Philosophy is nothing but the human quest for truth. From very remote time Indians are blessed with the spontaneous curiosity about what truth is. The first literature containing the truth realized by the ancient Indians is the Vedas. The philosophy revealed in this literature was more or less tuned with human nakedness together with submission to nature. Gods. This went on unchallenged till the Buddha preached his new doctrine which afterwards brought about a head-on collision with the Vedic scripture, but the Buddha failed to give any positive answer to any Vedic approach and consequently in later periods a gigantic philosophical system was built up against the Vedic philosophy or more accurately there rose a protest against the uncrippled doctrine. In the Brahmanical state of Dignesvada, Karbhara and the Upanisads we find that the philosophy has taken a challenging attitude by now. The people also were clearly divided into two major groups. On the one hand, the Brahmans were there with the Vedic philosophy and on the other, the Buddhists came forward with their new philosophical doctrines.

It was the beginning of the Christian era when such a situation was created that the Brahmans and the Buddhists philosophers considered their respective philosophical views unsuccessful if those were not directed against the opponent and at the same time not victorious. It is obvious that the introduction of the debate system was largely responsible for the creation of this situation.

The fundamental difference in outlooks between realism and idealism led to mutual confrontations which continued in an unbroken line for generations of scholars resuming in the growth of a rich and vigorous literature. In this way a section of the Brahmans philosophers developed a philosophical system predominantly with the science of reasoning (nyaya). Later the system was known as Nyaya philosophy. The first systematic work on the Nyaya philosophy is the Nyaya-sutra of Gantama. It is supposed to be a work of about 150 A.D. Going through this work, we can undoubtedly say that much before the
composition of this work the Buddhists had already put forward a lot of strong arguments that helped their views to gain foothold in a concentrated self-sufficient system of philosophy.

We find in the Nyāya-sūtra that Gautama refutes several doctrines of the Buddhist philosophy, such as, the whole is not separate from its parts1, momentariness of things2, denial of the external object3, voidness of everything4 and so on. But it should be kept in mind that these doctrines could not assume the highly sophisticated forms by that time. And Gautama’s refutation also does not show much complicity of thought to turn those down.

Then there is a century of silence. In this period the followers of these two schools obviously went on with their studies but, no remarkable work was composed.

Now came ahead a Buddhist scholar to protest against the views of Gautama. He is none other than Nagarjuna5, who is the first outstanding philosopher to propagate the fundamental philosophy of voidness (sūnyavāda). Dr. S. Radhakrishna seeks to explain the background of the advent of this school in this way, “... Monism took the offensive and finally established itself triumphantly in the very heart of a new Buddhism. Transplanted upon a fresh soil the old Monism produced a powerful growth of various systems. In the schools of Nagarjuna and Deva it received a dialectical foundation, in the way of a dialectical destruction of all other systems6.”

In the Mādhyamika-Kārikā, Nagarjuna tries to establish his theory of voidness by contradicting many of the actual Nyāya-sūtras. He composed the oldest Buddhist treatises on the art of debate, viz., Vīgraha-vyākhyāna and Pratimā-vibhūṣya. In Vīgraha-vyākhyāna, going to prove the voidness of things, Nagarjuna has shown his daring attitude of uprooting even the existence of the Pratimā-s. As he was an exponent of a particular ‘nihiliastic’ theory, naturally he could not also check the temptation of sticking at the root of the categories proposed by Gautama. His Pratimā-vibhūṣya is exclusively a refutation of the sixteen categories contained in the Nyāya-sūtras. By applying his critical axe of relativity he claims that all the sixteen categories are relational and therefore ultimately unreal.

This Buddhist theory of voidness was one of the crucial points for a Nyāya exponent named Vatsayana. Going to prove his theory, the Buddhist Nāgārjuna started with demolishing even the existence of the instrument of valid knowledge. But Vatsayana started with a strong protest and a crucial defense of Pratimā and the very first line of his commentary reads Pratimāṃ tathā pratyakṣam pravṛtti-dhāraya arthavat pratimām.

Gautama formulated the sūtras but Nāgārjuna Playboy them mercilessly and Vatsayana who belonged to the lineage of the Nyāyaśāstra was prompted to write a commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras in the late 4th century or early 5th century. The commentary bears the title Nyāya-sūtrā-vyākhyā.

In course of explaining the Nyāya-sūtras, Vatsayana raises objections against Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of voidness of things which is discussed in the Mādhyamika-Kārikā according to which our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing in a dream or exhibited in a jadagāra or as the city of the celestial kings or as a mirage. Vatsayana argues against the Viśiṣṭādīśa philosophy (i.e., the theory of idealism) on the Nyāya-sūtras iv. 2. 26-7 and iii. 2. 11 and against the momentariness on the Nyāya-sūtras iii. 2.11-13.
To answer the objections raised by Vidyabhāsa, a Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhu (c. A.D. 410-490), composed three works, viz., Vāda-viśeṣa, Vāda-viśiṣṭāna and Viśu
ādhyāya. But unfortunately all the works are lost.

This philosopher however became also famous for propounding a fundamental doctrine of some Buddhist, the doctrine of idealism (Viśu-ādhyāya), as a sophistical philosophy.

As to the advent of Vijñānavāda, Dr. Sancherjavski says, "When Nyāgāraja's standpoint of extreme rationalism was forsaken, the brothers Aṇīga and Vāsudhanu took up the study of Nyāya logic and the work of its adaptation to the idealistic foundations of this philosophy". 14

As all the logical works of Vāsudhanu has been lost, the complete assessment of his view on logic is not possible at present. From the later works it is found that Vāsudhanu opposing the nature of perception and inference, the number and nature of the members of syllogism recommended in the Nyāya-sūtra, gave new definitions of them. 15 He wrote his Vāda-viśeṣa challenging the laws regulating the debates advocated by Gaṇaṭa.

This dispute between the realism of the Nyāya school and the dogmatic idealism of the Viśu-ādhyāya school of Buddhist philosophy went on. But it was the 5th century A.D. when India gave birth to her glorious philosopher-logician son, Dhīṅgā. In his hand Buddhist idealism assumed a critical stage. Dhīṅgā's Pramāṇa-samuccaya, perhaps the most outstanding one of his five works, 16 shook the world of Indian logic. Norwithstanding the truth the Buddhists realized, Buddhist philosophy was suffering from insufficiencies of depth in logic for their own to establish their realization. Now with Dhīṅgā, Buddhist philosophy got the elixir of life. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhūṣāna writes, "Both in matter and in manner his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. The keenness of his insight and the soundness of his critical senses combined to acquaint him with an individuality all his own. No praise seems too high for him. Indeed he may fittingly be styled as the first and last of Indian logician 17." 18

Pramāṇa-samuccaya is a logical work written in Astādhyāya metre. In this work Dhīṅgā expounds his own theories of Buddhist logic. By this Dhīṅgā pushed the Buddhist philosophy in the 4th ground where the Nyāyākṣas were the chief opponents. He criticizes a Nyāya view: Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.12, enumerating the sense-organs, does not mention the mind, but the Nyāyākṣas admit it as a separate sense-organ. In support of their view they say that the mind can unhesitatingly be admitted as a sense-organ because nowhere in the Nyāya-sūtra the view is contradicted. Now Dhīṅgā says, well, if absence of contradiction means admission, there would have been no necessity of all of formulating tīra sūtra because the group of sense-organs as mentioned there has not been contradicted anywhere in the Nyāya-sūtra 19. A few more objections like the above can be found which are nothing but trivial. 20

The crucial point of dispute are the definitions of perception pramāṇa and inference anumāṇa also with the definitions of probems (leśka) etc. given by Gaṇaṭa. Restating those Dhīṅgā formulated fresh definitions of them. 21 Comparison (anumāṇa) and verbal testimony (tābāda) are not separate instruments of valid knowledge in the Buddhist view. 22 It is Dhīṅgā who for the first time draws attention to the theory of Apośa, i.e., the law of contradiction 23. It changes the view opposite to 'the view of knowledge gathered in a direct way'. According to the Apośa theory, the law of cognizance is explained as 'we can actively cognize or determine a thing only by opposing it to what it is not'.

41
A spark which ignited the criticism in the realistic philosophy is Dignāga’s ‘definition of perception’. If the difference in the very basis appears too serious then that in the consecutive stages of development obviously turns to not only doctrinal dispute but also bitter relation in life. And exactly this happened in the later period. In the Nyāya philosophy being a realistic philosophy ‘the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact’ is also associated with terms is given the respect of nothing but perception and real knowledge. But really, according to Dignāga, is textually involved in causal efficiency. A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. A fire which is absent, which is imagined, which neither really burns nor cooks nor sheds any light, is an unreal fire. A reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither any position in time and space nor any characterizing quality cannot be expressed because there is in it nothing to be expressed. If we express that sensation in words, the thing to be expressed must be attached with some kind of mental imagination which pushes it to the realm of unreality. Representing this view Dignāga’s definition of perception pratisthāpa kalpatapāya has got the perpetuity.

In this way his observation of the truth rendered him into a perpetual enemy to the realistic group of philosophers. But whatever harm might have been to him, we have touched with a thrilling sensation of his revolutionary ideas. Unfortunately India could not protect any of the serious works of her worthy sons being lost for ever15.

Time rolled on. Then came the seventh century. During this intervening period the Nāyikā philosophers exerted their philosophy and logic but there was no one to put pen to paper. A Bhāratīya Brahman Udyotakāra wrote an extensive commentary on Gaudama’s Nyāya-sūtra and Vīlayyāna’s Nyāya-dhātyupadesa under the title of Nyāya-vāraṇika. The very purpose of composing the work, as the author himself declared, was to write an expository treatise on the Nyāya-sūtra to remove the veil of error cast by the quibblers16. These quibblers are none but Nāgājuna, Vasubandhu, Dignāga chiefly and other Buddhist logicians17.

It is quite natural that there are many things to be said for and against both the realists and the idealists. Udyotakāra carried out his duties as a realist. But he is much more vociferous against the Buddhist doctrines. His temper can only be compared with that of Udayana. The first thing to be mentioned is Udyotakāra’s discussion and refutation of Nāgājuna’s doctrine of voidness in Nyāya-vāraṇika under NS ii. 1. 8-19. In our world of cause and effect we cannot think of such a situation where there is no pramāṇa. The all-powerful pramāṇa can by no means be discarded. Only what he has done is that he has set the pramāṇa as an invulnerable foundation. The definitions of perception and inference given by Vasubandhu and those as given by Dignāga are vehemently criticized in Nyāya-vāraṇika under NS i. 1. 4-5. Dignāga in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya described a number of views regarding what actually is inferred in an inference and finally expressed his own view. All this is discussed and Dignāga’s views are criticized in Nyāya-vāraṇika under NS i. 1. 32-37. Udyotakāra criticizes the law of debate as suggested by Vasubandhu, in Nyāya-vāraṇika under NS ii. 2. 1. Apāra iva has been refuted by him in Nyāya-vāraṇika under NS ii. 2. 65. He also criticizes the demis of the evidences of comparison (pratisthāpa) and verbal testimony (āveda) in Nyāya-vāraṇika under NS i. 1. 6-7. He is actually on a criticizing spree
to refute the Buddhist theory in which the whole is viewed as identified with its parts, as Nyaya-Vaisesika under NS i. 1, 33. He also recorded a series of abhidharma arguments. The later Naiyayika logicians took up his Buddhist theory by the expression ‘identity of quality and the qualified’.

The essence of the Buddhist philosophy lies in the doctrine of momentariness. In Nyaya-Vaisesika under NS ii. 2, 10-17, Uddyotakara shows his devotion to refute the doctrine.

In Nyaya-Vaisesika under NS iv. 2, 26-37, Uddyotakara criticizes the Buddhist theory of ‘denial of the external objects’. Some remarkable passages from this discussion may perhaps be quoted: ‘pleasure or pain is quite different from knowledge (jñāna), for pleasure or pain is an “object to be cognized” (grāhita), while knowledge means its comprehension (grahapan).’ The object cognized and the act of comprehension can never be identical. Secondly, the admission of illusory knowledge necessarily entails the acceptance of its opposite, i.e., valid knowledge also. An object which is never known rightly can also be never known falsely. Thirdly, one who does not admit the reality of any object other than mere consciousness will not be in a position either to defend one’s own position or to refute that of other’s, because one will not be able to communicate or explain anything to others with one’s own mere consciousness which is intelligible to everyone else, just as the dream-experiences of a particular person are known to himself alone. To this, it may be replied that when a person defends his own thesis or refutes that of others he employs words and with the aid of ‘consciousness as endowed with the word-form’ (śabdajñāna-cinta) communication or explanation becomes possible, consciousness as endowed with the word-form is not unintelligible to others. The reply however does not fit in, for the Viśiṣṭa-vādins do not admit the reality of ābhasa as an external object and hence, they cannot speak of consciousness as endowed with the word-form. Fourthly, on the claim that no external object apart from consciousness exists really, no distinction can be made between the states of dream-and waking, i.e., in that case, objects will be equally non-existing always.

What Uddyotakara says against the soul theory of the Buddha has been more or less followed by the Nyāya logicians of later period.

Uddyotakara criticized the Buddhists a lot. But he never mentioned the name of any particular work or philosopher except in a single case where the name of the two works Vāda-vādha and Vīda-vādha-sūtra are mentioned. Though in most of the cases we come to know what the particular philosopher or logician is, he perhaps thought it would be sufficient to know that the refutation was directed against the Buddhist whoever he might be, an eminent one or an ordinary one.

Some argue that the mode of Uddyotakara’s refutation of the Buddhists is concerned more with verbal trickery than with true philosophical insight. It is found that while refuting a Buddhist theory he poses a number of alternative as to the opponent’s theory, as if he is asking the opponent in front to answer these. But, he tries to show, not a single alternative is per missible and the only alternative which is found left does nothing but prove the Nyāya view. Probably this charge against Uddyotakara is partly true. Though generally Uddyotakara allows his kind of style and sometimes does not hesitate to distort the opponent’s view, still in some cases he sticks to actual philosophical stand, which is found to be adopted continuously by the Nyāya logicians of later period.
But Nyāya-vādika could not remain unchallenged in the field of Indian philosophy for a long time. In the middle of the 7th century challenges came from one of the famous Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakīrti.

This philosopher has written seven logical works, the celebrated "seven treatises", which have become the fundamental works for the study of logic in the Buddhist community and have more or less superseded the works of Dignaga. Among the seven works the Pramāṇapadārthika is the chief one, written in expository verse; the next work Prakriyā-saṅkhyāgaṇa is an abridgment of the first, written in stanzaic prose; the Nyāya-śuddha is a further abridgment of the same subject; Hetu bheda is a short classification of logical creations; Sambandha-parīkṣa is an examination of the problem of relation in a small text in stanzas with the author's own comments; Viśuddha-mārga is a treatise on the art of carrying on disputation and Āśīkādīśa-nātha is a treatise on the reality of other minds, directed against Jainaism.

The Pramāṇa-pudārīka was lost in India but we are lucky enough that the manuscript of this work has been discovered by Rahul Sankrityayana from Tibet.

In this pioneering work, Dharmakīrti discusses his own philosophy of idealism, general- ly by giving up the temptation of picking the opponent's view. Though some refutations of the Nyāya views are found there, still its own remarkable philosophy and logic spontaneously emerged in the context of Nyāya philosophy, built by Īśyāyakāra.

He criticizes the Nyāya view of the existence of God in the chapter called Pramāṇapadārthī (verse Nos. 12-18). The Nyāya view of perception is criticized in Praccaya chapter (verse Nos. 136-46). The theory of generality (verse Nos. 145-48) and the theory of the existence of the whole also (verse Nos. 149-53) are refuted. The Nyāya definition of Pātaka is related in Paribhāṣāmāññī chapter (verse Nos. 194-71). In the same chapter the definition of prajñā also (verse Nos. 172-75) is criticized. But all these are matters of general logic.

"Although produced by a nimatha coming from an external object, but from an array time. In the middle of the 7th century, it is indeed a reality? It is supposed to be absolutely stripped off from every vestige of an imaginative or convulsive element. But in it is not pure imagination? No. A single moment, just as an absolute particular, is not something replaceable in an image, it cannot be reached by our knowledge, that is to say, it is not something empirically real. But it is the element which imparts reality to all the other. It is the indispensible condition of all real and consistent knowledge. It is nonempirical, but it is the metaphysical, it is not a "flow" in the theory... Dharmakīrti proposes to prove its reality by an experiment in the way of introspection. The metaphysical entities are metaphysical just because they are pure imagination just because there is no point of reality, no moment of pure sensation to which they could be attached. They are "sustainable as to place, time and sensible quality". But this point and this sensation are present, directly or indirectly, in every act of empirical reality and empirical cognition. This we can indirectly prove by introspection, Dharmakīrti says. That intuition is something quite different from productive imagination — can be proved just by introspection. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something indescribable (capable of coercing with a name). Now, if we bring in state at a patch of color and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other objects, if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of rigidity, (and become as though unconscious), this will be the condition of pure sensation. If we then, (awakening from this condition), begin to think, we notice a feeling (of
remembering) that we had an image (of a patch of colour before us), but we did not notice it whilst we were in the foregoing condition, (we could not name it) because it was pure sensation.\textsuperscript{24} This consecutive observation has given Dharmakīrti immortality in the history of Indian philosophy.

\textit{sahārya-prakṣa-saṁyati abheda niṣṭhādhiyogādhedasika bhūṭhāṇa-viśvārūpāni viśvēśvarē\textsuperscript{21},} a verse of \textit{Pramāṇa-viśeṣānta} is one of the most remarkable representations of the idealistic philosophy of Dharmakīrti. Practically there is no opponent philosopher who did not criticize this verse.

Even then Dharmakīrti was not unaware of the danger to which Idealism may ultimately lead in the shape of its direct consequence, solipsism. He therefore singled out this problem from his great work and devoted to it a special tract under the title \textit{Sāntanānānta-siddhi}, i.e., Establishment of the existence of the other minds. This work contains a verification of the whole of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology in its application to a special complicated case. Dharmakīrti makes a gift to us of this brilliant piece of document narrating the realistic and Buddhist position in a problematic matter in the day.

He however did not want to discuss about a metaphysical entity, which is a compulsory matter of discussion for the Nyāya logicians. It is said that Dharmakīrti, when studying under Śaṅkarāṇa wrote the chapter on \textit{Ashāthdhi} in \textit{Pramāṇa-vīrātika}. But this religious part was dropped in all the other manuscripts and he himself most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion in the opening passage of \textit{Sāntanānānta-siddhi}, “... Our knowledge being limited to experience, we neither think nor speak anything definite about Him, we can neither assert nor deny His existence”\textsuperscript{25}.

For a century, from Dharmakīrti’s time down to the 1st quarter of the 8th century, Buddhist philosophy was conspicuous by the absence of any remarkable original work due to absence of any talented philosopher in their school. At last a brilliant composition from the Buddhist school came to light. It is the \textit{Tattvacaritra-prakasa}. Its author Śāntaraksitā (A.D. 705-65) was a professor at Nalanda. He visited Tibet at the invitation of king Khris-aron deu-tsan (8th cent.). The king with the assistance of Śāntaraksitā built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-ye in Tibet, and Śāntaraksitā was its first abbot. It is sure that Tattvacaritra-prakasa was composed before its author had gone to Tibet. He has elaborately explains the Buddhist doctrines of his own line as he vehemently criticizes the Nyāya views.

Dharmakīrti’s \textit{Pramāṇa-vīrātika} was then inaccessible. The \textit{Tattvacaritra-prakasa} throws literally a flood of light on Buddhist metaphysics of the Saṅkarāṇa-Yoga school and logic and epistemology. The most remarkable feature of this work is its reproduction of the views of scholars who otherwise would have remained in perfect obscurity. Kamālārīya gives the names of the authors and quotes from them—\textsuperscript{26}

From the study of this work along with that of Śāntaraksitā’s \textit{Niśayā-vīrātika} and Kumārīya’s works one can fruitfully gather some ideas about the philosophical activities of the centuries. The attack on realism, on the Soul theory and on the infallibility of the Vedas, provoked simultaneously the Nyāya, and Kumārīya’s Mimamsa schools. This counter-criticisms of the orthodox stalwarts succeeded in undermining the prestige of the Buddhist monastery. But the Buddhists were not Suprime and reacted with vigour and nerve. The \textit{Tattvacaritra-prakasa} prominently represents this phase of the Buddhist reaction. In fact, Dharmakīrti started to criticize directly the Mimamsa school and as a result Kumārīya tried
to take revenge on the Buddhists. Naturally it was not possible for Sāntarakṣita and his disciple Kāmapāla, to keep silence against Kāmapāla’s criticism.

We are here concerned with the conflict between the Nyāya and the Buddhist. Therefore from Sāntarakṣita’s criticism of the Nyāya views, particularly of Uddayotakāra, it appears that as Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla (c. A.D. 790) accepted Saṅkhyaśāstra view in which the external object exists (though this existence can be proved only by inference), it had been easier for them to criticize the realist’s objections.

In Tattvarājyavarta, Uddayotakāra’s views on the part and the whole (verses Nos. 500-52, 583, 597-38), on momentariness (verse Nos. 370-84, 388, 466-67, 471-75, on Āpokā (verse Nos. 981-99, 1184-99), and on Soul (verse Nos. 100-11, 195-216, 220) are criticized.

There were other famous logicians also, in the intervening period. They were Bhāvavigna, Āvīśāsikaraṇa and Sāntakavasvamī. Bhāvavigna may be prior to Uddayotakāra, Bhāvavigna’s Āvīśāsikaraṇa and Āvīśāsikaraṇa’s Tattvarājyavarta are known to us only by name. Anyway, those Nyāyaśāstra logicians were “pillars” of the system. Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla naturally attacked them. Many minor views of these scholars are found mentioned and criticized in Tattvarājyavarta and Kāmapāla.

How one among many of the objections may be mentioned to point Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla as to how far the objection was justified. What we call existence, they are never tired of repeating, is always related to an action. “Existence in action” says Sāntarakṣita. It is an anthropomorphic illusion to suppose that a thing can exist, only, exist placidly, exist without action, and then, as it were, suddenly rise and produce an action. Whatever exists is always acting. The conclusion this whatsoever really exists in a cause is urged upon the Buddhist by his definition of existence quoted above. Existence, real existence, is nothing but efficiency. Consequently what is non-efficient or what is a non-cause, does not exist. “A non-cause”, says Uddayotakāra, addressing himself to the Buddhist, it doubtless, is for you either something non-existing or something changeless. Kāmapāla corrects this statement of Uddayotakāra and accuses him of not sufficiently knowing the theory of his adversaries, because, says he, “those Buddhists who are students of logic maintain that a non-cause is necessarily a non-reality”. Thas means this to be a real is nothing but to be a case, whatever exists is necessarily a cause.

The growth and development of the ideas and the sentiments of these two different groups of philosophers have been reflected in a rich literature which can make the subject extremely interesting.

Now with Sāntarakṣita and Kāmapāla, the Buddhist philosophy is in a sad situation, but on the contrary the Nyāya philosophy was rather pushed to the wall without any brilliant logical production up to the middle of the 9th century from the time of Uddayotakāra. In this situation, Vaiśeṣika Mīlāc. A.D. 832, a Buddhist logician wrote an elaborate gloss on the Nyāya-Śāstra under the title Nyāyaśāstra-dīkṣāyogapāda.

In the writing of Vaiśeṣika we find his exemplary observation of the logical nuances which can rarely be found in others. He possessed the rare qualities of erudition and fairness in representing the opposite’s point. As a Nyāya exponent he followed Uddayotakāra in refuting the Buddhist doctrines but not always without some differences of opinion. His refutation is much more deep and subtle in comparison with Uddayotakāra’s.

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refutation, being pungent and aggressive. Under NS i. 1. 4-5, Šīka shows us Vācaśpati’s clear understanding about the nature of the Buddhist perception and inference. Vācaśpati quotes the relevant verses of Dignāga while explaining Uddyotakāra’s refutation of Dignāga. He found the fresh scope of refuting Dharmakīrti’s views of perception and others. He quoted verses of Pramāṇa-sūtra and Pramāṇa-sūtra-vṛti. The verse of Tattvasamgraha is found to have been quoted in Tīkā but it seems that Vācaśpati did not give much importance to that text.

Up to the time before Vācaśpati, God was not so much considered to be a matter of dispute in debate with the Buddhists. But starting with him, to prove or to refute the existence of God became a prestige issue.

Generally it is found that a philosopher having faith in a certain philosophical system cannot show his adherence to another philosophical system. When a philosopher in course of explaining seeks the permanent justification of the doctrine containing in the philosophy of his own like and tries to adopt those in thought and practice, it is very difficult for him to make his mind agree to give importance to another system of philosophy. Vācaśpati is rather a conspicuous exception. He wrote three commentaries, Niṣṭhā-vidyā-kāraka-tīkā on Nyāya philosophy, Śāṅkhyā-sutra-kāmaṇḍu on Śāṅkhyā philosophy and Brāhmaṇa on Vedānta philosophy. We do not know which one of them he preferred, but in all the three commentaries, his concursative explanation of the different doctrines makes us believe that none, in actuality, is negligible. Now even after a long journey we are struck with doubt if the objections against the Buddhist philosophy actually forbid us to believe in it.

Now the objections against the Buddhists came from a new direction -- Kashmir. After Vācaśpati there flourished another talented Nyāya logician named Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 840-900) who was the younger contemporary of Vācaśpati. He wrote an independent commentary on the Niṣṭhā-sūtra, called Niṣṭhā-maṭhāṇa. He was an orthodox Brahmin who zealously defended the authority of the Vedas and saw the refutation of Buddhism as a religious cause. Yet he was not fanatic. He was capable of retaining his sense of humour under adversity. He tells us that as he writes Niṣṭhā-maṭhāṇa, he is being held prisoner in a cave and I have beguiled my days here by this diversion of writing a book. A rare virtue which is indicative of true greatness in his humility in declaring that he could lay claim to originality.

Many of the Buddhist views are mentioned and refuted in Niṣṭhā-maṭhāṇa, such as, there are only two instruments of valid knowledge, perception is conceptual construction which is free from determination by the imagination and is non-illusive. Apoha, momentariness, two theories of illusion – arūpābheda (of the Madhyamikas) and śacaśrayābheda (of the Viśṣāvatmikas), etc. Among these the Buddhist theory of momentariness exhausted Jayanta’s maximum energy.

It is needless to say that Dharmakīrti among the Buddhists is no doubt the main opponent of Jayanta. Numerous verses from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-sūtra have been quoted and refuted in Niṣṭhā-maṭhāṇa. Dignāga also is occasionally mentioned. Dharmottara (c. A.D. 820) also is criticized by Jayanta in a few places.

It is a preparad matter of dispute whether knowledge is like the eye or a candle. The philosophical discussion, however, about knowledge has been divided into two groups on
the basis of these two differences. And this stretched long. Naturally to refute the Viśṇuvaśādīnī we find this kind of discussion multi-faceted in a great detail in Nyāya-mārgajīri.

After Dhammapāli, the Mānīṣāya school turned up against the Buddhists. Kamānāla (c. 5th cent.) a great Mānīṣāya scholar implied great success in refuting them and establishing his opinion. But it was a fact for the Nyāya scholars that an old enemy is vanquished by a new enemy.

Prabhākara (c. late 6th cent.) another strong Mānīṣāya scholar played the same role. So the Nyāya scholars thought it necessary to stop the group of these new enemies.

Properly going through Nyāya-mārgajīri, it however appears that Jayanta was also attentive to the refutation of the Mānīṣāya views of Kamānāla as well as of Prabhākara. Actually with the decline of Buddhism in India the doctrinal and logical conflict was shifted to between the Nyāya and the Mānīṣāya schools of philosophy. It will not be improper to say that Jayanta accelerated the criticism against the Mānīṣāya school though it is found to have been started long before by Uddotakāra and rather prominently by Vācaspati. In fact, Jayanta had to protect the Nyāya philosophy from the attack not only of the Buddhists but also of different groups of other philosophers. In spite of this Jayanta has retained his renown by faithfully representing the opponent’s views.

Over and above, the activities of the Buddhists are not consistent with what they say. That is why Jayanta also was very much aggressive against them. He says “You, Buddhists, hold that there is no soul, yet you construct certain dreams to enjoy pleasure. In paradise after death, you say that everything is momentary, yet you build monasteries with the hope that they will last for centuries and you say that the world is void, yet you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. What a strange character, the Buddhists possess, they are weakly a monument of conceit.”

In the 10th century the Nyāya system of philosophy is divided into two courses. One flowed in the old line and the other course started with Bhāvanāvala. To put it clearly, Bhāvanāvala was the first known proponent of a number of doctrines which diverge boldly from the accepted traditional views. A Kathmānalī like Jayanta, Bhāvanāvala must have been flourished contemporaneously with him (c. A.D. 900-920).

Nāyaṇa-vaśādīrka is a monumental work composed by him. It is an auto-commentary of Nyāya-sūtras. It was supposed to be the last for a long time, but it is a miracle that perhaps the only manuscript of Nāyaṇa-vaśādīrka has been suddenly discovered from the personal custody of Sayya Sampīr Śānti, in 1939.

Profuse quotations and verses from Dharmaśāni’s Pramāṇa-vibhāsa and Prakāśika’s Pramāṇa-vibhāsa are found in this work. He criticizes the views of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, Digna, Dharmaśāni, Prakāśika, Dharmaśāni, Sūnaraśīla, Kārakāla, Kamagomini and many other. Prakāśika (c. A.D. 940) started the philosophical school of interpretation of Pramāṇa-vaśādīrka. He wrote a voluminous commentary on Pramāṇa-vaśādīrka under the title Pramāṇa-vibhāsa-ākāśārya.

Now appeared in the field a great Buddhist scholar named Jñānabhadra. He was associated with the Vikramashālī mārgajīri which was established by the famous Buddhist emperor Dharmaśāni (c. A.D. 730-810) and flourished under the liberal patronage of his successors. In the 11th century, we find it in the form of an international University attracting scholars from other parts of Asia. All the Shāstras were taught in it.
received priority among them. There were six great Enlightes there. Four of them were
called keepers of the four gates - Devaprapatian of the sea of learning that was
the mahabija and the two others, still greater, were called the two "Great Pillars" of wisdom.
We find Jalanirmita as the second Great Pillar of the University. He tried to revive
the Buddhist philosophy against the attack of the Nyaya logic.

He criticized the views of Triplicana and his disciple Vicaspati, Bhaisaravijala and a few
other Nyayika logicians with the utmost strength of his intellectuality. His writing on
the one hand attacks the acme of intellectual analysis and on the other hand unveils the
background of Udayana's arguments. Among those who were refuted by him, Triplicana
was a prominent figure between Kamalakasa and Vicaspati to receive the special attention
of Jalanirati. Anyway, Jalanirati was more concerned with the views of Bhaisaravijala, a
strong opponent who financed immediately before him. It is known that Triplicana
composed a work under the title Nyaya-praksastra. We do not know whether this work
is the same as the Nyaya-bhaja-bha, composed by him. One Nyaya-praksastra also was
attributed to him. But unfortunately we do not find any of his works.

Vinata 27 must have been a Nyaya author of considerable importance. His views on
Vivasvatika alone have been recorded by Jnanati and his disciple Ratnakrti. It seems that
he wrote a treatise on Vivasatika.

Saunandha 28 is the last Nyayika whose view on Ivvara alone has been quoted by
Jnanamitra.

It appears from his writing that being a teacher at Nalanda, Jalanirati directly realized
the insult coming from the Nyaya logicians. But though Jyantra and Bhaisaravijala criticized
the Buddhist doctrines very strongly, the warmthess of opposition cannot be realized on
their body. But Jalanirati and after him Udayana boiled over the dispute. They directly
perceived the heat of hostility.

The biggest tract composed by him is on momentariness. To establish the theory of
momentariness, the verse: 'yat sat sat karya karam yatath jalatha par handha samadca bhavih ime sati sa
saktrirhthakarmamna tathathe sadhath sadhath na sat satiyakto vidihe' was parameitya kryit.
It is bhaved dhvitiy trikehandhagangeya ritematritya sadhye ca vidihe. It was
emioned from his pen and got the honour of fulcrum of the theory. Apoka, anupalabdhi
and invariable concomitance (vypati) were discussed in a great detail. On God, Jalanirati
made such a heating discussion under the title Vivasvatika, that practically this aroused in
Udayana's writing an assaulting attitude, later.

Ratnakrti, a worthy disciple of Jalanirmita, in his ten small treatises on different
topics, tried to refute the Nyaya philosophy. He gave more attention to refute Triplicana
and Vicaspati rather than Bhaisaravijala. A close scrutiny reveals that Ratnakrti has sum-
marized the works of his guru in many cases and the debt has also been eloquently
acknowledged. But the fatal thing that Ratnakrti did, is his writing a treatise onn
Saunandha diliha and it is a great risk of trikarmikarana, which scared Dharmaraja
and him write Sashtisnainarsinadi. But Ratnakrti was daring enough to compose a work
refuting the crucial view of their honoured-by-all preceptor.

Jalanirmita made his last try to unerluate the injuries inflicted by Vicaspati and
Bhaisaravijala on the Buddhist philosophy, but their philosophy again got a mortal hurt, when
a Hindu logician Udayana (A.D. 984) composed two pugnt works under the titles
Nyaya-kasaraniti and Aramasinghaviveka.
The fundamental philosophy of momentariness and the denial of the existence of God are challenged in these two works, *Avatāra-viveka* is mainly devoted to the refutation of the Buddhist doctrines of Soul. It criticizes several Buddhist views like those of Universal Bliss, *Apanca*, Universality, unity of knowledge and its object, Cetāla, Vīra, Ātman, identity of the quality and the qualified, self or knowledge alone, Ātman, Vīra, Ātman, etc. In most of the topics *Avatāra-viveka*’s works supply the purāṇa-dharma. *Bhāvanāmitra* has been quoted and referred to by name. Everything is obviously to prove the existence of God. It can humorously be said here that God will himself intend to exist no more, if He comes to know that his existence depends so much pain-taking efforts done in *Avatāra-viveka*. In fact, *Mahaṇḍi* gave a heavy jerk to the Niyaya view of the existence of God as for which Udayana had to compose a separate work against these. In the practical life the bitterness traveled so penetratively between the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaisnavas that a controversy was decided (so goes the story) even by way of jumping from a palm tree. Udayana was very much proud of thinking himself as a protector of God. Here is his utterance: “Oh Lord, you have been pleased with me as you are now illustrious (when I have made you safe after defeating the Buddhists) and dare ignore me. But (be sure) when the Buddhists come again, your existence will depend upon me”.

The continuance of a feeling, both by the Nyāya logicians and the Buddhist philosophy helps to survive in the common mind. It is also a point that after *Bhāvanāmitra* there was no Buddhist scholar who could efficiently hold up their philosophy. Many works undoubtedly were composed but those lacked sharpness of original thinking. In fact, from the 10th century the struggle for existence of the Buddhists in India due to Muslim aggression over the Buddhist education centres was the main cause of unproductiveness of a brilliant philosophical literature for them. But the gradual fall of Buddhism in India was noticed much before. Dr. Sichersky writes, “Nothing better than the great scope and success of his propaganda he (Dhammacakrī) could only retain, but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism in its native soil. Buddhists in India was doomed. The most enlightened propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumblita and Śāntakaraṇa, the great champions of Brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching. Tradition successor Dhammacakrī as having combated them in public disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an after-thought and a pious desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confection that these great Brahman teachers had met with no Dhammacakrī to oppose them”.

But in the Nyāya line two commentators at least on Udayana’s *Avatāra-viveka* (alias *Buddha-dhikka-ra*) were composed by Śāntaka Mīra (A.D. 1450) and the other *Buddha-dhikka-ra* by Raghunāth Śāntaka (A.D. 1477-1547) extin-

ished the last hope of the Buddhists to escape from the trap of the Nyāya logic. In Śāntaka Mīra’s *Vidyaprabodha* Śāntaka’s name is found in the list of the foremost Buddhist logicians. But during Śāntaka’s time the Buddhist works lost much of their importance as there was a historical documents rather than part and parcel of living faith in India.NOTES

NOTES

1 Bhāvanāmitra – vide *History of Indian Logic*, pp.227-29

2 2 NS iv. 2-6-11

Katia-valaha – vide *do*-op. pp. 234-40

Upāpinaddha – vide *do*-op. p. 3
10 Definition of perception (tattvasat pratyakṣa), i.e., perception is cognition coming from that same object.
Definition of inference: samayatāpratyakṣam (svayampratipad), i.e., inference is the cognition of a thing which is invisibly coincident on the part of one who knows the said coincidence. Definition of samskara: sadsarvapaksha pratyakṣa, i.e., Samskara is the mention of the probabvisms. Definition of probabvisms: harsatvapaksha visesat, i.e., Probsms is that which is discerned from where the probabvisms is known to be absent.


12 A History of Indian Logic, p. 270

13 on sambhata pratyayam na va na va vairudhikar yasvatam/ anantadharmacakaraitam omyakhyad getting/...Quoted in NVT, vide Catue, pp. 255-6

14 "Digonaka hegins at Vyavahara by saying that every pratyakṣa (ske. spyi) takes pride in borrowing his definition of perception (sphitk) from the Sutra of the Vaisheshikas, viz., that perception is knowledge which arises from the interaction of the soul with the mind, the mind with the sense-organs, and the sense-organs with the object. The Nyayikas is however careful not to connect his perception with sensory sense, particularly (visesat) sense, substance (stein), quality (sattat) and action (karma) on which, as pointed out by Dignaga, the Vaisheshika’s smrti-science is dependent. Oh what a strange consistency!"
A History of Indian Logic, p. 279

15 Definition of perception: pratyakṣa kalpratyakṣa, i.e., perception is that which is free from mental construction. Definition of inference: samayatātva samadhi mudhikeshu na va tattva, i.e., Inference is that which is present in the subject of inference and also in things similar to it and which is absent from where the inferable property is non-existent. Definition of prakrti: grhyānambodhisattvam param dharmavah.

16 The controversy regarding comparison as a separate instrument of valid knowledge is very ancient. We find certain references of this in Nyaya-mahayana and Nyaya-Karmaramajit, e.g., VM, pp. 128-30; NRK, pp. 193-204

G. Fix in his ‘The Nyayamatra of Gomatas’ (fn, p. 198) wrote: In chapter IV of his Pramana-samuccaya Digonaka objects to sophistry as a separate instrument of cognition; he includes it under perception. Unfriendly view that compares does not differ from perception and word. But agent is not admitted as a separate instrument of valid knowledge by the Buddhists (vide Catue, p. 350). Vaiśeṣika accepted agents as a separate instrument of valid knowledge, (vide BL, fn. p. 72)

17 Chapter V of Pramana-samuccaya contains the doctrine of Agam.

18 Fragments from Digonaka have been found in several logica texts of Indian philosophy. Besides, also a large number of reconstruction works on Digonaka’s texts has been done by a number of scholars of different countries. Translations in different languages from the earliest Chinese and Tibetan translations are also available. vide The Encyclopedia of Indian philosophy, vol I, pp. 51-55
Collections of different views of Trikonama from the works of Jainists and others can be a valuable contribution to the Indian philosophical studies.

37 Vinas is mentioned several times in Jaina, vide Jaina sruti-mandalavali, pp. 213, 297-299, 315, 260. Also vide Ratnakaridasabhashali, p. 47

38 "The name of this scholar does not actually occur in these works. Jainaratrikrita introduces his views as those of a 'certainty scholar' (aparagavakya) (Treksanasura, pp. 287, 255). The marginal notes supply the lineage. Now what we would gather about this scholar is this: Jaina sutra were some tract on Nyaya philosophy to which the institution of the Buddhist position was to be regarded as a threat. The five points put against the Buddhist position by them have been proved incorrect in the Jaina sutra.

39 ...Jainarastrakritra introduced the name of scholars who would not consider important views of his time. Many important views he considered as new lost and perhaps unsound. In the Nyaya system the works of highest importance have been preserved. These intervening between two such works are lost. Jainaratrikritra views were quoted anonymously in later works. Thus some of the scholars on Jaina sutra are to be traced in Nyaya-samasthapa of Udayana. But the Buddhist and Jaina authors have preserved passages from the ancient masters with proper reference to their authors. Jainaratrikritra is responsible for preserving such passages from the works of many important scholars that came between Dhammapali and Udayana and thus his "Mandalavali became an important document to a student of Indian Logic".

40 As the yamunadvamsadaha mudra sutra, vijnanavada

41 In the 11th century the Buddhists, Jainas, Brahmans, Vaishnavas contributed voluminous writing on Buddhist thought and logic. In the Nyaya line from the beginning of the 11th century the Nyaya logic was much engaged with the philosophy of the New school of Nyaya logic, i.e., with Vatsyayana of Gaunam.

42 BL, 1, p. 35

ABBREVIATIONS
BL. - Buddhist Logic.
CM. - Cetanagrihika.
NKM - Nyayakumarsupali.
NM - Nyayamanjari, 3rd. ed. S. Subba.
NM(N) - Nyayamanjari, Sanyaspananda Sastri Vivavidhyaksha ed.
NS - Nyaya-sutra.
NV - Nyaya-vidika.
NVTT - Nyaya-sutopana dikta.

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Tika-ma maha-paṭhasastra (Pramanavartika) mDo xcv 11.230b, 6.329b, 1.