The Bulletin of Tibetology seeks to serve the specialist as well as the general reader with an interest in this field of study. The motif portraying the Stupa on the mountains suggests the dimensions of the field—

EDITORS

GYALMO HOPE NAMGYAL
T. SHERAB GYALTSHEN
NIRMAL C. SINHA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAIHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. A. SASTRI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREY WOLF IN TIBETAN TRADITION</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYNAK R. TULKU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTRIBUTORS IN THIS ISSUE—

N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI Formerly Adhyapaka in Visva-
bhavaní; leading scholar on Mahayana literature and author of publica-
tions on Tibetan and Chinese translations and commentaries.

MYNAK RIKHU TULKU Presiding Incarnate of Rikhu, the leading Sakya monastery in Mynak (Kham); resident in Sikkim since 1959 and attached to the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, first as a student of Sanskrit and English and now as a member of the staff.

---

Views expressed in the Bulletin of Tibetology are those of the contrib-
utors alone and not of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology. An article represents the private individual views of the author and does not reflect those of any office or institution with which the author may be associated.
BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

N. A. SASTRI
We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order: (1) Sarvajnasiddhakarika, (2) Bahyarthasiddhi Karika, (3) Srutipariksa, (4) Anyopaka-vicara, (5) Iswarabhongakarika. Of these the second, viz. Bahyarthasiddhi, Tib. physiol.gyi.don.grub, pa is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (asustup) counted for convenience into 188 verses. The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, is to refute the Yogacara idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Sarvastivadins-Vaibhasikas. Vasubandhu, for example, in his Vimsatika elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaibhasikas. Dignaga again in his Alamkanarariksa confirmed Vasubandhu’s opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations. Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of Sahopalsthana-niyama, concomitance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaibhasika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaibhasika masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santarakshita and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta’s premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (Bahyarthapariksa) they quote Subhagupta’s passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Paniika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.
This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhaga Gupta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmakirti (650 A.D.) and Santarakshita-Kamalasila (700-80 A.D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, a Jain author (c 700 A.D.) since the latter quotes the former in his Nysyavimcitsya the v.: sakshadaksasaka lokoesmis, etc. (Bhayartha, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A.D. (Cf. T. Sangnaha, Intro. XXXIV).

REVIEW OF TOPICS

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of idealism is the example of dream experiences. Subhaga Gupta refutes it by pointing out the differences between the wake experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the contention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusory, the author replies that some knowledge may err on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it errs even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. ver. 31 with note).

Dignaga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, i.e. non-cognizance of atoms in isolation (skaha-apariccheda) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they lose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our consciousness?—he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusive and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being conglutinated into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-substances (40).

Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial distinction (dhigha-gabheda) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (paramartha) is also illogical. If you
consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-unit on the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become collocated and accomplishes the gross things like the globe of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (anugrabhavitese) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (dravyasakti) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spiritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them. (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of Sahasrarnabhaecayana remarks that the knowledge is only cognizet and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cogized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the said how, reason has been pointed out to be defective; in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term saha ‘together’ always implies a companion and if there is really Saha-vedana, ‘together-cognition’, the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by some other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of Saha-vedana, according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously produce the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed Saha-vedana (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuratively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not plead, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of assuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-
knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in the knowledge (95). This image-theory is not favoured by the advocates of Cittamatra; idea alone in the ultimate plane of existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He makes his position further clear by saying that the consciousness which is imageless and formless comprehends (paricoid) through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. (105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness—form is accepted to be shared by the form of an object, how does it mean that the consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of cognizing the external things is the same with the saints as with the worldly, with this much difference that the former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision (Sarva-dhiya) whereas the latter by coveous observation of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of knowledge cannot be incriminated whether it comprehends simultaneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared by the Sauteranika who is not in favour of allowing any exception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear-cut exposition of this law: Samata samvartatavat yathā ghnā sarva-bhūga mohitā. Tatā sarvād vayavya na sakti sarva-vedhāna/ksaraka, IX, 1. The Krarmavedana also the opinion of Harivaran. Satya-siddhi, Chaps 15, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastuka-Vibhasa, p. 27 (Viswa-Bharati Annals, X).

The It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example cited in favour of Sātvamadhyamaka theory has been turned by the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp illuminizes itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge illuminates the selves of two or more allamastos of the same kind.
(106). Therefore according to Subhagupta, the visual consciousness, e.g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range; thus our cognition of several colours in a carpet (citrastara) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (grahya) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathāgata's sayings like everything is impermanent, etc. do not at all disclose that things exist there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (sakti) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any Sakti is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21). It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (viparyaya-pana) (129-31); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerner of other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (pariccheda). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an indescribable form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's theory of Svāvatāvedā, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cognizing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cognition is generally believed to have been propounded by the Saumrūṇikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later
The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally than alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159). The Buddhahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). These are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of cittamatratata must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddhha has declared (cittamatratata) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (170). Likewise the doctrine of no-soul has been preached with reference to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worldlings addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldlings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (kalptita), something fancied (vikalptita) and Dharmata. The inferred (kalptita) is nothing but bhava, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and Dharmata finally is the self-substancer (svatvaka). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e., Vikalptita as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the Vaibhasikas.
Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on the Tantric collection of the Tibetan Tripitaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Nurthong edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the reader who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sastrica) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa thul khrim, a Tibetan Refugee Lama working in the Visva-bharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

N. A. Sastric
The original Sanskrit verses of the Baha'artha Siddhi identified so far

भीभारतेविनं संबंधने मएः बारा्वादित साधनम् ।
ब्रजगायताविविहार्य । सर्वेष्वप्रकृतिवर्गेऽि ॥ २९ ॥

सुगुप्तारामणायथापि यत्रा निबायविषयम् ।
अन्तर्विद्येदालीगोि । सर्वेष्वाद्यक्षमयः ॥ ३० ॥

ब्रह्मेवयं सयमयं स्वस्तिनिकायसदान्यः ।
अत् अविद्य दशायुनात्मस्विभिषक्षतमयः ॥ ४४ ॥

ताग्नोपेक्षा शास्त्रय् बारामणाय परस्यविनिर्विषयम् ।
अः ब्रह्माविभिन्निभवतः । नागोपिषयः ॥ ५९ ॥

प्रक्षेपलविद्यतः संन्यासानेपनसः ।
नित्यवेदो नूठुदु । सवर्मैक्यतः कमः ॥ ६८ ॥

तत्त्वावस्था श्राकेष्वरस्य । सवर्मैक्यमपन्नमसः ।
निर्मीतो तत्सः हेतुनाय प्रवदयाविन्यसः ॥ ७७ ॥

बृहस्पति तु साधना यथा विशृंख्यायाम् ।
स्वस्तिनिकायसदान्यः । साधनामयः कुप्ती। येन विद्य सहविद्यायः ॥ ८५ ॥

ब्रह्माकाराद्यथे । तत्त्वावस्था यथेऽि ।
समस्तो निर्माणसाधनाम प्रक्षेपनेऽि ॥ ८७ ॥

कर्म तद्रक्ष्मान् तपस्य । तत्त्वावस्थाः ।
प्रक्षेपन तेन सर्वस्य कर्म लोकोऽि अविनिर्दितः ॥ ९९ ॥

साहायः श ब्रह्माकारात तत्त्वावस्थाः।
दृशी वृद्धिमयं निर्माणं कं । विनाय प्रक्षेपमेऽि ॥ १५ ॥

यथा दृशी प्रवत्तय विनायाविनिर्दितम् ।
वेदन ब्राह्मणाद्यथैत्वः शास्त्रमेऽि तत्त्वः ॥ १९ ॥
1. One who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (Gurusha) as well as duties beneficial to other living beings; to him I salute in order to achieve success (Artha-siddhi) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.

2. (The Idealist says:) The external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real); (Reason): because it is a (mere) idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example) just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea.

3. Thus the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted in our daily life (avisayavatadrsit).

4. The alternative proposition, that either the object-cause (glambana) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.

5. One experiences in dream one’s own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage?

6. If you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading of a waking person and his bodily extermination resemble a dream experience, why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.

7. If you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but there is no perversion in naming things. A knowledge which is non-illusive is never contradicted. What is contradicted is always illusive.

8. A knowledge of a material thing which differs from neither space nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusive (abhrena). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusive knowledge and nothing else.

9—10a. The person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the Saint (Yogi). (In case of absolute denial of external things)
10. bd. (The Idealist continues) Even our truly apprehension (vibhavatpratiti) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does)?

11. If things exist on account of deep-rooted impressions (vasana), why are not the dreamy things also explained (in the like manner)? Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.

12. The mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (vasana) are all momentary; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of fruition.

13. For him who opines that the knowledge of one taste does not at all arise from any sense datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.

14. If it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit? The cause of fruition (vipaka) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.

15. Just as something seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.

16. In whose opinion the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for preaching, (for him) the fruition will repeat endlessly even after its destruction.

17. Why do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (vasana) of non-contradiction? If you say: because the material and other external things are unfit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).

18. If non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of arisya (= Alayavijana) why is it
not (like this) that as long as there is eye-disease (simitra) as basis (astray움), so long there is non-contradiction?

19. Suppose the Yogacarin acts (pravritti) on the notion of mind alone (Cittamatra) and on the presumption of the all alambana as false; when in the interval the notion of Cittamatra is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (avisamvada) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.

20. The Sakti matured (paripakा) for arepa, assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.

21. And the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No vasana is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.

22. Things are made fragrant on account of an act produced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the Jati flowers.

23. Here the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their upadana consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.

24. Therefore the theory of vasana needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti.

25. Nevertheless, if you say: the knowledge of odayagama (rāga, pa), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (svatansayak) and this my opinion may be compared with the fact of the seed which being sowed matures of itself.

26. This opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its upadana consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it involves a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (aryopajastraya).

27. This defect is absent in the system which holds that Saktis that are imputed (arepita) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some Visesa, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.
28. But there is a system of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named upadana (ساودرب) and this is quite irrelevant.

29. When the proposition of Cittamakara that is to be established the proof or argument (sadhana) is the knowledge itself (jnana); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (vijaya) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be sesavat (i.e. sesawad-anumon).  

30. A close scrutiny (laksaphay) joyfulness (daksh myur) engagement (pravriti) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.

31. Certain sensuous knowledge errors on account of some impediment (this is possible). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error creates an absolute darkness in the universe.

ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.

32. Others say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is in external object (corresponding to the sensuous consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable (object) is what is produced internally from one's own mind but it is not a visible object (rupa) (existing externally outside of the mind).

33a-c. The proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (samsatiy; because each atom is not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge. – So says Dinnaga.

33d-34. (Hetu-Reason) would become doubtful (sandgha) when it is applied to Citta and Caita, mind and mental-phenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understand ing of Tathagata.

35. (The author continues:) Just as the illusive idea of permanence appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (in momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms.
36. When we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness.

37. Therefore the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our consciousness is totally unfounded.

38. What a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (adraya) and resembles the double moon (says Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its hetu, prebams is not at all proved as valid one.

39. The atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed Sancita, integrated;—to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (adraya)?

40. They (atoms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.

41. The philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated colours (Citrapata).

42. In certain place, when an image of certain object (rupa) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (asraya) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms.

43. As atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge?

44. Atoms cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.

45. Vasubandhu's criticism of the atoms on the basis of their spacial distinctions is Rasness. For, the term, space (dikshabda) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.
46. Hence by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several other atoms but never the atoms are considered as parts.

47. When one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.

48. Where the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.

49. A (gross) form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit., one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms.

50. If, as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (avaya) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived so (i.e. one indivisible time-unit)?

51. Since knowledge continues to exist for two moments its uninterrupted existence (nairaniraya) is possible, yet the form of one unit (avaya-npa) is not permissible on the knowledge; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms also.

52. By virtue of a peculiar relationship (patisa) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts.

53. This shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun.

54. Just as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atom can produce such phenomenon.

55. Therefore what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (binda) is impossible to exist since the distinction between the
atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (kadaicitka) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).

56. The⁵⁷ atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related⁶⁰ and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.

57. By⁵⁷ virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (anyagraha) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (vajra) and other such things.

58. Certain⁵⁷ atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (dravyavakti) just like the evil spirit (piṣaka) the serpent and others are subdued by force of mantra-vakti.

59. But⁴⁰⁴ there are many other atoms having very little power and strength⁴⁰⁶ (to appear in life).

The⁴⁰⁴ person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (acala) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. with their numbers and other distinctions.

60-61a. Therefore⁴⁰⁶ it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (bhrama) then your understanding⁴⁰⁶ that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number ‘eight’ on the aggregate of eight atoms.

61b-62. If⁴⁰⁴ you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic⁴⁰⁷ thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings⁴⁰⁸ and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Pradhāna⁴⁰⁹ and Purusa, etc.?

63. You⁴⁰⁴ may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Pradhāna is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (gunaitisaya) (like saitva,
rajas and tamas). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).

64. Therefore the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other the sages living in a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible

65. When two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once.

66. There is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.

67. If the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise.

68. If the term saha is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. Sahajpalambha) becomes indefinite in all respects (asaktika) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (jneyacetas) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (citta-cuditatsa).

69. If the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures; how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost, hell and others is an illusion?

70. If, even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejinder is based again on illusion.

71. The term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (hitu-Sahajpalambha) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.
72. If the term *Saha* ‘co-existence’ is taken to mean one and the same thing (ekartha) then *hetu* would be unproved (avisāda) for other party, for example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?  

73. If every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (*ekena upalambha*)?  

74. The object-cause felt by a person internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (*hetu*) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other’s cognizance (*svabhava-viprakāśa = nan-kshin. bkhāl. ba*).

75. If the reason (*hetu*) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party who plead for the doctrine of mind alone (*cittamatra*).

76. If you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (*aprakāśa-bhava*), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (*savagamrvanadvam*) would not dispute here in this matter (thus leading to *siddhasvatam*).

77. If you conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge?

78. Suppose, for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (*artha*), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion.

79. If certain imaginary form (*kalpito-rupa* i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced; therefore the reason (*Saha-salamābhā*) is not proper to set up.

80. For this reason two formats of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is
81. The causal factors (samagri) of the preceding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (rupa) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive cognition (sahevedana) would become justifiable.

82. When the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (puraparasa) the term co-cognition (sahevedana) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (sahevedanam na artha[ph]).

83. Since the knowledge-content is set internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined. 54

84. Since it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content (jnanam satiti), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself it is considered as cognized. 55

85. Thought the term 'cognized' (saheveda) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its import is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc. e.g. are not regarded of the (same) forms, visenit, horned figure on account of the usage of the term, cow, etc.

86. There are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (sukatanatana) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (Sarvajna). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain. 56a anaitikati (because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient? 56

87. In the system of the image-invested knowledge (of the Sautramuka) the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (siddha-adhanita).

88. The external thing (artha) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is...
considered as perceived figuratively. The external thing is not as all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.

89. If you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciousness) considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (tat pariccheda laksana) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?

90. (In the system of the Sautrantika-Yogascarsas an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (artha-pariccheddha)?

91. Consciousness (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object.

92. The consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object (vrittimatra), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (samaropa).

93. Just a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (prana-ropa), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.

94. No distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects (Sarvakaranadi).

95. Do we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively.

Akara-vada disproved

96. What image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (rupa), etc. but it is assumed to exist in the knowledge.

97. It is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations (avasaana); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world): how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (tanmatra-samā)?
98. Our intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced, for example in the case of eye-disease etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.

99. Likewise one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.

100. The assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (Kalpanatma). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to viseṣa, individual characteristic of the observed object.

101. You plead that the knowledge which is in fact imageless experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.

102. There is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (advayajñana). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.

103. If (you argue that) the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory; otherwise how could it be an assumed image?

104. Hence consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (particular) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fitting things whether existent or non-existent.

105. If (you say that) just as the lamp illumines the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two ātmanas (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.

106. However the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various sense-organs, hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.
107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) alambana.\[195\]

107c-9a. A knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing:—this contention is a simple illusion\[196\]; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the sort of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.

109b-1nc. In every mind the knowledge formed is uniform if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.

110b-d. When this (knowledge) illuminates the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its context\[197\] (visaya).

111-12b. If, while the knowledge lights up last a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).

Grahya aspect criticised

112c-13. The Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (grahyaathaga).

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (alambana) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (content).

114. How\[198\] does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction? That idea is only a fancy of your mind (citavasas\[199\]thaya). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself.

115a-b. If\[200\] there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all desired\[201\] (as content)?
Discussion on the actual object

115c-166. The simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (arga) each. How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished?

116c-176. The knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of alambana, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (alambana) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).

117c-186. The opinion that a similar knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper; for, no knowledge flashes up (bhavi) immediately after a similar knowledge.

118c-196. If the knowledge in the form of a visible object (rupa) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of rupa be similar to the alambana, i.e. sound?

119c-206. Some consider that a force (sakti) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause. This opinion is also improper; for, no force, sakti is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.

120c-216. If (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (artha) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as alambana exists indeed though not expressly stated.

121c-226. If you say that the knowledge of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (artha). If it lacks the characteristic (of alambana) how can it be alambana?

122c-236. (Thus) it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means.

123c-246. The objects like desirable and undesirable never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind; this contention is absolutely irrelevant.
124c-25b. On" certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (the experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefaction on account of varied causes.\(^{10}\)

125c-26b. Certain\(^{11}\)knowledge relating to an object (artha) reflects (the same object) as a patch of blush (vishäka) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (bhuhkhārapati) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.

126c-27b. Feelings\(^{12}\)like joy, sorrow and dullness are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things—if this is your contention; how is it proper?

127c-28b. (The \^{13}\)Idealist continues) All you refusations are made on the assumption (of external things) (apropa); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no alambhā in the externa? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (artha-kriyā) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.

128c-30c. If \(^{14}\)you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action\(^{15}\) is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (viparyāya-jñāna).

130d-31c. But\(^{16}\) again as a result of seeking the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (kriyamatra)\(^{17}\) is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (vibhrama) of some thing present for something absent.

131d-132c. As\(^{18}\) to the argument based on the sexual act (kama-carita)\(^{19}\) in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions)?

132d-133c. Since\(^{20}\) the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (rāga) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extreme love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.
133d-134c. If in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

134d-135c. If in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?

135d-136b. The semen being discharged out of extreme passion (raga) the purpose of life is fulfilled—this idea is not a happy one.

136d-137b. For example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act, the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.

137c-138e. Since there really exist the keepers of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admissible nor is any purposeful action in dream possible. Therefore the doctrine of Cittamaharana "mind alone" becomes unproved.

138d-139e. When different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings?

139d-140c. Similarly the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (amgraha) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) remains true in his promise.

140d-141b. In the absence of preliminary rites efficient act can not be accomplished; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.

141c-d. Why is the knowledge of the others' thought-discerner is untrue (avatharaha) ?

142. When other's mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.

143b-c. The grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge would arise.
143d-144b. So in the case with the knowledge of one's own mind. (In both the cases) the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. piriccheda-lakṣaṇa).

144c-145b. The memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing. What is directed towards the past (bhasa = yan-dag) is not a cognition (graha) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.

145c-146d. The non-dual form (advaya-rupa) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (Sambuddha) is not cognizable to us and therefore untrue (avyathartha). What is said to be untrue, is unsatisfactory because of the non-dual nature (advayavata) of the knowledge.

146c-147b. The Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.

147c-148c. To what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask) What is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other's mind can be comprehended?

148d-149. Then there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (niralamāna). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient?

150c-151b. By comprehending one's own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (swasamvedana).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realization of the mind alone (cittanāta-darsana).

151c-152b. If you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content?

152c. If you say again, that when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects—this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (grahaka-rupa) the entire universe.
153. There is not any person known to us as omniscient—
says self-styled wisdom among the so-called learned persons; but this saying reveals his dull intellect (sra-durmat) being engrossed in it.

154. As the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed.

155. But there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all worldlings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.

156. The knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this is void (sunya)' is related to (lit. entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote?

157. Just as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.

158. Assuming in the mind an idea of entity one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has no any purpose (dibarth) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.

159. The contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence (a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (no a reasonable proposition).

160. The person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice.

161. Therefore the state of well-faring (Saugata-paia) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (samas kri-antitya).
162. When one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfill the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.

163. If you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by perception, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.

165. When one practices repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.

166. Even if innumerable thoughts (manaskara) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.

167. In doing out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (arthamana-arthasvarupa) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain things (viz. three garments, etc).

168. There was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are with us; how can they be products of the mind-alone (lit. paratantra) ?

169. If these things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (lokaaya).

170. A man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics) ?

171. If (you say) it is produced by succession (prabhanda) of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance (parinirvava) ?
172. It is the sealed fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.

173. When a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause. This rule is also not permissible (in your system).

174. Thus (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.

175. If you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (saktis) in the mind, wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction?

176. If the cause immediately preceding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (concomitant) with the mind of smoke.

177. When the concomitance is completely unproved how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus this result arises from that cause?

178. Therefore the doctrine that the whole universe is Chittamatra, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (kalpitam asriya) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist.

179. For what (object) one may display desire and other passions, Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (kalpta = Vikalpta) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things in order to remove all such passions (dosa) of the worldlings.

180. Similarly in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldlings. Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldlings).

181. Since some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment
towards an agent as real the idea of agent as real is necessarily to be negated.\textsuperscript{113}

182-183. In\textsuperscript{114} other places it has been likewise declared thus: There is something inferred (kalpita) and some other thing fancied, vikalpita (= parikalpita). \textsuperscript{115} The true form of dharmata (dharmata=rupa=gaṇga=form=svarga) has been explained thus: dharmata is svālayaka, self-essence. What is kalpita is no other than a basic reality (bhāvamātra), and the vikalpita is its diversity (bhēda). This diversity of dharmata will be inappropriate in the absence of bhava\textsuperscript{116} (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).

184. If\textsuperscript{117} the Rupa is declared to be svarga (devoid of rupa-nature) how the term rupa is employed on it? If you argue that it is done so on the assumption of the rupa-nature, what is the ultimate objective (phala) gained\textsuperscript{118} (therefrom)?

185. Of\textsuperscript{119} what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing.\textsuperscript{120} (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as it the dream.\textsuperscript{121}

186. The\textsuperscript{122} advocate of the external reality point out to the Idealist (citra-mātrata-vadin) thus: Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not.

187. But\textsuperscript{123} I have no wonderfull (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.

188. The\textsuperscript{124} wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Hence-forth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.
1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit:

परिवर्तः य ग्याधिपाथत्सा कवयित्रलक्ष्मी।

बालोऽत्मकः ज्ञानपीतिपादाप्स्ति निःश्चरणः।

2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, svrūha and purvarūpa as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Prām. Sam. 1. ver.-1, with vritth. v, my Review in ALB,) and the author of the Sutrālankara (=Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata. Institute, Tirupati, 1941).

3. सुवर्णदादितेषाः प्रस्ताव्यां न संपन्नः।

यथा विद्याधिकृतं ज्ञानवर्जनमेवासामालः।

a. lit शेष: शेष:Jananatan as Sadhana, reason is referred to in the verse 29 below.

4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimātaka and the Alambana-parikā.

5. बालोऽत्मकः सावनी विद्याधि-कल्पसारिणः।

अविज्ञातवद्वादित्वावितराः पुनः विद्याधि।

6. Dharmakīrti's definition of pramāṇa is: प्रमाणात्वत्मस्वतः समयम्,

अविज्ञातवद्वादित्वावितराः पुनः विद्याधि।... Pram. varittika, I, ver. 1, Subhagupta's one of the arguments to prove his externalism is svasamvidavā; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, II, 20, ff.

7. अन्तः अन्तः कथा: सूक्तत्त्वम् कथा।

अन्तः अन्तः कथा।

8. सुवर्णदादितेषाः प्रस्ताव्यां न संपन्नः।

विद्याधिकृतत्वम् कथा।

विद्याधिकृतत्वम् कथा।

9. बालोऽत्मकः सावनी विद्याधि-कल्पसारिणः।

अविज्ञातवद्वादित्वावितराः पुनः विद्याधि।

10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, generally raise such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to Compare a European parallel: Dr.
Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley’s philosophy by kicking a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, Mysterias Universe, the Bridge series, p. 71).

11. इत्यादि गत्वा ज्ञाते निर्युक्तार्थां गया गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये

12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things; e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.

13. वेदांत कलाचारणमात्र यह निर्युक्तार्थां गया गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये

14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the material things, i.e. atoms; cp. Nya. binda-pradipa p.24, नीलकण्ठ पि मुनित्व दृष्टि: नुमुनीत्व दृष्टि: and Ptram. va-bhaya p. 188: न तेरी नामार्थो मूढ़विद्या. The Buddhists including the Sarvastivadin maintain that every thing is momentary and the moment is no other than the thing itself.

15. विधेयकु शलाकारणमात्र यहैर्दित्व निर्युक्तार्थां गया गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये गये

16. A partly definition of yogin.

17. This is explained in the Puggalapannatti, p. 145: शेषोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि नुस्तोऽि

Abh-kosa (Pousin, VI, p. 276) : One who is entered in Nirvikasamipati is named ‘doubly delivered’, because by force of prajna and Samadhi he is delivered from klesa-aravana and vinoksa-aravana (cp. 8 imokas in VIII, p. 205) Satya Siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary). If he gains both, he is ubhayato-bhaga-vimukta; for the deferment is one part and the element hindering dhanya-concentration is another part. (iv. also chap. x. exd) V. Magga (XXI para 78). अभ्यासानेन स्वयं भवन्ति प्रज्ञा उभयात्म भवन्ति: ति विमुख्यो मात्रविनिः वुतुिः
18. प्रभावदीर्घी | 1
स्वतंत्रित्व निलिपिमात्र, | 2
विज्ञानशास्त्रत | 3
कहूँ: ॥ ॥
a—अभावित प्रभावदीर्घी।।
19. श्रीमदभाग, अध्याय अन्तः कथा: श्रीमद नि कहूँ। | 1
प्राकृतसमालोचना स्मारकुलकथा: पुष्पा: ॥ ॥
20. अनिवार्यमणिमुद्रा व्याख्यानाधिकृत:। | 2
विश्लेषणशिविशेषिनां वाक्यां एवहेतुः ॥ ॥
21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (V, Abh. Athasam, IV. 86, Kosa’s Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentary-theory the Vaibhasika maintains that karman produces its fruits through avijnapti which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (V, Kosa, f. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.
22. सम्म शास्त्रीयमणिमुद्रा मणिविशेषिनां आते। | 2
तथा तत्त्व प्रयोगमात्र ॥ ॥
23. Ekaraa-jnana—adhyay-jnana of the Yogacara which is dichotomized into subject and object due to premordial force, (anadi-vastu). It is somewhat similar to the Shvetanika’s ekaraa-akhandha-jnana, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 with note 1.
24. निदर्शणप्रकाशसेवेत् बिनकालयते न किंच। | 3
किंवदं अतिक्षेत्री न सुनक: नासकाम् ॥ ॥
a—Jnana-viparyyena.
25. इह लण्डे विनित्त्रधुरे कथान्तरमस्मित्त नस्तोऽजायूऽम्, | 4
सम्बन्धित् यथा तेन परिवर्जन: श्रव्यः ॥ ॥
a=Tib. de-marphyi-mi-brtar-shin.
26. अद्यावत्तत्वसंस्कृतप्रेषयं देश्वार्थं न च। | 5
(सत) पूनजातिकालिनियो ध्यात्म परिवर्जयः ॥ ॥
s=Read in Tib, dan.gi for gan-gis.
27. The idea seems to be this: when the Yogacara devalues the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: वेनले नीलकुट्पाय बाहाज्ञ्यता प्रस्तुते। Pram, va. ver. 220.

28. एकादेशमानयतात रत्ने न जली माया ।
बहारिसामेयन्यालेयति वै वाभ्युपलोरिए।
31. b—दृष्टिनेत्र चारान्त ।
b—See the verse 29.

29. परिमाध्यमविविधादिव्यां भोगे।
विकिरणसमयो वाणायामविशेषां नारे।
कृतो न न ॥ १६॥
a—सो मृच्छ अविविध व्याख्या।

30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (taitirika) is, however, contradicted at once.

31. नागाराज तु प्रकृतेऽप्राचाराञ्चोदित तर्थता।
नागेशुभाषलेबद्रिलोकावलं नागेशुभाषलेबद्रिमयेते ॥ १७॥

31a. cp, Nya, bindu-Tippani, p. 19: सर्वावलोकने। सत्यं कुञ्जना साधना-विनाश । Every perceptual knowledge is illusive so far as its object is concerned.

32. बाहारिसामालेयति वै बेलकुट्पायो चुज्जात ।
बाहारिसामालेयति वै बेलकुट्पायो चुज्जात ॥ २०॥

33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other external causes.

34. बाहारिसामेयां उपस्थित यज्ञां यत एव ॥
सर्वान्तः तथा तत्स्वयं गहोत्यां हारानेत्रयां
वाता ॥ २१॥

35. This is probably anadikakalika-nusana accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation cfr, Madh. avatara, VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabuddhi’s comment: Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8.
36. वनस्पतिरूपस्तु निकृष्टं काम्यं समाप्ते भवत्।

जरासंधिमुखं संसर्गं गये ज्ञायसे लिपि॥ २२॥

37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common example in Indian Sāstraic literature. cp. Kosavya. II p.39, 22

38. तत्तद्विद्याविनीतांशेन तत्तस्यामोऽभिधितः।

तद यद्यक अर्द्रोग्य विक्रम पूजनं॥ २२॥

39. अतः व्याख्याताशास्त्रे नाधीतति वाचनम्।

तत्रेता चर्चामेऽविद्या शास्त्रविण्युः॥ २२॥

40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Sautrantika. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensuous, one nonsensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their spadana consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness of the yogacarins. The sautrantika contradicts the vastma theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind=Alaya-consciousness, or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, v. Et. Lamotte, Histoire du Budhisme, p. 673; and Maisuda, Sects p. 68. The kosa speaks of the seven types of vijnana in this line: शिविर्देशस्थतिः पदः (१, १६).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the yogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vacaspati's Syogavakrtika: (The yogacara) (The external object is superfluous, there is in the internal) Biotic force which accidently becomes mature and evokes an idea; this is also accidental (and changing inomittantly with a change its cause). (The Sautrantika) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, Bud. Logic; II, p. 367-68). One interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed here: शीविर्देशस्थति व्यविविथ वतः। दक्षतश्यं समस्तालिकादितः। संबद्धं सम्बन्धं विक्रमश्च न संबद्धांस्यविविथे सति। Arthavivakṣaya Sutratika. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioned by Sanskara, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things; cp. the ver. 27 below the same idea.
41. समानानान्तर गर्गाद्विश्वासद्वादशस्त्र वि
सोध निच नरेन न सुभु ममतिं वेदः ॥ २१ ॥
a धृतिनिशांक ।
42,
43. ग्रहारिक विकारनृपादानिनिधिः
भूमिसुभुमातिविशेष स वृत्तोत्तमात्मिनः ॥ २५ ॥
44. Praavrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter
again on the former to produce k.
45. सम्यक्करणात्मने अन्तरं रोकने व प्रस्तुत:।
विकारविनयनिनिधिः निवेद्यत्त अपरिपूर्विताः ॥ २७ ॥
तत: पद्ये न रोकिते,
a परिपूर्वितोत्त ।
46. This is the Soutrantika's standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. सन्योगदानान्तरकालतः
सन्योगदानान्तरिनिधिः न निवेद्यत्त अ तथा । ॥ २८ ॥
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named
upadana, cfr. Trisatika, ver. 3 with Bhaya of Shinamati.
49. भौमानिने ग्रहाने ग्रहाय ज्ञानतिनिनिधिः
विकारविनयनिनिधिः सर्व शेषकुप्ये ॥ २९ ॥
This verse is cited in Tatti. pan p. 582.
298. n. 1.
51. इह दुःखशान्तिः शुभायती तत्तत्त्वरूपम्।
शुभायतारूपम् न यथा सति सत्यम् ॥ ३० ॥
a धृतिनिशांक ।, Tib. dgab. rgyur. c. lit. भास्कराचार्यभासी,
52. ग्रहाद्विश्वासद्वादशस्त्रायाः भासाति ज्ञानायाः
विकारविनयनिनिधिः सर्व शेषम् ॥ ३१ ॥
53. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is
illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above).
The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it
is vitiated in a later stage.
54. अन्यो सर्वदश विकारविनयनिनिधिः सः।
स्य महायज्ञाय यतः हि कथा नानापि तस्म ॥ ३२ ॥
55. This and the following are the opinions of Dignaga, v. Alam. pariksha, ver. 6.

56. अति शाक्तिनिर्भृत तत्त्वात्मोंभविताच्छेदः ।
नन्दिशाश्चर्यानि गुणः ।

57. This is the main argument set up by Dignaga in favour of his idealism, v. Alam. par. ver. 1.

58. विद्वानसत्त्वं स्वसं व यद्यभागातः ।
एकं नानवचारां तद्द्वारारूपस्थितिः ॥ ॥

59. तत्त्वात्मोंभविताच्छेदः ॥
वायुत्वमाग्रेषु तत्त्वात्मोंभवितः ॥ ॥

This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied heio is chaksa-prajnerevede.

60. दृष्ट्वा हयं उपात्मसाध्यात्ममाभिन्नी बैतिः ।
कालादेशभ्ये कथा केहि निःकालादेशम् ॥ ॥

61. The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tatt. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive is ver. 592-4 (ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.

62. तत्त्वात्मोंभविताच्छेदः ॥
वायुत्वमाग्रेषु तत्त्वात्मोंभवितः ॥ ॥

63. The opinion of Vasubandhu, Vimsatika, ver. 11, and also of Dignaga, Alam. par. ver. 1.
64. गदाधर तसी कविता शिववाहानुसार दार्शनिक प्रकार में अर्थ है।


66. अन्योपि कथितानि स्वाता संग्यामनिकारणा।

67. The author thinks that Sāncita stems are dāraya, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his Anyappha-vicara, ver. 2. The logical school of Dignaga following the Saunadiketri standpoin defines dāraya as one capable of discharging a perceptive action: dāraya-kriya-karanam tasya-takaranam. v. Tatt. pan. p. 730, (18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-7) cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195.

68. स्वान्तेति तत्स्वरुपः स सांवर्त्ततिः सः सांवर्त्ततिः।

69. The same idea in the author's Anyappha-vicara, ver. 7. cp. Tatt. san. ver. 870.

70. सांवर्त्तति। तत्स्वरुपः स सांवर्त्तति। तत्स्वरुपः स सांवर्त्तति।

71. This very instance compells the Yogacara to declare that the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all false (ailika) v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 2037; असामाध्यित्वादिकारकसः अभेद असामाध्यित्वादिकारकसः अभेद। तत्स्वरुपः स सांवर्त्तति। तत्स्वरुपः स सांवर्त्ततिः। तत्स्वरुपः स सांवर्त्ततिः।
A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratnakirti in his Citra-adhyasa-palaka-rasa (v. Ratnakirti, K. J. Institute, Patna, 1957).

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. Pram. var. maṇḍupikā moṃka samayata vijnāṇa-viśeṣita. । viśeṣita-vijnāṇa karunacarya parāra. । ॥ v. vers.: Ibid., 297-298; Tatt. san. v. 1255; prajñā sarvāpti evaṃ ca nāma-caryāṃ过度。 ।。 ॥

Another explanation is offered in the following lines: ।.

Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition: v. baḥ biṣṣaṇa kāraṇa samādhi. ।. ॥

A similar explanation is found in T. Panj. p. 371, l. 16, e. note 778 below the passage (Daśavatāraprakāsa, 72)...

Atoms appear and disappear together: śāyānaḥ ca śāyānāṃ viṣayaḥ. ।. ॥

This is what the Sarvastivāda-Vaibhāsikas conclude. It is further made clear in the next verse, cp. kosa, l. p. 35, iv. 18-26, and Vis. Mag.: गर्भो सः स्वयम् गर्भं नेत्र गर्भं। गर्भं गर्भं गर्भं नेत्र गर्भं।

72. \(aḥ\) aḥ bhava-bhuvana-kāraṇo matih.

73. A similar explanation in T. Panj. p. 371, l. 16, e. note 778 below the passage (Daśavatāraprakāsa, 72).

74. सायानसायानां विज्ञानोऽवृत्तमात्र।

75. अत्तम्परिभाष्य एव विज्ञानम्।
76.  

This verse is cited in T. Panj. p. 551, 1. 21: अमानि गृहूँ तभि मूलिध्वनि एसःसत्वानि विद्धानिः कै ती विघ्नकालेऽकामसमाहि गतिः।

77.  

The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. panj. p.356, cp. n. 79 below.

78.  

The author refers here to Vasubandhu’s criticism of atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14:

Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the kośabhasya, I. ver. 43. Tib. pp. 81-84. and the Yaśibhasa’s defence.

79.  

cp. T. panj. p. 555: महसात्सुमुहुम शहं—पृथ्वीरा कालायसाधना।

80.  

The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cp. note 14.

81.  

cp. Vimsa, bhasya: कदः हि परमात्मा। कृतिदिव्यायो गृहस्तिदिव्या इति विक्रमेऽ प्रचार । तत्र न तस्मात् परमात्मानोऽनैत्यसम्भव। The present verse answers this objection.
82. ब्रेक्तकृतत्वार्थवादकार्यं विषयम्।
व्याप्तिकल्पमुन्तरव्यवहारम्। चक्रम्। ॥ ॥
The idea of this verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n. -79. व्याप्तिकल्प-एकाद्रभूतिः. This explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom is imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate.

83. तत्तथेकाव्यवाच्यम् कर्मं नु गृह्यते यथा।
दैव तात्त्विकते तत्र दैवकार्यस्मिन्। ॥ ॥

84. The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic form becomes a visible gross form.

85. नेतृत्वरूपपरायणम् विषयम्।
विनामात्: वृहस्पतियां अ तात्त्विकम्। कर्मं। ॥ ॥

86. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also will be so.

87. तात्त्विक विषयव्यवाहारकार्यम् तत्त्वात्मिकम्।
यथा ज्ञातसन्यस्ते हैः सत्यात्मकः। ॥ ॥

88. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments, त्व, Abh. San. IV.

89. Atoms, though existing is an uninterrupted series are not conceived as one अत्यवस्था on the analogy of knowledge.

90. वस्तुत्वात् कार्यावस्था, गतिकार्यो गतिमात्।
त्वात्त्विकम् वृहस्पतियां अ तात्त्विकम्। ॥ ॥

91. This is in reply to Vasubandhu's criticism: साधारणे गविस्तारो गति: केवल श्रवणप्रकरणे। Kosabhasya, I. 43. This answer implies that the author is a Sāvaita-paramānu-vadin.

92. ब्रेक्तकृतत्वार्थवादकार्यम् कर्मं नु गृह्यते।
सत्य विषयव्यवस्थार्थ वृहस्पतियां अ तात्त्विकम्। ॥ ॥

93. This answers Vasubandhu's query: वाचार्थकार्यम् कर्मं नु विम्सा। त. 74.

94. खण्डप्रयोगानुसार: गतिः कुमारी आचार्य यथा।
पर्यामान्याय तथा भैवस्मात् सत्यात्मिकः ॥ ॥
95. तनो भेदमा अविष्कारला विषो नगरीत पुष्पा।
कऽचालित्वा च्वत्तपत्रोऽपि रीतम्भो न कुल्लेन ऑक्वेला। a=parinama—
hgyur. ba.
96. cp. Vimss. 12d. विषा; श्वायतप्यतां।
97. अनोत्पथमानांपुंसा वनस्पति अविष्कारता।
अन्त्र: शिवुण नमस्त गृहीतास्तुप्रविश्व। ॥ २८ ॥
98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that atoms do not come in contact with one another. Read in Tib. reg. pa for rig. pa.
99. परन्तप्रकोण विलुप्तप्रतिभाः । परन्तप्रकोण विलुप्तप्रतिभाः गणिते िं ॥ २७ ॥
a=hgyur. ba. v. Madh. vrtt, p. 7.
100. वेतस्तमानस्मृतेषु संख्या छोटे गणा।
a=brgyus. pa उल्लरत S. Das, Dictionary.
101. शैवद्वातिकविलोकनः । सिवमानवनादिहिः।
संग्रामापिभोगेन कलोपाश्चायीदृश ॥ २९ ॥
102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into competition and to form any visible object.
103. The Yogin can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression: acaladagh is again used later in ver. 64 below.
104. तनो नगरितं सो धनुः: तथा अविलोकनादि।
प्रायोगिकाः पो ग्यायादायमेव ॥ ६५ ॥
प्रायादि अविलोकनादि; a=अविलोकनादि द्वारा सो पो।
105. The idea may be amplified thus: If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with equally be illusive. Here the author’s reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprehended by the outer senses. Cp. the saying; द्वारा विषयो वि. सूचे अविकृतनादि द्वारा जानन सम मात्रम्। cited in Nya-
106. *धीर्यतेषुपूर्वः तताः।* ।

वर्तमानमयेऽक्षे नर्मदाविविशेषम् पूर्वक ॥ ६३ ॥

प्रभावपीयतेषुपूर्वः, *धीर्यतेषुपूर्वः* कर्त्तः ॥ ६४ ॥

मृगसंगमः प्रभावपीयतेषुपूर्वः* ॥ ६५ ॥

*a=lit.\, विस्मयः। b\, \text{कृत्य} will be a better reading.*

107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.

108. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is well explained in the *Viśnubhāṣya* ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the texts with notes from *Vinita-tārā's comments* (*Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1964*).

109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusa as illusory?

110. *तत्स्य च म गंगातु गुरुदार्शियमाति ॥ भावाया कन्यावर्तपती न स्वामया पूर्व्यंकनम् ॥ ६३ ॥*

111. *अभाय तदस्तवेव अभायकृत्यांभिखाः ॥ सतीमन्बिवृद्धिः। ते सांप्रतिनिधिः स्वामया ॥ ६४ ॥*

112. The same expression previously in ver. 59. *क्. 103.*

113. *सतीमन्बितिः उच्चो भज्ज्विन्ते ॥ अभायस्यायनः श्रवद्यद् साह स्रवेत् ॥ ६५ ॥*

114. T. Panji, explains *Jñāna-jñā prevent* निपकाविमोघवाषु निर्देशनवानन्यम् सर्वस्यवेदम् । नाम सात्त्व अवलकस्य एव निपकाविमोहस्त्वः निलोकाविमोहस्त्वः निलोकाविमोहस्त्वः निलोकाविमोहस्त्वः निलोकाविमोहस्त्वः निलोकाविमोहस्त्वः । न च निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो । निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो निलोकाविमोहिर्यो ॥ । । p. 569.

115. नामोऽपितः घातको भावात् नामोऽपितः घातको भावात् ॥ । । । ॥ ।

This is cited in T. Panji. *v. note. 14. end.*
116. अमावस्या में विशसं यझ श्री विश्रामानि।
तहा तन | तता सरस | मूलते नाथाप भुज्य। II ४७॥
\(a \) lit. मरणाह।

117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz., in the absence of either of the two, knowledge or the object, no cognition flares out and that is the reason why they are felt simultaneously.

118. एकालाबलिश्चा: सम्म्ह्यःसम्म्झन्त्यः।
विचरतान्तर हेतु संस्कारोक्तो ४ च। II ४॥
This verse is cited in T Panji (p. 556, 1, 4) in prose: 'As the sacrifice is absent, questionably, chance in the mind becomes a faculty.'

119. कमालविद्या: विद्यायां विण्किता न स्पे०।
विद्यापरंपरारहौ वै यकु ति भ्रम। II ४९॥

120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell, etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?

121. आत्मानि समबृते विद्येव इत्यवधिद।
तथाविद्वानिन्दुपर: परोहितानी विमानाः। II ५॥

122. समवभावः संवेदनायां धर्माचल कमालविद्या।
विचारां कस्तो हृतुपयति सहिह्यायां। II ५॥

Kamalavala introducing this verse remarks: 'In establishing the existence of these things this objection is also noticed by Dhairmpasa in his comment on Alam. par.'

123. एकामश्: सहायपरेकोपसिद्धाः।
तता।

124. T Panji refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus: 'If the spirit is present in the body and is another, there is falsehood.'

\(b\) प्रत्यूक्त: स नाम वश्योऽनुष्ठानोऽस्मात्।
तथा नै नवधमालमाविद्यायां नातद्विभास्माद।
सदा च संस्कृत। (sic)

\(c\) प्रत्यूक्त: स नाम वश्योऽनुष्ठानोऽस्मात्।
तथा नै नवधमालमाविद्यायां नातद्विभास्माद।
सदा च संस्कृत। (sic)
125. The idea expressed in this verse is well stated in T. Panjia. passage cited in the previous note.

126. The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panjia. passage cited in the note 124.

127. Thus the reason becomes avyutanta-avidhi.

128. For the advocate of sakara jnana, the image is a part of the knowledge. To prove it is useless.

129. The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the black shell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since the black colour cannot be attributed to the knowledge, there ought to be something black material other than the knowledge. The classical example is: pitoh sankara. This example at bhurjaha jnana seems to be purposely employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz. black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge.

130. The case-ending in Tib. c. dgah. bai.


133. The case-ending in Tib. a. No case-ending in Tib. c. dgah. bai.

134. The case-ending in Tib. a. No case-ending in Tib. c. dgah. bai.


137. नासा न तु माति भागनि निर्वासनुसार।

This verse is cited in T. panj. p. 569, il. 16-17 along with the verse, माधोऽनिर्वास, p. 114.

138. Samagri, according to early Buddhist includes three factors: (1) ekaya (2) indriya, and (3) vijnana, manas and it gives rise to a sensation, sparsa, which is followed by feeling, vedana, and then image, samjna. (v. Bud. logic, II, p. 311) Table, Cp. Kosa. III, p. 65. 23.

139. Here the term saha is in the sense of immediate succession: cf. the next verse.

140. सर्पिरं दं नामानुचिन्द्रद्र बच्चोऽनि।

141. सागरलेख विज्ञानापंचोऽनि, शास्त्रामणह।

142. That is, the reason is doubtful. (v. ver. 74 above.) Sanditya-asidha.

143. भागवर्गः बच्चोऽनि नेति प्रयत्नोऽनि।

144. The idea is made clear in T. Panj. p. 570, l. 18 ff.

145. नासा न तु माति भागनि निर्वासनुसार।

The author probably means this mathayate vedayata by the expression jnaa-sita, sva-piticus, &c. It does not however follow from this that the author means that the knowledge knows itself. According to the Vaibhavika knowledge knows its preceding moment and hence there is no jnaa-sita, sva-pitita.

145a. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panj. p. 570. l. 32, ff.
तथा यदि मुख्या संबंध स्वयंत्र होतेहोते पदार्थों । तद्वा हेतु विद्वानह । क्षमा व वाचकलेक्षण स्वयंत्रविद्वानक्षमता । तथापि न वाचकलेक्षणः । न कथ नोटासमाप्त हस्यार्थिनी विश्लेषिनीः।

Mukhya *samvedana* above referred to is also implied in the following passage: "स्वेताभ्यास वेदान्त सामान्यम् संवेदनेन सामान्यम् स्वेताभ्यासः।" — (T. Panjii, p. 568, I. 12) The *Bhāyārthavadin* of this passage is probably, the Vaibhāsika (?)

146. संवेदनांस्वेताभ्यासंस्वेत्याभ्यासः। यथा वेदाभ्यासंस्वेताभ्यासः। संबंधोऽवस्थाम् कपाल ॥ ५६॥

146a. This defect of *anāikantika* is explained in T. Panjii, v. note on ver. 68.

146b. cp. T. Panjii, p. 573, I. 15 ff., making this same prasanga in a different context.

147. साक्षात्कारः त सिद्धान्तसमृद्धैः। तत्सरसोऽथ त समाधृतिः सिद्धान्तसमृद्धैः।

This verse is cited in T. Panjii p. 570, II 20-4 with this introductory remark: "यथा साक्षात्कारः नैसर्गिकसत्ता साक्षात्कारः तद्वा साक्षात्कारः। तद्वा साक्षात्कारः। साक्षात्कारः।—॥ The *Sakarā-Jñāna-vadin* is the *Sautrantikā*.

148. ब्राह्मणस्वेताभ्यासः गद्यसाहित्यसमाप्त । अन्य ज्ञानाभ्यासां भेदेऽथ भविष्यति ॥ ५७॥

a = उक्तचारः Its *samvedana* is *gaṇa*. The idea is well explained in the passage quoted in note 145. This is the *sandpoint* of the *Sautrantikā* also. He is therefore called *Bhāyārthānāmanav-vedāṇa* r., my paper: Bud. Idealism, ob. cit., p. 78; Tsan, p. 402, ver. भविष्यम मात्राप्रदार्थः वा यथावत् वेदनः।

149. यद्य तद्विषययः यद्य ॥ [2061] तद्विषयेदार्थसमाप्त ।

विश्लेष्य तैः वेदनः क्षणः किं द्विधतः ॥ ५८॥

T. Panjii. (p. 561, I. 11 ff) cites this verse with this remark: "वेदनः मुख्यातीतः विश्लेषश्चार्थिनी विश्लेषिनीः। तद्विषयेदार्थः। तत्साक्षात्कारः किं कथि वेदनः ॥ विश्लेषेदार्थार्थिनीः। विश्लेष्य परम्पराध्रुवः। अधि च ॥—॥ Definition of *parichcheda*, v. ver. 92. below.—

150. विश्लेषार्थवात्सनां व्यवस्थायः मूलः ॥ ५९॥

वाच्याय व्यवस्थ विश्लेष्य परम्पराध्रुविनायः ॥ ६०॥

a — समारूपः।
151. This is probably the author's criticism of the *saupya* theory of the Sautrantika-Yogacara.

152. अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[�न्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | \[अन्धिकुर्मिललिपिंसुत्तृवनामसद्ये | 

153. विद्वद्व तपस्यां न विद्वद्व यपनामांतः।

154. विद्वद्वान्तः कार्यम तस्मादेन हि स्वतः।

155. Thus the above stated *panccheda* of the ver. 89 is simply *vittinatara*.

156. अनुभवमेव वद्व न विद्वद्व वद्वि वद्वि।

157. सर्वथा तदः संवादः न नेनो प्रबलमातः।

158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things; *sarvakaram-man* is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, r. kosa. IX. ver. 1.

159. चतुर्वटर द्वादश चौदश चतुर्वेशष्टिः।

160. Sakara-vadin is the Sautrantika, and nirakara-vadin Vaihavasi. The Yogacara is tulya-kala-vadin and the Vaihavasika and Satyasiddha are *atulya-kala-vadin*—*Krana-vadin*. Similarly Vasubandhu, a friend of the Sautrantika school pleads for *atulya-kala-vadin*, a Successive comprehension even of omniscient Buddha thus:

सत्त्वनात्सत्त्वसंवादः चतुर्वटरः |

तत्सामसंवादसंवादातः |
161. अन्तर्द्देश यसल तस्मादकथायें स्वर्णाको।
अन्तर्देश संस्कृतीयपुनर्जन्म अन्तर्देश ॥ १०॥

162. We experience different things in different shapes. Some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaibhasikas are external and real belonging to the congealed atoms. The Sautrntika and Digonaga school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind's construction.

163. वियाधिचक्रः विन्यास विन्यास न न स्वर्णाको।
अन्तर्देश संस्कृतीयपुनर्जन्म अन्तर्देश ॥ १०॥
a = lit. तांत्रिकम्।

164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, klesa and jneya-avarana would not have any idea of external things. The author refutes this point, cp. T. Panjji. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.

165. विविधानाशिवा वृद्धिः साधारण व्यापस्थानः।
अन्तर्देश संस्कृतीयपुनर्जन्म।
a = lit. अन्तर्देश संस्कृतीयपुनर्जन्म।

165a. The avisamrupa argument has already been stated in ver. 3. v also ver. 185. Here we may note the passage cited in T. Panjji. 574, 20, 21. The Mahayanists held that the yoga of the second stage is the same as the one of the Jneya-avarana. The text of this passage may be found in his last commentary on the Kaṭikās.

166. निर्दिष्टां विविधानाशिवा वृद्धिः।
केतुकुमारिः विविधानाशिवा वृद्धिः।
निर्दिष्टां ज्ञातांमयवाक्यां रूपस्तिः।

167. अन्तर्देश संस्कृतीयपुनर्जन्म अन्तर्देश ॥ १०॥

168. The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.
169. यत्र दिः भवति मां निरस्थ्यायुतं तस्मातः
बेलि यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् न ॥ १०२ ॥
This verse is cited in T. sm. p. 572.

170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, adhyātma as stated in the next verse and imageless, cfr. T. Panji, p. 182: निरस्थ्यायुतं तस्मात यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् तस्मात यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम्
The imageless produced by anadi-veçana or sakti formed out of knowledges by the sensible object for the Sautra-ätika ५, ver. 27, above.

171. यस्य सोऽद्वीप नास्य सोऽद्वीप मिरोधादिकारणातः
अन्वयं बेलि यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् ॥ १०३ ॥
\( \text{sa} \) In the sense of a separate image, prthak akara.

172. अयस्य अवस्था अयस्य अवस्था अयस्था अवस्था
[207a] यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् ॥ १०४ ॥
a or लवणम्.

173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says; this is accepted by the author himself, note: बेलि यज्ञायमार्यां in the ver. 101.
The author, however, stated it as कल्पितa by way of pratyanga.

174. नृत्यं लवणम् १०५ ॥
\( \text{sa} \) यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् ॥ १०५ ॥
a or लवणम्.

175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs, for the Vaiśhālatka, are derivative material elements, but for the Yogacara they are some forms of Sakti, v. Alambanap, ver. 7, with Vinitadeva's tika. cfr. Sayaysidhi, chap. 45, they are nominal. Paramesvata is explained in ver. 89-92 above. Yogacara object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.

176. श्रीमत तपस्या प्रारम्भितो समाध्यायी
\( \text{sa} \) यज्ञायमार्यां नृत्यं लवणम् ॥ १०६ ॥
\( \text{sa} \) तपस्या. श्रीसम्मानैः
This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense.

177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautra-ätika-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of varanavada which is criticised in Mad. Īrūka, VII, 8 and Madh. avataras, my Sanskrit text,
p. 60: सब कल्प्न्ति हीलानिरुक्तवस्मादायनम्। It seems that the early Sautrantika, i.e. Darśantaṇika does not accept the theory of svatamoveda, cfr. Kosa, IX, p. 231, n. 4; Vyāhyā, p. 698, 2-3; Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68,71,72. The Vaibhāṣika maintains that one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, (cfr. ver. 84, n. 144, cp. ver. 90, 144 and 147; also) In case of the accepting svatamoveda, how the memory is possible is explained in Bodhi-avātara IX ver. 246, my Epitom. p. 39, ALB. 1953.

178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several colours in the case of citrastraṇa is quite permissible, T. T. Panjiri, p. 571: देव समस्ते समयाक्षेत्रस्याचार्यसः स्मरितम् विद्ययत्ते द्विंधितो रंगात्या परम्परा भवन्ति। विद्ययत्ते द्विंधितो रंगात्यां परम्परा भवन्ति। तस्य विद्ययत्ते द्विंधितो रंगात्यां परम्परा भवन्ति। तस्य विद्ययत्ते द्विंधितो रंगात्यां परम्परा भवन्ति। Tattvāntara, probably means some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are simultaneously experienced in the case of citrastraṇa. But Subhāgupta may not agree with this opinion, as a sensuous knowledge, according to him can comprehend several homogeneous objects at once.

179. कन्याराहणेऽन्न्वतः विशिष्टसीमांवचारः। नेति ते देवता: तन्न्वदान्यान्त्रि न च।

180. cp. M. I, 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242; Sadyasiddhi, chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, sound, etc. cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respective sense-organ-says the Vaibhāṣika. The Yogacara on the other hand, think that simultaneity of different nonconstrucive consciousness is possible as T. san, says; स्वजीवकेश्वरसदान्तविद्यते तात्त्विकता।

181. तुष्य व गात्रस्ते स्मरितम् व्यक्तित्वं न गम।

182. अहं सर्वत्र विद्वते न कन्यास्य भोगः।

होतं भवंकर्तान्तं भवेत् विशेषदृष्टिविविधं। (1255-55)

The same in Panm, var. 131, 136-37.

सहवेदनान्तं भेदावशायविविधं स्वजीवं।

दुर्वात्रऽस्य भवेत्। च।

cp. Ibid. 206: तात्त्विकता तत्वं भवेत् विशेषदृष्टिविविधं।

बहुविधानेऽन्न्वतः विशेषदृष्टिविविधं स्वजीवं।

Prajñālāra's Bhsya: विशेषदृष्टिविविधं र्मान् नामार्थविविधं। तात्त्विकताः
The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. cp. again T. san: अविवाक्त्र इत्य सहाय, पाण्डु. p. 241: सत्यविवाक्त्र इत्य सहाय, स्वयम्बूर्धनोऽस्मात्। See also note 71 above.

181. निर्विवाक्त्र इत्य सहाय पाण्डु। a=dmīgs. pa.

182. निर्विवाक्त्र कारणमात्र अविवाक्त्रा दुःख पाण्डु। (197)

183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (sāvakalpa) is effected with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. logic II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment's pure sensation.

184. अविवाक्त्रा दुःख पाण्डु।

185. Jnanakara, for this author, is grabakakara, cfr. n. 165n.

186. निर्विवाक्त्रा दुःख पाण्डु।

187. cp. T. San. ver. 2039. सत्यविवाक्त्र इत्य सहाय स्वयम्बूर्धनात्।

188. निर्विवाक्त्रा दुःख पाण्डु।

Tadā निर्विवाक्त्रा इत्य सहाय न निर्विवाक्त्रा।
189.  

190. Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.

191. The kind of nirvikalpa mind that is pleaded by the Sautrantika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The Valabhasika conception of nirvikalpa is explained in Kosala, 1, ver. 33, with Pounsin's note.

192. We must distinguish between the mental act and the mind. The mind is a mental function, whereas the mental act is the object of the mind.

193. This argument is set up by Dignaga, v. Alampana, ver. 1-3.

194. The idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to its object and this simulated knowledge becomes the object of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its predecessor. In Tibetan or after su-a-sa stands for objective case governed by the verb had, pa.

200. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next...
moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your Sarangāya theory. Therefore it is not well founded.

202. केवलाधृतीन्द्राधिकारयो तथा ब्रह्मचर्य:।
    शरीर: प्रवाहमया विश्रान्त: त भौतिकस्वयंतरात्मगत:।
    आ लित: तत्का: ब लित: अलावन:।

203. See T. San. ver. 2083: दत्तवधिकार भवतानाहो विविधविविधत:।
    पानजी दत्तवधिकार भवत इतिभौतिकस्वयंतरात्मगत:।
    कस्त भवत इति विविधविविधत: यास्य दत्तवधिकारस्वयंतरात्मगत:।
    Sakti may be considered alambana as it arouses the knowledge, v. note 43. Sakti—alambana theory has also been referred to by Visistadeva in his Tika Alambananap, ver. 8. v. my forthcoming edn.

204. धातुः विविधता विविधताय विविधतार्थिः। ॥ १२० ॥
    येकाप्रावरणेऽविद: अलित: अत्यन्ताभिलक्षमः।

205. अत्यन्ताभिलक्ष नामकार्यात् नात्मकाते तृतीयाः। येकाप्रावरणेऽविद:।
    ॥ १२१ ॥
    धातुः विविधताय विविधतार्थिः। तृतीयाः।
    अत्यन्ताभिलक्ष नामकार्यात्।

206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality and objectivity. Sakti may fulfil the first but not the second.

207. ग्रंथिकृतम: इत्यं वाच्यात्मकातः कर्तव्यः। ॥ १२२ ॥
    सत्त्वात् युक्तो न न जैत्य विश्वशास्तितु ॥

208. This is the fundamental doctrine of the author, Vaibhasika.

209. वाच्यात्मकातः कर्तव्योपयुक्त न ॥ १२३ ॥
    विविधतार्थिः विविधतार्थिः। भवानितिः।

210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the external like desirable or undesirable; for, what is desirable for one person is undesirable for another, v. Bhavasatikā, p. 39.

211. पुरुषात्मकस्ते कर्मादित्यते गुणात्मकः। ॥ १२४ ॥
    हृदयेश्वत्त्त विविधात्मकात्मकात्मकातः।
    a लित: अलावनस्व:—The case-ending is not in Tib.
212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this: The Yogacara thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power or adhisthāna, cp. Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. योगाचारी त्वम पौर्णिमा एवं श्रवणश्रवणिकालेः अति।

213. अर्थात्, वीरिनिमोक्ष गण्य तत्समाचारणम्, १ १७३ द। अथवा युज्मातृत्वस्य सन्तुष्टिः।

214. दीर्घुमूल्यस्यत्समाचारवाम्बातिन्यात्तैः मन्त्रयोगोऽद्वैते । अकस्मात् मूल्यस्य व्यज्ञात्तैः तद्गुणः।

215. भाषे, भाषा हुयतो शेष तद्वयस्मात्तथात्तैः । २२ ॥ बहु पुरुषोपयोगः, निम्नलिखितविवाहः।

216. अविश्व यथोपयोगश्च, १ १५२ द।

217. Svapropaghitavat, v. note 221 below. The Saunaritika-Yogacara's definition of reality is: स्वप्रपरम्परेष्वादः यथाः। Nyayabindu, i, 15; T. Pranji, p 730, l, 16; सस्तःसत्तानांतः यथाः।

218. निम्नलिखितविवाहः काल तहतिहोत्री वेदम्।

219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse.

220. [208a] आध्यात्मिक वेदां वेदाः, १ १२९ द।

221. This is given as an example to disprove externism by Vatsyayana in his Ymaa ver. 3 a: त्वमनवया भो। भश्ययः निम्नलिखितविवाहः। यथा यथात् द्वितीयविवाहः।
222. साक्षात्कार सुखार्गियोत्त || १३२ ||
करण्य खाले रघुनाथ मंगलांण कामत निविदा ||
यथा स्वायत्सनम्।

233. कामिन्य यलों ऊँच || १३३ ||
कामाक्षाकाश समपूर्ण, हर्माहर ख्यातमालवर।
विश्वसनवशीलिन।

244. विराजितिच योगसत्ता || १३४ ||
त समाधिय मनुष्यन कर्माण्य व्यवस्थापन।
विश्वसनवशीलिन।

255. राजाणु कुमार साधनें || १३५ ||
हूँर्हूँ हूँ हूँ ततु पुर्णें च कहाँरे।

266. Bio y-don z-buddher aritbah probably is the same as kamartha previously stated in the ver. 132, note, 220, i.e. putwarta purpose of human action.

277. विमाणांक यथा तैक सुखार्गियोलवसम रें || १३६ ||
अवरण वहने वहने सिद्धवर्दिन देकर।

288. The definition of action is: भेदां बौद्ध व्यक्तिण च corresponding to pali A. III, 415. Ref. Kathavathu, p. 393. Madh. kar. XVII, 2-3, Madh. Av, VI, ver. 89. cited in Boch. Panji. p. 472-Poussin, kosa. IV, n. 3 since there is no cetasas, will to dream, there is no real action.

299. पौडःमुन्निकालयात: वसों अन्वहताः || १३७ ||
अतो विकारितह बे व कार्येन्येन विश च।
विकारितहिचिकालयः।
a = lit. तथा वकार्याय: सिद्ध।
b = lit. विकारितहिचिकालयानोऽ।

300. The author refutes the Vimala, ver. 4,... || चक्रवर्ती पुनः।
स्वाभासांतः हृदये दैम व्यक्ते।
Bhaya: यथा नवेकु नाराश्न। नारासायनांद्विद्विद्। देशालय-विलेखत: विकारिते मुख:।
विकारिताबृहस्पतियांगालनान्विर्यावृक्षसंयोजिते।
बैतूलामोक्षविधि शास्त्रं प्रयोगो च विकारितार्किकम्।
नारासायनांद्विद्विद्। समाधियान्विर्यावृक्षसंयोजिते।

310. नारासायनांद्विद्विद् || १३८ ||
स्वाभासांतः हृदये दैम व्यक्ते।
परिदृश्य: कृती नानिता।

233. तथा निर्विपुलतांतः \( ॥ \) \( १२३ \) \( ॥ \)

234. Reference is probably a Caruda-mastra promising the boon.

235. \( \text{मृच्छित्य संपति तांत्रिकता कथा} \) \( ॥ \)

236. Panatantra, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.

237. \( \text{पौराणिको नामस्वार्तपि} \) \( ॥ \) \( १७१ \) \( ॥ \)

238. Vasubandhu contends that paras-citta-jnana is untrue, cp. Yimsa- ver 20, but is true for the author, \( \text{v. ver. 148. below.} \)

239. \( \text{वाल्मीकिन्द्रो नान्याय विदितव विह शेष} \)

240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.

241. \( \text{स्ववाचार्यकल्याण्य} \) \( \text{व्याख्या} \) \( \text{रूहे न} \) \( \text{प्रके} \) \( \text{वे} \)

242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika's theory of of rasmu: moving towards the object much criticised in the Saiva-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed, वास्त्र \( \text{(vapana)} \) for Dignaga, Pram-sam i, 9, T. Panji. p. 399:

243. \( \text{लघु} \) \( \text{वास्त्र} \) \( \text{व्याख्या} \) \( ॥ \) \( १७३ \) \( ॥ \)

244. Sva-citta-jnana, knowing one's own mind is possible in the same manner as paras-citta-jnana is. This is not, however,
sva-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.


247. cp. Vimsa p. 19: ... etc. तत्तत्त्वातः तत्त्तत्त्वातः। तत्तत्त्वातः तत्तत्त्वातः। तत्तत्त्वातः तत्तत्त्वातः। तत्तत्त्वातः तत्तत्त्वातः। तत्तत्त्वातः तत्तत्त्वातः। तत्तत्त्वातः तत्तत्त्वातः।

250. This is the Vaiśeṣika’s conception of Sarṣajna.

253. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it v. n. 249-50.
257. भविष्यिक विकारं सर्वं विकारितमह ॥ ५२ ॥
हि विज्ञानविद् जो ज्ञातं जानकारक ॥
वैत्य पूजाप्रुणी ॥
a z lit. सर्वं विकारितमह ॥

258. तत्त्वे नेत्रं करण ॥
श्रवं विद्या प्राप्तस्म न्युत्तिख ह वैत्यप्रुण ॥ ५३ ॥
a z Th. der. sdugs. so.

259. This probably refers to Kumarila's objection.

260. मयायोत्थितिवादः औ प्रक्षण्यानवध्यूष ॥
रूपादिवृत्तिसामान्यं नित्यस्त莉 ६ परिवर्तनं ॥ ५४ ॥
a z lit. नित्यस्त्यत्सामान्यं नित्यस्त莉 ॥
b z lit. नित्यस्त्यत्सामान्यं स्वभावित ॥

261. सह सार्यं साधनात्म ८ दानाद्वारं निर ॥
विक्रमं जनन जन्यो न प्रेमस्त्युतं जूति है ॥ ५५ ॥
a z जनने जन्यो ब्रह्मण ॥

262. शुद्धगृहि व जन य भवन सुधाकरं ८ मं भवन ॥
ब्रह्मणवृत्तियुक्तं शुद्धगृहि तत ् जनन ॥ ५६ ॥
a z lit. शुद्धगृहि तत ् जनन ॥

263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.

264. जयगान भाषितं रासायन ॥
दयानं भाषायं यथावत् इति ॥ ५७ ॥

265. दूरी भाषाकारेरो [२००६] न भाषासमाधिकार ॥
a z दूरी भाषाकारेरो दयानं इति ॥ ५८ ॥

266. It is interesting to note that the author's statement to the effect that our idea of one entity (dhāva) in as assumption on the discrete atoms.

267. नित्यायोत्थितिवादः औ नित्यायोत्थितिवादः
वैत्यप्रुणीबृत्तियुक्तमुख्यानवध्यूषि ॥ ५९ ॥
a z add. मघु ॥

268. विवेकविद्वस्तिः सर्वपरि द्वस्ति विवेकित ॥
भौतिकस्वयं विवेकित ॥ ६० ॥
269. It is historically true that the Buddha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment cannot be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yogicara.

270. अतः सम्बृहद कस्त तत्त्विकाष्ठः नुस: | 
तत्त्वादित्याठानिः तत्त्वादित्यालयादि नुस: || १६१ ||

271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

272. यथा वैषयिकसाधारे यथाधिक्षत्वम्। 
तद्विक्षोत्तत्वम् न सम्भवति। || १६२ ||

273. अन्योपदेशकामावे विषयिकाष्ठो च। 
दत्तानामार्काः व विशेषतः वाच नव || १६३ ||
सम्भवादित्यालाभात्मात्मानाम् विभविद्वा। 
तत्त्वादित्यालयादि नुसः कतादित्यालयादि। || १६४ ||

274. cp. Vimśa. ver. 18: विषयिकाष्ठो विषयिकाष्ठं विषयिकाष्ठवस्ती निचः।

275. यथाविशेषाथिकवात्स्य यथाविशेषाथिकवात्स्य। 
तद्विक्षोत्तत्वम् न सम्भवति। || १६५ ||

276. अन्योपदेशायाम् महाभियोगिनः विषयिकाष्ठो च। 
वेदं ज्ञातं आचार्यं विषयिकाष्ठो च। || १६६ ||

277. सम्पूर्ण सर्वविद्वाच विषयिकाष्ठो च। 
कथितं अन्योपदेशायाम्। || १६७ ||

278. See Bodhic. v. 5, 86 and Panji, citing the authority of the Bodhisattva-pratimoksa.

279. परिनिर्वाणसमस्तेऽनुवम मूलाक्षणः। 
स्य विशेषायाम् कथाम् यथूपादनाय। || १६८ ||


281. यथा न्यथा न स्यू मम मूलाक्षणिकायाम्। 
तत्त्वादित्यालयादि नुसः मूलाक्षणिकायाम्। || १६९ ||

282. भूखुधर्मा विषयिकाष्ठो विषयिकाष्ठो च। 
कथितं अन्योपदेशायाम्। || १७० ||
283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-ran-dagdl... 
Swaya-moksa is the highest perfection attainable by any 
disciple of the Buddha.

284. यदि प्रकृति; जीव: सत्तिरि: [209] विजय ग्रन्थे। 
तथा पुनःसहस्रोशोऽधृत 29 यथा पुनः सत्तिरि: 
[192]


286. अन्नविह्र लोकलोप वैज्ञानिकोशलुकारक्यम्।

287. भद्दालस्तरं बलव विज्ञेयवेदन्त।

288. cp. T. Panji, p. 180: ब्रह्मवादाय गति विस्तारित नाते वास्तविकतां।

289. विद्यालयारस्त्र ज्ञात विज्ञा भूमिकातिविवेचना।

290. This prasanga has been made, because the knowledge of 
smoke is not concentimint with the knowledge of fire: this 
will become clear from the just next verse.

291. बाणिज्यवाचितं विज्ञा भूमिकावरण यदि।

292. ब्रह्मवादाय गति विस्तारित नाते वास्तविकताः।

293. प्रतिक्रियायांनेत्र व वचनामानसंवेचने।

294. अति विलोममयम् सन्तोष्य सिद्धार्थस्तर्यं।

295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpreta-
tions of those passages which speak of citramatra.

296. विद्यालयारस्त्र ज्ञात: बाणिज्यवाचितं विज्ञा।

297. a z. lit. विज्ञागताः धार्मिकोशलुकारक्यम् विज्ञानान्त्यसि।

298. This is the author's explanation of Dharmacaryam, a 
Mahayanic idea of the external things. Thus, according to
hin all the passages declaring *dharma-nairatmya* are to be understood in the manner indicated here.

297. *अन्यत्वाच तथा गोरे तथा बल्लिकविनिमयः*।

*Bhayaparabho भक्तिः: कल्पन, विलियः* **297**


298. *वायो न विदे भोगे तथा बल्लिकविनिमयः*।

*B बाणायिनिर्धारितत: वायो विविधः* **298**

300. *Padgala-nairatmya* is also accepted by the Sarvastivadi-Vais.

bhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for accepting it.

301. *योजनासम्बन्धम् क्षेत्रविनिमयः*।

*B योजनासम्बन्धम् परमता तु योजनासम्बन्धः* **301**

302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris.

tics, *(laksana)*, viz. *Parikalpita, parantarana* and *parinigpana*.

Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz. *kalpita, vikalpita* and *dharma*, of which the last one is explained as *svakshana* corresponding to *Parinigpana* of the Yogacara. *Kalpita*, a basic entity, i.e. a *bhavamatra* may correspondto *Parantarana* and *Vikalpita*, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to *parikalpita*. Thus according to this Vaishasika author as in the case of the Yogacara, two things, *Kalpita* and *dharma* are true whereas *vikalpita* like *parikalpita* of the Yogacara is untrue. That the *vikalpita* is untrue has already been pointed out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false as in much as fancied by worldlings. *cp. ver. 40, विलियः भाववियः न भाविकार्य निमित्तः*।

*Dharma*, is an everlasting truly as it is the same as *svakshana*, an everlasting *bhavahota*, *(svabhavah karvita casti)* ... *Kalpita* that is explained as *bhavamatra*, a basic
entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the various things are fancied. Atoms are *kalpita*, i.e. inferred, *v. ver. 64, (n. 111)*. why the separate atoms are not cognized is made clear by the author in the *ver. 44 (n. 76)*, though the aggregate atoms are cognized in their *svakshana*, *v. ver. 37, (n. 62)*.
303. गव रण शुभ रूपमूल का लाल: कयित्ता।
कयित्ता हैलके बिना कयित्तामूली। II १५४।

304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika standpoint.

305. दस्यावरू (210a) यवीते गन भव एव स्त।
अबयान्त्री सबस्प तथागत परमेश्वर स्वरूप, ll १५५।
a. Tib. dnigsmayin.

306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external things is avilamvada, a non-contradicted experience, v. verr. 3. (n. 5) 12 (n. 31) and 99. (n. 168).

307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and [therefore] are non-existent.

308. मध्याध्यात्। यहरेये अनिरंतर दिनस।
क्ष ्क्षेत्रेश्वरे नो वा बिनालंतु परिग्रन्ते। II १५५।
a=ही. विकाल।

309. नागाध्यात्मकसः नेद्धल कपुरीर्कर्षा।
विकालायकात्मकानां संयुक्तम् देसभ म न । १५५।

310. श्रावण भागुनया भागुनया भागुनया भागुनया भागुन।
अभ्यासः मर्य मर्य मर्य मर्य मर्य मर्य मर्य मर्य। II १५५।
a. Tib. mon. nded. cin—सागास—
b. Tib. skye. ba. gten—बगास।
c. Tib. dngog.dngag. dngog.dngag.
1. [གངས་གཞག] 8(2013) འབྲུག་ཐོབ། རས་དབང་ཆུས་ཀྱི་མིན་གྲངས།
   རོ་བོད་ཤུཀ་བཤེས་བོད་།
2. [མི་དེ་ཡི་ཁྲིམས་བཤད།] རུས་གཞག དཔལ་ཤེས་བོད། རུས་གཞག དཔལ་ཤེས་བོད།
3. [དེ་ཡི་ཁྲིམས་བཤད།] འབྲུག་ཐོབ་མི་སྤུལ།
4. [གཟུགས་གཞག] རུས་གཞག དཔལ་ཤེས་བོད།
5. [དེ་ཡི་ཁྲིམས་བཤད།] འབྲུག་ཐོབ་མི་སྤུལ།
6. [དེ་ཡི་ཁྲིམས་བཤད།] འབྲུག་ཐོབ་མི་སྤུལ།
7. རག་པའི་མཐོང་བཅས་སོ།། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
    དཔལ་མོ་ཤིང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
8. དབང་པོ་ནང་ཐོབ་དམིགས། དཔལ་མོ་ཤིང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
    དཔལ་མོ་ཤིང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
9. དམིགས་བུ་འཕོ་ཐོབ་ལྷག་པ་ཡིན། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
    འཕགས་པ་བཤེལ་བ་ཡིན། འཕགས་པ་བཤེལ་བ་ཡིན།
10. འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
    འཁོར་ཐོགས་བུ་འཕོ་ཐོབ་ལྷག་པ་ཡིན། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
11. དབང་པོ་ནང་ཐོབ་དམིགས། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
    འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
12. འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
    འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
13. འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
    འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། རིག་སུ་ཐོགས་མེ་ཏོག་མིན།
14. འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
    འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
15. འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
    འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
16. འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
    འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་། འབྲས་གླེང་བཞིན་དེ་དེ་བཟང་།
17. ཿ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཞེས་ཐོབ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

18. ཉུབ་ངན་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་དག་བུ་། བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

19. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

20. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

21. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

22. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

23. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

24. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

25. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

26. དེ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།

[2004] ནི་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན། ཟོ་བོད་ལ་བཀོད་པ་བཀོད་པ་བོད་མཁན།
37. གཞུང་བཟོག་དགོངས་པར་འབྱུང་ཁྲིམས། འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
38. འཕུག་པར་རྩོར་བཞི་བོད། འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
39. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས། རྩོར་བཞི་བོད།
40. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
41. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
42. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
43. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
44. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
45. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
46. འཕྲུལ་མདོ་གྲུབ་ཐོབ་མི་ཁྲིམས།
47.  dünak pum `phrengtshognyi bzhin| gnyenmarg rgyan sogs bangs rgyal chos| 1
   dbang phyag sde bzhin| gnyenmarg rgyan sogs bangs rgyal chos| 1
48.  lobsang gtsug ba bstan i sbyin| bstan i sbyin| 1
   dbang phyag sde bzhin| bstan i sbyin| 1
49.  dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
   dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
50.  khang chen gyi phyi de sbya khyab gling| khang chen gyi phyi de sbya khyab gling| 1
   dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
51.  letrul gyi phyi de sbya khyab gling| letrul gyi phyi de sbya khyab gling| 1
    [2054] khang chen gyi phyi de sbya khyab gling| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
52.  dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
    dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
53.  dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
    dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
54.  dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
    dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
55.  dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
    dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
56.  dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
    dbang phyag sde bzhin| dbang phyag sde bzhin| 1
57. ཨུག་པར་ཡུན་པའི་སོགས་སྟེཉེས་པའི་དངོས་གྲོལ་གཅིག་

58. ཡི་རིམ་འཇིག་ཤེས་ཅིག་གི་དགོས་པོས་

59. འི་བསྟན་ནམ་ཐ་སྒྲིག་རིམ་ཐོག་

60. ཆིབ་ལྡེན་ཚིགས་པར་རྩོང་

61. ནུས་པར་ཐོབ་ཤེས་པའི་དངོས་

62. ས་ད་ཅུ་ལྡེན་ཐོབ་སྟེཉེས་པའི་དངོས་

63. དེའི་ཐོབ་བསྒྲུད་གཞོན་པ་དངོས་

64. མས་པའི་ཐོབ་བསྒྲུད་

65. དེའི་ཐོབ་བསྒྲུད་གཞོན་པ་དངོས་

66. དེའི་ཐོབ་བསྒྲུད་གཞོན་པ་དངོས་
95. শিবায় শিবায় শিবায় । মনঃ শিবায় মনঃ শিবায় ।
   মনঃ শিবায় ।

96. শিবায় শিবায় মনঃ । শিবায় শিবায় শিবায় ।
   মনঃ শিবায় ।

97. মনঃ মনঃ মনঃ ।

98. মনঃ মনঃ ।

99. মনঃ মনঃ ।

100. মনঃ মনঃ ।

101. মনঃ মনঃ ।

102. মনঃ মনঃ ।

103. মনঃ মনঃ ।

104. মনঃ মনঃ ।
114. ང་བོ་ཞི་དགེ་བཙན་པོ་
115. བཤི་དོན་བཤི་དོན་བཤི་དོན་བཤི
116. བཤི་དོན་བཤི་དོན་བཤི་
117. བཤི་དོན་བཤི་
118. བཤི་དོན་བཤི
119. བཤི་དོན་བཤི
120. བཤི་དོན་བཤི
121. བཤི་དོན་
122. བཤི་
123. བཤི་

124. ལོང་ཕྲུག  འཛིན་པོ་ཟླ་བཞིན་ འབྲུ་མི་ཐོབ་བསྡུ་བོད།
   ལྷག་པོ་བྱེད་བསྡུ་བོད་བཞིན་ལ་བ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

125. ཆུང་ལུག  འཕུག་ འཕགས་པར་བེད།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

126. འཕུག་ ལེ་བསྡུས་བཞིན་བཞིཏ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

127. རྡོ་རྗེ་ འཕུག་ ལེ་བསྡུས་བཞིན་བཞིཏ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

128. རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

129. རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

130. རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

131. རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

132. རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།

133. རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་ རྡོ་རྗེ་
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
   བོད་པོ་ཞིག་ལས་ལ་ཕྱེད་བོད་བཞིན་ལ།
134. ཀྱི་སྐྱིད་པས་འོགས་པར་འགྲུབ་མྱུར་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་པར་བྱང་

135. མི་ལྡེ་འབོད་པར་འགྲུབ་མྱུར་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་པར་

136. ཀྱི་སྐྱིད་པས་འོགས་པར་
   ཕྱུལ་དུ་བུ་ཅན་སེམས་

137. ཀྱི་སྐྱིད་པས་འོགས་པར་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་པར་

138. ངོ་མ་པ་དེ་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་

139. ཕྱུལ་དུ་བུ་ཅན་སེམས་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་

140. ཆོས་སྐྱིད་བསྟན་པ་འཇིག་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་

141. ངོ་མ་པ་དེ་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་

142. ངོ་མ་པ་དེ་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་

143. ངོ་མ་པ་དེ་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་
   བོད་པའི་ལྟ་སྤྱོད་མེད་
144. কৌণি হলে পুনরায় ভক্তি বৃদ্ধি করা প্রয়োজন।
    যদি দেব পূর্বক মুক্তি লাভ করি তাহ তাহার তত্ত্বাবধারন নয়।

145. শিষ্যমণি মিশ্রণ করিয়া নরমবাক্তিত্ব করিয়া
    (পূর্বক নামপ্রসাদ করিয়া সুর্যের সেবা করিয়া)
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]

146. দেখি নিত্য মন্ত্র অনুষ্ঠান কর প্রতিদিন
    নিষেধ করিয়া সৃষ্টি করি
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]

147. কৃষি কর অনুষ্ঠান কর অনুষ্ঠান কর
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]
    প্রতিদিন সম্পূর্ণ তীর্থ কর
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]

148. নিয়মিত হলে প্রতিদিন কর
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]

149. বিভিন্ন মন্ত্র অনুষ্ঠান কর অনুষ্ঠান কর
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা করিয়া দীপক দিয়া]

150. [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর অনুষ্ঠান কর]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর অনুষ্ঠান কর]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর অনুষ্ঠান কর]

151. [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]

152. [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]
    [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]

153. [কোন কোন স্থলে লিখিত সেবা কর]
154. མཁྱེན་པ་དང་དགུ་པ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཤྱི་ཤྱི་
ཐེབས་ཀྱིས་དྲི་ེ་དྲི་ེ

155. བོད་ཀྱི་ཚགས་པ་སི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཤྱི་ཤྱི་
བཙུན་བཟུན་གྱིས་ན་ཤྱི་ཤྱི

156. ལོ་ཐོ་ཤོག་ཤོག་བརྩོན་པོ་ཤོག་ཤོག་

157. སིད་མི་ཤོག་ཤོག་ཤོག་

158. སིད་ཚོག་ས་ཤོག་ཤོག་

159. མཁྱེན་པ་བཙུན་བཟུན་ཤོག་ཤོག་

160. སིད་ཚོག་ས་ཤོག་ཤོག་

161. སིད་ཚོག་ས་ཤོག་ཤོག་

162. སིད་ཚོག་ས་ཤོག་ཤོག་

163. སིད་ཚོག་ས་ཤོག་ཤོག་
174. [भूनल्लिमुख्रस्वस्तिः]
[गृहस्थानस्मरणस्वस्तिः]
[विद्वद्धा दत्तकस्मरणस्वस्तिः]

175. [वंशविवेकस्वस्तिः]
[समस्याचारस्वस्तिः]
[स्मृतिस्मरणस्वस्तिः]
[स्मृतिप्रचारस्मरणस्वस्तिः]

176. [श्रवणस्मरणस्वस्तिः]
[प्रहरिक्रममपिंचशेषाः]
[श्रीदेवी अमृताहीनाः]
[तुपि सुखमार्गिता पिन्निकाः]

177. [रघुपत्निविन्यासविनयशेषाः]
[समाजशैलीविन्यासाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्यासविनयशेषाः]

178. [श्रीमानशुभलिङ्गशेषाः]
[श्रीपरवस्तुसम्पत्तिशेषाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससम्पत्तिशेषाः]

179. [रघुपत्निविन्यासशेषाः]
[श्रीमानशुभलिङ्गशेषाः]
[श्रीपरवस्तुसम्पत्तिशेषाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससम्पत्तिशेषाः]

180. [प्रहरिक्रमसूत्रशेषाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससूत्रशेषाः]
[प्रहरिक्रमसूत्रशेषाः]
[श्रीमाननिःखशेषाः]

181. [विद्यार्थिधर्मीकाराध्यायः]
[श्रीत्रित्रुद्धशेषाः]
[श्रीमाननिःखशेषाः]
[प्रहरिक्रमसूत्रशेषाः]

182. [श्रीमानशुभलिङ्गशेषाः]
[श्रीपरवस्तुसम्पत्तिशेषाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससम्पत्तिशेषाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससम्पत्तिशेषाः]

183. [श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससम्पत्तिशेषाः]
[श्रीपरवस्तुसम्पत्तिशेषाः]
[श्रीरघुपत्निविन्याससम्पत्तिशेषाः]
1. This introductory sentence is not found in the Snar-thang cdn. (=N.)

2. N. རོ་མོ་

3. N. རོ་མོ་ for རོ་མོ་

4. Peking (=P.) སྦྲི་། རུ་

5. P. ཐ་

6. P. རོ་མོ་ for རོ་མོ་

7. P: རོ་མོ་

8. P. ཐ་

9. P. རོ་མོ་

10. P. ཐ་

11. P. རོ་མོ་

12. P. རོ་མོ་

13. N. རོ་མོ་

14. P. ཐ་

15. P. རོ་མོ་ (?)
16. P. नृपन
17. N. नृपनच
18. P. नृप
19. P. नृप
20. P. नृप
21. P. नृप
22. P. नृप

Verse 95a: Read नृपशिक्ष for नृपशि

“d” Read नृपशिक्ष =नृपशि for नृपशि वाल
TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY

(Figure refers to the verse number)

गुणु  वर्तम 68.

तः  च 68, 101.

णीत्व  यम 81.  ो  दुःख

—त्व  अपराज  ो  दुःखे

रेणव्या  च 101.

हिंस्की  भवान 101.

हिुंपि  शरण 68.

सहस्युक्त महाभाष्य  वैद्यक निशाने 95.

भूष्य विषया 35.  ो  भूष्यां  हृदी

रेणु  नध 29.

हृदाकाराश विराहंदुकु मन वेन स्थान हावेलन 614.

कर्महेतु ज्ञानहेतु तुर्यकु  वाणित हावेलन 71.

कुलकालकालिकु हिताधिकालिकु  भिंविभिन्न भक्तिपथ 35.

दुःख  संहारे 87.  ो  दुर्दा

हिताधिकालिकु विराहंदुकु  विनिज्जन  वकेद 87.

भूष्य  विषया 35.

भूष्यां विषया 71.

दुःख  विषया 87.
কেন্দ্রে ফুলফল মিলিত রয়ে গেছে যেন তুলনামূলক ৯৫।

নরুদারিকা হেঁহেঁ, ৬৮, ৭১।

কুঁজ বা কুঁজকরে মূল নির্দেশিত হয়েছে ৩৫।

ষষ্ঠশতক অবস্থান ৮৭, মূল ৫৫।

ক্লাইমেট ন না তুলনা ৮৯।

দুই প্রতি ইস্ট্রমেন্টাল প্রস্তাব করা ৬৩।

৩. ” ” ” ” ” ”

ক্রিয়াহ্রদেশীয় ইস্ট্রমেন্টাল" এক বাল প্রয়োজন: ৬৪।

ক্রিয়াসম্পন্ন ধারণা নির্দেশিত হবে তুলনামূলক ৯৫।

মূল পার্থক্য বাড়ানোর ফলে তুলনামূলক ৮৭।

নামাংকনের পরামর্শ নেওয়ার ফলে ৮৭।

মূল শুধু ৮৯।

কলা ৪৪, ৬৬; তথ্য ৭১।

হিসাব হেঁ ৮৯।

কুঁজ কুঁজ না ৯৫।

ক্রিয়াহ্রদেশীয় ইস্ট্রমেন্টাল (৪) প্রস্তাব করা ৮৯।

ক্রিয়াহ্রদেশীয় ইস্ট্রমেন্টাল ১০১।

কুঁজকরে না ১০১।

ক্রিয়াহ্রদেশীয় ইস্ট্রমেন্টাল ৫৫।

নরুদারিকা হেঁ ৪৪।
ماکدیسی

لشکر 89. v. مرتضی‌قلی‌نژاد

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی

ماکدیسی
"Holding the banner of wolf symbolises holding by force, that is, conquest". (1)

It is true that the expression "grey wolf" is used much later than "wolf", though ordinarily the colour of the wolf is grey in Tibet as in other parts of the world too (2). The first instances—in the works on Mahakala (mgon-po 'bras-lugs) and Kila (phur-pa 'bras) in Kanjur (bkha'-'dun 'bras-skyes) and Tenjur (bstan-'gyur 'bras-skyes) (3)—did not use the epithet grey while later in Sakyabum (sa-sku-yab-'khor) (4), Rinchen Terzed (rin-chen-ter-mi-dod) (5) and the 5th Dalai Lama's (bes-'bu-chen-po 'bras-skyes) works, (6) the epithet was quite current.

When the Mandala (dkhyul-'khor 'bras-skyes) (7) of a deity was threatened by the evil spirits as animal like tiger, elephant or wolf emerged from the body of the same deity to protect the Mandala. The fat of the wolf is used in Tantric (bgyud 'bras) chemistry (8) and some Mandala is surrounded by eight graves and also eight different creatures (9). Wolf is one among the eight creatures.

In Eastern Tibet (gsangs 'bras) a traveller would regard it as a good omen, if he comes across a hawk, a kite or a wolf on the way. This belief can perhaps be traced back to King Gesar (gszar 'bras). Gesar had three big generals who were represented by these three creatures. In the epic of Gesar one reads about the general who was symbolised by wolf and who described himself as the wolf of a man who killed or preyed on others as if they were lambs (10).

There are possibilities that the grey wolf motif itself might have developed in Khotan (bs-yul 'bras) and had come to Tibet via India, in the time of Guru Padmasambhava (eighth century A.C.). The Tsenmara (tsi-'ud-mar-po 'bras-sknyes) and his six brothers appeared as wolves in seven different colours and approached Guru Padmasambhava, desiring to disturb him while he was in meditation in a grave in India (11). On asking who the demons
were, Guru was told that they were the sons of the king of Khotan. By his supernatural power the seven devons were made to be the protectors of the Doctrine. They are known as Tsennar Pandun (bsan-dmar-spun-bdan 67/4/8/4/3) in Tibet.

In Tibetan literature the banner of wolf (spyang k'i-gyal-mtshan 67/2/8/3/2) is found in the books on Gyalpo Ku-nga (rgyal-po-skhu-ha 67/8/6/8: five kings who are the protectors of the monasteries and the State Oracles of Tibet) who are known as “tobunqagham” in Mongolia. In those books the symbolic meaning is as explained above in the opening para. Among those deities, the chief deity known as Pehar (pe-har 67/2/8) or Pekar (pe-kar 67/2/8) or pe-dkar 67/2/8 is sometimes addressed as the god of war of all men (skyes-bu-yongs.kyi-dgra-lha 67/6/3/6/8) or simply as great god of war (dgra-lha-beni-pc 67/2/8/2/2/8) who came to Tibet in the eighth century from Bhat Hor (bha-ta-hor 67/2/8) (13). The books on these deities narrate almost the same story about the appearance of Pehar—first in Khotan, then in Bhat Hor (Mongolia) and finally in Tibet. (14). It is said that after the completion of Samye (bsam-yas 67/2/8) monastery the Guru asked a serpani to be the guardian of the monastery but it refused (15). Then the Guru advised the king Thrinog Dotten (khrig-stong-kle-besan 67/3/2/8/2/8) to send an army to Bhat Hor for bringing certain objects from the Gomda (gmo-grwa 67/8, Meditation School). An army was sent and they racqueted that school and brought the objects which included a small turquoise image of the Buddha and a mask (16). These were in the monastery of Samye till 1959. Pehar, as custodian of religious property in that school could not leave the site but had to follow those articles, as it was said by Guru. Thereupon he was appointed by the Guru as the guardian of the monastery. There is a temple in Samye which is known as Pehar Chog (pe-har-log 67/2/8) and on which there was a banner of wolf on the roof of the temple on the north (17). Mongolia being on the north of Tibet, the northern direction is significant.

It is interesting to note that in Tibetan tradition a deity riding a grey wolf or having a grey wolf head is usually found on the north, northwest or back of the principal deity surrounded by its retinues (18). In Mongolia the word for north, umar-a, also stands for back.

The animals which the Dharmapalas (Defenders of Law) have are tiger, wolf, kite, crow and owl etc. Thu'u Kun (thu'u-bkan 67/2/8) divides the day and night into six periods and finds the
evil spirits disguised in six forms. To subdue these evils there are six retinues; for instance, when an evil spirit appears in the form of a sheen, the wolf is the subduer of it (19).

Dhalha (dgra-lha) [god of war, see Sarat Chandra Das: Tibetan English Dictionary] is one of the five gods, who are inseparable companions of humanity. Dhalha is accompanied by a wolf and a hawk; it is said that Dhalha let emanations of wolves and hawks (20).

The Turks might have got grey wolf banner from Tibet. When the third Dalai Lama visited the Mongol Khan in the 16th century, as it was prophesied in Kadam Lepsham (bla-gdams-glegs-bam) and also by Chogyal Phagpa (chos-rgyal-phags-pa) (21), he (D.L.) built a monastery which included a temple named Pehar Chog (22). Whether there was a wolf banner or not on the roof of that temple but there must have been paintings of all the retinues of the Pehar. Among the retinues of Pehar, some hold the banner of wolf (23).

The third Dalai Lama was born in Water Rabbit year corresponding to 1543 and passed away in Mongolia in Earth Rat year, that is, 1588. A recent traveller to Mongolia says that Erdeni Tsu, the largest monastery, was founded in 1586 (24). Though the founder of the monastery is not mentioned in his travel book, one can guess by its date that the third Dalai Lama may have been the founder of it.

A special importance of the wolf for the Mongols is that the first Mongol king had the name Borte-chinua which means grey-blue wolf (25); and the Mongols also believed that their first king was descended from the Tibetan kings. The Mongol historians say that he was the youngest son of Dalai Subin Aru Altan Shiregetu (Tibetan gri-gum-btsan-po) whose name was Shaza Thi (sha-za-thi), means flesh eater) and his two brothers fled to Kongpo (kon-po) after their father’s assassination (26). From there he crossed over the Tengis Sea in the direction of the north and came in the land of the Mongols (27). Mongol Chronicles of the Seveneenth century say “tere gongbo-yin utus-u ule itegon” meaning that he (Borte-chinua) did not trust the Dongpo people (28), and came to Mongolia. On the other hand the Tibetan historians as Golotsawa (gpos-lo-tsa-wa) and Sonam Gyaltzen (sod-nams-rgyal-mtshin) and fifth Dalai Lama describe the first Mongol king Borta Che (sbor-ta-che), the son
of Heaven (29) and about Shaza Thî, they said that he later on became the king of Kongpo (30).

The wolf was also described as the god of the travellers (’gro-lha དབུ་ལྷ) (31). It is however difficult to say whether the association of wolf with travels is Bon (པོ་) or Buddhist (བོད་པ) (32).

NOTES


Tenjur འིན་ཐོབ་Vol. 3: p. 185.


(8) Kanjur ཤི་ Vol. 3: p. 56.

(9) Tenjur ཤི་ Vol. 3: p. 185.
(10) Ms. with author part. II, p. 35. reads as: 'ོར་ལྟ་ི་ ཏོ་ དབང་པོ་' 


(12) Ms. in Namgyal Institute of Tibetology p. 160; and 

(13) Fifth Dalai Lama: book No. 37, p. 9; and same thing is 

(14) book No. 37, p. 9.


(18) Fifth Dalai Lama: book No. 37, p. 3; Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. 5: p. 171, 188 and also p. 92; and 

(19) book No. 5, p. 6.
(20) The Golden Annals (ed. Lokesch Chandra) part III, p. 20, reads as: "हिंदू नाजिका अपना एक साल भूल गया। हिंदू नाजिका अपना एक साल भूल गया।"


(22) JORGEN BISCH, Mongolia: Unknown Land (London 1963) p. 110.


(30) ὅραμα τὸς ἄδελφος τοῦ δικηγόρου p. 27; ἡ ἄρα ἡ συμπτομή τοῦ βιβλίου p. 87; The Red Annals (NIT 1961) and ὅραμα τὸς δικηγόρου τῆς ἀδελφῆς (Primary School Reader 5, published by the Council for Tibetan Education 1963) p. 145.

All these books mention their (three sons of ὁ ἄρα ἡ συμπτομή τοῦ βιβλίου) flight to Kongpo but they disagree about who was the youngest or eldest.

(31) ὅραμα τὸς δικηγόρου τῆς ἀδελφῆς p. 136.
Price per copy Rupees Five

Bulletin of Tibetology along with other publications of Nangyal Institute of Tibetology are available with

KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO.
63 Geearend Street
London W. C. 1

FIRMA K. L. MUKHOPADHYAY
61/2 Rabinaram Avoor Lane
Calcutta 12

and

all leading booksellers