्त==वि:

309. गणान्यायविवाहरे मेघुलो कुष्ठीरंकिः।
सन्नार्तविवर्तवत्तानां काहीतथाप देवसिद्ध ॥ १६३ ॥

310. जातिभाबी मौहलोकोमाणं: अवसासार्दीहृत।
वा तथा महत्त्व मधेवर्ती ॥ १५५ ॥
a. Tib. moon madzed chin—sahaka—
b. Tib. syne ba gelen—sahaka—
c. Tib. ฐुत्त्वङ्गी dweang-sig.
THE TIBETAN TEXT
1. ༡ ལྷ་བི་མཐེས་དུས་རི་བཤེས་[2 (2016) བརྒྱུད་ཆུས་] འཛིན་དེབ་ཆེན་པོ་མ་ཆད་པར་རྒྱུད།
    ༡ ང་བོ་ཙོ་གཉིས་གྲུ་བཞི་[བལ་མས་གྲུབ་སེམས་དབང་ཕྲྲོ་]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་རཱ་ཤཱ་ཞ་[བཞི་ནུབ་]

2. ༢ དབང་པོ་ཐོན་པ་དུས་རི་བཤེས་[དབང་པོ་ཚིག་མི་བཤེས་] ༡ གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]

3. ༣ ཡི་མ་བི་ཤེས་མས་ཚོགས་[ཤེས་མས་ཚོགས་] ༡ གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]

4. ༤ འཕྲུལ་ལྡོ་གཉིས་ཏུ་དུས་རི་[པ་] ༡ གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]

5. ༥ ང་བོ་ཙོ་གཉིས་གྲུ་བཞི་[d] [d] [d] [d] [d] [d]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]

6. ༦ ང་བོ་ཙོ་གཉིས་གྲུ་བཞི་[d] [d] [d] [d] [d] [d]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
    གཞི་ལྔ་རང་བཞི་[📦] [📦]
17. བོད་ཡུལ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིར་བཤད། རོ་བོས་པའོ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
18. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
19. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
20. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
21. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
22. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
23. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
24. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
25. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
26. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
27. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
28. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
29. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
30. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
31. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
32. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
33. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
34. རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད། རི་མོ་ལུ་བཤད་བཞི་བཤད་བཞིས།
27. །ངོ་བོ་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །འོད་པར་ོབ་པ་ཅིག་ལྷོན་ཐོས།

28. །རྡོ་རྗེ་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །རྡོ་རྗེ་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

29. །རྡོ་རྗེ་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །རྡོ་རྗེ་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

30. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

31. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

32. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

33. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

34. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

35. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།

36. །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན། །ཐོགས་ཤེ་དུས་པར་ཐེག་པ་ཡིན།
37. রাজ্যের মন্ত্রণালয়ের সুনামী বিষয়ে

38. বিভিন্ন সংস্থার সহযোগিতা

39. হিন্দুধর্মের সচিব নির্দেশ

40. নার্সিং সমাজের কার্যক্রম

41. বুধবারের সম্মেলন

42. মহাকাব্য প্রথম অংশের প্রকাশ

43. রেলওয়ে সংস্থার সহযোগিতা

44. নানা ধর্মের কার্যক্রম

45. মহিলা সমাজের সহযোগিতা

46. সমাজের সহযোগিতা এবং মহিলা সমাজের সহযোগিতা
47. ར་བར་བཟོ་ཞི་ཤེས་ཐུབ་བཅོམ།  ས་བཞིན་བཙོན་བསམ་བྱུགས་པ་ན་
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

48. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

49. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

50. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

51. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

52. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

53. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

54. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

55. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།

56. ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།  ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
    | ར་བཟོ་དོན་དོན་བཟོ་བཅོམ།
57. ༣ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

58. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

59. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

60. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

61. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

62. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

63. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།

64. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་گི།

65. སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
   སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི། ༡ སྐད་འདྲ་དུ་དཔལ་དོན་ཁང་གི།
76. ཀྱི་དཔོན་པོ་དང་སྐྱེས་དཔོན་(2003) ཕྱོང་བཟོ་དཔོན་ལོ་མ་ཡུལ།
       འཆེད་པོ་ཐབས་མ་པ་ལྟར། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

77. གཞི་བཞི་བདེ་བཞི་སེམས་པ། འབྲིས་མཐོང་བཞི་དོན་དུ་ཐོག་ཏུ་བྱེད།
       འཕྲི་བཞི་བདེ་བཞི་སེམས་པ། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

78. འཇིག་ཤིག་བརྡ་བདུན་ཕབ་དང་། བཞི་བཞི་བདེ་བཞི་སེམས་པ།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

79. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

80. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

81. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

82. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

83. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

84. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།

85. འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།
       འཕྲི་ཐོབ་མཐོང་ཐོབ་ཐོག་དུས་། གོ་བོ་དང་ཐོབ་མཐོང་མི་རིང་།
86. འསང་ལས་བུལ་བཞི་ཐོབ་བརྒྱ། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   གདན་ཐོང་ནང་ཐོ་བཞུད་ཏེ་ཏོག། ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏེ་ཏོག་།
   དུས་ཕྱོགས་ཕྱིན་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།

87. ནུས་པ་ར་དྲ་དུས་གྱིས་བསྡུས། དུས་ཕྱོགས་ཕྱིན་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།

88. འོ་བོ་བཅོ་སྐྱོང་ཙམ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།
   འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།

89. དུས་ཕྱོགས་ཕྱིན་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།

90. འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།

91. འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།

92. འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།

93. འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།

94. འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད། འོཞི་རིང་ལོངས་སུ་བཞུད།
   ལོངས་ཐོང་བཞུད་ཐོག་ཏོག་ཏོག་།
95. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
   | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
96. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
   | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
97. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
   | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
98. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
   | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
99. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
   | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
100. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
    | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
101. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
    | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
102. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
    | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
103. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
    | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
104. | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི། | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
    | རུས་པ་དོ་མི་སྨོན་པོ་གྱི།
105. 甘麻拉德那洛桑策仁巴   甘麻拉德那洛桑策仁巴   甘麻拉德那洛桑策仁巴
106. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
107. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
108. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
109. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
110. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
111. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
112. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
113. 納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴   納桑達那洛桑策仁巴
114. སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
115. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
116. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
117. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
118. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
119. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
120. སུམ་ཤེς་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
121. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
122. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་  
123. སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་ སུམ་ཤེས་  
[སུམ་ཤེས་ PBS སུམ་ཤེས་
124. སྐྱེ་ཤི་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                     ཡོ་བྱེད་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
125. བོད་པ་ཟིོད་སྟ་ལོ་ཁྲུབ་པར་
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
126. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
127. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
128. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
129. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
130. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
131. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
132. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
133. སྦྱིན་པོ་མཛད་ལྡན་བོད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
                རྟེ་དོ་བྱེད་ཨོ་ཤི་ཐོ་ཁུང་།
144. བེད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ། | བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

145. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

146. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

147. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

148. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

149. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

150. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

151. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

152. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)

153. བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
(བོད་པ་ལ་མི་ཤིག་པ་ཕྲོ་བུ།)
174. [བོད་ཀྱི་དྲི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད།] [ཐོས་དབང་ཕྱོགས་པར་བཟོ།]
[རི་སྟེ། ན་མ་རྩེ་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད།]

175. [ལྷ་སྟེ་དོན་ཕྲོ་སྟེ་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད།] [ཐོས་དབང་ཕྱོགས་པར་བཟོ།]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད།]

176. [ཙོམ་པར་བརྒྱད་པ་བེན།] [ཐོས་དབང་ཕྱོགས་པར་བཟོ།]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད།]

177. [དི་ལྡེ་བྲག་རྫོག་པ་བིད།] [སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད།]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]

178. [བྲོང་བསྟན་བཟང་བསྡུད་པ་] [ཐོས་དབང་ཕྱོགས་པར་བཟོ།]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]

179. [ཙོམ་པར་བརྒྱད་པ་བེན་བོད།] [སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]

180. [གཞི་ཕྲྲེ་བསྟན་བཟང་བསྡུད།] [སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]

181. [གཞི་ཕྲྲེ་བསྟན་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད།] [སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]

182. [དི་ལྡེ་བྲག་རྫོག་པ་བིད།] [སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]

183. [གཞི་ཕྲྲེ་བསྟན་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད།] [སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]
[སི་རྒྱས་གྱི་བོད་བཟང་བསྡུད་བོད་]
184. སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་པོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།
185. སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།
186. སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།
187. སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།
188. སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།

"སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།"

"གཞན་པའི་བོད་ཞིག་པ་མྱི་མི་ཞིག་པ་ཤེས་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ། སྐྱེས་བྱེ་བོད་ཞིག་པ་བདེན་པ་ཡ།" [210a, 74]
1. This introductory sentence is not found in the Snar-thang edn. (=N.)
2. N. སྣམ་
3. N. སྣལ་ for སྣག་
4. Peking (=P.) སྣོད་པ།
5. P. སྣ
6. P. སྣར་ for སྣམ་
7. P. སྣ་
8. P. སྣ
9. P. སྣ
10. P. སྣ
11. P. སྣ
12. P. སྣ
13. N. སྣ
14. P. སྣ
15. P. སྣ (?)
16. P. ტრჟ
17. N. ტვრჟ
18. P. ტრჟ
19. P. ტრჟ
20. P. ტრჟ
21. P. ტრჟ
22. P. ტრჟ

Verse 95a: Read ტაჩჟჟ for ტჟჟ
“d” Read ტჟჟ =ფიტა for ტჟჟ

“d” Read ტჟჟ =ფიტa for ტჟჟ

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TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY

(Figure refers to the verse number)

68. इति । 68, 101.
68. इति । 68, 101.
68. इति । 68, 101.
68. इति । 68, 101.
68. इति । 68, 101.
68. इति । 68, 101.
93

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का – प्रो. genetive, वं. द्रव्यवाच
कृष्ण महायज्ञ संक्लीप 87. ए. चिप्प
अन्य – विभक्तवाचा तृतीय सिद्धि नामम् का निर्देशन 95.
अवती-
विनाशन 101.
कृष्णा नाम 87. ए. द्रव्यवाचा
अन्य – विभक्तवाचा तृतीय सिद्धि नामम् का निर्देशन 81.
अवती-
अन्य 44.
पुनर्जन 87.
कृष्ण‐महायज्ञ हस्ताक्षरी नामम् का निर्देशन 44.
कृषिक शिक्षण व सीमांकन 29.
कृषि कृषि अवती 11-12-3.
मङ्गल उपवन 87.
अन्य – कृषि कृषि, तृतीय शिक्षण 68.
अन्य 44.
कृषिक नाम 29.
कृषिकृषिकृषि समाधुतकृति विभक्तवाचा 29.
कृषि गामन 66.
मङ्गल बंश 71, 81.
अन्य 87.
अन्य 29.
कृषि कृषि के नामम् व पुनर्जन विभक्तवाचा हिं सामान 81.
মায়াঘূংচ্ছন্ন—সম্বন্ধ 89. এখন এই ঘূংচ্ছন্ন হলো সম্বন্ধ 89।

মায়াঘূংচ্ছন্ন বহ 35, এখন 66।

এখন বহ 89।

লেখী প্রো. নৃপম ইষ্ট 89। এখন এই ঘূংচ্ছন্ন হলো 89।

লেখী বহ এখন ইষ্ট 89।

চারণ 89।

চারণ নাম 66।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা বিবরণ 71।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 71।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 71।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 101।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 101।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 81।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 81।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 66। (ইট নির্দেশিত ইটকর্তাতি নির্দেশিত)।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন এই ঘূংচ্ছন্নের পরিচিতিতাতিকে পরিচিতি এখন 89।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 71।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন প্রতিষ্ঠা পরিচিতি এখন শালবিবি 44।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 44। প্রতিষ্ঠার 71।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 44।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 44।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 35।

নিয়ন্ত্রণের কথা এখন 35।
—མཐོང་ལྡེ་མི་དྲུག་པར་རེ་ 44.

—ཐེ་ལྡེ་མི་དྲུག་པར་རེ་ pro. locative v. སྒྲུབ་; སྒྲུབ་_med.

སྐེབས་ med. 81.

སྐེབས་ med. 101.

—དོན་མཐོང་པོ་ དུས་པར་རེ།
—དཔལ་མཆོག
—ཐུབ་པོར་གྲོལ
—ཆི

སྐེབས་ med. 66.

ཕྱིན་པོ་བཞིན་པར་ med. 29.

ཕྱིན་པོ་བཞིན་པར་ pro. བཞིན་པ་;

སྤྱེས་པ་སེམས་པའི་ཐུབ་པོི་མོ་
—སྐེབས་ med. 68.

ཕྱིན་པོ་བཞིན་པར་ med. 68.

ཕྱིན་པོ་བཞིན་པར་ med. 29.

ཕྱིན་པོ་བཞིན་པར་ med. 81.

ཐུབ་པོི་མོ་ 81. sino. Tib.