The Bulletin of Tibetology seeks to serve the specialist as well as the general reader with an interest in this field of study. The motif portraying the Stupa on the mountains suggests the dimensions of the field.

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GEORGE BOGLE’S TREATY WITH BHUTAN (1775)
—A. Deb

Attention of several observers has been drawn by the lack of impressive results flowing from Bogle’s mission to Tibet in 1774-75. Francis Younghusband wrote “as regards personal relationship he was eminently successful and that was about as much as he could have expected to establish at the start” (1). This obviously refers to the rapport Bogle had established with the third Panchen Lama who was held in high esteem by Emperor Chien-lung and who had admittedly a decisive influence over the Lhasa pontificate.

In the context of hopes raised by the “Design” of Warren Hastings (2) a sense of disappointment is understandable. Nevertheless a study of the impact of the mission in other respects is amply rewarding. Bogle’s transactions in Bhutan is relatively a neglected episode though it merits more than a passing attention. Accompanied by Alexander Hamilton the convoy left Calcutta in the month of May, 1774. The mission travelled by way of Cooch Behar and Buxa to Tashi Chhodzong. It was detained there till October while the Panchen Lama was seeking entry permits from the Tibetan Government. During his return journey Bogle concluded a treaty with the Deb Raja in May, 1775, conceding important privileges to traders from Bhutan. This commercial treaty with Bhutan can appropriately be looked upon as complementary to the Anglo-Bhutanesque treaty of April, 1774 which ended the First Bhutan War. The treaty of 1774 had already initiated the policy of wooing Bhutan in the interest of trans-Himalayan trade as is evident from the remarkable territorial concessions made to Bhutan at the expense of Cooch Behar.

On Bogle’s recommendation Warren Hastings addressed a letter to the Deb Raja in November, 1774 and enclosed a “parwana” therewith. It reads:—

“Notice is hereby given to all merchants of Bhutan that the strictest orders have been issued to the officers at Kangpur and Ghuraghat dependent on the Subah of Bengal (the paradise of nations) that they do not obstruct the passage of Bhutan merchants to those places for the purpose carrying on there trade as formerly, but that they afford
every assistance to their caravans. They are therefore required not
to entertain the least apprehension and with greater security and
confidence to come into Bengal and carry on traffic as formerly.
Placing on entire reliance on this let them act accordingly there in”.

Three concessions were further elaborated by the treaty which
Bogle concluded with the Deb Raja in May, 1775. The treaty distinctly
encompassed commercial relations with two countries. The preamble
was intended for promotion of trade with Tibet. It runs—”Where-
as the trade between Bengal and Tibet was formerly very considerable
and all Hindu and Mussalmans were allowed to trade into Nepal which
was the centre of communication between the two countries and
whereas from wars and oppressions in Nepal the merchants have of late
years been unable to travel into the country, the Governor as well as
the Deb Raja united in friendship, being desirous of removing these
obstacles, so that merchants may carry on their trade free and secure
as formerly”.

The operative part of the treaty with Bhutan contained the
following provisions:

“...That the Bhutanese shall enjoy the privilege of trading to
Rangpur as formerly, and shall also be allowed to proceed either
duly or by their own consent to all places in Bengal for the
purpose of trading and selling their horses free from duty or hindrance.

“...That the duty hitherto exacted at Rangpur from the Bhutan
caravans be henceforth abolished.

“...That the Deb Raja shall allow all Hindu and Mussalman merchants
freely to pass and repass through his country between Bengal and Tibet.

“...That no English or European merchants shall enter the Deb
Raja’s dominions.

“...That the exclusive trade in sandal, indigo, red skin, tobacco,
betelnut and pan shall remain with the Bhutanese and that the merchants
be prohibited from importing the same into the Deb Raja’s dominions;
and that the Governor-General shall confirm this in regard to indigo
by an order to Rangpur.”

In his letter dated 19th June, 1775, from Cooch Behar addressed
to the Governor General, Bogle informed that he had “Settled matters
with the Raja” excepting the “article of Europeans”.

6
In later historical literature the treaty was regarded as an essay below expectation. Bogle failed to secure the Deb Raja’s consent to allow Englishmen in his country and to that extent, as Cammuso Schuyler says, his mission had “in a measure” failed. (6) But the envoy carefully explained that the entire trade with Tibet was in the hands of native agency “before Europeans had anything to do with it”. (7) Bogle believed trade in this region could be promoted “without the establishment of English factories and the employment of English Agents”. Trade through Nepal was in the hands of this native agency before the rise of the Gorkha power. Bogle would consider it an achievement to restore it “back to that point” and he believed that the “Connection” he had established with the Panchen Lama and the Deb Raja would accomplish it. (1) It might have been possible to secure access for Europeans when “they were settled in Hindustan merely as merchants but the “power and elevation to which the English have now risen render them the objects of jealousy to all their neighbours”. (4) He foresaw that without soothing the misgivings of the hillmen about Europeans “it was impossible to obtain a communication with Tibet”. Again, the sale of broad cloth, the most important commodity in the traffic with Tibet had decreased and “what is now consumed a large portion is of French manufacture... I never could meet with any English cloth”. (10) Conceivably, the French had more effectively utilized the native agency in getting to the Tibetan market and thus Bogle saw no reason to underrate it. An illuminating comment from Brian Hodgson is:— “Let the trade be in accustomed hands, and those hands be rendered more effectually operative by the co-operation at Calcutta of English merchants”. (11)

Bogle noticed that the Deb Raja and his officers were “in fact the merchants of Bhutan”. He had to calm their apprehension and it would appear that the exclusive privileges which he guaranteed in respect of the import of “valuable sorts of goods” including indigo and the abolition of duty on horses amounting to “six annas in the rupee” were aimed at removing official opposition.

In his treaty Bogle carried out the instructions he had received from the Governor General while at Tashi Chodzong. (12) Hastings had written:— “You may even consent to relinquish the tribute or duty which is exacted from the Bhutan caravans which comes annually to Rangpur. To that place all their goods for trade, of whatever kind, may come at all times, free from any duty or impost whatever, and exempt from stoppage, and in like manner all goods shall pass from Bengal into
Blunt free from duty and exaction’. This concession, Warren Hastings thought, was to be the ‘groundwork’ of Bogle’s commercial transaction in Bhutan. Bogle was asked ‘to build such improvements on it’ as his judgement and occasion may dictate. With an unerring insight of the compulsions that make all the difference between success and failure the Governor General had another clear instruction. Bogle was to ‘discovery’ how ‘his (Dee Raja’s) personal interests may be affected by the scheme’ and to ‘encourage any hopes of advantages he may entertain’ provided it did not interfere with the general plan. Thus a dramatic concession combined with an assurance to the non-politic commercial privileges of the officialdom in Bhutan were the two powerful levers with which Bogle was armed before his negotiations. The envoy extended the privileges further as he was ‘aware’ (11) that some of the Bhutanese would wish to proceed further than Ranpur and even to Calcutta. The first Bhutan War had ‘enlarged their minds’ and they now hoped to purchase many articles on better terms and would be ‘glad’ to get some firearms at Calcutta. The privilege of permitting the Bhutanese into the interior parts of Bengal, as Bogle confessed, was ‘one engine I hope to avail myself with some advantage. I shall have need of them all to bring me to a point in which their own particular interest is concerned’. To put up the sale of English broadcloth (14) he thought it necessary to encourage the Kadaangis, Gossains, Bhutanese and Tibetans to visit Calcutta in winter. These merchants would be ‘able to procure at the lowest rates’ and passports and safe escort to the northern frontier would make them prefer the Company’s cloth to any other. The treaty Bogle concluded aimed at ‘freedom and security’ for traders; it included commercial intercourse would follow. As he put it:— ‘Merchants left to themselves naturally discover the most proper manner of conducting their trade, and promoted by self interest carry it on to the greatest extent’. (14)

In 1765 Bogle himself organised the fair at Ranpur. Having ‘excused all duties’ there was a great concourse of Bhutan merchants, ‘who after buying and selling freely went away very well satisfied’. (15) Bogle’s treaty with Bhutan ensured the continuance of ancient trade with trans-Himalaya through native agencies, though perhaps on a diminished scale, for the next half century. In 1833 a Zeänkaff (Subordinate Official) from Bhutan narrated:—

‘To Mongol Khans (Khachi?) trade a good deal at Hasa (Lhasa); they occasionally go to Ranpur in Bengal by the Phari and Padumung routes for the purchase of ottor skins’. (17) Surgeon
Rennie says (1865) that the trade between Bhutan and Rangpur "gradually fell off" in the time of William Bentinck when the privileges enjoyed by Bhutanesse traders were abolished "for the sake of economy". Campbell, the Superintendent of Darjeeling, organised a fair at Titya which was a "great success while under his control". Subsequently Titya was included within Rangpur and the "fair then gradually languished and is now one in name only". (18)

Bogle's mission to Bhutan, according to Cumman Schuyler, was to serve "as a commercial reconnaissance, concerned almost entirely with trade rather than diplomacy". The envoy also became seized with the task of probing the political situation obtaining in Bhutan. He recorded the "rooted enmity" and "opposition of interests" between the ruler and a "junta of priests" led by Lama Rimchochho. This resulted in a "revolution", which combined with the failure of Deb Jolhar's (Turner's Deb Terria) Cooch Behar expedition led to the flight of the latter to the neighbourhood of Lhasa. (19) The Deb Raja was entrapped with the secular affairs and "executive part of the Government" and had extended his grip more and more during the preceding two centuries and, as Bogle noted, the Deb Raja's authority "in the internal Government of the country appears to be very complete". (20) These observations were of great relevance in locating the de facto sovereignty in Bhutan and in prescribing British protocol in the following century.

Bogle elaborated on the futility of a military conquest of Bhutan. He thought that even if a military expedition to Bhutan were successful it would only lead to a disadvantage to the Company "beyond which it already enjoyed". The Anglo-Bhutanese treaty of 1774 had secured the possession of Cooch Behar and was a guarantee against future Bhutanese aggression. He ruled out possession of any part of Bhutan for the purpose of settlement unless done with the consent of the Bhutaneses. He believed this could never be obtained. Economically as well as militarily the policy of conquest of Bhutan would be blunderous—"two battalions, I think, could reduce the country. But two brigades could not keep communication and if that is cut off conquest could be of no use"—. There is a view that "if conquest was effected, all the rest would follow of course; but that I am convinced would not be the case". (21)

Regarding the impact of these objective observations Cumman Schuyler writes—"whether or not they actively influenced the English rulers of India, they expressed a point of view that was held towards
the northern states for many years to come. In fact they were the first enunciation of what was to become almost a permanent policy". It took a few decades of raids faithfully recorded by British frontier officials, two official missions to Bhutan and the humiliation of Ashley Eden at Punakha, to arrive at this conclusion that for security and the Bengal Diaries an invasion of the Himalayan Kingdom was worth undertaking (1864).

During Warren Hastings' administration the importance of Bhutan as a "Gate on the South that prevents entry" (15) was never lost sight of. The Gorkhas had already blocked the "passes through Mustang and Demjong (Sikkim). The road through Mustang was "uncommercial and distant". Missions were sent to Bhutan under Alexander Hamilton in 1776 and again in 1777. One of the duties of Hamilton was to examine the claims of the Deb Raja on the districts of Ambert, Falakar and Jalpeph in the heart of the Bengal diaries. He reported that if "the situation was made he would probably be able to induce the Deb Raja to fulfill his agreement with Mr. Bogle and only to levy moderate transit duties on merchandise" (14). Hamilton returned "after basing upon the agreement between the Deb Raja and Mr. Bogle being faithfully observed". Hamilton was sent on a third mission in 1777 to consolidate the new Deb Raja. In April 1779 Bogle was appointed as envoy to Tibet a second time. The journey was never undertaken as the Panchen Lama had left for Peking to meet the emperor.

The policy between the third Panchen Lama and Chien-Lung is an elegant comment on the wisely conceived plans of George Bogle. Samuel Turner (1754) collected information about this historic meeting from the Regent at Tashilhunpo. The Lama, in Turner's words, took several occasions "of representing in strongest terms the particular anxiety which subsisted between the Governor-General and himself" (15). His conversation so influenced the Emperor that "he resolved upon commencing through the Lama's mediation an immediate correspondence with his friend". Such indeed was the confidence and esteem which the Emperor manifested for the Panchen Lama that he "promised him a full compliance with whatever he should ask."

A similar account of the meeting was given by Parangip Gosain, the friend and companion of Bogle and Turner in Tibet. "In the country of Bhoutan, which lies on the borders of my country, there resides a great prince or ruler for whom I have the greatest friendship. I wish you should now regard him also, and if you will
write him a letter of friendship and receive his in return, it will afford me the greatest pleasure, as I wish you should be known to each other and that a friendly communication should in future subsist between you'.

Gout Das Bysack points out that it is not known who translated the report of Penang. A translation was with Warren Hastings from whom through various channels Alexander Dalrymple obtained it and published it in the Oriental Repository.(16)

The possibilities inherent in the relationship between the Panchen Lama and Emperor Chien-lung and in Bogle's attempts were denied, however by the Panchen's death at Peking in 1786 followed by Bogle's in 1791.

The second mission to Tibet was revived for the second time under Samuel Turner in 1781. Turner, like Bogle in 1775, fully appreciated that commerce with Bhutan and Tibet could be promoted only through the native agency. Turner sought to extend the scope of Bogle's treaty with the Deb Raja by securing a promise from the Regent of the Panchen Lama of 'encouragement to all merchants, natives of India, that may be sent to traffic in Tibet on behalf of the Government of Bengal' (27). Every assistance 'requisite for the transport of their goods from the frontier of Bhutan' was assured. The merchants would be assigned place of residence for vending their commodities 'either within the monastery, or, should it be considered as more eligible, in the town itself'. Like his predecessor Turner thought that 'security and protection were the essential requisites' in commercial intercourse and profit will prove 'its best encouragement'. It was necessary to 'let merchants first learn the way, taste the profit and establish the intercourse...'.

'Turner did not insist on written treaty with the Regent at Tashi Lhumpo because such a treaty might become 'revocable' by the new Panchen Lama when he came of age. Turner says that 'regulations' for trade through Bhutan by means of native agency were 'settled by the Treaty entered into by Mr. Bogle, in the year 1775, the Deb Raja having acknowledged to me the validity of the Treaty, it became unnecessary to insist on the execution of another'.'(28)

Warren Hastings not only prevented the opening made by Bogle from again being closed but also sought to preserve the existing results of Bogle's mission to Bhutan by soliciting legitimate interest of Cooch-Behar. As an unique event, the historians of Cooch Behar have cited the cession of tracts to Bhutan known as Ambati Fulakata and Jelpen.
The transfer of these areas had been recommended by Hamilton to induce the Deb Raja to fulfill the agreement he had concluded with Bogle. These areas belonged to the Raikan (vassals) of Bahadurpur under Cooch Behar (37). A temple dedicated to Siva stood at Jalpeh which was built by Maharaja Pran Narayan of Cooch Behar (1821-62). A recent article seeks to trace the story of the site at Jalpeh back to the 7th Century A.D. (31). Ashley Eden, a later British envoy to Bhutan, "entirely failed to comprehend the reasons" and wrote "I am afraid on this occasion the friendship of the Bhutanese was purchased at the expense of the Bahadurpur Zamindars". This historic transaction is an example of how the claims of history or geography, religion or language were subordinated to the company's own motive: securing access to Tibet and through Tibet to China.

Soon after the departure of Warren Hastings, in the words of a modern Tibet explorer, "a convettemp occurred and all his work was undone" (12). Prof. Sunobhas Chandra Sarkar has pointed out that there was a "distinct severed" (32) policy of policy at the dawn of the Earl of Cornwallis. The humiliation of Nepal is the Gurkha-Tibet war of 1792 completed the disruption of the course of Anglo-Tibetan relations. A recent work on Tibet by a Tibetan scholar shows that under the "patron-Lama" relationship China's role in the war of 1792 was that of an "ally of long standing and that the imperial troops did not enter Tibet to attack Tibetans or to conquer their country" (34). Without going into the question of the status or authority of Tibet to pursue her own policy after 1792, it is necessary to underline that the company's Government regarded Chinese exclusiveness as the prime reason for rendering infractions Bogle's pioneering work not only in Tibet but also in Bhutan. Indeed Bogle's treaty with Bhutan was regarded as in a state of suspended animation. The following excerpt is from a letter from the Agent to the Governor General, North East Frontier, to Government (34) is of peculiar relevance in this connection. The letter, dated 9th June 1816, runs:—

"I believe, Bhutan is now as it was in the time of Turner's mission a dependency of Tibet, but I am not able to state any particulars as to their connection. Our subjects have been excluded from the trade of Tibet and Bhutan through the jealousy and influence of the Chinese Government against the wishes of the Ladans and inhabitants of either country and though the favourable commercial treaty settled by Mr. Bogle in 1775 and
subsequently admitted in 1285 by the Deo Raja has never been abrogated yet it has been rendered of no benefit and virtually set aside through the interference of the Chinese Government. An envoy must possibly be able to restore to our subjects the privilege of conducting their trade in Bhutan ———-. It will not be presumed that the Chinese will be 'long allowed to exclude British subjects from the privileges granted to other foreigners and to totally interdict them from all the vast possessions that acknowledge their authority'.

Thus as late as 1836 it was found that the Company's treaty with Bhutan was never abrogated. Only Manchu exclusiveness deprived me East India Company the benefits of trade in a legitimate manner. Proposing a new mission to Bhutan the same letter stated that such a mission should be made the medium of conveying dispatches to the Dali Lama ———- referring probably to the circumstances which broke off our intercourse with Tibet, the misunderstanding that our government was connected with the attack of the Nepalese upon Tashihunapo.'

The next mission to Bhutan, in the words of R.S. Pemberton, the leader of the mission, tried to "ascertain the nature of the foreign relations of the Tibetan government." The envoy learnt from Tibetan merchants that "there were foreigners residing there! who "sat at tables and were constantly writing and reading books." He came to believe that agents of Russia had found their way to Lhasa. (36) Obviously diplomacy on the northern borderland of India had to concern itself with the meeting of three empires rather than two.

NOTES
1. Youngusband, Francis, India and Tibet pp. 74, 35.
5. Schueller Camman, Trade through the Himalayas The Early Attempts to open Tibet. Princeton, 1951 p. 50.
16. ibid. Introduction c iii
17. National Archives of India, New Delhi. Foreign Political 1: Dec-
1253 No 76. Memorandum on the Conversation with Cheeky. Then
sent on diplomatic to Agent to the Governor General, North East
Frontier.
18.'Retail, Surgeon James and the story of the Dam War, London,
23. Turner Samuel: Account of an Embark to the Court of Tesho Lama in
26. State Archives, Government of West Bengal, Bhutan Political
27. Ghosal, Swat Chandra, A History of Cash Beak (Translated from
28. Nirmal Chandra Chaudhuri, Bhairavarthi (Bengali Monthly),
Calcuta Agraharan, 1376 B.S.
30. Samtar, Suubhan Chandra : Some Notes on the Intercourse of Benga
with the Northern Countries in the second half of the Eighteenth
32. National Archives of India, P.C. June 1856 No 52.
1961, p. 98.
Gaudapada’s work, that is, his Karika in four chapters, may be regarded an important landmark in the development of the Advaita Vedantic thought. His exposition of Advaitism is unique and without parallel in the Vedantic literature. He does not follow the traditional line of argument for upholding his thesis. The language he has adopted is Buddhist in many parts. He employed several expressions which are common to Buddhism and its philosophy and which create impression in the mind of readers that the author (Gaudapada) was a follower of Buddhism (e.g., V. Bhatanacharya’s edition of the Karika). It is mysterious indeed why Gaudapada should have at all adopted such an ambiguous language betraying his trustfulness to the Advaitic thought and tradition. He is traditionally regarded a disciple of the sage Suka in the Sveta up. bhasya ad 1.8, and a grandpreceptor of Sri Sankara through Govindakshamala-gavatpada (v. R.D. Karmarkar’s edn. of the Karika, Introduction). He has, perhaps, been influenced by Buddhism, especially in its later developed form, because he was a native of the Gauda country where Buddhism was a prominent and popular faith in his days. He might have aimed at propagation of Advaitism in the popular language and style of Buddhism which might appeal to the lay as well as the learned men of the society in those days. This appears to be the most plausible explanation of the riddle why Gaudapada adopted such an ambiguous style which being improperly understood would convey the converse of what he intends to convey.

Thus we meet with two sets of interpretations of the text one tending towards Buddhism and the other opposing it (e.g. V. Bhatanacharya and R.D. Karmarkar). I shall confine myself in the following pages mainly to clear off the wrong interpretations of the ambiguous expressions employed by Gaudapada in the course of upholding his fundamental thesis of Advaitism.

The text consists of four chapters, of which the first contains 29 verses explaining the Mandukyopanishad. The central theme of the Upanishad is the description of four stages of Atman, Brahman known as Viveka, Tajjana, Prajna and Turya (fourth) who is Sarvajña, perceiver of
the whole. The first three stages are represented in the following states in order: Waking (Jagrata), Dream, and Deep Sleep. The fourth is the transcendental state. Atman in the first three stages generally stays in the three places of the body: the left eye, mind and heart respectively. The mystic syllable 'Om' while considered to be consisting of three parts, a, u and m represents the last three states of Brahman. While considered as purificating and one unit it represents the fourth Advaita state of Brahman (Karika, 19). Gaudapada points out the distinction between the third and the fourth state thus: the non-grasping of dualism is common to both states, but the Atman in the third is under the influence of avidya,nescience and sleep, while in the fourth Atman is relieved of both (K. 15). He says further that the living being who is caught in the slumber of immanent Maya (Illusion) gets awakened, then be realizes Advaita (Monism) which is freed from birth and sleep (K. 16).

This idea is common to Yogacara Buddhism. If we substitute Chitamrutra for Advaita the passage would turn into a Buddhist maxim. This chapter is rightly styled as Omkaraprakarana, an exposition of the Om syllable. Read for fuller contents of the chapter Kurmarkar, Introduction, Xii.

The second chapter named Vaishhthya-prakarana consists of 38 verses. The chapter starts with the elucidation of the external world and its futility on the analogy of dreams phrenomenon. The illusory character of our objective universe is a common doctrine of both the Vedantic and the Yogacara Buddhists and the dream analogy is also a common weapon to demonstrate their position. Reference to Vaisheshika's Vimstikka, verse 1 with bhaya. Another common example for the purpose is the illusory notion of the Serpent or the Rope in the twilight. Guada says: Just as the idea of serpent is imagined on the rope in the dark, just so is the idea of five Atman imposed on the Brahman. When true knowledge of the rope is gained the illusion of serpent disappears; likewise one Atman is discriminated as diverse through the influence of Maya and when the true character of Atman's oneness is ascertained the discrimination disappears (K., 16-17).

Then the author elaborates the views of different thinkers who oppose erroneously the ultimate reality things such as Prana, breath, elements, Guana etc. Guada does not omit to mention in the list the ultimate reality of Buddhist, viz. mind, manas, citta (K. 3 7). Here the absence of Jnana, Vijnana or Prajnana is noteworthy because it is charac-
teristic of Atman, Brahman stated in the Upanisads. It has been in fine
remarked that the entire universe is to be considered by the Vedantin
as a dream, illusion or castle in the air. The highest truth is that there
is no annihilation, nor origination, no fettered prison nor aspirer of
truth and no desire of release nor released (K. 32). This utterance of
Gauda, resembles very closely to Nagajuna’s characteristic Nihilism.
If the stanza is detached from the context one could hardly think that
this utterance comes from a Vedantin. Gauda, comes very close to Nagaju-
na because both of them plead for the unreality of the diverse world
and for one absolute Whole. They, however, differ in their approach
to the ultimate truth. Naga would designate it Sunya, or the highest
perfection of wisdom whereas for Gauda, it is Atman or Brahman,
an embodiment of the highest knowledge. Cf. Sveta. up. bhaya.,
Gita-prasa, p. 46, citing the Brahmapurana.

Gauda closes this chap (II) with the declaration that Non-
dualism is auspicious (अनुप्रयोग लोक, K. 33) and the same as Advaita
or Tattva. He further says: Advaya which implies the negation of
plurality and of the mind’s constructive states has been revealed by the
Sages that have reached the yonder shore of Vedic lore (K. 33). The
Advaya doctrine is common to the Mahayana Buddhists. It’s probably
for this reason that Gauda adds that his doctrine of Advaya has been
revealed by the Vedic Sages with the implication that he is not speaking
of the Buddhist doctrine. We may likewise find several times in
Sankara’s kalyaan on the Upanisads the expression of Advaita in relation
brahman.

It is to be noted here that Amaratinda, the Sanskrit Lexico-
grapher has credited Buddha with preaching the Advaya doctrine proba-
ably for the first time. Both schools of later Buddhism, the Madhyamika
and the Yogacara proudly acclaim themselves as great champions of
the Advaya doctrine though the import of the term, advaya, is quite
different for each school. For the Madhyamika it conveys the idea
of middle path, Madhyamaka-practis whereas for the Yogacara it
signifies the absence of subject and object अनिवृत्तत्त्वमान
Though Gauda and Sankara characterize Brahman as advaya
they probably intend to convey the idea of aditya, “without
the second”, i.e. Advaita. Now I leave it to future studies to decide
which school initiated the doctrine and which one adopted it later.

The third chap (III) named Advaita-prakarana contains 48
verses. The exposition of Advaita in this chapter is quite logical in

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succession after establishing the futility of the diverse worlds in the second chapter. This chapter may also be named as Akarpaya-prakarana as the author starts in the second stanza as की विद्वानवचन-प्रकरणम् “I shall elucidate unpitiableness”. In the first stanza Gauda has stated that the worship, upanana, is related to the Karpa-Brahman, Hiranya-garba etc. The world-upper being different from the worshipped occupies a pitiable state, kepana. In fact every body is Ajn, unborn, i.e. Brahman prior to an illusion creation. For this reason, says Gauda—| shall elucidate Akarpaya, unpitiableness which is a quality of Brahmic state अकार्पणस्य नमस्तम्. It appears therefore that Akarpaya may fittingly be equated to the Advaitic state. Brah. Up. mentions kepana as opposed to Brahmana, v. passage cited below, comm. No. 16.

The main arguments of this chapter may be summed up as follows:

1. There is nothing born; some philosophers advocate the birth of what is unborn. The unborn is immortal, how could it be reduced to mortality? (K.12). No. Jiva, person is born; this is the ultimate truth comprising an absolute non-existence of birth (K.42).

2. Relation between Jiva and Brahman is similar to that between the vast space and the space within the pot (ghata-aksa); this is to say the difference between them is made by the limiting adjunct (Upadhyagata). The moment the pot is destroyed the difference disappears (K.3.40). This illustration of space is made in respect of birth. So ghata-aksa is neither a produce nor a part of Akasa. Likewise are Jiva and Brahman (K.7). The aggregates (inorganic objects) are creations of one’s own illusion, maya and similar to those in dream (K.12). Hence the identity of Jiva and Brahman is much extolled in the scripture Upnishads and their differentiation is severely censured there—which position is quite rational (K.11). Thus non-dualism is the Absolute Truth and dualism is only its variety (K.18). The same idea is echoed in the Vishnu-devimorton in sveta Up. bhashya, p. 48.

3. In the light of non-dualism stressed in several Upnishads, the passages dealing with the process of creation of the universe are to be explained away as a devise for leading people to the ultimate purpose of identity of Jiva with Brahman (Kk.14,15).
4. Mind is a sole factor for dualism, अविद्याविद्यावेदना इत्यत्ब when the mind is reduced to a non-entity (amanibhava) dualism vanishes (K. 31). The mind is so reduced when one does not conceive anything as a result of realizing and experiencing the truth of Atman, Brahman (K. 32). The same topic has been elaborated in Kk. 14, 18, 49. In deep sleep the mind is laid low and being controlled it is cut off from its activity; then it becomes Brahman which is embodied in an all-round illumination of knowledge (Kk. 15, 46). It is unborn, sleepless, dreamless, devoid of name and form, omniscient and flashing up once only (K. 16, cp Kk. 37, 40). One should therefore control the mind through proper means when it becomes distracted by pleasure and enjoyment. Recollecting that everything is miserable one should turn its back from pleasure and enjoyment, and recollecting that everything is unborn one sees nothing as born (K. 43). When the mind becomes low-spirited it should be awakened; being distracted it should be pacified; being contaminated with impurities it should be watched with care, and being attained to the state of equilibrium it should not be shaken up. One should not enjoy pleasure out of concentration, but should get detached from it through his wisdom; the mind being steady and motionless one should with efforts free it from its dualistic tendency. When the mind is not laid low and not distracted, the mind which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns into Brahman (Kk. 44, 46).

Comment. Now let us see whether any of the above topics of Gauda can be compared with ideas of the Buddhist authors.

1) Our comment on the Ajatiwada is deferred to the next chapter on the same topic.

2) The space-example is also found in a Mahayanautra cited in M. vrtti, p. 175 which insists on the identity of all entities on the analogy of space. The passage runs: तत्तपरिप गम देशम यथ मूलवरिष्णिताय तस्य रत्नाकारवाजत्वाय अस्तामानत्याय। शतपर-माहोत्न न किष्ठन्त वामात्याय।......

3) Gauda says that the Upanishadic doctrine of creation is a devise for some ultimate purpose (K. 2) this looks like an echo of Vasubandhu’s explanation of Buddha’s utterances about skanda, ayatana and dhatus (V. Vasubandhu’s Vimatsika, ver. 8-10). Buddha is regarded as Upaya- kusala, clever in employing devices suitable to convert people to his own faith (Cp. Satyadiddhi, ch 1.p. 5, n. 33). It is likely therefore that
Gandhi was convinced in and convinced of the advantage of the Buddhist argument to explain away the vyākya contradictory to their favourite conclusions.

4) “This dualistic appearance is a vision of the mind” मन्त्रार्थवाक्य (K. 31), this expression seems to be resulted from the dream example employed several times in the Treatise by Gandhi (cp. K. 20 also). According to the Upamihād, it is the mind that creates a new imaginary world in dreams, e.g. Prana; up. IV, 5: अतः श्च, (सामु.)

द्वारा मनस्मिनमुदातिनि... since the same axiom is applicable to the waiting state the above expression “manudravyam” has perhaps been coined. The Vedantins would otherwise express it as सनन्दनदिनेन or मातासुन्दरिवसंभव इत्यादि. Since the Yogacara Buddhists also plead that the universe is imaginary and a creation of mind they would reject the idea as मनस्मिनर्वाहसः सवं using ‘तत्त्व’ instead of “द्वारा”. The above statement would also result authentically into another axiom: भविष्यतिविवाहारण...” / विभवारण:... the end of misery is brought about by the mind’s control (K. 46).

It is interesting to note that the above ideas of Gandhi have some parallel in the Visuddhimagga (in the group of six chapters) as follows:—

अभियान विवाहारण... भविष्यतिविवाहारण:...

ब्रह्म भविष्यतिविवाहारण: ...

ब्रह्माय भविष्यतिविवाहारण: ...

तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः...

विवाहारण: विवाहारण: विवाहारण: ...

विवाहारण: विवाहारण: विवाहारण: ...

तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः...

ब्रह्माय भविष्यतिविवाहारण: ...

तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः...

तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः तथा ज्ञातुैः...
"All actions are the result of knowledge, (avidya) and vidya is regarded as knowledge. The creature takes birth as a result of its action and it gets released as a result of vidya, (knowledge). The ultimate truth is Advaita, (monism) and dualism is only its variety. The notion 'I' and 'mine' arises from the lack of wisdom; Advaita, on the other hand, is experienced as freed from conceptions and as unapproachable. Dvaita is embodied in the mind's activities which are born of their causes, dharma and adharma, merit and demerit. They are to be made ceased and at their cessation dualism dvaitam becomes utterly irrational. This entire universe is imagined by the mind alone and the monistic state is secured when the mind becomes non-entity (amamithava) or non-mind. The cognitive experiences arise in accordance with the resultant forces of action karma-vasana, that is the consciousness arises in such a fashion as the forces assume and as soon as it is removed or stopped the ultimate Truth, Brahman shines forth of its own accord" (cited in the Svet, bhahya, pp 48-49, Gita press).

Note. Vijnana and Vijnapti are employed in the same import as in Yogacara Buddhism. The idea that at the stoppage of mind's activities truth shines forth can be compared with the Yoga Sutra I, 1, 7: सत्ता इत्यवस्थे ज्ञानायाम् च. cp. Sankara bhahya on Gita, XVIII, 50: गात्रादित्यभावादोदरशणादित्याश्च कार्तिकाय निर्धारितं।

K.35. The idea that Gauda that the mind being controlled and checked in its activity turns out into Brahma (cp. K.45) looks like the Yogacara's favourite thesis that the mind being stopped in its creation of dualism भाव्यास्वभाव क्यों भावे भावेषु turns out into Dhammabhus, i.e. Tathagata (v. Trimsika, ver. 28 with bhahya). It does not, however, follow that Gauda formed his idea after the pattern of Yogacara Buddhism. The Vedantin has his own reasoning for it. Sankara pleads once: Mind (manas) is Brahma because the latter is the inner core of the former तत्सत्तकयात्राकालवास्तव। Kena. Up bhahya II, 14. The Vedantin's definition of Jiva is: conscious spirit circumscribed by the limiting adjunct, the inner organ, i.e. the mind, etc (Vedanta-paribhasa.) When the inner organ is made deprived of its funcioning it becomes pure consciousness, caitanya like Ghatakaas becoming the vast space at the destruction of the pot.

K.36. Sakrt-vibhatam, flashing up once. This expression again appears in chap IV, K. 81. Its synonym is Sakri-jyotiis found in chap III, K. 37. Atrim is also stated to be Svayanjyotis in Br.Up.
Gautama made it vayan-prabhatam (IV, 81). The Mahaangika Buddhists have also characterised their original mind as Prakriti-prabha-saram. The Sakri-vishatan may be considered in relation with some Buddhists’ theory of Ekakshara-abhamsamadbha, one moment’s intuition of Truth. This theory has been advocated by the Medhimisaka and also in the Suya-siddhi (ch.19-27) as against the Vaishnikas’ theory of gradual intuition of the four Truths (anuparaswahananassy). The one moment’s intuition is advocated for the reason that the Truth is only one, viz. Causation-Truth, Nirvada-satyam. May we grant now that there may be some link between these two theories of the Vedanta and the Buddhist? Sankara perhaps refers to this one moment’s intuition theory while commenting on the Kena. Up. I, 2.4: विश्वसन्तितन्त्राम विश्वसन्तितन्त्राम राजसे 'according to some prati-bodha implies one moment’s consciousness’. We may also take note here of the Brahm Up. I, 36: 'सत्त्वं ब्रह्मसम्बन्ध तव अग्नि ज्ञान आत्म ' and Sankara’s bhaṭaya thereon.

K 44. Gautama’s prescription of cure for the mind’s concentration-ills is comparable with that of the Buddhist authors. Gautama says that the mind gets distracted due to its inclination to enjoy the sensuous pleasures and it becomes low-spirited on account of some mental illness etc. Both the states are detrimental to the ultimate goal. So Gautama advises that the mind should be pacified when it becomes distracted, and it should be awakened when it becomes low-spirited.

According to the Buddhists mind’s stubborness and low-spirits are two impediments to the Enlightenment. When the mind is stubborn one should cultivate calmness, concentration and equanimity because through these three factors the stubborn mind can easily be pacified. When the mind becomes low-spirited the yogin should cultivate analytical thinking, exercise and joy because through these factors the low-spirited mind can easily be awakened (Samaṇa, V, 12 ff). The S. S. Sthiti discusses this point in greater details. When it is distracted the act of controlling should be applied; when it is too weakened the act of strengthening should be applied. The golden youth now meets the gold, heaves it, waters and keeps it on timely. If it is too heated it becomes fluid being too cooled it becomes thickened and being kept on it becomes explained likewise is the yogin’s mind (ch. 196). The tuned horse also may be compared here (Ibid).

The Yogipatra refers to about nine factors of distraction and their satellites about five in all (I, 30-32). In order to check them an exercise
of contemplation on Eka-tattva, single truth is advised; the mind may again be appeared by means of contemplation of four devices Maitri, love, Karuna, compassion, Mudita, joyfulness and Upoksha, indifference (I. 13), or by some such other means (6, 14). The Yogasutra speaks nothing about the kinds of unfavourable mental states as the Buddhist sources or Gauda describe.

It is therefore most likely that Gauda was acquainted with the Buddhist tradition regarding the Dhyana process and made use of it in his own fashion to suit his favourite thesis. The mind’s distraction (= stubbornness in Buddhism) which arises due to sensuous pleasure should be checked by recollecting the affective axiom that everything is miserable, a formula quite popular in Buddhism (K. 43). Gauda says in the same breath that by recollecting everything as unborn he does not see anything as born. But the link between the first and the second statement is not quite obvious and logical. Gauda probably adopts Patanjali’s opinion of Eka-tattva-abhyasa, contemplation-exercise on single truth (Yogasutra I. 13). It appears to us in that case that we should interpret “aja” unborn as Brahman and “jata” born as ilusory things. Cfr. our remark on the title of the third chapter above.

K. 46. Our comment on this chapter may be closed with Gauda’s instructive remark on the mind and in ultimate reality. He states: When the mind is not low-spirited and distracted, the same which is now motionless and freed from its dualistic reflection turns cut into Brahman—which statement may suggest to us that Gauda expresses a Buddhistic idea in the Vedantic terminology. How it could be justified from the Advaita Vedantin’s standpoint of view that has been made clear previously v. comment on K. 15.

Chap IV

The fourth chapter traditionally styled as Atatasanti prakarana consists of just a hundred stanzas eight of which are repetitions from the previous chapters. This chapter contains several puzzling and enigmatic expressions which led some scholars to doubt whether the author was truly an Advaita Vedantin. Hence the chapter is interesting to us in more than one respect. Its theme is the same as that of the previous chapter viz. elucidation of Advaitism in greater details.

The main topics may be summed up as below:—

1. Criticism of jati-kosha, theory of origination. The origination-theorists are all dualistic thinkers, viz, Sankhya, Vaiseshika, the Buddhists
with the exception of the Madhyamikas. They may be grouped into two: 1) Some plead for origination of what is non-existent, by others pled for the origination of what is clearly existent, thus they both dispute each other and lead ultimately to non-origination which we approve and never dispute with them.

The author ridicules the theory of origination, Itkula as it does not stand a moment’s scrutiny; hence Ajaivaka, non-origination is only rationally acceptable conclusion (K. 3:1,2,7). The important factor that brings us to non-origination is the non-recognition of the order of sequence between the cause and the effect (K. 2:1); it becomes thus obvious that nothing originates from itself or something else, nor does anything originate whether it is existent or non-existent etc. (K. 2:1). cp, Nagajuna’s mācin na bhūta pārthuh Madhyamakas, Śāstra.

Likewise the non-existent is not caused by the non-existent nor is the existent caused by the non-existent. The existent cannot be caused by the existent, how can the non-existent be caused by the existent? (K. 4:6). This looks like Nagajuna’s dialectic. The origination, however, has been precluded by the enlightened sages, Bodhisattvas who are frightened at the doctrine of non-origination and those who believe in the true existence of things as illusory experience their activities (K. 4:1); viewing thus the wise enter into the truth of non-origination of the cause and the effect (K.14).

2. Prakṛti. The empirical experience, prakṛti is conditioned by its cause; if it is not so, diversity or multiplicity (multiplicity, namely) is accepted (in the empirical field of dharmas). Prakṛti (the worldly experience) is regarded as conditioned by causes (saṃsāra) from the viewpoint of logic. The cause (causa) becomes non-causal (anātma) from the viewpoint of Truth (K. 4:25).

3. Dream. The dream-example is elaborated and applied to things experienced in the waking state (K. 3:31,32,33,61-69). Waking experience is applied to dream state in K. 4:6. Just as one experiences the unknowable objects (saṁvedyā) as real in the waking state, just so one experiences things in dream; perception (viparyeyā) is the causing factor in both cases.

4. Maya and Nāmātka. The magic elephant is regarded as real because it moves and causes experiences; likewise are the external

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things. (K.44) Buddha (Gautama) preached: “Things are originated on account of causes and conditions”; this origination is comparable with magic, and the magic too does not at all exist (K.58). The illusory person is born and dies; likewise the living beings are existent (born) and non-existent (die) (K.69). The same is repeated with the illustration of Nirmitaka, created being (K.70).

5. Atara, firebrand, whirling of the firebrand causes the appearance of a wheel, so the vibration of consciousness gives rise to the appearance of the subject-object notions. When the firebrand is stopped it causes no such appearance but remains in its unborn state. While the firebrand is whirling the appearance of wheel does not come from the the outside and enters into the fire brand, nor does the wheel appearance go out of the fire brand, because it is not a substance; so is the case with Vijnana being at vibration, the appearance of the subject and object does not come from the outside and enters into Vijnana, nor does the appearance go out of it because the subject-object appearance is not a substance. The appearance is always unthinkable (aitihyaka) because no law of causation between the two (Vijnana and appearance) is operative (Kk.47-52)

6. Citta and artha. Mind does not touch the object nor does it reflect the object, because the object is unreal and so is its reflection. The mind teaches no cause (nimitta) in all three times-Perception is causeless by itself, how will it cause the appearance? Hence the mind has no birth, nor does the mind’s vision have it. The person who perceives its birth will also perceive the foot-print in the sky (K.16-18). The mind and its object have no birth; the person who understands this fact will never fall in perversion (K.46). Dualism of subject and object appearance is the result of the mind’s vibration, citta-upadanta. The mind in fact is object-free; hence it is proclaimed to be contact-free, atanga (K.73) cp. K.94.

7. Samsara and Moksha. For samsara which is beginningless, no end can be achieved and for release, moksha which has a beginning, no endlessness can be achieved (K.19). As long as one has obsession with cause and effect so long he will have the causal production. The obsession being removed the causal production ceases to exist. As long as one is obsessed with the cause and effect, so long will his samsaric life continue; his obsession with the cause and effect being removed he will not be caught in samsara (K.35-36).

8. Kshanti. All entities are by nature freed from decay and death. Those who conceive their decay and death, are dropped from their goal
due to their wrong conception (K.14). All entities are beginning-
less and to be understood as similar to sky by nature. All entities
by nature are confirmed as enlightened from the beginning; one who
his perseverance to this effect will become worthy of immortality
(K.91-92).

9. Samata-niched-dhara. Everything is born in the empirical
plane of existence, hence they are not permanent. Everything is
unborn as they exist (for all time), hence they are not annihilated (K.57).
From a magic seed springs up the magic sprout, then the latter is neither
permanent nor impermanent. The same rule is to be applied in respect
of all entities (K.59). No talk of eternal or non-eternal is possible
with reference to the unborn things. Where no letters (i.e. words)
are applicable, no discrimination (of permanent or impermanent) can
be applied thereof (K.60).

10. Adicya, non-dual. Consciousness which is in fact unborn, un-
moving, object-free, calm and non-dual appears as though having birth
movement and object (K.45). Everything is unborn; its birth is a
vision of our mind. The mind being changeless, its non-birth, non-
parti is inevitably non-dual (K.79). The mind being retrenched and
inactivated, its status is motionless; this state which is invariably, unborn
and non-dual becomes the sole domain of Buddhas, the enlightened
ones (K.89).

11. Kalyuta and Kanaturaa. Whatever exists in the imaginary sphere of
existence (samvega) does not exist in the absolute sense. Something
may, perhaps, exist from the viewpoint of empirical law of causation,
that too does not exist in the absolute sense. The absolute may be
unborn from the viewpoint of imaginary spheres of existence.
Kalyuta-
samvega, it is not at all unborn in the absolute. It takes birth from the
view point of empirical law of causation (K.72-74).

12. Abhirvata. There is allowance to a false idea of dualism, but
that dualism is not there. Realizing the absence of dualism one takes
no birth as he has no cause for the birth (K.73). The mind on account
of adherence to false idea of dualism, activates itself in an apparently
similar object (e.g. the idea of allers on the race) but when one realizes
the absence of the mistaken object he retreasons himself from it and becomes
detached from it (K.79).

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13. **Citiksha.** By apprehending some or other object the noble Atman is perpetually concealed as being happy, but disclosed as being miserable. The ignorant encompasses Him in four attributes: Ego, non-Ego, both Ego and non-Ego and neither Ego nor non-Ego, which attributes signify four ideas in order: "\textit{unsteady},", \textit{steady}," and the absence of both". These are four extreme points by which the noble Atman is perpetually concealed. The person who recognizes Him as being untouched by these attributes becomes omniscient (K.S. 81: 84).

14. **Buddhi, Samdhi-lokika and Lokottara-jnana.** The empirical knowledge (lokika-jnana) is what consists of two objects and its experience; pure empirical knowledge is what has the phenomenon of experience but is deprived of its object. The transcendental knowledge (lokottara) is considered as what is deprived of both the object and its experience. The Enlightened Sages, Buddhas have always proclaimed that the knowledge and the knowable (Jnana, Jnayi) are to be understood well. When the three-fold knowledge and the knowable are understood in their order the wise will acquire omniscience in respect of everything (K.S. 87: 59). Those whoever are convinced in respect of brightness and identity (of all things) are indeed possessed of the highest knowledge in the world and in this fact the world does not delive (K.S. 87: 99).

15. **Aparyaya.** What is to be discarded, what is knowable, what is to be acquired and what is to be measured are all to be understood from the Agrayana, the highest Upanishadic path. Of these the ignorance-oriented experience has been accepted in the three states except in the cognizable-lunya state (K.S. 99: 99).

16. **Brahmaya.** Having reached the complete omniscience, Brahmanhood, and a non-dual position not amenable to the beginning middle and end, what more must this one may yet aim for? This disciple of Brahmin is spoken of as their innate calm state. It is also stated as done because they by nature are controlled in their senses; the wise knowing thiswise should acquire the calm state (K.S. 81: 96).

17. **Varada.** Having realized truly the absence of causation and not finding any distinct cause for anything one secures the fearless state which is devoid of grief and desire (K.S. 35). All entities are calm from the beginning, sober, very quiet by nature and undifferentiated; their identity (satya) is unborn (i.e. Brahman) and fearless, \textit{risnada}. Those who \textit{walk in things}’ differentiation have no fearlessness. All
different doctrines are deeply bent on differentiations; therefore they are pitiable (K.s, 93-94). Having realized the state which is hardly visible, too deep, unborn, undifferenciated, fearless and freed from diversity, we invite our preceptor to the best of our ability (K.109).

18. Avacana: If there is even a subtle notion of diversity of things lingering in his mind the unwise will have no detachment.

What to speak of that he will slip away his veil of incognizance? All thence (i.e. sentient beings) are never covered by any veil, free from impurities by nature, enlightened and liberated from the outset thus understand our teachers (K.97-98).

19. Jnanam or Brahma: Buddha’s knowledge does not cross over into entities, nor do the entities likewise cross over into knowledge—this has not been declared by (Gautama) Buddha (K.99). The unborn knowledge is not regarded to be crossing over into unborn entities. Since the knowledge does not cross over into entity it is declared as relation-free (K.106 cr. 72 under the head e).

20. Aparajya: I salute to him who has preached yoga freed from contact, which is pleasant and beneficial to all sentient beings, dispute-free and contradiction-free (K.1), cr. III. 19: the contact-free yoga is hardly experienced by any mediator who is frightened from this yoga thinking that is dreadful, though it is in fact otherwise.

Comment, 1. Aparajya: This is the most characteristic feature of Gauḍa’s philosophy. Nagajuna (hereafter referred as Nga) too has made use of this thesis as one of the most powerful weapon to uphold his favourite philosophy of Nihilism, Sauvada. Though Gauḍa and Nga concur in pleading very strongly for non-origination of things their ultimate purpose is quite different. Gauḍa by devoting the separate non-existence or non-origination of things aims at upholding Apatu or Brahman as one sole principle, Advaita. Whereas Nga aims as an absolute voidness, nisvatta. Though our modern mind tends to identify them as one and the same neither Gauḍa would say that he abides at voidness, nor would Nga say so at the Upanishadic Brahman. They differ thus in their purposes which oppose each other.

The circumstances which led them to their different conclusions must also be different. Since Gauḍa cites on several occasions instances from the Upanishads and other Vedic sources we may fairly be sure that
he has been inspired by those sources. We find in the Upanishads several passages to the effect that one Atman or Brahman alone is true and other phenomenal things are untrue or false: e.g. Avatmaka. Up. 1.11.11: भावमा वा द्वारा अस्तित्व नमुना निबिन्द निफुत। Br. Up III, 5, 1: तेन ईशा एव अशीष्यत्वं ब्रह्म। ......... When things other than Brahman are declared untrue they deserve to be termed non-existent and their apparent existence and appearance are to be explained away as the effects of our mind’s illusion like a notion of the serpent on the rope. When the notice of the serpent disappears on a close observation the serpent and the rope become one and the same and the serpent has not a separate existence. Likewise to say that things other than Brahman are untrue and false implies that they have no separate existence and to be viewed as identical with Brahman itself. To confirm this idea the Sveta Upanishad says:—

This Brahman that remains always within is knowable.
There is nothing other than this Brahman realisable.
The enjoyer, enjoyable and享受 encompassing the three are stated to be this Brahman alone. 1.12.

On the basis of this identity all the attributes that are applicable to Brahman can also be applied to other phenomenal things. This is the reason why Gauda declares that things (dharmas) are adi-stanta, adi-buddha and adi-nirukta (worse, released and enlightened from the outset) etc. The most characteristic of all attributes is ajna, ajnata ‘unborn’. Upanishads always prefer the expression: ajna, ajnata, na jyotate, etc. to qualify Brahman or Atman. It may now appear quite obvious why Gauda generally calls phenomenal things as ajna, ajnata, ajati, etc. This is perhaps the background on which Gauda’s ajnata-jada has been worked out.

In the case of Naga’s ajati or antapattana nano-origination proposition the following facts may be considered as basis: Asvajit, one of the foremost disciples of Buddha, has credited his master with the discovery of a true cause of things that are brought about by causes in this sthana.

म भव्यं आध्यात्मिक भव्यं अश्चिन्तित्वं इत्यादि।
“Tathagata (Buddha) has proclaimed the true cause of things that arise on account of their causes’” (Sattasāra sutta, p.26, note on p. 31 more particulars about the stanza).
It is called there as Pratitya-samutpada-gōthā implying thereby a formula 29
of Dependent Origination. The formula is said to contain twelve members such as Artha, Samtha, Pipasa and others arranged in a progressive order to show that the first member causes the second, the second causes the third and the latter causes the fourth and so on. The formula explains how a human being comes into existence from its embryonic stage to a full grown-up stage. In other words it makes plain how the truth of origin of misery, Samadaya says operates. The same formula is said to lead to the cessation-truth, Nirvana-suga by a cessative process, i.e. the cessation of the last member leads to that of the second member and so on. This doctrine obviously proves that both the origin and cessation are conditioned by causes. The law of causation, Pratityasamutpada, thus forms a central theme in early Buddhism explaining how the phenomenal world originates and how it ceases to originate at the end.

This position turns to be quite different when Buddhism assumes Mahayana form and introduced a monistic teaching. The Mahayana school headed by Naga and a large number of Mahaya Sutras credited no more to Buddha to be the discoverer of the law of causation in its early form. The doctrine of Pratityasamutpada implies for Naga the reverse of origination, i.e. non-origination and non-cessation. Note the first stanza of this Mahayana Sutra:

महेन्द्रकृपयारथोऽनुỏणतमष्किता।

This idea of non-origination is confirmed in the Mahayanim scriptures: ये धर्मविशेषतः स शुद्धस्वः, “What is originated through causes is not originated in fact” (cited in the Mdbh., vrtti, p. 239 from the Anuvatita Sutra). The reversal of origination into non-origination was necessitated in view of changing pattern of the Mahayana’s outlook in respect of universe and their declared monistic principle. Now the Pratityasamutpada gatha has no more its original value, it has been since then relegated to an obsolete position. Gauta has also noticed this Gatha and its principal idea of origination (ON, 57).

Thus once a monistic principle becomes a declared motto, a nihilistic attitude towards other things is inevitable. This background offered Naga a great opportunity to wield his critical acumen and demolish the entire structure of dualistic thinking solely of his co-religionists, Abhidharmaikas, Sarvajnanas and Valbhaiska. His polemics against these schools met with in his Mahayana sutra and Dharmasamiksa etc. Naga being the foremost in the field of dialectic logic, the pattern
of his critique would not have but served as model to the nonastic thinkers like Guṇḍa. Though Guṇḍa and Nāga plead for non-originating theory we should not however, ever look their fundamental differences. As we clearly noticed Nāga uphold Śaṅkaravada whereas Guṇḍa advocates Advaita-vāda. The latter’s criticism of origination is directed against the Śaṅkhyas in the main (Kā. 3-2), cp. Śraut śāstra-gītā, 130; Śaṅkaravāda; the Vaiṣeṣikas’ avatāra-vāda is discussed only in one or two places (Kā. 3, 4.7, etc.). Now ex Cunnamāṇa Karana-kāya-vāda is the central theme of all dualists and has been criticised on several occasions (Read verses under topic No. 6, 7; cītā, etc and saṇdogu, etc.).

The origination theory of the early Buddhists as stated in the Pratītya-saṃutpada-gīthā has been referred to and ridiculed, read IV, 48: 3-31 with the gāthās: 3-31 हृदयं नहो । तेन तथाक्षरो हुपहः

As previously remarked Nāga’s target of attack is upholding the non-originating theory is in the main the early Buddhist who followed the Pratītya-saṃutpada-gīthā closely in letter. His criticism against the Śaṅkhyas and the Vaiṣeṣikas can be found in the Dhātva-mūkha (my translation, ci. 11). It is a well known fact that the Mahāyānīs, profess no proposition of their own; they simply ridicule the opponents’ propositions (cf. Vīgrahavāyavanti, vers. 29, and Madh., vṛtti, p. 6). With the question whether Śaṅkhyas, Nihībāṇa is adhered to Nāga replies an emphatic no. He declares distinctly:

"it is not stated as void or non-void, nor is to be stood as both or non-both, it is however stated as void in order to convey an empirical understanding".

M. Sastri, XXII, 11.

Likewise an exclusive ati or atiyoga theory is not acceptable to Nāga, cfr. this point in his Dhātva-mūkha, ch. 1, later portion. Guṇḍa on the other hand sticks to the non-originating doctrine throughout the treatise and hints sometime that adhyātma or ajñāta śūnyā for Śrāvakas or Āryas. We should not nevertheless miss to take note of some common expression between Guṇḍa and Nāga. Read e.g. Guṇḍa’s verse.

सत्ते ते पदसा वाचिष्ठ न अविचं भास त।

विविधान्विरूपः व विविधान्विरूपम् भास्ये॥

31
with Nagas' and Kasyapa's disputes. Therefore, the Buddha taught a different path of knowledge.

M. Santé, 1,1, and

and Ānanda, 1,7, and

1. Prajñāpāramitā and Paramārtara. Our reading of these verses may not be very satisfactory as they are shrouded in unfamiliar expressions which are not understandable by our ordinary intellect. Gomā has employed here apparently some Buddhist expressions like Prajñāpāramitā and Paramārtara. Though the latter term can be traced in the treatises of the Sankhya and Samkhya-kārikā, the former can hardly be traced in the Brahmanical literature. It appears therefore that Gomā adopted it from the Buddhist sources and used it of his own. The Buddhist scholars employ the term prajñāpāramitā in the sense of ordinary talk on philosophically an empirical realm of existence. V. Satya-simha, ch. on this topic and cp. also Budhdā-prajñāpāramitā, Loka-jñāpā, etc., which are some of the tika in the Buddhist literature. Its synonym in later Buddhism is Sāṃśaya-sāṣāya, empirical truth.

Parāsmāntara is also a Buddhist expression conveying the idea of origination dependent on causes and conditions. In Yogacāra Buddhism the term conveys the sense "the mind and mental states dependent on causes and conditions." In fact it is not at all a Buddhist term when it signifies anything that depends on some ultimate cause in contrast with which is independent, Sāṃśaya. For example, the emotions in Sāṃśaya system are prakāraṇa because they are evolved from prakāraṇa which is praksita because it does not evolve from anything else (V. Sankhyākārika, 10). Sri Sankara also employs prakāraṇa in connection with our body, kāraṇa-kāraṇa-vaṇgāñca "the aggregates of effects and senses". So Gomā's sense is quite obvious, viz. parāsmāntara, causal product i.e., the samānta process continues and persists until sāṃśaya, deluding forces are present. It is an established fact in every system of thought that the deluding forces necessarily give rise to their effects, i.e., sāṃśaya, like an empirical existence.

In the next verse the author speaks of Yudha-darsana and Bhāṣa-darsana. The firm is concerned with the empirical experiences and their conditioning factors whereas the latter with the absolute. Bhāṣa-darsana, as insight into the absolute truth turns out the conditioning
factors into non-factors. The term samsara-darshanam looks like a Buddhist expression, note Avalokiteshvara’s stanzas:


3. Dream. Example on dream analogy read our remarks on ch. II (beginning). The only point to be noticed here is acaita, ‘‘unthinkable’’. This term is again spoken of in connection with the universe of subject and object in K. 47 and 52. Read comment on the fire-brand example, topic no. 4.

4. Maya, etc.: Maya example is common to both Buddhists’ and Vedanta. Nirnataka example is more likely a Buddhist one. Sambhara, however, refers to the idea of a magician creating himself as walking in air etc.: यदा मन्याति विकासाणां आकारांभविता || अक्षरो गणान नाविन्नेन सिद्धिमाति । (Aitareya. Up.bhashya, Gita Press. p.37). The important verse to be noted here in this section is Gauda’s refutation of Buddha’s renowned Gatha on Pratitya-samutpada doctrine. Gauda says that Buddha’s teaching on the origination of things has not been stated from the absolute point of view. The origination of those things resembles a magic act which by itself is unproved as existent. Read comment on jati-vada for more detail.

5. Fire-brand. This is a well-known example in Indian philosophical literature. The whirling fire-brand causes the appearance of wheel which is unthinkable, acaita, because it does not exist in the fire-brand, nor does it come from the outside or go out of the fire-brand. The wheel-appearance is unthinkable, because it is not a substance, i.e. it cannot be regarded as the actual effect of the fire-brand. Likewise the appearance of the subject-object universe on the consciousness is unthinkable, because the said appearance is not a substance; hence there cannot be a causal relation between the appearance and consciousness कारणेतत्त्वत्त्वाति. It seems that Gauda expounds the Vedantic idea in the Yogacara Buddhist terminology.

Our author on a previous occasion has also spoken of the unthinkable in K-44. The person with waking state perceives, as a result of
perversion, the unthinkable external elements as real (ūtata), etc.
Ref. Dream-example No. 3. Here for Gaṇḍa, the phenomenal universe is unthinkable, because it is an imposed appearance on Brahmā like the wheel appearance on the fire-brand. The wheel appearance is neither a substance nor the effect of the fire-brand. Likewise phenomenon of universe is neither substance nor the effect of Brahmā but it is unthinkable (acintya); magic or idee. There cannot be a causal relation between the universe and Brahmā because the universe is not at all a substance.

The idea of unthinkable is also common to the Yogacara Buddhists. The Ratnasūtra, thus refers to four unthinkable acintyas: Svātā Ācāra, Nirmala Tathāgata, Vimala Buddhagotra and Jina-ācāra. Here acintya appears to signify their characteristics inexplicable in the terms of ordinary reasoning.

The Satya-siddhi again defines the sense organ as anūtya-kura-balropā of the four great elements. It is acintya because it cannot be stated as either one with or other than the four great elements. According to Digamśa the sense organ is a sort of Sakti inherent in the Abhyās consciousness. He also refers to it alternately as anūtya-yoga, probably an opinion of the S. Siddhi (v. my dhammamatiṣākha, ver. 78).

The Madhyamika's doctrine of voidness which may be posited as a parallel of Vaiśekha doctrine of illusion, māyāvada appears to have sprung up as a result of their speculative thoughts in their indecipherable character. The Madhyamika affirms that the phenomenal world is indecipherable because it does not stand their logical test. We have several reasons to make us believe that the movement of the Madhyamika philosophy was not started with Nāgāraja but it was initiated from the early period of the Mahayana scriptures. We may cite here a few examples. The Bhāsūtākaraśāstra says: The consciousness of next new birth is something indescribable. The last consciousness when it ceases, does not go anywhere and the first consciousness, when it arises does not come from anywhere else. For, they have no reality of their own and are void of their self-substance (pp. 410). It may now be plain that the relation between these two elements of consciousness are to be spelled in terms of logic. The idea is that the same consciousness does not cross over to the new birth and continues for the time (nta sambhava). The same position is confirmed in the Sūtadharma-Sūtra dealing with the Pandita-samātāyāsa doctrine, p. 7, Na saṃkramanah. The Madh. vṛtti (p. 171) cites a Mahayanic sutra bearing on this topic.
The indescribable character of the relation between the cause and the effect has been argued by Naga in several places as a basis of his Sunyata doctrine. He pleads for example:

Pratitya-samutpada nahi, evam evam tat

This topic will continue in the comment on Sunyata, etc. No. 9.

6. Citta and arrtha. Naga introduces in his sastra chap. III, on a critical examination of sensory perception which leads him to the conclusion that none of the senses could possibly discharge its function with which concurs Gauda's contention that the mind does not contact with its object, etc. It is worthwhile to take note of the verse from the Bhavasankranti-Sutra:

Cited from M. vritti, p. 120.

Gauda's statement that the person who conceives the origination of things will see the footprint in the sky is comparable with the verse cited in Madh. vritti p. 90: śūnyatā nahi vidhī karoti jagatitāmaśaḥ bruhayat vodāpyā. (Ratnakarastotra) cp. also with other contexts by Bhikkhu, Vijaya and Dhammapada, VII, 4 and Theragatha, 97. Sankara also cites the simile along with others: sa duryā dharmaś ca brahmānānudarśaḥ sāyo' yathā-bhūtavasādāyaḥ mokṣaṁ krodhaṁ karaitaḥ ca viddhati.

Aitareya bhashya. p. 76-71 (Gita Press) Here Gauda might have in his mind the Yogacara Buddhists who hold that the mind though momentary continues in succession.

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Cittasandhī (ver. 23). The vibration of the mind has already been spoken of in III, 29 as being happened in dream as well as in the waking state on account of maya. The Buddhists also speak of the mind’s noding as resulting in false assumption. Buddhā sas: ‘nitenā is the mind’s noding, vibration and elaboration, etc. (Samyutta, IV, 207; cited also in S. Sādhi, ch. 84). Note also the passage cited in Madh. vṛtti p. 540 l. 12: सन्ति भूतानां भूतानां भूतानां भूतानां, साध्वायां साध्वायां। साध्वायां साध्वायां। 

1.13: निर्वेर्पितो निर्वेर्पितो निर्वेर्पितो। निर्वेर्पितो निर्वेर्पितो। निर्वेर्पितो निर्वेर्पितो। 

7. Samara and Madhyā. Gaudā makes clear here that he keeps the same attitude towards Samara as Naga, and his predecessors maintain. They plead that the belief and adherence to law of causation leads to a great sequence of one being bogged down in a turbulent empirical life. The best means to get rid of it is to be detached from the false notion of causation law. The causation law is false because it falls to the ground when it is put to a critical analysis. The Madhyāmikā declares that things that are valued on the basis of causal relations are absolutely valueless and hence void, anāmayya. Gaudā and his followers as a result of the same logical absurdity call the empirical things as maya or avaya. Things are anāmayya unthinkable because their causal relations are impossible to be made satisfactorily agreeable to our reasoning. Gaudā has in a specimen, shows how absurd it is to talk about the causal relation in respect of the fire-branded and its wheel-like appearance (v. Comm. No. 9). Naga has on the side of Mahāyāna Buddhism done the same task throughout his Madh. Sūtra.

8. Kshetra. This concept is much favored by the Buddhists and found in a specific context, e.g., janasthānā in Buddhāna. Gaudā seems to have generalized the term in a broader sense of perversion. How the entity are free from decay and birth, beginningless and -enlightened by nature have already been made plain in the comment on Apativāda No. 1. Their companion with sky is also common to the Buddhās. The comparison implies that the entities are identical and changeless, and in addition, they are void for the Madhyāmikās. For the Mahāyānic idea of kshanti read the Samadhiṣṭāna Sūtra:

The Buddhāsūtra does not dispute with anybody nor does he talk about any purposeless topic and remains constantly in his objective and dharma; this is the description of the first kshānti.
He understands all things as comparable with pāyā and grasps no nimitta. The characteristic marks of the perceived object, nor does he run astray from his cultivated knowledge. These are specifications of the first kṣānti. (v. Buddhagosa-sangha, p. 218).

9. Savata and Sīchāna. Buddha’s doctrine is based on the middle path, maddhānāyaṃ pratipada avoiding two extreme ends: afflicting one self with the bodily torture and indulging in the sensuous pleasure (v. Dharmakāśikā-pavattīna Sutta) which ends are stated later as existence and non-existence (Samyutta-III, 155 cited in S. Siddhi, ch. 28, No. 183.
The Mahāvīra equated bhava-śūnya (म्हावीर) with Savata and sīhavarteśhā (सीवाश्ने) with sīchāna (v. Poussin, M. vṛtti, p. 1, n. 4 and p.172, 5). Naga then declared that Buddha’s doctrine freed from eternalism and nihilism (Samadaya-sāya) in his Madhavatāvatā-śāstra-dṛṣṭi in his Madhavatāvatā-śāstra-dṛṣṭi and Nāgīrīcchāna-sūtra and Pratītya-sampradāya, law of causation with a view to avoiding the two ends, so says a Sutta: “The view of non-existence (Nihilism) disappears when one understands the origin of things (Samadaya-sāya) and the view of existence (Eternalism) disappears when one understands their cessation, Nāgīrīcchāna-sūtra” (Samyutta, III, 14 cited in S. Siddhi ch. 196). Naga comments: The law of causation helps to avoid those two flaws in the doctrine. He says: Whichever arises due to causes and conditions is neither identical with nor different from its cause; hence it is neither perished nor preserved (M. Sastra XVIII, 10 cp. comm. No. 5 above). The Satāmsiṃha Sutta states that the formula of causation should be viewed on the background of five aspects, the first two of which are: na savata and na sīchāna and explain them in the same fashion as Naga does v. verse cited above.
The Lalitavistara also expresses similar view: कैयसा प्रसिद्धि वाकातुस्कर ने व शोभोक्तिः रोकते अवस्था। न च अन्य तदो न च तत्त्वं न अत्युत्तमं ज्ञानप्रज्ञायेः।” “For example, the sprout springs up from the seed; they are neither one and the same nor different from each other; thus their nature is neither permanent nor impermanent” (cited in M. vṛtti p. 177).

Aryadeva elucidates the topic in a simpler manner: Because an element comes into being there is no Nihilism. Because an element goes out of existence there is no Eternalism (Cited Bod, p. 179).

Being examined of this grand idea of the Buddhists Gauda thinks his Advaita doctrine should also be made freed from these two flaws.
So he says: Because things take birth, i.e., change into another form in the empirical sense, they are not permanent; but because they are in fact unborn, i.e., do not change in their aspect of existence an inherent Brahmanic state, they are eternal. Gauda’s statement: "In regard to unborn things no talk is possible of 'eternal' or 'non-eternal' (K.60) may be compared with Naga’s verse: With reference to void things what is the same, what is different, what is eternal and what is non-eternal... (XXV, 11). Note the difference between Gauda and Naga in their metaphysical outlook: for the former "things are unborn" and for the latter "things are void".

Gauda next says (60 c-d) Where no letters are applicable, no discrimination is possibly applicable thereto, which saying implies that Truth is anakhara, inexplicable in letter; cp. Naga’s idea: Anakharam Tavam. Discrimination is rooted in letter words; cp. the following idea: sources of discrimination are words and the letter is the source of the former, विनिमयस्वरूपः क्षणः विकल्पः: सवधयेत्।

Gauda’s expression: illusory things create illusory things; likewise are the phenomenal things (K.59) is comparable with Naga’s verse: void things arise from the void things: सुन्दरवेन तद तत्त्वा गति: प्रवृतिः स्वयं पद्ध्यः। Padiya-samapada-hridaya, ver. 4.

10. Advaya. Gauda seems to speak of the individualAtom by vijana (which is identical with Brahman) when he refers to it as motionless and without second. The consciousness appears in the empirical plane of existence as though having birth, motion, etc. The idea may be compared with Dharmakirti’s saying: अयोध्यमानः हि सुन्दरप्रत्येकः विकल्पितानि। मायामांहिविरमितस्तत्त्वः। Pravartini, 154

Gauda says (K. 77) that the mind’s non-birth samapatti, is advaya and that the non-birth is possible when there is no samita, mind’s activating cause, pravarti-nimitta. At this state the mind becomes one with Brahman, Brahm-bhava (v. our comment on III, KK. 35, 40 above and Yogastra 1, 1, 3). The same idea is expressed in a different fashion (K. 89), i.e. the motionless state which is the same as Brahmic non-dual position is declared to be the sole domain of Buddha’s highest knowledge. Here “Buddha” is in a general sense meaning an enlightened sage, v. our remark on advaya in Sh. II, end).

11. Kalpita and Paramantra. Those two verses are the most enigmatic and misunderstood. The terms Kalpita and Paramantra are the yogacara expressions adopted by Gauda and grafted to his Vedantic
ideology. Before we try to understand them we have to bear in mind the following background. Mahayana Buddhists admit two kinds of samvriti: Tathya and Mithya-samvriti. For example, the sight of water in the mirage is suprised in the next moment on a close observation. Here the sight of water is Mithya-samvriti, and the observation of the mirage is Tathya-samvriti (v. my paper: Mahayana-maharana Samghakha in FORM, IX, p. 151). Gaun’s kalpita samvriti corresponds to Mithya-samvriti (cfr. Bud., ver. 9) and parasara to Tathya. Samv. i.e. Lokamantari orsatva. Kalpita-sam, is the imagined water in the mirage and the Parasara-sam is the experience of the worldly objects which are products of causation law. For the Yogacara Buddhists kalpita aspect is non-existent and false and the parasara aspect i.e. the mind and the mental state is existent and real. For the Madhyamikas it is also unreal and void.

Now we can very well understand what Gauna means to convey in these two verses. In kalpita-samvriti i.e. in our sole imagination something appears as real, e.g. the water in the mirage, but it turns to be unreal in the Tathya-samvriti;Loka-yavahara which Gauna calls Parasara and which has a bit of reality (paramarthika). The objective universe may be real from the viewpoint of the law of causation, Parasara-sam;Tathya-sam but it is unreal from the absolute point of view (K. 75). The next must be understood thus: so-called ultimate principle, Pradnya, etc. of other philosophers is conceived as unborn from the viewpoint of Kalpita-sam imaginary experience (Kalpita-sam: Mithya-sam), but it is not unborn from the viewpoint of the highest Truth. It takes birth etc. from the viewpoint of Parasara-sam;Tathya-sam. Parasara-sam is so called because the law of causation is admissible in the empirical plane. It is an interesting coincidence that Candrakirti (100 in his Madhyamika-vatamsa) illustrates Mithya-sam by quoting the Sankhya and others and their so-called ultimate principles (v. my paper: Mahyana Samghkha op. cit. p. 45). It is strange that the Sankhya on the verse attributed to Sankara interprets parasara into parattantra (v. comm. No. 2. more about parattantra). In the light of above finding R. D. Karraker’s much laboured explanation and note are not admissible (v. his notes on pp. 150-153).

17. Aabhavanta. The first line of K. 75 is a citation from the Mahayana-vidbha of Maitreya ch. 1, 1. ver. 1: abhdsenabhdsat samvedana eva ity es ity. Sriramak comments: there is a foundation i.e. Parattantra-mind mental state and on it kalpita false idea’s imposed in which (parattantra) exists no dual, subject and object, etc. We are not to understand
Gauta in this manner. He probably means: there is abhinivesa (wrong adherence) for alabha-sthiti, duhkham but there is no duhkha in fact. If we divide the verse into two sentences all the grammatical difficulties would be saved? The K. 39 avakaśa plan that Gauta does not intend to express the Buddhist meaning in k. 75 a-b because 14 says in this verse that an account of abhinivesa or false idea of duhkha, alabha a man engages himself in an approposely similar object. Here the subject of the verb 'vivartati' is 'sa' a p-pronom, not the mind.

3. Gauta. This is the most characteristic feature of the Madhyamaka philosophy. Nāgārjuna proclaims that the highest Truth of his conception is free from any attribute: existence, non-existence etc. He inherited this doctrine from buddha's discourse to Āgāvaca about the Tatāgata's status after death which (status) has been described as 'hata na hata' hata ca ca hata, naiva na hata na hata'. Then Buddha gives out his opinion about the point that Tatāgata in Nirvanā is incomparable like the great ocean (Mahā-vāsūliya, No. 72). It is therefore appropriate for the Madhyamaka to qualify the Truth as free from existence etc.; but could it be justified on the part of Gauta who is an Advaita Vedantin and whose ultimate truth is Brahman and essentially sat, existence in character? For this reason probably Gauta states that the four attributes signify in order: unintelligible, steady etc. Thus Gauta appears to refer by satīdhi, existence-theorists to the multiple principle of the dualists like the Samkhya, Vaisheshika and the early Buddhists. Their principles being more than one the existence trait does not remain attached to one principle. For the materialists (māntika) the highest principle being na the non-existence trait is fixed. The meaning of abhava and aprakāramā may be understood appropriately in relation to other theses is order.

1.4. Ladikha-pranam. The varieties of knowledge, ladika, etc. are are quite common to the yāgurika Buddhists though their interpretations are somewhat different. No difference can be noticed with reference is the first variety, vi. Ladika and its meaning because it is concerned with the ordinary waking experience. The difference is to be noted in the second variety, i.e. Sādhu-ladika. For the buddha (yāgurika) it is a pure empirical knowledge which is the pratyaksha-ladika in, a knowledge acquired subsequent to the concentration Samadhi and reflects things in their own nature namely as the reflections of the mind and the mental states, paratārasthita. The yogin should perceive the pratāntara-trait through this knowledge after rising up from the samadhi, tākṣaṇa, the highest transcendental knowledge.
known as Aneya parama, i.e. state when Alaya-consciousness is turned into Tathata, or Dharmas-Dharmas, etc. (v. Trimsale, ver. 18-20).

It appears that Gauda employs these apparently Buddhist terms to convey his own ideas. His commentator explains the Buddhalakshika and Lokottara as heaven state and deep sleep consciousness respectively, in the dream state the mind whose experiences unreal things, so it is without objects there are experiences-ananta apramahita. In the deep sleep even the mind ceases to operate, hence it is considered to be appraised of both, objects and their experiences.

The Laksayatana Sutra speaks of the three kinds: Loka, Lokottara and Lokottarana and describes them as three stages of development. The first is related to other philosophers who advocate different ultimate categories of existence and non-existence. The second is concerned with all mâyâkas and pratyeka-Buddhas' knowledge and the third with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas' developed knowledge (v. the text cited by Karnamer in his notes, p. 131).

The second line of this K. 88 is the most ambiguous. The Bhavya of Sankara comments: The knowledge through which the above said three states are understood is knowable; cognizable, vijey is known as the fourth state (turiyâkhyam), the Absolute Truth,... This interpretation appears to be somewhat uncertain in the next verse, 116 which does not mention the fourth state in a plain language. The verse reads: When three-fold knowledge and the knowable (pratyakṣa) are understood well in their order one becomes omniscient. According to the Bhavya, Svâvagata, 'omniscience' stands for the fourth state (v. the text cited in the notes p. 140). So apparently there is no incoherence on the part of Bhavya, so Karnamer's criticism of Bhavya seems to be unfair.

15 Agriyana. This term is also a Buddhist expression meaning Mahayana, generally misunderstood as great vehicles. According to the Upanishads yâna means "path" in the expressions like Dhyâna and Paryaya etc. In Buddhism there are two yanas: Dhyâna, Paryaya, Bodhya-yana and Mahayana also called Agriyana sometimes. On the Brahmanical side two yanas are well known, viz., Paryaya and Dhyâna (v. Br. Up. VI, 1, 1, Prana, 1, 9 and Mundaka III, 1, 4) which are concerned with the field of karmy, Yedic rites and the worship of lower Brahman (upasana). It is most likely that Gauda accepted here as el elsewhere the Buddhist expression, agrigana to convey his Vedantic idea i.e. the highest Upanishadic path. The Buddhists call Mahayana sometimes

41
Buddhavatmaka. As its counterpart the Vedanta may also call his path as Brahma-vana like Brahma-nirvana of the Gita, V, 24-26. II, 77.

Now we have to explain the Veda etc on the basis of the Uttaradha. Heya, 'to be abandoned' is apariccheda, knowledge of the lower Brahman (cfr. Sankara's Bhashya on Mambaka, l, 27). The knowable is apariccheda, knowledge of higher order leading to Brahma-nirvânâna (v. ibid) Or it may indicate the knowable first stated in the ver. 58 (v. comment on it above). Apariccheda, 'to be acquired' is the fruit effected by Karman, Samavaphala (v. Bhishya on Mambaka 1, 1, 2; Svarad Atithi-bhâga apariccheda, apariccheda samavaphala 2a). Padyam, 'to be matured' is the realization of Atman and its identity with Brahman on the maturation of one's intellect (v. Sankara's Bhashya on Tattha, l, 11. p. 90 Gita press, tp. the exposition, padça in Ceta. Up. V, 5 and Sankara's Aparokshaanubhuti, ver. ते वेष ब्रह्माय: सिद्धांतवतिका व या धनु: । ते वेष मयादात गता ॥ ॥ 132 ॥

Here vitti is Brahma-vatī, thinking of Brahman.

An illusory experience of these four may happen in all three states, lābha etc. (K, 83) except in the fourth vijnana state. This interpretation may sound well. But the difficulty we encounter here is that the interpretation clashes with Gauḍa's description of the third state, deep sleep as drows of objects and their experiences.

16. Brahma-sa Gauḍa calls the Uttaradha consciousness non-dual Brahmanhood (Brahavanā) probably in order to distinguish his Advaita doctrine from Buddhism. The Bhadraranyaka describes who is Brahmade and who is Kṛṣṇa: तौः स एवाचर नामविविधा असत्त रूपाते वेदिः स एवाचर नामविविधा असत्त रूपाते आत्मा कास्यं नाम द्वारा स्वयं एव वेदिः स एवाचर नामविविधा असत्त रूपाते आत्मा कास्यं नाम द्वारा स्वयं एव वेदिः ॥ (III, 8, 10). It is worthwhile to remember here that a counter-claim has also been made by Buddha and his disciples. Their claim is that their faith alone leads to Brahmanhood, cfr. Dharmapāla, Brahmanavaga, 36. and my paper, Message of Buddha and reference on pp. 5-8, Prabuddhābhārata, 1936, May.

17. Vaisnavism. This is also a Buddhist expression. It is one of the most important attributes of Buddha like Daśabala etc. The Sudra-uddhra state Buddha deserves our homage because he is superior to all other religious teachers in respect of his sublime qualities like Vaisnavism, cfr. (ch. 3 and my paper on this subject in Sino Indian Studies, vol.1, p. 3). Now Gauḍa appears to have generalized the expression
and claimed that the Realizer of Brahman and Aman may also deserve to be characterized as ‘Vishva’ just like Buddha claiming to be Brahman.

18. Avastha. This is a common concept of all schools of Indian philosophy though its content may differ in each school. The most characteristic feature of avastha, well accepted by the Vedantins and the Buddhists is anidya, a senselessness which is amplifies into Raga, dvisha and rooha, 'lust, indignation and satification'. GauḍṬ here speaks of no anidya or anoya but its effect, i.e., the notion of diversity in identity. Things, in fact, are free from will, pure by nature, etc. Thus our leaders understand. (Ref. our comment on Ajitī no. 1). Here again a generalization of Buddha’s epithet ‘Nayaka’ has been claimed by GauḍṬ, cp. Avasthāntāna’s synonym of Buddhā “Nayaka” and “Vījayaka”.

19. Jñanāntāna Trans. GauḍṬ states why knowledge does not cross over into entities in K. 96. Because both knowledge and entities are univeral, ‘aja’ and essentially of identical character of Brahman one does not cross over into other. The thing other than Brahman is a myth in the highest sense of Truth. This is the reason why the knowledge is eloquently declared to be freed from any relation with its relatives. GauḍṬ has already stated that the mind never touches its object since the latter is unreal (K. 72). He now speaks about that point which has not been admitted by Buddha. Buddha on the other hand, proclaimed in his first sermon: in me a knowledge arose in respect of dharma, entities: क्रमे भक्तिर्दृष्टिर्विश्वव्यवहारिः, etc which claim has been challenged by GauḍṬ in this verse, this challenge will set at rest all speculations about GauḍṬ and his professed faith.

20. Aparāya-yoga. This seems to be absolutely a new expression coined by GauḍṬ. It has no parallel either in Buddhism or Brahmanism. It is a paradoxical combination joining, yoga in the absence of contact, aparā. What does it signify? The classical definition of yoga in Buddhism is to concentrate one’s mind on a particular object. This is definitely a aparā-yoga. The Buddhists admit nine grades of dhyana, four rupa-dhyanas: four arupe-dhyanas and the last: Niruddha-tanumati which is literally aparā-yoga. For in the previous 8 dhyanas the mind is operating and engaged in one or other object; it is in the last sarvadhi the mind ceases to operate; the yogin has only the body to get into contact with the object, kayaena aparasa viśaratī क्यायेन स्पर्श विशरोति this is called aparasa viśara (Pali; phassa-viśara). This fact makes clear that GauḍṬ’s Aparāya-yoga is unknown to the Buddhists.
The Kathopanishad defines yoga as follows: When the five senses knowledges together with mind cease to operate and the intellect too does not act, that state is the highest position (gati). That position is considered as yoga in which the senses including the mind and the intellect are controlled and held up steadfast (III, 2, 10-11). This is the yoga that Gauda has in mind. Since in this state all the senses, the mind and the intellect cease to operate, there is nothing that comes into contact with any object. This position may appropriately be termed "Apara-yoga". Sankara's remarks in this context are noteworthy. He says: "सारणिको तमसाः ज्ञानमिद्वा आरोग्याः किवॉपाकृति-सत्ता। नवां-मेर्येच्छांग्रहान्तरोपारं नैवभवत् तत्तत्र । (Katha. Bhashya, Gita press, p. 164)

"That which wise state the wise consider as the yoga which in fact is only a disjoining (vivarga) i.e. contact-free, because this state of yogin, sinn is characterized as an absence of contact with all sorts of evil allures".

This statement of Sri Sankara makes it quite obvious that the yoga described in the Upanishad here is truly Apara-yoga of Gauda.

Let us see whether the Gita sheds any light on this topic. The following passage probably helps us a good deal to resolve the riddle:

वात्स्यरावणे असङ्केत्यो निन्दकवायु न्र रुष्ट ।
स वहिष्कृतकाम्यो नित्यनवाद्वियथे ॥

"The yogic who being detached from the external touchables obtains the happiness in his self; he is merged in Brahman-yoga and experiences the inextinguishable happiness".

This stanza simply demonstrates that Gauda's Apara-yoga is no other than Brahman-yoga of the Gita. The expression, Apara-yoga with reference to Brahman-yoga is the most appropriate, since Brahman being identical with the yogin's Atman, self has no contact even of the minutest degree could be imagined.

11. Arivada and Aripuddha. Buddhas has stood on several occasions that he does not dispute with the world and that he follows what the ordinary people talk about the worldly affairs (v. Sarvyatta, III, 138, Majh. l. and S. Siddhi, ch. 3, p. 17).

Gauda likewise says that we approve quite happily the thesis of no-birth, ajainada which results from the quarrelsome dispute elaborated by other schools of thought about sankhya and aurkaya etc (IV, 5). Naga would not concur with Gauda in this respect because the former
could not have any dogma of his own as a settled fact, hence he disputes every dogma of his opponents.

Sri Sankara is more eloquent in disclosing the Advaita’s attitude towards the controversial issues set forth by other philosophers. Note his statements cited below:

Therefore the person desirous of Realization, discarding the logicalian’s system should take good care in respect of the doctrine of identity of Atman-Ishwara. For this reason, we shall disclose some lapses in their systems but not being entangled in the systems. The following has been stated in this context:

The Vedantins placing the entire burden of points of dispute, their origin and cause upon the disputants and being protected by them in our decision about the thesis of existence passes on peacefully and happily” (Pratya-Bhashya VI,3,Gita Press p.111)

Note on the last verse. Gauḍa pays homage to his preceptor though not expressed, after understanding and realizing the fearless deep and undifferentiated state of peace in order to show his gratitude to his preceptor. This is quite in keeping with the tradition deserved in the Upasrthals, e.g. Prasne. Up. last verse, Mundaka and Brah. Up etc. A similar tradition is noticeable on the Buddhist side e.g. Sundara-Sandhya where Nanda acknowledges his gratitude to Buddha. Naga’s homage to Buddha in the last verse of his Sastra enables the tradition quite alive.

Finally a Note on Dipudama vara. Gauḍa’s paying homage to Dipudama vara in ch. IV, stanza 1, has given rise to some controversy among scholars regarding the identity of the person so designated. Some scholars of Buddhism believe that Gauḍa refers there to Buddha while others on the brahmical side believe otherwise. It appears to us that though Gauḍa adopts the Buddhistic terminology and pattern of arguments to uphold his Advaita philosophy, he cannot be stated to have utilized Buddha in the stanzas. Our reason for this surmise is that Buddha is prominently spoken as “the Superiormost teacher of all men and gods” (Gauḍa śadādādānām) but not Dvi-
padam vara, "best of all men". Naga accordingly pays homage to Buddha as Padam vara, 'best of all speakers or speakers' (v. the first stanza of his Saster... ते सर्वे बदन्ते वर्ण.). Gauda's object of reverence is the best of biped, i.e. Purushottama, 'best of all persons' which obviously refers to Good, Vyūha, ref Gita. उस्म: पुरुषोत्तमः प्रमाणे पुरुषायु:।

Ch. XV, 17, 'the Supreme Person is different (from the lower Brahman) and known as the Supreme Self' which passage speaks of the Supreme Being penetrating three realms of existence (bhūkṣa). We should not confuse between 'Depadam varas' and 'Padam varas' which two terms signify two distinct theological concepts.

It does not matter very much whether Gauda refers to Buddha or Purushottama. None can nevertheless gainay that Gauda adopted a great deal of dialectics from Naga and other Buddhist authors and adapted them suitably to the needs of upholding his Upanishadic Māyāvāda darsana.
GILGIT (AND SWAT)

—NIRMAL C. SINHA

The previous issue (Vol VII, No 3) of *Bulletins of Tibetology* has a learned paper entitled "Gilgit in Ancient Times". This study, as stated in its concluding paragraph, "shows how important Baltistan and Gilgit have been in the political, diplomatic and military history of Tibet, China, Kashmir, Tibet, Kapiya, Gandhara, Kashmir and North India in ancient times". Tibet heads the list of countries enumerated here. The reason for this is to be found in the cultural history recorded in Tibetan tradition and not in the political history as narrated in Chinese *Atabari* or in Sanskrit *Riwer of Kings*. I thus propose to present the cultural relations of Gilgit and Swat with Tibet in ancient times.

Gilgit as a strategic summit is a comparatively modern affair and may be traced from 1860s when Britain and Russia were nearing each other in lower Asia. I have no on-the-ground knowledge of Gilgit or Swat; the nearest point I have been towards Swat is Taxila. For geographical data of Gilgit and Swat I depend on the observations of explorers and scholars like Alexander Cunningham, Frederic Drew, Reginald Schomberg, Clarmont Skrine, Olaf Caroe, KPS Néron and above all Aurel Stein. Inferences drawn are mine. For cultural history of Gilgit (and Swat), I add my own observations to the findings of authorities like SCHLAFIGTWEIT, FAANCKE, THOMAS, TUKCO, DUFFT and STEIN.

**GILGIT LOCATION & AREA**

Gilgit township is on the river Gilgit near northern latitude 35.55 and eastern longitude 74.15; Gilgit river joins Indus thirty miles down SE. A much larger area that the township has from time to time been known as Gilgit. Ever since the occupation of Gilgit by Pakistan raiders (1947-48), few scholars have been permitted to Gilgit. Arnold Toynbee visited in 1960. Vide Bowerman *Onis and Jamna* (Oxford 1965) pp 121-4. Toynbee however is not a specialist in inner Asia or Buddhism. In 1965 summer, a specialist scholar of Tibet-Burman languages, Richard Keith Spigg was issued permit for Gilgit-Baltistan but eventually returned from Rawalpindi. That was on the eve of Pakistan’s war on India.
For a description of Gilgit Agency of Kashmir State prior to Pakistan occupation, the account from the then current edition of official publication Ashiqgan’s frontiers (Vol XII 1972) in urge till British withdrawal in 1947 is extracted:

"The Gilgit Agency comprises the following districts:—
1. The Gilgit Wazarat, which includes the Tehsil of Gilgit (including Bani) and the Subdistrict of Astor.
2. The States of Hunza and Nagar.
3. The Chitrali districts of the Chitral district in the Indus valley.
4. The Governorship of Pahari.
5. The Governorship of Yasin.
7. The Governorship of Wakhan.

The Gilgit Wazarat is administered by Kashmir State officials. Hunza and Nagar enjoy an internal autonomy which is complete, and the other areas one varying in degree". These districts "have all acknowledged the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir as their suzerain, and they all pay him some form of tribute".

Gilgit Agency thus stretches from Baltistan-Tibet in the east to Swat-Dir-Chitral in the west. In layman’s language Gilgit Agency is situated between Tibetan and Pathan areas. The political boundaries of Gilgit Agency do not by any means suggest its ethnolinguistic frontiers. From ethnolinguistic considerations it is difficult to demarcate Gilgit’s eastern frontiers as its western frontiers. Eastern parts of Gilgit are in Tibetan world while its western parts are in Pathan world. In ancient and medieval times Gilgit was the transit post between Bhara (Tibet) and Sutlej (Swat). It was a transit post in both commercial and cultural context. Gilgit’s strategic importance is a fact of modern history. Alexander of Macedon makes a push upto easternmost Swat (Azirun’s Acres identified with Pir Sir by Stein) but had no reason to probe towards Gilgit, though the land of Hyperbores would be due north of Gilgit.

Though as a place name, either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan, Gilgit is not much ancient, the confluence of the rivers (Gilgit and Indus) obviously made it an important point from ancientmost times; besides
the site was a convenient stage between poses in the north and the south. A part of the Central Asian traffic through the Indus valley would therefore halt at Gilgit. It would not be unreasonable to associate Gilgit with the products and wares of Central Asia (and Tibet) found in the pre-historic sites like Harappa and Mohenjodaro. In later times Gilgit was more important as a transit post in cultural intercourse of peoples. In propagation as well as development of Mahayana, Gilgit (and Swat) had a distinct role. Earlier Asokan missionaries to Khotan possibly passed through Gilgit.

SINDHU नीश्चयः

Among the tributaries of the Indus are rivers. Gilgit and Swat and the two adjacent valleys were the westernmost extensions of Tibetan world till Mahayana came in an end first in Swat and then in Gilgit. For pilgrims from China, Gālālata (Gilgit) to Suvasta (Swat) was the convenient route for entry into Gandhara. The "dangerous passage" and "impassable gorge" of Chinese accounts may be identified with similar spots between Gilgit and Swat. Vide Petech (1): Northern India according to the Shui-chih-chu (Rome 1938). The hazardous journey was obligatory if Udīyāna in Suvastu was not to be omitted.

Indus river has a special sanctity for the Tibetans. Of the four legendary rivers arising near Kailas (Manasarovar), Indus is a constant mention and a firm fact. Vide Wylie (T.V.1): The Geography of Tibet etc (Rome 1961). The river, or the valley, must have been Tibet's link with Sindhu par excellence, viz, the ocean, from earliest times. Ideas as well as articles might have moved between Indus Valley and Western Tibet. Avalokitesvara as well as Tara could have come to Tibet via Swat and Gilgit.

Avalokitesvara's seat Potala, as described in Mahayana Sanskrit literature, is generally located in South India and is co-referenced in Tibetan tradition. There were however several places called Potala. One such was Tatta a town in Sind not far from the mouth of the Indus. Tatta as 'potala' (harbour) could be reached from Western Tibet via Gilgit and Swat. This port of Sindhu Sauvita was earlier known as Patala and was noticed by Greek geographer Agatharchides (c, 115 B.C.). A new name, with perhaps a new site, was al-Dayhu at the time of Arab conquest of Sindhu Sauvita. Vide Hourani (G.F.): Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Princeton 1951) pp 18-13, 53 and 65. Potala (or Patala) was by then a mystic spot for
those who adored the sanctity of Sindh. For Patita and Sindh. Suviṣṇa in Saka-Kushan times see Raychaudhuri (H.C.): *Pictorial History of Aryan India* (Calcutta 1957) and Sircar (O.C.): *Cotomography and Geography in Early Indian Literature* (Calcutta 1967).

The northern regions of Indus valley are also known to be the homeland of Tara; Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit and Khotan are suggested as the provenance. Vide Hirasanda Sherei: *The Origin and Cult of Tara* (Archaeological Survey of India 1975). I would add Swat to this list as Uddiyana was undoubtedly an equally famous centre of Tantric and Tara worship; Uddiyana’s antiquity was as great in Tibetan tradition as that of Patna. For Devī (Tara) in Sāvīṇa see Raychaudhuri, op. cit.

**URGYAN**

Uddiyana or Urgyan is generally located in Swat valley. In Tibetan tradition the Buddha Śākyamuni made a prophecy at the time of his Nirvāṇa that a much wiser and more powerful Buddha would be born in a lotus in the Ghunakothe lake of Urgyan. Guru Rinpoche Padmasambhava, who preached Tantrik Buddhism all over the Himalayas and in Tibet in the eighth century of Christian era, is admitted to be the same incarnation. As late as the seventeenth century pilgrims from Tibet did visit Swat valley in quest of Padmasambhava’s birthplace. This pilgrimage ceased altogether when Burhān disappeared from the west of Ladakh, that is, from Baltistan and Gilgit. When active contacts ceased Largeyan or Uddiyana became “a kind of magic land for many Tibetan pilgrims” not unlike Shambhala. Vide Tucci (G): *Travels of Tibetan Pilgrims in the Swat Valley* (Calcutta 1940).

Like Shambhala, Uddiyana was “transformed into a fairyland of which the geographical and historical reality faded and decayed” (Tucci). While the historical reality of Uddiyana remained obscure till the archeologist’s explications of this century, the geographical reality was alive in Pāthān poems of later days. To Kāshābal Kian Klatak, Swat was a paradise on earth, lovelier than Kāshābal and more like Kashmir.
'In climate it is glorious, lovelier far than Kabul,
Bleak is Kabul, Swat is mild and gentle,
Its air and verdure are like unto Kashmir,
Though it spreads not out so finely;
In every home there are cascades and fountains,
Fine cities there are, fine dwellings, and fair markets,
Such a country, with such a clime and such streams,
Wherein every place is by nature a garden of flowers.'

Trans. Carloé

BRU-ZA ब्रुज़ा ब्रुज़ा ब्रुज़ा ब्रुज़ा ब्रुज़ा

"Bru-za in Gilgit" is how Ladakhi chroniclers would locate another mystic land, Vide Francke (A.H.): Antiquities of Indian Tibet. Vol II (Calcutta 1926), pp. 152-1. Gilgit in Ladakhi tradition would include besides Gilgit Wazzat, the States of Hunza and Nagar and perhaps even some western States towards Swat. A leading authority on history and culture of Tibet, Hugh Richardson, narrows down the area of Bru-za to Hunza.

Gilgit, spelt Gyil-grid by Cunningham and Gyilt-gyid or Gyl lid by Francke, is derived from the river with same name also spelt Gying-yol. Francke: op.cit., pp. 156-7. The river valley has no doubt several times changed its dimensions and terrain through centuries. As a link between Tibetan areas on the east and Pathan areas on the west, the river valley continued its own role till the seventeenth century.

Gilgit was also a link between Tokhar-speaking men in the north and Sanskrit-speaking men in the south. When in Kushara times Buddhism commenced its voyage across the Pamirs, the valleys of Swat and Gilgit were on the route. So Bru-za was a centre for propagation of Buddhism a few centuries before Buddhism established itself in Tibet. Bru-za, along with Zhang-zhung and I-yul, was an ancient centre of civilization as recorded in pre-Buddhist tradition of Tibet. Before the monks and scholars from Kashmir would begin their missionary travels for Khotan, Kashgar or Kucha they must have made Bru-za itself a centre of Buddhism. In this process many pre-Buddhist ideas and rituals might have been accommodated as did Padmasambhava later. Thus Bru-za, the mythic land, is celebrated both in Bon and Buddhist traditions of Tibet. Thus we are presented with the curious fact that
in the eighth and ninth centuries. (Christian era) Fugitive Buddhist monks from Khotan as well as fugitive Bon priests from Tibet sought asylum in Brū-za.

Selmut Hoffmann has worked on the literature concerning Brū-za and a part of his work is found in his English publication The Religions of Tibet (London 1967). It may be noted here that both Uddhijana and Brū-za are associated with the wanderings of Padmasambhava, that many Nyingma texts are known to be translations from originals in the languages of Uddhijana and Brū-za, that some obscure contents of Kanjur are claimed to be from Brū-za script and that Sākya Pandita (1182-1251) had among his accomplishments "mastery of Brū-za idioms".

Tibetan documents discovered in Tun Chung contain significant references to Brū-za. Yuks Thampa (F.W.), Tibetan Literary Texts and Documents Concerning Chinese Tibetans 2 Yols (London 1935-1951) The Prophecy of Sangha-sadul-tra says that the monks of Tibet and Kashgari being vexed by unbelieving will go to the Brū-za country. The Mirror depicting the Royal Lineage refers to the Bon priests of Brū-za and Zhang Zhung. Some references suggest that Brū-za might have extended to Khotan for sometime. There is also reference to Padmasambhava's visit to Brū-za.

GILGIT MANUSCRIPTS

Discovery of archaeological objects and antiquities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir began towards the end of the nineteenth century. An account of the archaeological explorations and preserved monuments till 1930 will be found in Kak (R.C.), Ancient Monuments of Kashmir (London 1933).

The discovery of the Gilgit Manuscripts was announced by Dr. Aurel Stein in the Calcutta Statesman of 24 July 1931. Some shepherds "watching flocks above Naipur village, about two miles west of Gilgit Cantonment, one said to have cleaned a piece of timber sticking out on the top of a small stone-covered mound. Further digging laid bare a circular chamber within the ruins of a Buddhist stupa filled with hundreds of small votive stupas and relief plaques common in Central Asia and Tibet...In the course of the excavation a great mass of ancient manuscripts came to light closely packed in what appears to have been a wooden box...The paleographic indications of some of the manuscripts suggest that they may date back to the sixth century A.D."
The great savant Sylvain Levi evinced much interest in this discovery and another Central Asian antiquarian Hackin visited the spot of finds. The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Dewan Baladutt (later Sir) Gopalaswamy Ayyanger, entrusted Professors Nalinaksha Dutt, the eminent Buddhist scholar of Calcutta University, with the work of deciphering and publishing the manuscripts. Dutt's work came out in eight books, Gilgit Manuscripts (Srinagar 1939-Calcutta 1959). The contents, with extensive notes, constitute an important source for the history of Buddhism, particularly about the interrelation between Mahayana and Hinayana before the spread of Buddhism in Tibet.

It is reported that the Government of Pakistan found several manuscripts after its occupation of Baltistan and Gilgit. Pakistan archaeologists having no interest in reading such manuscripts, these new finds were handed over to the Institute Italiano per il Medio et Estremo Oriente in Rome. Dr Edward Come has edited some.

NOT FOR SILK

In medieval times Gilgit lost much of its importance as a trade post.

There is a current notion that both in ancient and medieval times Gilgit was a point on the famous Silk Road. This notion is altogether due to a misconception about Silk Road: the caravan routes branching out of the Silk Road are often erroneously called Silk Roads. Gilgit-Kashgar (& Yarkand) road was a southern feeder of the Silk Road which crossed through Yarkistan without detour, between Tu-men (Jade Gate) in the east and Marakanda (Samarkand) in the west. Gilgit-Kashgar (& Yarkand) road thrived on wool, dry fruits and stud. Even then Gilgit was not attractive to the British traders in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the opinion of an Indian authority on the British Period of Indian history, explorations of Moorcroft and Trebeck in the Western Himalayas did not promise as much as the earlier probes of Bogle and Turner in the Eastern Himalayas. Vide Sinha (Narendra Krishna): The Economic History of Bengal 1783-1848, Vol III (Calcutta 1970), p 50. Right from beginning the British probes for trade across the Himalayas were, in my submission, intended to reach China overland. If Gilgit was on the Silk Road, the East India Company and later the British Crown would not have ignored an opening through Gilgit, Kashgar and Yarkand. Instead the British authorities in India engaged in a systematic penetration through Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan for trade.
Much information on this aspect of Anglo-Chinese relations from the middle of the nineteenth century will be found in the forthcoming works of two young scholars of Calcutta University: Arabinda Deb and Jahar Sen. I need not anticipate their findings here in my words. I would however emphasize that Gilgit gained importance in British esteem in the second half of the nineteenth century for strategic reasons and not as an ancient post on the Silk Road.

Russian expansion in Turkestan, followed by Russian visitors to the Pamirs, was not a welcome situation for the British Empire in Asia. In addition to the Resident for Jammu & Kashmir at Srinagar, the British stationed in 1853 an Agent at Gilgit and developed the roads towards Swat-Dir-Chitrāl. Kashmir and Yarkand routes were also developed. In 1893 a Special Assistant to the Resident for Jammu & Kashmir was stationed in Kāshgar. In 1904 the post was upgraded to His Britannic Majesty's Consul; in 1911 redesignated at Consul General The Consulate at Kashgar continued till the British withdrawal from India.

From 1893 to 1947 Gilgit flourished as a transit post for Central Asian trade but never lost its strategic value. Gilgit was useful for obscure, though disreputable, purpose also. In the third decade of this century, the tribal gunsmen in the pay of His Britannic Majesty's Consul General, roved through Swat and Gilgit, British arms for the Chinese Governor of Sinkiang. These arms were used to suppress the native Moslem rebellion against the Chinese rule. The Gilgit highway had then become so strategic that in 1935 the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir was obliged to grant a sixty years' lease of Gilgit Agency to the British Crown.

In 1947-48 Pakistan invaded and occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. The raiders came from Swat-Dir-Chitrāl following the ancient tracks improved by the British. The contending World Powers in the Cold War promptly recognized Gilgit as a strategic summit. Its Tibetan past is now recalled in the usage Chos for Islam in certain dialects of Gilgit and Baltistan.

For modern history of Gilgit see Fisher (M.W.), Rose (L.E.) and Hurtenback (R.A.): Himalayan Battleground (New York 1964) and Buzau (P.N.K.): A History of Kashmir (Delhi 1963). For ancient history, the monumental works of Aurel Stein are the indispensable authority; two particularly The Routes of Desert Cathay (London 1917) and In SEARCH of Aryan Asia (London 1918) describe the routes and passes in a
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