Gaudapada’s work, that is, his Karika in four chapters, may be regarded as an important landmark in the development of the Advaita Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted is Buddhist in many parts. He employed several expressions which are common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Buddhism (e.g. V. Bhattacharya’s edition of the Karika). It is mysterious and indirect why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous language betraying his trustfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Suka in the Svetasvara up. bhasya ad 1.8, and a grandpreceptor of Sri Sankara through Govinda-gata-pada (v. R.D. Karanekar’s edn. of the Karika, introduction). He has, perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed form, because he was a native of the Gauda country where Buddhism was a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society in these days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends to convey.

Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text one tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhattacharya and R.D. Karanekar). I shall confine myself in the following pages mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expressions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental thesis of Advaitism.

The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 19 verses explaining the Mandukya Upanishad. The central theme of the Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahman known as VIVEK, Tajja, Praja and Turya (fourth) who is Savaitva, perceiver of
the whole. The first three stages are represented by the following states in order: Waking (Jagati), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally stays in the three places of the body: the left eye, mind and heart respectively. The mystic syllable 'Om' while considered to be consisting of three parts: a, u and m represents the last three states of Brhaman. While considered as pureless and one unit it represents the fourth Advaita state of Brhaman (Karma, 19). Guatapada points out the distinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping of dualism is common to both states, but the Atman in the third is under the influence of avidya, ignorance and sleep, while in the fourth Atman is relieved of both (K. 15). He says further that the living being who is caught in the slumber of maximum Maya (Illusion) gets awakened, then he realizes Advaita (Momism) which is freed from birth and sleep (K.16).

This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute Chitamatrata for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhist maxim. This chapter is rightly styled as Omkarcaparakarana, an exposition of the Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Karmakara, Introduction, X.f.

The second chapter named Vaishathyaparakarana consists of 38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external world and its futility on the analogy of dream phenomenon. The illusory character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of both the Vedantic and the Yogacara buddhist and the dream analogy is also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to Vaisshadhu’s Vinystika, verse 1 with bhayas. Another common example for the purpose is the illusory notion of the Serpent on the Rope in the twilight. Guauta says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of five Atman imposed on the Brhaman. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent disappears; likewise one Atman is discriminated as diverse through the influence of Maya and when the true character of Atman’s oneness is ascertained the discrimination disappears (K.F. 16-17).

Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who possess extremely the ultimate reality things such as Prakrit, Breath, Elements, Gunas etc. Guauta does not omit to mention in the list the ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, manas, citra. Here the absence of Jiva, Vijnana or Prajnana is noteworthy because it is charac.
teristic of Atman, Brahma stated in the Upanisads. It has been in line remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin as a diva, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered prison nor aspirer of truth and no desirous of release nor released (K. 31). This utterance of Gauda, resembles very closely to Nagarjuna’s characteristic Nihilism. If the stanza is detached from the context one could hardly think that this utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauda, comes very close to Nagarjuna because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world and for one absolute Whole. They, however, differ in their approach to the ultimate truth. Naga, would designate it Sunyata, or the highest perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauda, it is Atman or Brahman, an embodiment of the highest knowledge. Cfr. Sveta. up. bhasya, Gitapress, p.34, citing the Brahmapurana.

Gauda closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-dualism is auspicious (अवक्षेत विश्वा, K.33) and the same as Advaita or Tatvam. He further says: Advaya which implies the negation of plurality and of the mind’s constructive states has been revealed by the Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K.33). The Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayanic Buddhists. It’s probably for this reason that Gauda adds that his doctrine of Advaya has been revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in Sankara’s bhasya on the Upanisads the expression of Advaya in relation to Brahman.

It is to be noted here that Amaratida, the Sanskrit lexicographer has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctrine probably for the first time. Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term advaya, is quite different for each school. For the Madhyamikas it conveys the idea of middle path, Madhyama-pratipada whereas for the Yogacara it signifies the absence of subject and object (भिन्नप्रभावितम्) Though Gauda and Sankara characterise Brahman as advaya they probably intend to convey the idea of advaya, “without the second”, i.e. Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later.

The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 48 verses. The exposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in
succession after establishing the certainty of the diverse worlds in the second chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpanya-prakarana as the author starts in the second stanza as श्री विविषाचारकाचाय श्री ब्रह्म सर्वाना।

2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghasata-aksena); that is to say, the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhi-ghata). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3.49). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghasata-aksena is neither a product nor a part of Aksa. Likewise are Jiva and Brahman (K.7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations of one’s own illusion, maya, and similar to those in dream (K.12). Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much entwined in the scripture Upanishads and their differentiation is severally ceased there—which position is quite rational (K.13). That non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vishnu-dharmottara cited in Svet. Up.bhashya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upanishads, the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a devise for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.15, 14-15).

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immaterial, how could it be reduced to mortality (K.12). No Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.49).

The passage cited below, comment No. 16.

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immaterial, how could it be reduced to mortality (K.12). No Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.49).

2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghasata-aksena); that is to say, the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhi-ghata). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3.49). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghasata-aksena is neither a product nor a part of Aksa. Likewise are Jiva and Brahman (K.7). The aggregates (material objects) are creations of one’s own illusion, maya, and similar to those in dream (K.12). Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much entwined in the scripture Upanishads and their differentiation is severally ceased there—which position is quite rational (K.13). That non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vishnu-dharmottara cited in Svet. Up.bhashya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upanishads, the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a devise for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.15, 14-15).
4. Mind is a sole factor for dualism, जनविन्दिक इत्यादि when the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amalabhava) dualism vanishes (K. 31). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman (K. 33). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk. 14, 18, 40. In deep sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round illumination of knowledge (Kk. 16, 45). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, devoid of name and form, omniscient and rising up once only (K. 16, cp. Kk. 17, 40). One should therefore control the mind through proper means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollecting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees nothing as born (K. 43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it should be awakened; being distracted it should be pacified: being contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being attained to the state of equilibrium it should not be shaken up. One should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns into Brahman (Kk. 44, 48).

Comment. Now let us see whether any of the above topics of Gauḍa can be compared with ideas of the Buddhist authors.

1) Our comment on the Ajatavāda is deferred to the next chapter on the same topic.

2) The same example is also found in a Mahāyaṇa sutra cited in M. vṛtti, p. 375 which insists on the identity of all entities on the analogy of space. The passage runs: तत्त्वात्परम न देवता यथा जगद्धकारणात्मां यथा जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां जगद्धकारणात्मां

3) Gauḍa says that the Upaniṣadic doctrine of creation is a devise for some ultimate purpose (K. 53); this looks like an echo of Vasubandhu’s explanation of Buddha’s utterances about skandha, ayatana and dhatu (V. Vasubandhu’s Vimśatikā, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upaya-kūsala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to his own faith (Cp. Satyakālida, ch. 1.p.5, n.3). It is likely therefore that
Gautama was convinced in and convinced of the advantage of the Buddhist argument to explain away the seeming contradictory to their favourite conclusions.

4) **“This dualistic appearance is a vision of the mind”** मात्रविद्य-मित्र ेत्यम् (K. 33’’), this expression seems to be resulted from the dream example employed several times in the Treatise by Gautama (cp. K. 79 also). According to the Upanishads it is the mind that creates a new imaginary world in dreams, cp. e.g., Pramāṇa up. IV, 5: कविता द्वयु (संहन.):

वेदांत मात्रम् न न नवः **since the above axiom is applicable to the waking state the above expression “manmadhyan” has perhaps been coined.** The Vedanta would otherwise express it as मात्रविद्यामन्त्रित या शास्त्रानुपलब्ध प्रकृत्याचार्य, etc. Since the Yogacara Buddhists also placed that the universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would reject the idea as मात्रविद्यामन्त्रित या शास्त्रानुपलब्ध प्रकृत्याचार्य, “manmadhyan” instead of “clairvoyant”. The above statement would also result authentically into another axiom: जननी विद्यामन्त्रित **“...” and “...” the end of misery is brought about by the mind’s control (K. 48).**

It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gautama have some parallel in the Visuddhimagga (in the group of six chapters) as follows—

अत्यधिक तथागताम् अविद्यालेखाम् तथागताम्।

विद्यामन्त्रित तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।

विद्यामन्त्रि तथागताम् अविद्यायेकादशम्।
"All actions are (the result of) nescience, (avidya) and vidya is regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its action and it gets released as a result of vidya, (knowledge). The ultimate truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion "I" and "mine" arises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unapproachable. Dvaita is embodied in the mind's activities which are born of their causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaitam becomes utterly irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (amashilahva) or non-mind. The cognitive experiences arise in accordance with the resultant forces of action karma-vasana, that is the consciousness arises in such a fashion as the forces assume and as soon as it is removed or stopped the ultimate Truth, Brahman shines forth of its own accord" (cited in the Svet. bhashya, pp 48-49, Gita press).

Note. Vijñana and Vijnapti are employed in the same import as in Yogacara: Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of mind's activities Truth shines forth can be compared with the Yoga Sutra I, 1,7: तदस्य क्षणां विद्या सत्यम्। cp. Sankara bhashya on Gita, XVIII, 50: नास्ति यत्थस्य अभावस्यत्स्य सब्जित: कार्यः।

K.35. The idea of Gauda that the mind being controlled and checked in its activity turns out into Brahman (cp. K.46) looks like the Yogacara's favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation of dualism प्रकाशाकर्षयत् turns out into Dharmanabhasa, i.e. Tathagata (v. Trimsika, ver. 28 with bhashya). It does not, however, follow that Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Yogacara Buddhism. The Vedantin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: मनस्य (manas) is Brahman because the latter is the inner core of the former तत्स्वस्वदर्शनाभावते. Kena. Up bhashya II, 24. The Vedantist's definition of jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedantaparibhasha.) When the inner organ is made deprived of its functioning it becomes pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakaas becoming the vast space at the destruction of the pot.

K.36. Sakrt-vibhatam, flashing up once. This expression again appears in chap IV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakrit-joytis found in chap III, K. 37. Atman is also stated to be Svayanjyotis in Br.Up.
Gautama made it vayam-prabhatam (IV, 81). The Mahaananga-ka Budhha have also characterised their original mind as Prakriti-prahar-ram. The Sakti-vishatan may be considered in relation with some Budhha's theory of Ek-kshana-abhisaambhatha, one moment's intuition of Truth. This theory has been advocated by the Madhyantika and also in the Suya-siddhi (ch.26:27) as against the Vacchakas' theory of gradual intuition of the four Truths (asupaltabhisanva). The one moment's intuition is advocated for the reason that the 'Truth is only one, viz. Cessation-Truth, Nirvaha-suya. May we guess now that there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedanta and the Buddhist? Sankara perhaps refers to this one moment's intuition theory while commenting on the Kena. Up. II, 2.4: विविधविनोक्तः

as शुद्धिर्मन्य बलिवदव दासार्थे 'according to some pratibhada implies one moment's consciousness'. We may also take note here of the Br. Up. III, 36: . . . . . . वर्मशुद्धिर् सहस्यिन्ति श्रावण अत्यं प्रभृतिवीर्यं एव वै एव and Sankara's bhashya thereon.

K 44. Gautama's prescription of cure for the mind's concentration-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gautama says that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the kshana pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gautama advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited.

According to the Budhha's mind's stubbornness and low-spirits are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn one should cultivate calmness, concentration and equanimity because through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified. When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analytical thinking, exercise and joy because through these factors the low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samyuta V, 12 ff). The S. Siddhi discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the act of controlling should be applied: when it is too weakened the act of thickening should be applied. The mudravas, thus meets the gold, heats it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heated it becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept on it becomes explained. Likewise is the yogin's mind (ch. 156). The taxed horse also may be compared here (86).

The Tapanara refers to about nine factors of distraction and their satellites about five in all (I, 30-31). In order to check them an exercise
of contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may
again be appealed by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri,
love, Karuna, compassion, Mudita, joyfulness and Upoksha, indifference
(I. 13), or by some such other means (I. 14). The Yogasutra speaks
nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist
sources or Gauda describe.

It is therefore most likely that Gauda was acquainted with the
Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in
his own fashion to suit his favourite theses. The mind’s distraction
(= stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to sensuous pleasure should
be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miser-
able, a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K.43). Gauda says in the
same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn one does not see
anything as born. But the link between the first and the second state-
ment is not quite obvious and logical. Gauda probably adopts Patanjali’s
opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth
(Yogasutra I.13). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret
“ajna” unborn as Brahman and “jata” born as illusory things. Cfr.
our remark on the title of the third chapter above.

K. 46. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with
Gauda’s instructive remark on the mind and ultimate reality. He
states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same
which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns
out to be Brahman—which statement may suggest to us that Gauda expresses
a Buddhist idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justi-

died from the Advaita Vedantist’s standpoint of view that has been made
clear previously see comment on K. 15.

Chap IV

The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Atatasanti prakarana
consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from
the previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic
expressions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was
truly an Advaita Vedantist. Hence the chapter is interesting to us in
more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous
chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitism in greater details.

The main topics may be summed up as below:—

1. Criticism of Jati-vada, theory of origination. The origination-
thorists are all dualistic thinkers, viz, Sankhya, Vaiseshika, the Buddhists
with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into two: 1) Some plead for origination of what is non-existent, 2) others plead for non-origination of what is clearly existent, thus they both dispute each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and never dispute with them.

The author ridicules the theory of origination. Itsvada as it does not stand a moment's scrutiny; hence Ajitvada, non-origination is only rationally acceptable conclusion (K. 3:31:72). The important factor that brings us apart, non-origination is the non-recognition of the order of sequence between the cause and the effect (K. 2:1); it becomes thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor does anything originate whether it is existent or non-existent etc. (K. 2:1), cp, Nagaśrīnā's mṛcchikā sānātī nāyikā parāṇī Madh. Sutra.

Likewise the non-existential is not caused by the non-existent nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent cannot be caused by the existent. How can the non-existent be caused by the existent? (K. 6:6). This looks like Nagaśrīnā's dialectic. The origination, however, has been praised by the enlightened sages, Budhas for those who are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those who believe in the true existence of things as ill-3 experience their activities (K. 4:9); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of non-origination of the cause and the effect (K. 1:14).

2. Prakāṣa. The empirical experience, prakāṣa is conditioned by its cause; it is not so, diversity or duality (taccessible by us) would be destroyed. Because the delineation is operative in causal production (prakāṣa) is accepted (in the empirical field of duality). Prakāṣa (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes (māyā) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause, (causa) becomes non-cause (nihāya) from the viewpoint of Truth (K. 4:19-25).

3. Dream. The dream-example is elucidated and applied to things experienced in the waking state (K. 2:21:21:39:61-68). Waking experience is applied to dream state in K. 4:1. Just as one experiences the unthinkable objects (vāyu) as real in the waking state, just so one experiences things in dream; perversion (vāpyāya) is the causing factor in both cases.

4. Agya and Nirmitaka. The magic elephant is regarded as real because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the external
things (K.44) Buddha (-Gautama) preached: "Things are originated on account of causes and conditions"; this origination is comparable with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K.58). The illusory person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) and non-existent (die) (K.69). The same is repeated with the illustration of Nirmūtaka, created being (K.70).

5. Alāra, firebrand, whirling the firebrand causes the appearance of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes no such appearance but remains in its unborn state. While the firebrand is whisking the appearance of wheel does not come from the outside and enters into the fire brand, nor does the wheel appearance go out of the fire brand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with Viṃjana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does not come from the outside and enters into Viṃjana, nor does the appearance go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance. The appearance is always unthinkable (aninātha) because no law of causation between the two (Viṃjana and appearance) is operative (Kk.47-52).

6. Citta and artha. Mind does not touch the object nor does it reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. The mind teaches no cause (cittaka) in all three times: Perception is causeless by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind has no birth, nor does the mind’s vision have it. The person who perceives its birth will also perceive the foot-print in the sky (K.66:28). The mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this fact will never fall in perversion (K.46). Dualism of subject and object appearance is the result of the mind’s vibration, citta-spanda. The mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, atanga (K.77) cp. K.18.

7. Samsara and Mukha. For samsara which is beginningless, no end can be achieved and for release, mukha which has a beginning, no endlessness can be achieved (K.9). As long as one has obsession with cause and effect so long will he have the causal production. The obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being removed he will not be caught in samsara (K.15:15).

8. Kaha. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. Those who conceive their decay and death are dropped from their goal
due to their wrong conception (K. 16). All entities are beginning-
less and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities
by nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who
his perseverance to this effect will become worthy of immortality
(K. 51-52).

9. Sarvata-schededrata. Everything is born in the empirical
plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is
unborn as they exist (for all time), hence they are not annihilated (K. 57).
From a magic seed springs up the magic sprout, then the latter is neither
permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect
of all entities (K. 59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is possible
with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words)
are applicable, no discrimination (of permanent or impermanent) can
be applied thereto (K. 60).

10. Adbaya, non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, un-
moving, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though having birth
movement and object (k. 45). Everything is unborn; its birth is a
vision of our mind. The mind being valueless, its non-birth, and
i.e. is inevitably non-dual (k. 79). The mind being arrested and
inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariable, unborn
and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened
sages (k. 80).

11. Kalya and Paramatra. What exists in the imaginary sphere
of existence (asamvitt) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something
may, perhaps, exist from the viewpoint of empirical law of causation,
that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be
unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary sphere of existence.
Kalya-
asamvitt, it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the
view point of empirical law of causation (k. 72-74).

12. Abhiviveka. There is allowance to a false idea of dualism, but
that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes
no birth as he has no cause for the birth (K. 75). The mind on account
of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently
similar object (e.g. the idea of silver on the page) but when one realizes
the absence of the mistaken object he retreats himself from it and becomes
detached from it (K. 79).

26
15. Citakrit. By apprehending some or other object the noble Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being miserable. The ignorant encompass Him in four attributes; Eka, non-Eka, both Eka and non-Eka and neither Eka nor non-Eka, which attributes signify four ideas in order: “one” (EKa), “many” (non-Eka) “and the absence of both”. These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Him as being untouched by these attributes becomes omniscient (K.S: 81-84). 

14. Sādāka, Sādāka-lokottara and Lokottara-jñāna. The empirical knowledge (lokottara-jñāna) is what consists of two objects and its experience; pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (lokottara) is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. The Enlightened Sages, Buddhas have always proclaimed that the knowledge and the knowable (jñāna, jnaya) are to be understood well. When the three-fold knowledge and the knowable are understood in their order the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (K.S: 87-89). Those whoever are convinced in respect of brightness and identity (of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world and in this fact the world does not delive (K.S: 91). 

15. Aprayāda. What is to be discarded, what is knowable, what is to be acquired and what is to be measured are all to be understood from the Aprayāda, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except in the cognizable-īśaya state (K. 99). 

16. Brahgyena. Having reached to the complete omniscience, Brahmānhood, and a non-dual position not amenable to the beginning middle and end, what more true this one may yearn for? This disciple of Brahman is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as done because they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise knowing this wise should acquire the calm state (K.S: 86-87). 

17. Kauravya. Having realized truly the absence of causation and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless state which is devoid of grief and desire (K.S: 75). All entities are calm from the beginning, unborn, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; their identity (satya) is unborn (i.e. Brahman) and fearless; kauravya. Those who walk in things’ differentiation have no fearlessness. All
different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiations; therefore they are pitiable (Gy, 3:3-4). Having realized the state which is hardly visible, too deep, unknown, unfathomable, fearless and freed from diversity, we attribute the preceptor to the best of our ability (K.105).

18. Avinana: If there is even a subtle notion of diversity of things lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detachment. What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of enlightenment? All creatures (i.e. sentient beings) are never covered by any veil, free from impurities by nature, enlightened and liberated from the outset-thus understand our teachers (K.97-98).

19. Jnanam or Brahmatma: Buddha’s knowledge does not cross over into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge—this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K.99). The unborn knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as relation-free (K.36, cf. 72 under the head 6).

20. Apanta-yoga: I salute to him who has preached yoga freed from contact, which is pleasurable and beneficial to all sentient beings, dispute-free and contradiction-free (K.7), cf. III. 39: the contact-free yoga is hardly experienced by any meditator who is frightened from this yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otherwise.

Comment, 1. Apanta. This is the most characteristic feature of Gauda’s philosophy. Nagajuna (hereafter referred as Nga) too has made use of this thesis as one of the most powerful weapon to uphold his favourite philosophy of Nihilism, Samyoeda. Though Gauda and Nga concur in pleading very strongly for non-originating of things their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauda by devoting the separate non-existence of non-originating of things aims at upholding Atman or Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Nga aims at an absolute voidness, svayata. Though our modern mind tends to identify them as one and the same neither Gauda would say that he also at voidness, nor would Nga say so as the Upanishadic Brahman. They differ thus in their purposes which oppose each other.

The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions must also be different. Since Gauda cites on several occasions instances from the Upanishads and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that
he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other phenomenal things are untrue or false; e.g. Avadya. Up. 1.14.1:

When things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are to be explained away as the effects of our mind’s illusion like a notion of the serpent on the rope. When the notice of the serpent disappears on a close observation the serpent and the rope become one and the same and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no separate existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm this idea the Svetâ Upanishad says:—

This Brahman that remains always within is knowable.
There is nothing other than this Brahman realisable.
The enjoyer, enjoyable and commandant.
All these three are stated to be this Brahman alone. 1.12.

On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is the reason why Gaudâ declares that things (dharmas) are adi-santa, adi-buddha and adi-mukta (sorcerer, released and enlightened from the outset) etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is ajña, ajnata ‘unborn’. Upanishads always prefer the expression: ajña, ajnata, na jñayate, etc. to qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why Gaudâ generally calls phenomenal things as ajña, ajnata, ajati, etc. This is perhaps the background on which Gaudâ’s ajñata-rupa has been worked out.

In the case of Nagâ’s ajñata or amapatt-madbhanda non-origination proposition the following facts may be considered as basis: Avajit, one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes in this stanzas.

"Tathagata (Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things that arise on account of their causes” (v. Satistheda sutra, p. 26, note on p, 31, more particulars about the stanza).

It is called there as Pratyaya-samapāda-gūtha implying thereby a formula
of Dependent Origination. The formula is said to contain twelve members such as Artha, Samaya, Vijaya and others arranged in a progressive order so that the first member causes the second, the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on. The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its endogenous stage to a full grown up stage. In other words it makes plain how the truth of origin of misery, Santaya, says operates. The same formula is said to lead to the cessation-truth, nirvana, by a cessative process, i.e. the cessation of the first member leads to that of the second member and so on. This doctrine obviously proves that both the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of cessation, Pratitya-samutpada, thus forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining how the phenomenal world originates and how it ceases to originate at the end.

This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes Mahayana form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Mahayana school headed by Nagarjuna and a large number of Mahayana Sutras credited no more Buddhism to be the discoverer of the law of cessation in its early form. The doctrine of Pratitya-samutpada implies for Nagarjuna the reverse of origination, i.e. non-origination and non-ceSSION. Note the first stanza of this Mahayana Sutra:

मेघोपनिषद्वितीया || प्रतित्यसमुपदा || ||

This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayana scripture: यो भविष्योर्धिन्स इत्युतम, “What is originated through causes is not originated in fact” (cited in the Maha. vi., p. 259 from the Aayaveda Sutra). The reversal of origination into non-origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Mahayana’s outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle. Now the Pratitya-samutpada gatha has no more its original value, it has been since then relegated to an absolute position. Gaada has also noticed this Gatha and its principal idea of origination (v.N, 57).

Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background offered Nagarjuna a great opportunity to wield his critical scissors and demolish the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists, Abhidharmikas, Sarvastivadins and Valabhaikas. His polemics against these schools we met with in his Madhyamika sattera and Prakriyamukha, etc. Nagarjuna being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern
of his critique would not have but served as model to the monastic thinkers like Gauda. Though Gauda and Naga plead for non-originating theory we should not however, ever took their fundamental differences. As we clearly noticed Naga uphold Sanyavada whereas Gauda advocates Advaita-vada. The latter's criticism of originating is directed against the Sankhyas in the main (Kr. 3-17), cp. *mahābhārata.* Another aspect of the Sankhyas' *sankhyavada* is discussed only in one or two places (Kr. 1-5, etc.). Law or Causation *Kārama-kārya-vada* is the central theme of all dualists and has been criticised on several occasions (Read verses under topic No. 6, 7, etc and 525, etc).

The originating theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the Pratītya-samutpāda-gaṇa has been referred to and reduplicated, read IV, ch. 1: the prata śūsti or viśvadana vṛtti tata śvadhiśvānaḥ.

As previously remarked Naga's target of attack is upholding the non-originating theory in the main. The early Buddhist who followed the Pratītya-samutpāda-gaṇa closely is better. His criticism against the Sankhyas and the Vaiseshikas can be found in the Dvādasha-mukha (my translation, ch. II). It is a well-known fact that the Mahāyānīs profess no propositions of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents' propositions. For, Vidyāvatī, p. 19 and Madh. vṛtti, p. 6 with Aṣṭasādhu's rejection. The question whether Sanyavada, Nabhāna is adhered to Nabhāna replies an emphatic *no.* He declares explicitly.

"It is not stated as void or non-vaid, nor is to be stood as both or non-both; it is however stated as void in order to convey an empirical understanding.*

M. Sastri, XXII, 11.

Likewise an exclusive *śūnyatā* or *ātman* theory is not acceptable to Naga, cp. this point in his Dvādasha-mukha, ch. 1 later portion. Gauda on the other hand sticks to the non-originating doctrine throughout the treatise and hints sometime that ātman or ātman is for Shāhānak or Atman. We should not nevertheless miss to take note of some common expression between Gauda and Naga. Read e.g. Gauda's verse.

प्रत्येके श्रवणे विवेचनेन निर्विवेचनेन आचार।

विवेचनेन न विवेचनेन आचाराय।

31
with Nagar's

\[\text{\textit{Prayujn Đăng và Phat}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Paratana}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Sukhakasika, etc.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Samvrti-says, empirical truths}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Paratana}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Bhaga-darsana and Bhaga-darsana}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Bhaga-darsana, an insight into the absolute truth turns out the conditioning}}\]
factors into non-factors. The term shaste-darmanam looks like a Buddhist expression, note Asvaghosa's stanzas:

शस्तेद्धर्मानम् श्वस्तेद्धर्मानम् अधिकारोऽिषुभे


3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on ch. II (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is avayā, "unthinkable". This term is again spoken of in connection with the universe of subject and object in K. 47 and 52. Read comment on the fire-brand example, opus no. 4.

4. daya, etc.: Maya example is common to both Buddhists and Vedants. Nirvāṇa example is more likely a Buddhist one. Saṁyogī, however, refers to the idea of a magician creating himself as walking in air etc.: वषा भवाय विषयात्तत्त्व अपनावेषाः कतचत्तुर्म विनिर्मिताः। (Aitareya. Up. bhashya, Gita Press. p. 37). The important verse to be noted here in this section is Gauda's refutation of Buddha's renowned Gatha on Pārīśīya-anuṣṭapā doctrine. Gauda says that Buddha's teaching on the origination of things has not been stated from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resembles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment on jyoti-sāda for more details.

5. Fire-brand... This is a well-known example in Indian philosophica literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance of wheel which is unthinkable, avayā, because it does not exist in the fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. The wheel- appearance is unthinkable, because it is a substance, i.e., it cannot be regarded as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise the appearance of the subject-object universe on the consciousness is unthinkable, because the said appearance is not a substance; hence there cannot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness अत्योक्षरताम्रत्तम्। It seems that Gauda exposes the Vedantic idea in the Yogācāra Buddhist terminology.

Our author on a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthinkable in K. 44. The person with waking state perceives, as a result of
perversion, the unthinkable external elements as real (bhūta), etc. Ref. Dream-example No. 3. Here for Gauch, the phenomenal universe is unthinkable, because it is an imposed appearance on Brahman like the wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahman but it is unthinkable (acintya); magic or idee. There cannot be a causal relation between the universe and Brahman because the universe is not at all a substance.

The idea of unthinkable is also common in the Yogacara Buddhists. The Ratnaputra thus refers to four unthinkable acintya's: Samala Tathāta, Nirmala Tathāta, Vinśala Buddhaśrama and Jina-kriya. Here acintya appears to signify their characteristics inexplicable in the terms of ordinary reasoning.

The Sātya-siddhi again defines the sense organ as anitya-karma-maṇḍaripā of the four great elements. It is acintya because it cannot be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. According to Deussen the sense organ is a sort of Sakti inherent in the Abya consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as anitya-karma, probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (in dharmapariksha, ver. 7.8).

The Mahāyāna's doctrine of voidness which may be postulated as a parallel of Vedanta doctrine of illusion, nyaya-vada appears to have sprung up as a result of their speculative about things in their indescribable character. The Mahāyānas assert that the phenomenal world is indescribable because it does not stand their logical test. We have several reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Mahāyāna analysis was not started with Nāgā but it must have been initiated from the early period of the Mahāyāna scriptures. We may cite here a few examples. The Bhavavatsanaṭvatā asya: The consciousness of next new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises does not come from anywhere else. For, they have no reality of their own and are void of their self-substance (pp. 4, 12). It may now be plain that the relation between these two elements of consciousness not be specified in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time (na sambhavat). The same position is confirmed in the Saṅkṣetra Sūtra dealing with the Pratītya-saṃutpada doctrine, p. 12. Na sambhavat . . . The Madh. vṛtti (p. 171) cites a Mahāyāna sūtra bearing on this topic:
The indescribable character of the relation between the cause and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his Sanyata doctrine. He pleads for example:—

हस्तमित्रत्वमात्र नाहि दक्षिणे कर्तव्यमात्र नाहि |

मान्यते सम्भवमात्र नाहि शास्त्रमात्र नाहि काृत्यमात्र |

M. Sutra XVIII,10

Cp. M. vrtti, p. 139 citation from the Anavatapta Sutta:

य: यथोच्चित्तस्य स प्रवेशो

त: तव यथाप्राप्ति तिथिविशेषिते।

अ: यथाविचारथ: स द्विनृ अनुस: |

अ: सुवशो नृत्यो विद्वद्यानि।।

This topic will continue in the comment on Senata, etc. No. 9.

6. Citta and artha. Naga introduces in his sastra chap. Ill. on a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function with which conceives Gauda’s contention that the mind does not contact with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the Bhavasatkrami-Sutra:

न वधुः उसेऽस्य कर्म शास्त्रमात्र न केवल स: |

द्वितीय गर्भस्य यथा तादात्मस्य न स: गाह्ये। |

Cited in M. vrtti, p. 130.

Gauda’s statement that the person who conceives the origination of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the verse cited in Mudh. vrtti p. 90: शास्त्रमात्र नित्य: विद्वद्वि कर्म अवरूपिनिः शाश्वतस्य वा गपम्। (Ratnakarasatra) cp. also Bhagavatam 9.2 eahy: दम्म परि रूपमिनिः। Dhammapada, VII, 4 and Theragatha, 92. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: स नूत: लघाणि वनव च ग्रंथायुक्तस्वतिः |

शोभाभवं च वाच्यायुक्तादि किं केवल मनस्तवमि कृत्यमि च विद्वद्वि। |

Aitareya bhashya. p. 76-71 (Gita Press), Here Gauda might have in his mind the Yogacara Buddhists who hold that the mind though momentary continues in succession.
Cittapandita (ver. 23). The vibration of the mind has already been spoken of in III, 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the minds nodding as resulting in false assumption. Buddha says: ‘Nodding is the mind’s nodding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 207-7 cited also in S. Suthe, ch. 84). Note also the passage cited in Madh. vrtti p. 540 l.12. निर्विभाविता जलनम् यथा भास्मास्मि। सर्वविविद्वानाप्रपन्नः। सर्वविविद्वानाप्रपन्नः
तथाः। “Nirvive is a purification and stoppage of all causing factors and of all distraction and shaking.” This idea may quite possibly tally with Gauda’s conception of the universe as a vibration of the mind.

7. Samara and Madha. Gauda makes clear here that he keeps the same attitude towards Samara as Naga, and his predecessors maintain. They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation leads to a great sequence of one being bogged down in a turbulent empirical life. The best means to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground when it is put to a critical analysis. The Madhyamika declares that things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely valueless and hence void, maya. Gauda and his followers as a result of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or avayya. Things are acyaya unthinkable because their causal relations are impossible to be made satisfactorily agreeable to our reasoning. Gauda has as a specimen, shows how absurd it is to talk about the causal relation in respect of the fire-breed and its wheel like appearance (v. Comm. Ng.4). Naga has on the side of Mahayana Buddhism done the same cask throughout his Madh. Sutra.

8. Kshanti. This concept is much favoured by the Buddhists and found in a specific context, e.g. jana kshanti in Buddhism. Gauda seems to have generalized the term in a broader sense of perseverance. How the entity are free from decay and birth, beginningless and enlightened by nature have already been made plain in the comment on APTIVADH No. 1. Their companion with sky is also common to the Buddhists. The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, and in addition, they are void for the Madhyamikas. For the Mahayanic idea of kshanti read the Samadhiyag. Sutra:

The Madhyamikas do not dispute with anybody nor does he talk about any purposeless topic and remains constantly in his objective and dharma; this is the description of the first kshanti.
He understands all things as comparable with pada and grasps no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perceived object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. These are specifications of the first kṣantī. (v. Buddhagosa-sangha, p. 218).

9. Sāvāta and uchchāda. Buddha’s doctrine is based on the middle path, mādhyamagratnpatipada avoiding two extreme ends: afflicting one self with the bodily torture and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. Dharmacakṣusappavittana Sutta) which ends are stated later as existence and non-existence (Samyutta-nikāya III, 155 cited in S. Siddhi, ch. 28, No. 131).

The Mahāvacca equated bhava-kāra (भवाबका) with Sāvāta and vihara-kāra (विहारका) with uchchāda (v. Pousin, M. vṛtti, p. 1, n. 4 and p.127, 8). Naga then declared that Buddha’s doctrine freed from eternalism and nihilism (Sāvātagatha-duti in his Matha, sastra XVIII, Bh-Buddha int.Data Pratītya-samupāda, law of causation with a view to avoiding the two ends, so says a Sutta: “The view of non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin of things (Samadāya-saṃyut) and the view of existence (Eternalism) disappears when one understands their cessation, Nirodha-caiyā” (Samyutta, III, 14 cited in S. Siddhi ch. 196). Naga comments: The law of causation helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. He says: Whichever arises due to causes and conditions is neither identical with nor different from its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra XVIII, 10 cp. comm. No. 5 above). The Samādhi Sutta states that the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of the five aspects, the first two of which are: na saṃsāra and na uchchāda and explain them in the same fashion as Nage does v. verse cited above).

The Lallavatīsara also expresses similar view: कोणतर तत्तो विद्याक्रूर्ती न व ते गूढः स्वयं संवेदिते। न परं तत्ता न च चिति तति निर्ममययुद्ध विनित्तेन।

“For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is neither permanent nor impermanent” (cited in M. vṛtti p. 177).

Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler manner: Because an element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes out of existence there is no Eternalism (Cited Bod., p. 179).

Being examined of this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from these two flaws.
So he says: Because things take birth, i.e. change into another form in the empirical sense, they are not permanent; but because they are in fact unborn, i.e. do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent Brahmnsic state, they are eternal. Gauda's statement: 'In regard to unborn things no talk is possible of 'eternal' or 'non-eternal' (K.s0) may be compared with Naga's verse: With reference to void things what is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal... (XXV, 3). Note the difference between Gauda and Naga in their metaphysical outlook: for the former "things are unborn" and for the latter "things are void".

Gauda next says (60 e-d) Where no letters are applicable, no discrimination is possibly applicable thereto, which saying implies that Truth is anākhara, inexplicable in letter; cp. Naga's idea: Anākhara Toream. Discrimination is rooted in letterwords; cp. the following idea: sources of discrimination are words and the letter is the source of the former,

Gauda's expression: illusory things create illusory things; likewise are the phenomenal things (K.59) is comparable with Naga's verse: void things arise from the void things. मूलन्यक हि शक्ति पदात्: अलवणि सभात्।

10. Advaya. Gauda seems to speak of the individual Atom by vijana (which is identical with Brahman) when he refers to it as motionless and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane of existence as though having birth, motion, etc. The idea may be compared with Dharmakīrti's saying: अवभासो हि सुमुक्षार्था विविधत्वसंगते। महायथाहि विनिरीभुवनाती चपयोगी।

Gauda says (K.77) that the mind's non-birth snemputti, is advaya and that the non-birth is possible when there is no samita, mind's activating cause, pravṛtti-nimitta. At this state the mind becomes one with Brahman, Brahm-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK.35, 40 above and Yogastra 1, 1, 3). The same idea is expressed in a different fashion (K.89), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual position is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha's highest knowledge. Here "Buddha" is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage, v. our remark on advaya in III, II, end).

11. Kalpta and Panaanta. Those two verses are the most enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms Kalpta and Panaanta are the yogacara expressions adopted by Gauda and grafted to his Vedantic
ideology. Before we try to understand them we have to bear in mind the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of samiti: Tathya and Mithya-samiti. For example, the sight of water in the mirage is supplied in the next moment on a close observation. Here the sight of water is Mithya-samiti, and the observation of the mirage is Tathya-samiti (as my paper: Madhyamakara Samgraha in FORM, IX, p. 151). Gauss’s kalpa samiti corresponds to Mithya-samiti (cfr. Ibid, ver. 9) and Paramantra to Tathya Samiti, i.e. Lokasamiti or srta. Kalpita-sanam is the imagined water in the mirage and the Paratata-sam is the experience of the worldly objects which are products of causation laws. For the yogacara Buddhists kalpa aspect is non-existent and false and the paramantra aspect i.e. the mind and the mental state is existent and real. For the Madhyamikas it is also unreal and void.

Now we can very well understand what Gauss means to convey in these two verses. In kalpita-samiti i.e. in our sole imagination something appears as if real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be unreal in the Tathya-samiti-Lokasastrabhawa which Gauss calls Paramantra and which has a bit of reality (paramarthas). The objective universe may be real from the viewpoint of the law of causation, Paratata-sam-Loka-sam but it is unreal from the absolute point of view (K. 73). The next must be understood that so-called ultimate principle, Pradhanas, etc. of other philosophers is conceived as unborn from the viewpoint of kalpita-sam imaginary experience (Kalpita-sam-Mithya-sam), but it is not unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc. from the viewpoint of Paratata-sam-Lokasastrabhawa. Paratata-sam is so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical plane. It is an interesting coincidence that Candrakirti also in his Madhyaya, avatara illustrates Mithya-sam by quoting the Sanskara of Nitiya and others and their so-called ultimate principles (v. my paper: Madhyaya samgraha op. cit. p. 40). It is strange that the Ishaya on the verse attributed to Sankara interprets paramantra into paramantra (v. comm. No. 1. more about paramantra). In the light of above finding R.D. Karzok’s much labourd explanation and now are not admissible (v. his notes on pp. 130–131).

17. Adbhuta. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the Madhyanta-vibhaga of Maitreyas ch. 1, vs. 12b: अभूतोऽनंसीमिन्ति इस्म तत न विचार. Shiramati comments: there is a foundation i.e. Paratata-mind mental state and on it kalpita, false ideas’ imposed in which (paramantra) exists no dual, subject and object, etc. We are not to understand...
Gauta in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinivesa (wrong adherence) for abhuta-dwara, duhiti but there is no duhiti in fact. If we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical difficulties would be solved. The K. 79 explains plain that Gauta does not intend to express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75-a because k. 4 says in this verse that an account of abhinivesa or false idea of duhiti, abhuta a man engages himself in an apparently similar object. Here the subject of the verb 'urnushat' is 'it', a p-ron, not the mind.

3. Gauta. This is the most characteristic feature of the Mahayanaiksha philosophy. He eloquently proclaims that the highest Truth of his conception is free from any attributes, existence or non-existence etc. He inherited this doctrine from Buddha’s discourse to Aggavecha about the Tatagita’s status after death which (status) has been described as ‘na bhati’ (the same as ‘na bhati’ of the Prajapatis, 74). It is therefore appropriate for the Mahayanaiksha to qualify the Truth as free from existence etc.; but could it be justifiable on the part of Gauta who is an Advaita Vedantin and whose ultimate truth is Brahman and essentially, not existence in character? For this reason probably Gauta states that the four attributes signify in order: unsteadiness, steadiness, activity, stillness etc. Thus Gauta appears to refer by sadhuka, existence-theos, the multiple principle of the dualists like the Sankhya, Vaisheshika and the early Buddhists. Their principles being more than one the existence trait does not remain attached to one principle. For the materialists (mystika) the highest principle being non-existence trait is fixed. The meaning of abhuta and abhutasaka may be understood appropriately in relation to other traits is order.

4. Larikha-prasta etc. The varieties of knowledge, lurika, etc. are quite common to the yogic Buddhism though their interpretations are somewhat different. No differences can be noticed with reference to the first variety, i.e., Larikha and its meaning because it is concerned with the ordinary waking experience. The difference is to be noted in the second variety, i.e., Sadhika-lurika. For the Buddhists (i. yogena) it is a pure empirical knowledge which is the prastabhasta-prastu, i.e., a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration Samadhi and reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind and the mental states, purusha-sastra. The yogin much would perceive the purusha-trait through this knowledge after rising up from the samadhi, Samadhi, the highest transcendental knowledge.
known as Aragyanam, i.e. state when Atma-consciousness is turned into Tathata, or Dhamma-Dhamma, etc. (v. Trimkle, ver. 18-19).

It appears that Gauda employs these apparently Buddhist terms to convey his own ideas. His commentator explains the Suddhahatuska and Lokottara as 'heaven state and deep sleep consciousness' respectively. In the Svetam state the mind above experiences unreal things, so it is without objects there are experiences-avasa gudana. In the deep sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considered to be Nirvikalpa, of both objects and their experiences.

The Laskavatara Sutras speaks of the three kinds: Lokadh, lobhata and lokaattaras and describes them in these stages of development. The first is related to other philosophers who advocate different ultimate categories of existence and non-existence. The second is concerned with all meyakas and pratyeka-buddha's knowledge and the third with Buddhah and Bodhisattva's developed knowledge (v. the text cited by Karnekar in his notes. p. 138).

The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The Bheda of Sankara comments: The knowledge through which the above said three states are understood is knowable or invariable, viparyata is known as the fourth state (tattvakshya), the Absolute Truth.... This interpretation appears to be somewhat uncertain in the next verse, i.e. which does not mention the fourth state in its plain language. The verse reads: When three-fold knowledge and the knowable (prapti) are understood well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to the Bheda, Snyata, 'omniscience' stands for the fourth state (i.e. the text cited in the notes p. 146). So apparently there is no incoherence on the part of Bheda, so Karnekar's criticism of Bheda seems to be unfair.

15 Agarjana. This term is also a Buddhist expression meaning Mahayan, generally understood as very great. According to the Upanishads 'janana' means 'path' in the expressions like Desanam and Prapana etc. In Buddhism there are three janas: Pratnyaka, Bodha-jana and Mahaya-nama also called Agrajana sometime. On the Brahmanical side two janas are well known, viz., Paryaya and Desanam (v. Br. Up. VI, 2, 1, Prana, I, 9 and Mundaka III, 1, 6) which are concerned with the field of karma, Yeda (puces and the worship of lower Brahmans (upanana). It is most likely that Gauda accepted here as ud eshew the Buddhist expression, agrajana to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the highest Upahadsic path. The Bodhisattva call Mahayana sometimes
Buddhavāna. As its counterpart the Vedanta may also call his path as Brahma-vāna like Brahmapāraṇava of the Gītā, V., 2-3-10, II, 3-7.

Now we have to explain the Heya etc. on the basis of the Upānatads. Heya, 'to be abandoned' is aparītya, knowledge of the lower Brahmān (cfr. Sankara’s Bhāṣya on Māṇḍūkya, I, 2, 7). The knowable is aparītya, knowledge of higher order leading to Brahmānic-cakṣuṣa (v. ibid.) or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the ver. 38 (v. comment on it above). Aparīta, 'to be acquired' is the fruit effected by Karman, Samaya-phala (v. Bhāṣya on Māṇḍūkya 1, 2, 7; Svaśāstra-kātyāyan upadhyāya, aprat, samkhyāyan vyākhyāna va). Pafyam, 'to be matured' is the realization of Atman and its identity with Brahmān on the maturation of one’s intellect (v. Sankara’s Bhāṣya on Tattva, I, 11, p. 90 Gītā Pras, tp. the exposition, pafya in Svea, Up. V, 5 and Sankara’s Aparākṣānamahbhut, ver. 11). Gītā 5: 11

Here vṛtti is Brahma-vṛtti, thinking of Brahmān.

An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three states, kālaïka, etc. (K. 88) except in the fourth vijnana state. This interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here is that the interpretation clashes with Gauḍa’s description of the third state, deep sleep as devoid of objects and their experiences.

16. Brahmān: Gauḍa calls the Upaniṣadic omniscience a non-dual Brahmānic knowledge (Brahmāna) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita doctrine from Buddhism. The Bhadāratya describes who is Brahmāta and who is Kāpota: वे एवं एवं वातार्थ नामविविधता अवतारण भविष्यति यों जिह व रूपस्य सानां समासां अस्यां अस्तां बालस्य वीर्यां भ्रमण । (III, 8, 10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim is that their faith alone leads to Brahmānic knowledge. Cfr. Dhammapada, Brahmavagga, 36. and my paper, Message of Buddha and reference on pp. 5-6, Prabuddha Bharata, 1926, May.

17. Vasudeva. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of the most important attributes of Buddha like Dāsikāla etc. The Śārva-sūtra state Buddha deserves our homage because he is superior to all other religious teachers in respect of his sublime qualities like Vasudēva, etc. (cfr. 3 and my paper on this subject in Sino Indian Studies, vol. I, pp. 3). Now Gauḍa appears to have generalized the expression.
and claimed that the Realizer of Brahman and Aham may also deserve to be characterized as 'Vishnu' just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman.

18. 'Avasana.' This is a common concept of all schools of Indian philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The most characteristic feature of 'Avasana', well accepted in the Vedanta and the Buddhist is 'avida', a negation which is amplified into Rg, dukha and naka, 'lust, indigation and satisfaction'. Gauḍa here speaks of no 'avida' or naka but its effect, i.e., the notion of diversity in identity. Things, in fact, are free from evil, pure by nature, etc. Thus our leaders understand. (Ref. our comment on Ājīta no. 1). Here again a generalization of Buddha's epithet 'Nayaka' has been claimed by Gauḍa, cp. Annavastrika's synonym of Buddha 'Nayaka' and 'Vidya'.

19. 'Janamamatra.' Gauḍa states why knowledge does not cross over into entities in k. 96. Because both knowledge and entities are unborn, 'ājan' and essentially of identical character of Brahman one does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowledge is eloquently declared to be freed from any relation with its relics. Gauḍa has already stated that the mind never touches its object since the latter is unreal (K. 72). He now speaks about that point has not been admitted by Buddha. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in his first sermon: 'in me a knowledge arose in respect of dharmas, entities; वेस्यं तत्तत्तवविद्ति विषयं ज्ञाता व, etc which claim has been challenged by Gauḍa in this verse, this challenge will set at rest all speculations about Gauḍa and his profound faith.

20. 'Apsara-yoga.' This seems to be absolutely new expression coined by Gauḍa. It has no parallel either in Buddha or Brahmanism. It is a paradoxical combination joining, yoga in the absence of contact, prasa. What does it signify? The classical definition of yoga in Buddhist is to concentrate one's mind on a particular object. This is definitely a sparso-yoga. The Buddhists admit nine grades of dhyanas: four rupa-dhyanas, four arupa-dhyanas and the last: Niruddha-dhyāna which is literally a sparso-yoga. For in the previous 8 dhyanas the mind is operating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last sarvadā the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get in contact with the object, kayena sparso vihāri karunā śūcyata śyaṅgaṭha this is called sparso vibhāsa (Pali; phassa-vibhāsa). This fact makes clear that Gauḍa's Apsara-yoga is unknown to the Buddhists.

42
The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the five senses knowledges together with mind cease to operate and the intellect too does not act, that state is the highest position (gaat). That position is considered as yoga in which the senses including the mind and the intellect are controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-11). This is the yoga that Gauḍa has in mind. Since in this state all the senses, the mind and the intellect cease to operate, there is nothing that comes into contact with any object. This position may appropriately be termed “Apara-yoga.” Sankara’s remarks in this context are noteworthy. He says: तर्कसिद्धि मां यावनि विजयवदयं साजनि किलभेंद्रं कालं। यथा-संज्ञास्मिद्विवंद्यादर्शम् नीवकालम् कौन्तिक॥ (Katha. Bhashya, Gita press, p. 164)

“That saccharine state the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only a disjoining (vivogh) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, sinit is characterized as an absence of contact with all sorts of evil affairs”. This statement of Sri Sankara makes it quite obvious that the yoga described in the Upanishad here is truly Apara-yoga of Gauḍa.

Let us see whether the Gita sheds any light on this topic: The following passage probably helps us a good deal to resolve the riddle:

कारयन्ति अस्तक्तीत्वा विनस्तांश्च न कुष्ठं ।
स ब्रह्मयोगशयनं सुधारके सुनामसुधारं ॥

The yogin who being detached from the external touchables obtains the happiness in his self, he is merged in Brahma-yoga and experiences the inextinguishable happiness”.

This stanza amply demonstrates that Gauḍa’s Apara-yoga is no other than Brahma-yoga of the Gita. The expression, Apara-yoga with reference to Brahma-yoga is the most appropriate, since Brahma being identical with the yogin’s Atman, self has no contact even of the minutest degree could be imagined.

13. Arivada and Arispadha. Buddha has stood on several occasions that he does not dispute with the world and that he follows what the ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Sarvatutta, III, 138, Majh. 1. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 17).

Gauḍa likewise says that we approve quite happily the thesis of no-birth, ajayavada which results from the quadrisection dispute elaborated by other schools of thought about satkarya and anatkarya etc (IV, s). Naga would not concur with Gauḍa in this respect because the former

44
could not have any dogma of his own as a settled fact, hence he disputes every dogma of his opponents.

Sri Sankara is more eloquent in disclosing the Advaita's attitude towards the controversial issues set forth by other philosophers. Note his statements cited below:

"Therefore the person desirous of Realization, discarding the logician's system should take good care in respect of the doctrine of identity of Atman- Brahman. For this reason, we shall disclose some lapses in their systems but not being entangled in the systems. The following has been stated in this context: The Vedantin placing the entire burden of points of disputes, their origin and causes upon the disputants and being protected by them in our decision about the thesis of existence passes on peacefully and happily." (Pratama-Bhashya VI.5, Gita Press p.111)

Note on the last verse. Gauda pays homage to his preceptor though not expressed, after understanding and realizing the fearless deep and undifferentiated state of peace in order to show his gratitude to his preceptor. This is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved in the Upanishads, e.g. Prasse. Up. last verse, Mundaka and Brah. Up etc. A similar tradition is noticeable on the Buddhist side e.g. Sundaramandha where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga's homage to Buddha in the last verse of his Sutra keeps the tradition quite alive.

Finally a Note on Dvipadam vara. Gauda's paying homage to Dipdam vara in ch. IV, stanza 1, has given rise to some controversy amongst scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gauda refers there to Buddha while others on the Brahmanical side believe otherwise. It appears to us that though Gauda adopts the Buddhistic terminology and pattern of arguments to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to have saluted Buddha in the stanza. Our reason for this surmise is that Buddha is prominently spoken as "the Superintendt of all men and gods" (सदशी सः सुप्रेमद्वार) but not Dvi-

45
padam vara, "best of all men". Naga accordingly pays homage to Buddha as Vadarman vara, 'best of all speakers or wachers' (v. the first stanza of his Satsra... त बर महार्या वर्द्ध). Gauda's object of reverence is the best of bipati, i.e. Purushottama, 'best of all persons' which obviously refers to Good. Vismum, ref Gira. उन्म: 

Bhagavad-gita: Ch. XV, 17, 'the Supreme Person is different (from the lower Brahmun) and known as the Supreme Self' which passage speak of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of existence (loka-sarga). We should not confuse between 'Drispadam vara' and 'Vadarman vara' which two terms signify two distinct theological concepts.

It does not matter very much whether Gauda refers to Buddha or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainsay that Gauda adopted a great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and adapted them suitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Moxism Advaita darma.

46