STORL-CONSCIOUSNESS

(ALAYA-VIJNANA)

A Grand Concept of the Yogacara Buddhists

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Mind has three designations: citta, manas, and vijnana, which indicate one and the same thing (V. Panavastu, p. 36). Some authors distinguish as follows. What is past is manas; what is to come is citta and what is present is vijnana. They are further explained. It is called citta considering its movement to a distant past; it is manas considering its previous movement and it is vijnana considering its tendency to reappear (V. Bcl). A similar distinction is admitted by the Yogacaras: citta is Alayavijnana; Manas is klištan manas (defiled mind) as well as the mind of immediate past moment; vijnana is what cognizes the object in the present moment (Yogacarabhumi, p. 11). The Sarvastivadins too say that the immediate past moment of consciousness is manas, i.e. mana indriya, and vijnana is what cognizes its each object (अनुमति सतीतिभिर्, Vijnanam prativijnaptith -Kosa, I. 16).

According to the Satadharmanathamokhi citta is classified into eight as follows: five sensory consciousnesses as related to five senses; eye, ear, nose, tongue and body; the sixth: manovijnana; Seventh: Klištan manovijnana and the eighth: Alayavijnana (V. Panavastu, Appendix. 49-50). The first six are admitted also by all early Buddhists. The last two are added by the Yogacaras. Tokshikus explains the last three types thus: Sense-center, individualizing thought-center of Egotism, and store-center of ideation (Essentials, p. 37).

Alayavijnana, store-consciousness is the seed-bed of all that exists. Every seed lies in the store-consciousness and when it sprouts out into object world c reflection returns as a new seed. This new seed lies latent in it and gets manifest when the seed becomes matured under favourable conditions (Ibid). The Yogacarabhumi comments: Defiled mind is always centre of delusion, egotism, arrogance and self-love (विश्वास अप्रेक्षा विरोधार्थ, avidya atmardya samipama trna). The store-consciousness serves as seat of seeds, abode of all
ideations, and is counted resultant and a new birth-taking
factors
(Sabda-bhāsya-bhāskara-vijnānakāla śāstra-pūrṇa)
Yo. ch. p. 11). Sarva-bhūjātman asarvatvansthram upadatvāka-
sanghātastu.

According to the Abhidharmasūtra all elements are deposited
(as seeds) in store-consciousness and the latter again in the
former; thus they both go on as mutual causes and effects
(M. Vibh. Tika, 28).

This means that the mind reaches out into outer world and
perceiving
the objects put new ideas into the mind-store. Again these new ideas
seeds sprout out to reflect still newer seeds. Thus the seeds are accumula-
ted and stored there. The old seeds and new ones are mutually depend-
This explanation comes into conflict with the established tenet of the
school (Siddhānta), according to which store-consciousness is only
productive cause of all other active consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna)
which are called collectively ‘enjoyable’ (upadhīga). All the impure
elements are stored in it by way of effects and the store-consciousness
is related to them by way of efficient cause. It is indeterminate (ayadāra)
as either good or bad, because it is essentially resultant of acts of previous
life (vipaka). It accumulates all impressions of the effects which result
from the acts of previous life and are flowing spontaneously therefrom
(vipaka-saṅgādhipaśa) because it serves as the final cause of the good
and the bad elements (Kusaśa-abhala-dharmaśāhpya). Hence it is the
efficient cause of all active impure elements as well as the final cause
of all active consciousness-bodies (M. Vibh. Tika, p. 27-28).

Vaubbhāsika who pleads that the entire universe of the subjective
and objective elements is mere transformation of one consciousness
(vijñāna-parināma) brings it under three heads: 1) one Resultant con-
sciousness, 2) one thinking mind and 3) Six types of consciousness Represent-
ing their respective objects, visible matters, etc. Commenting on the
first, Resultant consciousness Vaubbhāsika says:

“It is the resultant and seat of all seeds” (विपक्ष: सन्योजनम्,
Vipaka sarabhiṣkam). It is abide of all seeds of defiling elements; hence it is termed storing centre (alaya). Or all elements are stored in it by way of effects (karya-bhava) and again the storing centre is stored in
every element by way of cause (karaṇa-bhava). It is a resultant effect
since it is produced in the form of different sentient beings in different
realms of existence as a result of good and bad acts of previous life.
(see Trimsika, ver. 2).

Vasubandhu in his Karmasiddhi (Et, Iamotte's Fowcck Translation in Melanges Chinois Et. Budzhiique. Vol. IV, further remarks: It is called Adana-vijñana as it assumes the body; it is Alaya-vijñana as all seeds of dharmas are stored in it; it is Vijnana-vijñana as it is a retribution of the acts of previous life (p. 103).

It is named Bhavangajijñana in the scripture of the Tamrasthira school, Mulavijñana in the scripture of the Mahāsāṃghika school and Assmara-kandha in the scripture of the Mahāsāṃgha school. (p. 106).
Note: Other two skandhas of the Mahāasaka are Ksamika-skandha and Abhijñavacitadū-kandha from Mahāsāṃgha (p. 63). (ibid. p. 106 n. 13). Ananda also considers Alaya as Bhavanga (v. M. sutra. XI. 32).

Alavijñana’s object and aspect or form (alambana-skara) are imperceptible. In the cessation trance (nīlodhā-śamapatti) there is one consciousness whose object and aspect are difficult to understand; likewise are the object and aspect of Alaya too. It comes under Vijnanopalamanskandha. But the sūtra speaks of the six consciousness-bodies alone and not of the Alavijñana (separately). Why so? The intention of Buddha is explained in the Sandhinirvacana: “believing that they (ignorant) would imagine that the Alavijñana is the soul, I have not revealed it to the ignorant people (p. 106-7) Sandhinirvacanasutra, stanza cited, p. 103 n. 108.

बाह्मनिर्वचन सोरी सूक्ष्मो अंतो यथा यशस्वी कविता सर्वकालिकः।
वनालो एको भविष्य न द्वारां यथा आर्यां दितिकम्पूः॥

Adavijñana gihira sukshmo ogho yatah varatii Survabho/bhikṣa eso mayi an prakara mahāva atma parikālavyah/ci. Trimska, p. 34 with slight variation in the second line.

Why do they think so? Because this consciousness is beginningless (anudakshika) and continues to the end of Samsara; because it is very subtle in its aspect, it does not change. Six consciousness-bodies are gross in their support-object, aspect and model (alambana, abhava, viśṇa) and easier to recognize; since they are associated with passions, klesa and pratipakṣakacarya, countereacting path and they are brought under sankless and vyavahāra, "pollution" and "purification" they are in the nature of result-consciousness. By this reasoning one will understand
that there exists one causal consciousness (bhū-vijñāna). The sutra does not speak of this consciousness because it is different from the six ones. That is the intention of the sutra for not speaking of the Atyaya-consciousness. Thence we explain why the sutras of other schools speak of only six consciousnesses besides Bhavangvijñāna... etc... (p. 108).

Vasubandhu pleads that there will be no harm in accepting one person having two consciousnesses together: (i) cause-consciousness and (ii) result-consciousness supporting each other. For, the retribution-consciousness (bhū-vijñāna) is perfumed by the active consciousness (pārvatīvijnāna). When they exist in two persons there is no such mutual relationship. Therefore we do not have any difficulty in this proposition (p. 109). Ref. also Trimsaka, ver. 15.

We may note here that the position is quite different with the Satyastidhi. According to this school one person can have only one mind at a time. The presence of two minds at a time involves two persons. This situation has been necessitated for the school on account of its refusing to support the Sāvastivadins’ tenet of samprajñā, association of thoughts (v. chs. 65-76).

We understand further that the problem of store-consciousness has also been discussed by Vasubandhu in his comment on the Daśabhumi-Sutra wherein this consciousness has ultimately been linked up with the Matrix of Tathagata as its interior source. The well-known Avatamsaka School of Buddhism (which is founded on the Gandavyuha Sutra) has sprung up absorbing much of the traditions and interpretations laid down in the Daśabhumi-Sutra and the comment thereon by Vasubandhu (Essentials, p. 110-11).

The Yogacara Idealists propounded the store-consciousness as repository of seeds of the active mind and mental states. We should remember that this parent consciousness itself polluted and impermanent, and hence it cannot serve our urge for the spiritual goal which may act as a guiding principle in our life purpose. Some sort of this rational thinking must have led the later Idealists to postulate the theory of causation by Dharmadhātu, Foundation of Elements which is a universal principle present in every individual; it is also termed Tathāgata-garbhā (v. Discussion on this topic in my bud. Idealism).
Let us take note of Takakusu’s observation on the causationtheory of the later Idealists; The theory of causation by Dharmadhatu is the climax of all causation theories; it is actually the conclusion of the theory of causal origination as it is the universal causation and it is already within the theory of universal immanence, panopahism, cosmoeism or whatever it may be called. (essentials, p. 113). The causation theory was first expressed by action-cause, since the action originates in ideation the theory was in the second stage expressed by the ideation-store; the latter again was in the third stage expressed as originated in the Matrix of Tathagata, Tathagata-garbha (cp. ibid).

The above process of thinking is truly a climax in the development of Buddhist thought. The theory of causation by the sole action-influence was pressed by the early Buddhists with a view to saving an absurd situation arising out of their no-soul doctrine. The Brahmanical system pleads for the soul as a spark of divine power implying thereby the presence of God in every individual. Since God is dishonored in Buddhism the soul is also likewise dropped. Thus the doctrine of immanence (antaryami-vada) that has been emphasized in the Brahmanical and other religious scriptures was not favored in the early stage of Buddhism. Now we find a revival in Mahayana Buddhism of the doctrine of immanence in the form of Dharmadhatu as Tathagata-garbha which is a reverse mode of store-consciousness (v. Ratnagota for detailed elucidation of the Garbha-theory).

The transcendental knowledge which comes in the possession of a Yogi at the final stage of his spiritual endeavor has been designated by Vasubandhu as Dharmakaya, Atmasvardhatu, Atreyaparavritti, Vasubandhu speaks of it as अवधारणात्मक, Atrey-paravritti, because a metamorphosis of Atmanstore-consciousness is effected into a non-dual knowledge (which is the same as Dharmakaya) as a result of dispelling the biotic forces of dualism which are active from immemorial days (his Trimisika, ver. 29-30 with Bhaya of Sthiramati).

Vajra-Samadhi calls it Amala-jnana, immaculate knowledge. Since this knowledge flushes up transplanting the polluted store-consciousness it has been considered a ninth pure knowledge in the Vajra-Samadhi (v.Lie bernhalf, Tung pao, XLIV.p.309). The relationship between these two knowledges, may either be identity or diversity. The identity view is perhaps favored by Vasubandhu and his school because the transcendental knowledge is not counted as the ninth in the early
texts of the school whereas the diversity view is endorsed in the V.
vasadhi. There is possibly a third view, viz. the view of indescribability
which may also be the opinion of Vedanta-bhāsya (e.g. his Trimśa, 
iv. 32). The nomenclature 'store-consciousness', 'Alaya-vijñana' is not
quite popular with the logical school of Dignaga, though the school
advocates strongly in favour of the idealistic outlook of the universe.
Dignaga, for example, after proving the impossibility of external
objects existing either in an atomic form or aggregate form elucidates
in fine how to account for our manifold experiences of things in the
outside world. He says: "It is the object of our knowledge which
exist-internally in the knowledge itself as knowable aspects and this
knowable aspect appears to us as though it exists externally (c. 'Alam,
podkha, ver. 6). Here in this context Dignaga is not enthusiastic to
peak of the nomenclature of Alaya-vijñana, though his commentator,
Vinduravā makes good the lapse' (c. the forthcoming publication of
this comment from T2, version). Dignaga's reluctance might be
prompted by the adverse comment from the opposite camp like the
Madhyayānikas and others. A similar situation may also account for
the Laksāvatara Sutra's cautious approach to the Yogacāra eight-fold
division of consciousness. The Sutra, though grouped under the
Yogacāra classic is leaned towards the Prajñaparamitā doctrine as is
evident from its solemn declaration that the said eight types of conscious-
ness are not at all transformations of one basic mind. 'They are indistin-
guishable like the ocean and its waves, hence they are of one and
the same trait:

यौन्तिलकातिदाही न महया गविष्य वर्षण ।
एष्येव तत्सुत्ता लया गाम निश्चलसः ।

विसान्ते देशं विद्यः परिपरसः संपन्ने ।
(See the Sattva, IV. 545, f.)

The great champion of the Madhyamaka school, Candrakīrti
comments: The advocate of the store-consciousness pleads that it
is the seat of all active consciousnesses and it produces the
appearance of the world. This advocate resembles the Brahmanical
system pleading for God as a creator of the universe. One difference
between them is that God is viewed permanent and the Alaya imperma-
tent but in other respects they differ not much. (v. my Sanskrit text,
Mathā. Avatāra, Ch. VI, p. 43).
The same accusation has been levelled by Acarya Bhavaviveka in his Karataka-rasa: If Dharma-kaya, Norm-body which is characterized by the yogeean as Atman-asparwa, or the consciousness be admitted in an existing self-being, then it is hardly distinguishable from the soul, Atman of the dharmic system because the soul also is described in the scripture as something existent, but beyond the reach of word and mind (v. My skt. text, p. 75-6).

Going back still earlier we have the Svetasadhi hurriedly structures on such theories thus: The concepts of Purusa or Padgita and alaya are all wrong views. This tense remark reveals that this author is inclined to bring them under the category of a perverted notion (v. ch. 153).

It appears that the Alaya-doctrine does not appeal so much to the Tibetan mystics as the doctrine of Sunyata does. The Tibetan yogin Milarepa bears witness to this own surmise.

The following statements about him may be noted here: “He was master architect, well-versed in the exposition of the science of the Clear Void Mind, wherein all forms and substances have their cause and origin” (Tibet’s Great Yogi, Milarepa, W. Y. Evans-Wentz, p. 36). “He was most learned professor in the Science of the Mind”. (p. 38, pass. 2)

It is reported that Milarepa himself uttered the following: As the mere name of food doth not satisfy the appetite of the hungry person, but he must eat food, so, also a man who would learn about the Voidness of Thought, must meditate so as to realize it . . . . In short, dedication to the contemplation of voidness of Equilibrium, of the indescribable, of the inscrutable forms the four different stages of the Four Degrees of Initiation graduated steps in the ultimate goal of the mystic Vajra-yana, (pp.142-143).

To what particular doctrine of Mahayana Sect he belongs? Milarepa replied: It was the highest creed of Mahayana, it was called the Path of Total Self-Abnegation, for the purpose of attaining Bud-dhahood in one life-time . . . . (p. 186). I was perfectly convinced that the real source of both Samadra and Nirvana lay in the Voidness (of the Sunya-mundane Mind). (p. 209). Noteworthy is the saying uttered on the occasion of his entering into Final Nirvana:

11
That which is of the nature of the uncreated, the Dharmadhatu, the unborn, the Voidness, the Sunyata hath no beginning nor doth it ever cease to be. Even birth and death are of the nature of the Voidness. Such being the Real Truth, avoid doubts and misgiving about this (p. 288).

Sunyata, Void or Voidness in the above passages conveys the idea of an absolute and unqualified voidness which approaches nearer to the Madhyamika’s conception of the term than to the Yogacara’s positive one. Cfr. Notes on pp. 37, n 5, 285, n.3, 288, n.3, etc.

Here we may incidentally note of an interesting piece of truth a common creed of the Yogacara Buddhists that is vouchsafed by Milarepa in the saying: ‘I understand that all sentient beings possess a ray of the Eternal and that we must work for their salvation and development’ (p. 85). This confession seems to be an echo of the Garbha theory of the Yogacara.

Et. Lamotte has drawn our attention to the fact that the term alaya can be traced to Pali canonical sources in the passages: आलयं तत्त्वं प्रत्येकं भवन्यमानं भवयते, alayarama kho punyam paja alayarata alayamidita, ‘people are delighted in alaya, engrossed in alaya and joyous in alaya’ (Ref. Digh.3.3.16,3.37,25; Majhima I, 167), 32, Samyutta I, p.136,111: Anguttara II, p.131,30; Mahavastu III, p.314,4). But its sense is panacakamugana, five objects of five senses according to comment. On Digh. later the Vijjanavadin found in the passage a justification of their theory of Alayavijñana, psychological basis of the school. He further remarks that the Vijnalakirti still ignores the Vijnanavadin (Et. Lamotte op. cit. p. 246, n.4). Refer to Majh.I.190 speaking of the Alaya in parallel with शंदा (wish), अनुभव (perception) and so on. The renowned Buddhist poet Asvaghosa still ignores the later technical sense of the term in this line:

कोंकेठूल्य आलयसाते नीवतीतः दर्श्यताः।

Loke, smin alayacame nivṛttatā darsabhā ratīh.

The taste towards the retreat is very rare in this world which is engrossed in enjoying the sensual pleasures, alaya. Sundarananda, XII, 23
Some Brahmanical Parallels

The advocate of transformation-theory (parinirvāṇa) on the Brahmanical side is the Śaṅkara philosopher. His eight rudimentary elements are comparable with the Viṣṇavasita’s groups of eight consciousnesses. The Śaṅkara eight rudiments are: Padabha or Atyakṣa, abhākṣa, buddhi and five great elements (γ. Rud. carita, XII, 18, Čānda, Sartra ch. 1 and Gita, XIII, 5). The classical Śaṅkhaṇa replaced the five great elements by their corresponding five subtle ones. A parallel development is also noticeable in the Sātīya-Sūkṣa (Ch. 16). The Bhāgavat Gītā in an earlier Chap. VII, 4 declares that the Nours, Prakṛti is distinguished into eight: Five great elements, mind, mana, intellect, buddhi and individuation, abhākṣa. The polluted mind of the Viṣṇavasita may be compared with abhākṣa because both are sources of the I-notion, the Gītā’s mind with Alaya-consciousness and buddhi with mano-vijñāna. Čānda assigns to Buddhi the function of I-notion from which state are produced five great elements. The mind, mana as producer of the world has been stated in the Mūḍaṇa Up. (1,1,8) according to the interpretation of Śrī Sankara (γ. Bhāṣya). This is probably only the passage which mentions the mind as the source of other elements, earth, etc. Let it be noted however that the mind, in turn, is a product of the personal Brahman called Prana, breath.

It has been previously stated that citta, mana and vijñāna signify one and the same thing for the Buddhists. The Tattvāṇiya Up. (II,4) mentions mana and vijñāna as distinct elements (cp. Kaṭha, III, 1,3). Śaṅkara takes vijñāna for buddhi (γ. Bhāṣya). The classical definition of mana and buddhi is that the former is characterized as designating (śānta-lakṣaṇa) and the latter as deciding (vishayamāna), (γ. Śaṅkara karika, 25, 27) and also accepted by Sankara (γ. Tāṭtwa, Bhāṣya, II, 3.4.; and Gita II, 41.44). There are certain contexts where Sankara is obliged to identify vijñāna and mana (Tāṭtwa, II, 6 Bhāṣya) and ṇaṇa and buddhi as one element (γ. Kaṭha, III, 1,3, Bhāṣya).

The Pranapanīta, while explaining “Sāra” “all” enumerates four distinct states: mana, mind, buddhi, intellect, shankara, individuation and citta, spirit together with their respective objects : mantavya, bhūdhyaya, abhākṣa, caryatavya. The last element in this group of “all” is pana indicating thereby that it is the source as well as the binding factor of the entire group. Incidentally we may note here that the “Sāra” may correspond roughly with the Buddhistic “Sarva” which covers the entire universe grouped into twelve bases.
This apart, the Upanisads and the Gita speak prominently of the states: manas and buddhi probably as a result of the Sankhya speculation which perhaps serves as the nucleus of the early metaphysical reckonings in India. The Buddhists nowhere mention buddhi as a distinct mental state although other states like dhi, nati meaning pavana are stated (v. Trisamka, 10. Conception of Bud. p. 84).

According to the reformed school of Buddhism, viz. Satyasadhdhi one mind element alone is substantial and all other mental phenomena are only its different moods and nominal but not substantial. This school thus divides under one element all other mental states counted into six by the Sarvastivadins as separate substantial elements. The Vijñapradhins do not dispute with the Sarvastivadins and accept their entire list (v. Trisamka and Satyalanka, in my Pancavastu, Appendix). They both differ each other, however in their ontological outlook, i.e. one is Idealist and the other Realist. Sri Shakara once is inclined to deny distinction between manas and buddhi (v. Kena Up, 1.15). Manas na minunte...manas includes also buddhi; his authority for this view is the Chandogopramana (1.5.3) which declares: मनस: कन्या निमित्तिस्माद अ० । अहूँ || ज्ञानिति हृदयान् करण एत। Kamas sankalpo vicharitam svadha avadhinnah adhritah hrith dhiritvam sarvam mana eva (v. his bhaya).

Antahkarana, inner organ is a collective term favoured by the Vedantins for different mental faculties: citta, manas, vibhrama and buddhi, etc. Another collective term generally found in the Upanisads is Satvata having the same idea (v. Svet. Up. II. 12). A favourite expression in the Upanisads is Visuddhavasasagra to convey the idea that the person of purified mind or some inner faculty becomes fit to realize his own self, atman, Brahman (v. Mundaka III, 1.8.10, and III, 2.6, etc.). Satvata is a Sankhya terminology for buddhi, intellect according to Caraka (v. my paper on Sankhya, Bharatiya Vidya, 1957, p. 1905).

May we suggest therefore that this old idea of mind or intellect is intended in the term "Bodhi-Satvata", (Bodhi-minded) and "Mahasatvata" (great-minded)?

One more interesting topic I would like to discuss in this context. The early Buddhists conceive that each sense-consciousness has its own basis, viz. the eye for the visual conscious, the ear for auditory one.
and so on. What is the basis for the mind, a sixth organ? The Sarvastivadin answers that mind’s just previous moment serves as the basis for the sub-sequent thought moment. But the early Theravadin would not agree with this because a basis according to them ought to be of the material character. Hence they postulate Manasavatta, the heart-substance as the mind’s basis. It is further claimed that this postulation has been made in accordance with a popular belief. (op. Compendium, p. 279). Now wherefrom does this popular belief come? We have an interesting narrative in the Upasàrid:

The Atmanyyupasirised narrates the process of the world-creation as follows:— There was in the beginning one Atman alone, and no other thing there was active (mitras). He thought: I shall create the world. He accordingly created these worlds: Arùhan, Marici, Mars and Ap. Arùhan world is what is the above the heaven, Eyuloka and also a foundation of the latter. Beneath the heaven is Antarika, that is the world of Marici. Ssamsins- rays of the Sun, beneath the Marici is the earth known as Mars: beneath the earth is Ap-water.

Then the Atman thought: I shall create the Lokapalas, guardians of the world; then he drew out the Purusa from the waters and other great elements and shaped him (with head and other parts). He heated him (by his tapas); of the Purusa so heated the mouth burst like an egg; from the mouth came out speech and Agni, fire, noses bursting breath and the wind came out; the eyeballs bursting came out Cakas, eye and therefore from Aditya (Sun), the ears bursting came out the ear organ and therefore quarters; the skin bursting hairs and therefore plants and trees came out: the heart bursting monas, mind and therefore from the moon came out: ...

When the created gods requested the Atman to provide them with their own dwelling places, the Purusa was finally presented before them. They being pleased entered into their places as per His Order:

Agni becoming speech entered in the mouth, the wind becoming breath entered in the noses, Aditya becoming the eye entered in the eye-balls. Diss becoming the eye entered in the ear-holes, Usadhi and Vanaapati becoming hairs entered in the skin. Candrasas becoming monas, mind entered in the heart. ......... (c. I and II)

The above narrative makes obvious that each sense-organ has its own basis, as well as its presiding deity and thus the mind has the heart as its basis and the moon as its presiding deity.
The same Upanisad declares on another occasion that the heart and the mind are identical: *Tad eva हृद्यन तनम् मनो योः* (III, 1,2). It is further stated that all the mental states such as Samjñana, vijñana and prajñana and others were all one and the same. This point goes quite in agreement with the Satyasiddhi’s contention of one mind becoming into several mental states.

Note 1 (p.6). This interpretation is quite compatible with a transformation-theorist, *Pratimmama-sadin* who is generally counted as Sat-kary-sadin, an upholder of the imperceptible presence of the effect in the cause. Thus when the effect is present in the cause, *vive-vahana* also may be the case, i.e. the cause may be present in the effect. So this interpretation of *Atiya* is very convincing.

Note 2 (p.10). For the transformation-theorist the relation between the cause and the effect may be both: identity and indescribability. *Vasubandhu* accordingly says *Paratattva* is neither different from nor identical with *Pratimmama* (ver.22). The Advaita Vedanta would also countenance the same view, cf my paper on Gautama in the *Bullion*, Vol VIII, 1, p.33 f.

Note 3 (p.16). This world of men is termed here *Mara* (मर) The Buddhists call it *Mara* (मर्य), i.e. the world belonging to the god of death.