EDUCATION IN NEPAL: MEETING OR MISSING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS?

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Education in Nepal has a number of annual highlights. One is the National Education Day, on Falgun 12th (late February), commemorating the late king Birendra’s coronation address in 1975. There he proclaimed that “education constitutes the mainspring of development” (quoted in Shrestha 1989: i). Accordingly, he commanded his government to make “primary education free of cost and accessible for all, boys and girls” (ibid.). A second annual occasion addressing education is the festival Basanta Panchami (mid February), a day dedicated to Saraswati, the goddess of wisdom and learning. On that day, (Hindu) students all over the country visit temples, where they spend hours scribbling down their notes in chalk, as notes written down on this particular day will never be forgotten. While this latter day is usually celebrated and characterised by its festive mood, the National Education Day is simply being “observed” (Khadka 1997: 12), and it is a rather ambivalent affair, or even a gloomy one, and indicative for the (poor) state of education in Nepal. Some authors even find stronger expressions, as Khadka in his cynical article “Celebrating the pathetic state” (ibid.), or Shanta Dixit (2002), in her critical assessment “Education, deception, state, and society” (2002).

Further regular events when education “hits” the headlines are in March/April when class 10 students need to take the final examinations of their secondary education in order to obtain their school-leaving certificates (SLC), and again in June/July, when SLC-results are published. While the first one is an occasion of at least modest hope, the second is usually one of more or less great despair, as the number of failed students usually outnumber those who pass. While pass rates ranged between 30-36% during the last years (see SPOTLIGHT 2003), in 2004 an astonishingly “high” number of 46% students passed (see Amgai 2004a), and this rather dreadful result was celebrated as a major national achievement. Yet, this was partly due to re-introducing a “grace mark” system, when failures within a 5%-margin in a single subject were to be neglected (ibid.). Worse still, less than 10% of class I students reach class 10 (Dixit 2002: 193), and only less than 50% reach class 5 (HMG/UNCTN 2003: 15). These figures render the Millennium Development Goals, aiming at universal primary education for boys and girls and gender equity in secondary education by 2015 (HMG/UNCTN 2003: 19), meaningless paper declarations, ridiculing past policies and millions of dollars spent and wasted from donor agencies.

Another crucial feature is that the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in the Nepalese educational “landscape”. By now there are...
about 8,500 private schools, providing educational facilities to about 1.5 million students. These can be found all across the country, although there is a strong concentration particularly in the Kathmandu valley and in some urban centres of the Terai (HMG/MOES 2003). Private schools are usually associated with two characteristics: contributing decisively to increasing the quality of education and yet strongly criticised for charging high fees, sometimes even termed “exorbitant” (Pokharel 2003: 19). This latter charge of turning education into a lucrative business was bound to lead to a confrontation with the Maoists, as regularly pointed out in their demands, as for instance in their early 40-point demands of 1996, stating that the “commercialisation of education should be stopped” (point 35, quoted from Thapa 2003: 394).

This issue was rather forcefully addressed when the Maoist-affiliated “student organisation” (All Nepal National Free Student Union, Revolutionary, ANNFSU-R) imposed several strikes upon all types of educational institutions during December 2002 and January 2003, aiming at pressurising private schools to reduce their fees (see Dhakal 2002b, Amgai 2002d, Amgai 2004d). A settlement was reached in January 2003 with PABSON (Private and Boarding Schools Organization of Nepal), agreeing to reduce fees in its member schools by 10-30% (Amgai 2004b). Consistent with these ideas, private schools have been targeted, physically attacked, and even closed in many rural areas, and occasionally also in the Kathmandu valley. On the other hand, Maoists have even more frequently targeted teachers and students from rural government schools by taking them hostage (Upadhyay 2004). In addition, many teachers have been approached for extortions, or have even been manslaughtered, as was the case with Mukti Nath Adhikari from Lamjung in 2002, who was stabbed and handed in front of his students, or Gyanendra Khadka who was hacked to death in Sindhupalchok in August 2003 (see Dhakal 2004a: 22). About 160 teachers from both sides have been killed, by Maoists as well as government forces, and about 3,000 have been displaced, seeking shelter either in district headquarters or in the capital (ibid.). These latter agitations have led to a petition from the side of five students submitted to the Supreme Court in February 2004, complaining that their “right to education was being violated by the string of strikes (bandh)” and appealing to the court to force political parties and student unions to stop these practices (ibid. 22). Similarly, the UN has demanded that educational institutions should be deemed “Zones of Peace” (Upadhyay 2004).

This brief introduction may suffice to show that education in Nepal has many facets. It is not only an affair between the state and its junior citizens and their parents, but it is also a highly (party) political issue, and also a business. This article addresses a number of critical issues pertaining to education. It will give a brief introduction to education policies during the last 50 years, highlighting the main objectives of these policies and critically assessing their achievements and failures. The article will identify a number of crucial features, such as low enrolment rates, high drop-out rates, and low performance in examinations, and assess their validity as indicators. In addition, it also provides a “mapping” of gender and regional disparities at a national level, based on data from the Ministry of Education (for the 1990s), supplemented by unpublished district-level data (for Jhapa district). The article then addresses the lack of achievement, identifying the “culprits” and political battlefields. It also provides some suggestions for policies, by (re-) considering “stakeholders” and their potential roles.

**Educational Policies in Nepal: A Brief Outline**

Education lies at the core of human development. As such, it is also a fundamental human right and thus, providing education to its citizens needs to be a focus of government activities all across the world, irrespective of the state of development. In addition, many international agencies, particularly UNESCO and UNICEF have drafted global educational agendas, as for instance during the world conference on “Education For All” held in Jomtien (Thailand) in 1990. There, all member states – including Nepal – have agreed upon the need to translate these international agendas into national policies. A more recent framework is the “Millennium Declaration”, signed in 2000 and now synthesised into the “Millennium Development Goals” (HMG/UNCTN 2003: 1). This aims to “achieve universal primary education” and to “ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary education” (ibid: 15). At the same time, Nepal’s country report states that “given the current rate of progress [...] it is unlikely that Nepal will achieve universal access to primary education by 2015” (ibid.). Thus, it is obvious that there still exist vast gaps between “paper declarations” and social realities in many fields, and education is certainly among the most blatant examples.

In Nepal, educational policies have been designed for the past 50 years, and the need for providing universal education has been targeted in virtually each of these policies. Yet, the “deadlines” for reaching this crucial goal keep being postponed, indicating not only a lack of achievement, but possibly also a lack of commitment. Thus, a large number of children, particularly girls, are still being deprived of this fundamental right. While public education was next to non-existent during the Rana period (prior to 1950) a massive initiative at promoting national education took place during Nepal’s (interim) democratic phase of the 1950s. When the Nepal National Education Planning Commission (NNEPC) handed in its report in 1955, it advised the government to introduce universal free primary education across the country. Education was to “reach all the people, not just a few” (quoted in Joshi 2003: 33). They also addressed the need that “education must be compulsory, so
that indifferent parents can not deprive their children of the benefits of education" (ibid: 92; quoted in Joshi 2003: 33). In order to implement these goals, they suggested a three-phase model, having 25% (300,000) of all children in primary schools by 1965; introducing voluntary universal primary education by 1975 and making it compulsory by 1985.

These policy guidelines have had a tremendous impact upon bringing children to school. When a UNESCO team assessed the state of education in Nepal in the early 1960s, the two authors H.B. Wood and Bruno Knall documented that by 1961 a total of 176,701 students all across the country were enrolled in primary schools alone and an additional 27,000 students in secondary schools (ibid. 1962: 33ff), with an astonishingly and admirably high number of girls (71,079 i.e., 38%). This implies an astronomical increase within a single decade, as student enrolment was below 10,000 in 1951 (ibid.). Some of the success was based on a wide communal involvement, as the NNEPC had advised the government to directly involve local communities in financing primary education. On the other hand, a point of critical assessment in their report was the extremely poor result and "human wastage" which went along with expanding education (see below), with extremely high drop-outs between primary and secondary education, but similarly within primary education. Thus, the universalisation of primary education was far from being achieved in 1975, and of more concern, this lack has continued to the present day.

A new attempt to improve educational standards was undertaken at the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Panchayat System, when HMG launched its “Basic Needs Fulfillment Programme” aimed at reducing poverty by the year 2000. This programme addressed five quantifiable indicators, i.e. food, clothing, housing, education, health, and the qualitative category “security” (see also Graner 1997: 92/93). Regarding education, the programme set the target that literacy was to be raised from 29.9% to 39.9% and that primary school enrolment was to be made universal, increasing from 82.78% of the 6-10 age group (1984/85) to 87% (1990), 95% (1995) and finally 100% by the year 2000, when a total number of 2,928,984 primary school children was projected (HMG/NPC 1987: 27ff). As a matter of fact, there have been quite impressive results in promoting students’ enrolment. Numbers more than doubled during the 1980s (see Figure 1, for detailed figures see Table A1, appendix) and increased further during the 1990s, both for boys and girls. On the other hand, enrolment of girls is still lagging far behind. Besides, there are vast regional disparities (see below).

The BNFP follows the lines of the previous Five-Year-Plans, which all stated rather ambitious objectives and only a few (minor) obstacles to be overcome. On the other hand, a much more critical assessment of primary education was written in the same year by Shrestha, who (also) points out that “investment in primary education yields the highest rate of return [...]”. At the same time, he critically assumes that “planners in Nepal do not seem to understand this basic formula of development” (1989: 94). He continues to argue that too little of the national budget is spent on education, and even within education too little is being spent on primary education whereas the lion’s share is given to “a few privileged students” in higher education, an “undemocratic act” and a basic flaw in the conception of primary education which needs to be changed before launching any programme of universal primary education (ibid.). Another point of criticism was the low quality, stating that “experience up to 1979/80 indicated that the grade 3 completers were virtually semi-literate” (ibid: 283). One immediate reaction in order to counteract this latter shortcoming was to extend primary education, from previously class 1 to 3 up to class 5 from 1980 onwards.

In order to improve the educational situation, Nepal was regularly granted major international assistance, for instance from UNICEF for its “Education for Girls and Women in Nepal”, signed in 1983. In this case, HMG’s
contribution was to provide the recurrent salaries for teachers and lecturers, and UNICEF's contribution comprised of about 5 million US $ (see Joshi 2003: 116ff). The most recent and much higher budgeted initiative is the so-called Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP), where several donors joined hands and funds (mainly grants, see Table I). This project aimed at improving access to schools, improving the quality of education and strengthening the administration (for details see Bajracharya & Phuyal 2000; Joshi 2003: 151ff). Activities for access comprised of expanding opportunities for non-formal education for women and girls, and a provision for out-of-school children, as non-attendance is seen as one of the major obstacles. In addition, the number of female teachers was to be increased, and community awareness programmes were to be launched. Quality was to be improved through textbook and curriculum development, in-service teacher training, and by introducing early childhood education in formal schooling (see Bajracharya & Phuyal 2000: 29ff). From the government side, 14% of the national budget was to allocated for education, yet only 55.4% for primary education (HMG/NPC/CBS & UNFPA 2003: 216). Yet, irrespective of these substantial financial inputs, improvements have been slow, to put it mildly.

Table 1: Budget Allocations from Different Donors within the Basic and Primary Education Project

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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>loan</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>12.5 (WB)</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>grant</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>grant</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>grant (in kind)</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>grant</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>FINNIDA</td>
<td>grant</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
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<td>23.5</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Source: Joshi 2003, 151ff

The Current Situation: Impressive Results and Misleading Statistics

Educational statistics document that policy targets have been met, and in some cases even exceeded. Thus, they seem to indicate that education in Nepal is rapidly progressing, leaving only a few regions which need to “catch up”. On the other hand, these statistics are based on a number of flaws, which are apparent when further disaggregated. These comprise of a disproportionately high number of class 1 students, which indicates that “primary” education is often “class 1-only” education, as argued elsewhere (see Graner 1998). Secondly, cohort analysis is often inappropriate, which results in gross distortions of enrolment figures. Thirdly, enrolment figures are usually based on admission at the beginning of the year, rather than documenting “real” attendance. Taking these issues into full account, it becomes obvious that enrolment is meager, rendering policies of “universal education” meaningless paper declarations. Fourthly, education is characterized by an utterly poor performance in examinations in many classes, particularly in classes 1, 5, 8 and 10 (see below).

When considering enrolment in primary education it is apparent that a disproportionately high number of students are enrolled in class 1 (see Figure 2). This most bizarre “pyramid” is apparent both among boys and girls and indicates that drop-outs are not only pronounced between primary and secondary education but also within primary education. Thus, at a national average, class 5 students account for less than half of the numbers of class 1 students. While this peculiar pattern could be interpreted as a most recent rise in class 1 admissions, its persistence over many years (see Figure 1, above) renders such an interpretation out of question (see also Graner 1998). School enrolment rates have two further distinctive features: firstly, high gender disparities and secondly, high regional disparities. Enrolment rates of girls until today lag far behind those of boys (see Figures 2 and 3). Above all, in many rural Terai and mountain districts of the mid and far western regions, drop-outs increase linearly for boys but exponential for girls, as for instance in Doti (see Figure 3). Thus, in quite a few districts class 1 girls account for 30-50% of all girls enrolled in school (analysis based on HMG/MOES 2003).

Enrolment rates are a crucial indicator in order to assess participation in education. These rates are usually based on a “cohort” analysis, relating the number of school children to a particular age group. In the case of primary students, this cohort is defined as children aged 6-10. Yet, in a context where over- as well as under-aged children account for a substantial number of children, such an analysis is analytically meaningless. Thus, in 2001 “gross” enrolment rates ranged between 72-229% (as in Mahottari and Tappeung, respectively), as documented in the annual Educational Statistics (HMG/MOES & 2003: 245ff). This distortion is corrected by differentiating gross and net enrolment rates, the latter ranging between 43 and 98% (39 to 98% for girls; ibid.). Yet, the precise calculations remain vague, as proper cohorts are difficult to enumerate. An attempt was made, based on data from the Population Census 2001 (see Figures 2 and 3). This documents that under-enrolment of girls starts in primary classes, in Doti even from class 3 onwards. Even then, net enrolment rates are extremely low, and are below 50% in a total of 9 districts, in the far western as well as in the central development region (see map, Figure 5).

Case studies indicate that ages in primary classes frequently vary over 4 to 5 years, due to a substantial number of over-aged and a few number of
under-aged students. Field data from Dailekh district (see Figure 4) document that ages range from 5 to 12 for primary classes and 11 to 17 for secondary classes (Shahi 2004). Whereas there are a large number of under-aged boys in primary classes, from class 6 onwards the majority of the students are over-aged. Similarly, a case study from Okhaldhunga documents that ages usually vary about 5 years (in class 8 even 6 years), and students are as old as 18 in class 8 and 20 in class 10 (Rai 2004). An even more disparate age structure is apparent from the Nepal Living Standard Survey (data base) for 1995/96, where class 5 students range between 8 and 17, and class 9 students between 13 and 20 (HMGINPC/CBS 1997, data base).

Figure 2: Gender-Disaggregated Enrolment and Cohorts for Class 1-10 (for 2001)

Figure 3: Gender-Disaggregated Enrolment and Cohorts for Doti District (for 2001)

Figure 4: Girl and Boy Enrolment and Age Structure at a Dailekh School (For 2004)

Figure 5: Net Enrolment Rates for Girls (2001)
The low pass rates of examinations, particularly during SLC, is one of the most crucial issues in education. During 2000-2003, an average of 30-35% of all students passed. Accordingly, highly concerned articles about “Poor examination results: Who is to blame” (Dhakal 2001c) or “SLC results: Poor pass rate” (SPOTLIGHT 2001b), are a regular annual feature of both newspapers and magazines, after the publication of SLC results in June/July.

In 2004, an unprecedented number (46%) passed. Yet, this “remarkable” achievement was mainly due to (re-)introducing a “grace mark” system, when failures within a 5%-margin in a single subject were to be neglected (Amgai 2004b). Whereas average figures are bad enough, in addition, regional and gender disparities are pronounced. Thus, an analysis of the 1995 results shows that Kathmandu was the only district where the number of students passed outnumbered those who failed. Among girls, only four districts had rates above 35%, whereas in almost all other areas, rates ranged between 25 and 35% in the western and eastern regions, or even 10-25% in most districts of the mid and far western regions (for map see Graner 1998: 210). Even more alarmingly, rates have further declined during the last years. Yet, these crucial figures have ceased to be documented, as the Ministry of

Wood & Knall attributed these high rates of failure to the “present obsolete examination system” (ibid: 43). They argued that examinations during secondary schooling were only carried out at the end of the entire 5-year period, i.e. after class 10. Thus, the consultants advised the government to introduce annual examinations, as this would reduce the volume of each examination. In addition, this system would allow for better tuition as well as for advising weaker students to discontinue their schooling (ibid: 43/44). While the examination system was changed long ago, the number of students passing has still not increased, indicating that the obstacles obviously lie elsewhere. In addition, Shanta Dixit raises concerns about the “learning” capabilities of those students who do pass, as examinations test “memorization abilities” rather than understanding (2002: 202).
Education has, most unfortunately, deleted this table from its annual statistics.

Reasons for this utterly poor state of education are manifold and are also a recurrent theme in the media, political debates and academic analyses. One of the most frequently addressed topics is blaming the parents, who are usually characterised as “poor”, and their “children have to supplement the income of the family”, as for instance in Hada (2003: 30ff; also ibid: 2000). This “causal analysis” is closely linked to the accusation that there is a “lack of general awareness” (ibid.), as “illiteracy […] has made the village people unaware of the importance of sending their children to school” (ibid.). Other reasons mentioned are lack of quality instruction and lack of commitment from the side of the teachers, but also a lack of supervision. This brings about a low internal efficiency, as repetition rates are extremely high. While the latter arguments are certainly valid, Hada’s analysis has two major flaws: the role of the government is completely ignored, rather teachers are perceived as extra-institutional bodies. Second, the myth about ignorant, illiterate parents reveals quite a high degree of constructed dichotomy from the perspective of Kathmandu-based educational “elites”, and does not fully capture rural processes (see below).

In her critical assessment “Education, deception, state, and society” (2002), Shanta Dixit provides a much more comprehensive analysis, and finds strong words for addressing what she epitomises as the “sorry state of government education” (ibid: 193). She characterises the situation as “emphasizing literacy at the expense of education” (ibid: 194ff), and promoting “memorization skills” (ibid: 199) more than any other meaningful form of education. This, she argues, brought about the “failure to provide minimally acceptable standards” (ibid.). She also criticises the “insensitiveness from the side of the government and also its lack of commitment, as intra-administrative postings and transfers do not create an atmosphere where ‘decision makers’ feel responsible, a flaw prevalent at all levels of government administration. This is particularly important as there are about 100,000 teachers (i.e. about 60% of all civil servants), and thus they constitute a massive “vote bank” for party political considerations. Interestingly, she also attributes a fairly irresponsible role to the donor community who could much more efficiently pressurise government but who instead simply give “financial fodder” to the Ministry, yet “without demanding tangible results” (ibid: 198).

As one of the most crucial issues to increase quality in education Shanta Dixit addresses the need for guaranteeing a high standard of teachers. Yet, this is not the case, and she argues that the present supervision system is completely inadequate. The crucial role of teachers has been addressed in many policies and projects. Under the BPEP’s first phase (1992-1998), teacher training activities were allocated about 10 million US $ (out of 67.2 million US $). On the other hand, qualifications of teachers have remained low until today, and a large number of them are virtually untrained, as indicated in the Ministry of Education’s annual statistics. This documents that more than one third of all teachers have only studied up to class 10 themselves, and, above all, have not even received any training prior to becoming teachers, mainly in government schools. Only a few among the teachers have passed their I.E. or B.A. (see Figure 7). Interestingly, and most alarmingly, hardly any among them have taken a degree in education. A disaggregation of these data based on types of schools, gender and age structure would be interesting, but data is not available at a national level. A case study from Morang district carried out by Pokharel shows that teachers’ qualifications are slightly higher in private schools, particularly for men (see Figure 8). The current amendment of the Education Act addresses this shortcoming, requiring teachers to obtain licenses (see Maharjan 2004).

Figure 7: Teachers Qualifications (HMG/MOE for 2001)
Figure 8: Teachers Qualifications in Morang District (Based on Pokharel 2004)

Interestingly, aspects of teachers' training were also addressed in the Wood-Knall Report. There, the authors had advised the government to establish "mobile training camps". Their main argument was the need to train teachers "in the hinterlands", as they perceived a high degree of "mobility inertia" from the side of the teachers, once they had moved to urban areas and do not wish to change their residence, except in favour of (other) urban areas. Thus, they state that urban training had "proved the inadvisability of trying to send urban-oriented teachers to the hinterlands" (1962: 69). A close relationship between teachers and villagers was also important, as community involvement was a crucial aspect of the 1960s educational planning. Yet, from 1964 onwards, these "normal mobile camps" were converted into permanent training centres, located in Kathmandu, Palpa, Pokhara, Dharan, and Birganj (see Joshi 2003: 91ff).

Private Education: Political Battlefields

Private education has played an increasingly important role in the Nepalese educational "landscape". While education was the sole responsibility of the government until 1980, the Education Act 1980 allowed for the operation of private schools. While their number increased modestly during the 1980s, increases were quite significant during the early and mid 1990s. Thus, by now there are about 8,500 private schools, providing educational facilities to about 1.5 million students. Yet, these institutions are highly concentrated, particularly in the Kathmandu valley and in some urban centres of the Terai.

As for instance in Morang and Jhapa (eastern region) and Kanchanpur and Chitwan (western and central region). Private schools are usually associated with two characteristics. Firstly, they have contributed decisively to increasing the quality of education. Thus, their students account for about 80% of the best students in the SLC-examinations (first division), although only 12% of the class 10 students attend private schools (about 24,170 out of 196,953 for 2001; HMG/MOES 2003: 77ff).

Secondly, private schools have been increasingly criticised for charging high, or even "exorbitant" fees (Pokharel 2003: 19). Yet, fees, in a free market economy, are good indicators for several aspects. On the one hand, they are a good indicator of what economists would call "purchasing capacities"; documenting economic capacities of an increasing number of households to "channel" expenditures into education. Closely related expenditures and investments into education are also crucial indicators for social change, documenting a psychological state of affairs, when households chose to spend their earnings in education rather than in other "consumption" sectors. This often implies an underlying assumption that the higher the fees the better the education. Thus, many parents seem to be "willing" to safeguard their children's future by investing up to the maximum of their capacities. This willingness was also encountered in a research study about the labour force engaged in carpet production in the late 1990s. There, many of the labourers with school aged children spent a comparatively high share of their incomes for private education. This type of investment was found to be a most valid proxy variable for the economic well being of the workers, as parents enrolled and un-enrolled their children in private schools according to their current economic capabilities (Granner, forthcoming).

On the other hand, private schools have been critically attacked for turning education into a lucrative business, particularly by the Maoists. Thus, their early 40-point demands handed over to the prime minister in 1996 included that "free and scientific health services and education should be available to all. The commercialisation of education should be stopped" (point 35; quoted from Thapa 2003: 394). Consistent with these ideas, private schools have been targeted. physically attacked. and even closed in many rural areas, and occasionally also in the Kathmandu valley. In order to pressurise schools the Maoist-affiliated "student organisation" (All Nepal National Free Student Union - Revolutionary, ANNFSU-R) imposed a number of strikes upon all types of educational institutions in December 2002, aiming at reducing fees in private schools (see Dhakal 2003b). This finally brought PABSON (Private and Boarding School Organisations of Nepal) to draft an 11-point code of conduct, implemented from January 2003 onwards, which was to reduce fees between 10% (for monthly fees below 500 NRs) and 25% (for fees above 2,000 NRs; ibid.). Later on, the Giri Commission suggested fees between 684 to 1365 NRs, and more recently a
task force suggested 700 NRs as an upper ceiling (Amgai 2004d). In addition, schools may charge extra fees for additional services, as for instance transportation, lunch, computer and swimming facilities, as well as for examinations. Yet, rates may exceed this upper ceiling up to 50% (ibid.).

Thus, it is crucial to point out that education, both in private and government schools, has suffered a severe set-back due to the political instability arising from the Maoist insurgency, which has targeted teachers in particular. Demanding financial “contributions” and redistributing those within the villages may have brought about some applause from the local peasantry during their early “Robin Hood” phase. Yet, they have gone much further later on, by attacking and even killing teachers, particularly since late 2001 (see also SPOTLIGHT 2002b). Some of the most disgusting examples were the cases of Mukti Nath Adhikari from Lamjung in 2002 who was stabbed and hanged in front of his students, and Gyanendra Khatikha who was hacked to death in Sindhupalchok in August 2003 (see Dakal 2004a). These actions are detrimental to education, and the psychological damage for the (young) students is certainly profound. Similarly, the taking of hostages has made school attendance a dangerous pastime.

Many teachers who feel threatened are thus leaving their schools, sometimes after taking official permission from the respective District Education Office. Such actions have left many schools without teachers, and has drastically worsened the already sorry state of teachers’ attendance at government schools. Besides, it is depriving them of their fundamental rights which even the Maoists should acknowledge. Maoist training camps should definitely not be taken as a potential alternative for minors, or otherwise one would have to ignore millions of Chinese youth left educationally devastated during the years of the so-called “cultural revolution” in China. Calls from the UN and guardians’ associations to convert schools into “peace zones” should be taken seriously. Otherwise a dangerous divide could evolve between those who can afford to send their children to neighbouring India and even further abroad and those “left behind” (see below). If overcoming this “educational divide” is really a part of the Maoists’ agenda, then high-quality education has to be facilitated within Nepal, instead of contributing to making it (next to) impossible.

Aiming at Quality Education: (re-)Considering the “Stakeholders”

In 1991, HMG/MOE raised concerns that the country may end up with a five-tier (basic) education system model, i.e. an expatriate model for the affluent, a private model for the less affluent, a public model for the middle class, an out-of-school model for the poor, and no model for the poorest (quoted in NESAC/UNDP 1998: 87). This article has shown that enrolment figures generally seem to confirm this statement. On the other hand, an analysis of primary enrolment figures has also shown that these figures tell a different story. Enrolment figures are much higher than could be solely attributed to middle class children (see Figure 2, above), indicating that the poor, and possibly even the poorest sections of society also send their children to school, for at least two or three years. Thus, the crucial question for policy makers is not how to bring children from these sections to school but how to keep them there. This is not necessarily easier to answer. Low efficiency seems to be a core issue.

When assessing the educational sector and its (lack of) achievements, a number of “stakeholders” need to be addressed and (re-)considered. Certainly the most crucial one is the state. Spending substantial amounts on physical infrastructure has brought schools closer to the potential users and has, thus, minimised reasons for not attending school. On the other hand, this preoccupation with physical targets has ignored many other factors which need to be improved. Providing qualified teachers is certainly a decisive factor, in terms of budget allocations for salaries as well as for training facilities. Unfortunately, the current budget with its freezing of government salaries (HMG/MOF 2004), drastically counteracts this “commitment”. Similarly, qualifications need to be guaranteed, in order to improve the performance of teachers. Above all, qualification rather than party alliance should be a baseline for assignments. In addition, regular trainings, for the sake of training and not for the sake of collecting TA/DAs, need to be offered. In addition, a much stricter monitoring of classroom performance is certainly important (see Dixit 2002: 205).

Similarly, curricula should be comprehensive and relevant, finding suitable compromises between national homogeneity and local variation. The latter aspect also needs to (re-)consider language issues (see also NESAC/UNDP 1998), as mother tongue classes could positively influence students’ attendance, at least in primary classes. Yet, this task is certainly difficult to organise in a country characterised by a mosaic of various culturally and linguistically distinct ethnic groups. One other crucial aspect is to integrate pre-school classes, which constitute an important component of private schools. This will certainly simultaneously decrease the burden of students attending overcrowded first classes and at the same time, will facilitate school-aged (girl) children who then do not need to watch their preschool aged siblings.

Secondly, the role of the state vis-à-vis its citizens need to be reconsidered. This implies both empowering them, but also reminding them about their core responsibilities. Nepal is one of only a few states in the world which has, until today, refrained from introducing compulsory primary education. Yet, in a country where all other policies have failed abysmally, this lack of legislation needs to be reconsidered. Similarly, in a context where many analyses indicate that children are incorporated into the household economy at a primary school age, these “opportunity costs” could be easily
classes, in addition to, and not instead of, an efficient classroom performance. This could bring about a situation where schools are perceived as the jewels of village life, increasing the willingness to let one’s children participate. Closely linked to this, elder students should become model roles for younger students, engaging in educational rather than in the political agendas of student unions.

Parents also need to take up their responsibility vis-à-vis the teachers. Even if only a few of them are qualified to monitor class room performance, monitoring of teachers’ attendance could positively contribute to decentralising education and empowering village communities. This also includes pressurising the government(s) to provide the institutional (and legal) framework for increasing their role, possibly also by providing them (partial) financial autonomy towards the teachers. Such a regulation could bring about a stronger feeling of teachers’ accountability towards the village community, rather than solely being oriented towards the District Education Offices (see also Dixit 2002: 201). The current amendment of the Education Act has contributed towards this end.

The third crucial stakeholders in improving education are the teachers. Representing the state and its policies at the local level, they are the most crucial “interface”. While being trained and paid to deliver education, their actual tasks are much more comprehensive. They need to motivate students to attend classes. In large classes, and when capabilities of strongly vary widely, this can be quite a demanding task. In such cases, tuition classes could help “poorer” students to improve their standing. This aspect is particularly important while preparing for the annual (or term) examinations, where achievements are generally rather weak. In some cases, teachers may also need to motivate parents in order to send their children to school and in some cases, even help to prevent parents from stopping their children attend.

Yet, such a commitment can only be asked for in an atmosphere where teachers enjoy their work and, above all, feel safe. This latter aspect asks for addressing the role of the political parties, the Maoists in particular. Murdering teachers in front of their students is certainly not a way to increase educational standards. It has also fairly little to do with ideology. Similarly, even though teachers’ salaries may be high in comparison to village economies, extorting from teachers is bound to decrease their motivation and, in extreme cases, encourage them to leave the village, leaving behind young students who are in desperate need of education.

A further crucial need from the side of the parents is that there needs to be a wide understanding and solidarity at the village level, providing moral support and, if necessary, also financial assistance to those families where so far education is given a low priority. The provision of free meals could certainly contribute positively to “convincing” parents. Similarly, there needs to be a provision of funds for tuition classes for low-performing students, as wide disparities within classes pose a burden not only for the teachers but also for all fellow students. In addition, parents need to take a much more pro-active role in mobilizing additional internal funds. The government’s commitment to free primary education does not necessarily imply that all expenses can be covered. There should be a willingness from the side of village communities to contribute to school budgets, in financial and/or labour contributions, for poorer households. Such a fund could positively contribute to making schools more attractive for both students and teachers, and the latter could upgrade their meager salaries by offering efficient tuition fees, in addition to, and not instead of, an efficient classroom performance. This could bring about a situation where schools are perceived as the jewels of village life, increasing the willingness to let one’s children participate. Closely linked to this, elder students should become model roles for younger students, engaging in educational rather than in the political agendas of student unions.

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from the Maoists in areas under their control, outlining "codes of conduct" for both government and private schools, and these need to be strictly adhered to and monitored. If such changes are brought about, then private education can gradually become obsolete, and free education will no longer imply "an excuse to provide below-standard education" (Dixit 2002: 206), where parents are asked to compromise on the quality of their children's education (ibid.).

References


2001c. "Poor Examination Results. Who Is To Blame For Poor Results?" Spotlight (August 1), 16.


Appendix 1

Table A1: Framework for General as well as Gender-related Institutions, Policies and Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Framework</th>
<th>General Policies and Legislations</th>
<th>Education-related Policies/Laws, Institutions and Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rana period (1846-1950)</td>
<td>Muluki Ain (1854)</td>
<td>National Education Plan (1954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muluki Ain (11th amendment, 2002)</td>
<td>Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP) 1992-1998 (First Phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women Education Unit (Min. of Education, 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP) 1999-2004 (Second Phase)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education Act, 8th Amendment (2002)</td>
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</tbody>
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Graber 2004 (compiled from various sources)

Appendix 2

Table A1: Numbers of Boy and Girl Students for (1980-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[in 1,000]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Boy Students</td>
<td>2,352</td>
<td>2,747</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1,821</td>
<td>2,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (class 1-5)</td>
<td>1,811</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>1,726</td>
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<td>Class 1 only</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>606</td>
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<tr>
<td>Classes 2-5</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>1,120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Classes 6-10</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
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</table>