SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION IN JAPAN: POLICY CHALLENGE FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE CIVIL SOCIETY

Kiyoshi Abe
Akira Furukawa
Kenji Kosaka

Concepts of social exclusion and inclusion

Significance of the concept of social exclusion: In the age of globalization, both underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries face serious socio-political problems. Of course, the specific features of those problems differ among regions and countries, but common trends characterize the troubles and suffering that many people face under runaway globalization.

Recently, the concept of “social exclusion” has attracted great interest in the field of sociology and its broader related disciplines (e.g., social work, social policy studies, criminology, surveillance studies). Although there is no single accepted definition of social exclusion, and the policy implications of research on social inclusion tend to differ by field, the general idea of inclusion/exclusion is becoming common conceptual ground for social scientific investigations aimed at clarifying the mechanisms that cause socio-political problems in contemporary globalized societies.

For example, David Byrne’s four-volume collection Social Exclusion (part of the “Critical Concepts in Sociology” series published by Routledge) discusses how and why the concept of social exclusion has become regarded as so significant to sociological inquiry today. The academic coverage of the book is very wide, and the socio-political issues discussed in each volume of the series span a great variety of topics. Although one could get the impression that almost any socio-political problem can be considered a form of social exclusion in the broader sense of inequality, the construct must be viewed in the context of the structural problems of contemporary societies.

Why has this concept become so popular in social scientific investigations? One reason is that the rapid spread of globalization has brought about or accentuated scores of social problems in both underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries. Certainly, the problem of social exclusion is not new. In fact, it is considered one of the most serious problems facing advanced societies, especially where the ideal of equality (in both opportunity and outcome) is politically sought after. However, with the global hegemony of neoliberalism, which defines freedom only in terms of...
opportunity, social exclusion and disparity seem to be increasing dramatically at a global scale.

Another reason that the concept of social exclusion has become popular is that it provides a critical lens to assess contemporary societies. In other words, the concept is not only descriptive and analytical, but also normative for research on social problems. It can facilitate both the scientific analysis and normative critique of the globalized world, and thus is likely to remain as a significant tool for social scientific investigation.

*Social inclusion as a policy agenda:* It seems that the concept of social exclusion can be used as a springboard for policy intervention backed by social scientific research. Sociological investigations that analyze exclusion clarify the conditions of those who are excluded from society, and thus open a dialogue on what policies may be needed to lessen hardship and improve the well-being of those people. Although how and to what extent such people are considered excluded differs depending on the political standpoints of researchers, any research on social exclusion will inevitably have policy implications. In this sense, academic discussion of social exclusion may be linked to political intervention via socio-economic policies.

The role of social scientific research and investigation (how and to what extent it should shape actual policy) has long been a point of contention. Some say that academic activity should be kept separate from the political process to maintain independence from political or economic influences. Others insist that a much closer relationship or partnership between academia and policymaking would be indispensable to social investigators to fulfill their professional role. It may be impossible to resolve this controversy on a philosophical or epistemological dimension, but surely the two camps could be bridged to find a middle ground that guarantees scientific autonomy while at the same time it contributes to socio-economic policy that improves society. Insofar as research based on the concept of social exclusion keeps a critical and normative commitment to improving society, such investigations should produce important suggestions or instructions for policy makers (e.g., by helping to identify which social policies are needed and desirable to make society more inclusive). Still, the link between academia and politics concerning social exclusion/inclusion should always be monitored.

**State of social exclusion in Japan**

*Homeless people in Japan:* The presence of homeless people has attracted public attention, and it is recognized as a serious socio-economic problem in
Japan. According to statistical data published by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan has 16,018 homeless people as of January 2008. However, this number is based on visual observations by researchers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and non-profit organizations (NPOs) that support homeless people criticize this method and insist that the number of homeless people is much higher than is reported by the administration each year (Kariya 2006). Although governmental reports claim that the total number of homeless people in each prefecture has decreased since 2003, a great number of people still live on the streets in Japan.

Since the Japanese economy entered a long-term recession in the mid-1990s, the presence of homeless people in urban areas of Japan, especially in Osaka and Tokyo, has risen drastically. From a social scientific perspective, this seems attributable to the economic depression and a malfunctioning policy of social security, and it suggests the need to enact a welfare policy for these excluded people. However, the general public’s perception of (and media discourse about) the homeless problem is quite different. Under the prevailing neoliberal ideology of self-choice and self-responsibility, the perceived main cause of the rising number of homeless people is their lack of ability to work (i.e., laziness, undisciplined mentality). This prevalent public sentiment in a sense legitimizes the exclusion of these people from society. In this way, homeless people are considered responsible for their difficult socioeconomic situations, rather than the victims of a dysfunctional social structure.

The visibility of homeless people in big cities such as Osaka and Tokyo compelled the government and local administrations to face the issue. However, efforts to date have not focused on how to include homeless people in society but rather on how to quell public fear of and disgust for these people and keep public parks clean and safe where many homeless people live.

Although the Japanese economy began to recover in early 2000 and has since experienced the longest period of economic boom since the end of World War II, the number of homeless people has increased. This suggests that this issue cannot be resolved solely by economic growth, and the increasing rate of homelessness may be related to the mechanisms of socio-political exclusion functioning in contemporary Japanese society.

Administrative treatment of non-nationals living in Japan: In March 2009, a case of enforced repatriation of a Philippine family attracted public attention.
(Asahi Newspaper, March 10, 2009). In that case, a married couple was forced to return to the Philippines because they had illegally overstayed in Japan for about 18 years. Although they had asked the Japanese government for special permission for residence as foreigners, which is issued based on the judgment of the Minister of Law, only their 13-year-old daughter was allowed to stay in the country\(^5\). Public opinion appeared sympathetic toward the family because the parents and daughter became separated against their will. However, at the same time, the result was considered legally just and fair because the family did not have legal status, and the daughter was not a Japanese national (even though she was born and raised in Japan). The majority of the public seems to think that, although the situation was sad and severe, the family did not deserve the legal right of residence because they are not Japanese nationals.

It is informative to compare this case to another case concerning the nationality of Philippine children in Japan. In June 2008, the Supreme Court of Japan made a decision to recognize the children of an unmarried couple, a Japanese male and a Philippine female, as Japanese nationals (Asahi Newspaper, June 5, 2008). Compared to this case, although the juridical points of the two cases are different, the 2009 case of enforced repatriation seems legally too strict and authoritarian to people who feel sympathy for the Philippine family separated by the decision of the immigration office. These two cases demonstrate what Japanese nationality means in the legal system, who are to be recognized as Japanese nationals, and who are to be given the right of residence in Japan. Although Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan declares that, "[a]ll of the people are equal under the law," from the viewpoint of juridical procedure "all" is often interpreted as those who have Japanese nationality. Therefore, the Philippine-Japanese children given Japanese nationality in 2008 can enjoy full citizenship rights in Japan, while the other Philippine child, whose parents were both Filipino, is not legally recognized as a Japanese national (even though she was born in Japan) and will have limited legal rights.

**Administrative and political actions taken to address social exclusion**

*Policy of supporting homeless people:* Although homelessness can often be attributed to individual self-responsibility, which is a cliché of neoliberalism, the rising visibility of homeless people compelled the government and local administration to implement policies aimed at addressing the problem\(^6\). In 2002, the Japanese government issued a special measure to encourage homeless people to get jobs and earn money. The law established the “Shelter
for Homeless People" and the "Center for Supporting Homeless People." Although the aim of the shelter is to provide this basic necessity, the objective of the center is to help a homeless person get a job and begin a normal life. The basic philosophy of these policies, as often pointed out in studies on homelessness, is the idea of "workfare" rather than "welfare."

Certainly, this special measure can be viewed as a policy that creates opportunities for homeless people to get jobs and recover their livelihood. However, at the same time, the law seems to create an excluded group of people who cannot work or are reluctant to work (e.g., those who suffer mental or physical disease). As we pointed out earlier, homelessness cannot be solved solely by economic policy. Therefore, to appropriately include these people in society, both economic and welfare policies are indispensable. However, this special measure is excessively market-oriented. For those with sufficient ability and will to work as employees in the labor market, the center could be utilized as an institutionalized step toward recovering a normal life. However, for those who cannot work or are reluctant to reenter the labor market, this policy is repressive instead of supportive in that they are forced into the labor market despite their inability to work.

Juridical judgment of people who illegally overstay in Japan: In March 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan established the program "Multicultural Japan" (Tabunka Kyousei Puroguramu). Since then, many local governments and administrations have implemented policies related to the program. Considering the postwar ideology of the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of Japanese society, this program is a slight but significant step toward a more ethnically and culturally open society.

Still, it is apparent that how and to what extent one can enjoy citizenship in modern Japanese society depends heavily on whether or not one has status as a Japanese national. A Japanese national can have full rights of citizenship, whereas others cannot. Although the legal, political, and social content of such rights given to citizens might not be satisfactory, judged from the viewpoint of ideal citizenship (Marshall 1964), the entitlement to citizenship rights is formally guaranteed to every Japanese. In other words, non-nationals can enjoy only limited citizenship, even if they are born and raised in Japan. The long-lasting debate over the political right of Korean residents in Japan to vote demonstrates this point very prominently.

The second and third generations of Korean residents were born in Japan and brought up in Japanese culture. It is said that many of them cannot even
speak the Korean language, as they have lived in every way like a Japanese person. They pay taxes and obey the law. Yet, they have almost no right to participate in national or local elections (a few local governments, such as Maibara-cho in Shiga Prefecture, gave foreign residents the right to vote in a local referendum in 2002, although the scope of political topics covered was restricted). Some political parties are keen to give local election rights to Korean residents, but others, such as the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, are strongly against such a political movement and claim that it threatens the very essence of Japanese nationality. Instead of giving Korean residents a very restricted right to vote, some argue that the most legally legitimate and desirable way for non-nationals to participate in politics would be for them to abandon their original nationalities and apply anew for Japanese nationality. This may in some ways represent a more inclusive system of political participation, but it is based on giving foreigners Japanese nationality rather than reforming the election system and legislation regarding political participation, and it is far from the concept of a multicultural Japan. Rather, it can be understood as a contemporary version of a nationalistic assimilation policy in that it is naively assumed that those who are given Japanese nationality should behave like ordinary Japanese.

Policies of social inclusion and exclusion

Social inclusion in the market and state: A typical social inclusion policy used to combat homelessness is to encourage excluded individuals or groups to get jobs and earn money in order to live a "normal" life. The aim of such "market-oriented inclusion policies" is to support independent living by bringing excluded people into the labor market. However, those who cannot or are reluctant to work as paid employees are stigmatized as disabled people for whom paternalistic medical care is needed (in such cases, they are no longer treated as independent citizens) or as lazy homeless people who are responsible for exacerbating the socio-economic situation they face. Ironically, due to this stigmatization, the policy intended to foster social inclusion in fact excludes some homeless people not only from the labor market, but also from the administrative policy itself.

According to the traditional idea of social welfare policy, which became dominant in the postwar period in many Western developed countries, even if one cannot earn money to make a living, one should be included in society via public support, which is to be supplied by the social security system. Such social welfare policy can be understood as a consequence of the antagonism between capitalism and socialism in the first half of the twentieth
century. The political concept of social welfare is that the state should make the society as inclusive as possible through redistribution of economic and material resources.

However, under the hegemony of neoliberalism in contemporary advanced societies, which aims to negate the welfare state, the inclusion policy based on the ideal of social welfare seems to be fading rapidly (Harvey 2005). Moreover, in security-obsessed surveillance societies, the policy targets of social welfare (e.g., homeless people, single mothers, ethnic minority groups) can easily be stigmatized with a negative public image that they are nothing but a public burden for whom public money must be spent, or a public enemy against whom security measures must be tightened (Young 1999). In the political and social regime of neoliberalism, the social welfare policy is easily marginalized or refuted by politicians and the public alike. Although it seems apparent that the neoliberal inclusion policy oriented toward the labor market cannot resolve the homeless problem sufficiently, it is nonetheless considered a feasible political option for coping with social exclusion. Therefore, even if the market-oriented inclusion policy brings about newly excluded groups of people, this can be legitimized as the due result of these individuals’ choices.

The recent juridical decisions and procedures concerning the entitlement of Japanese nationality discussed above show that the socio-political conditions required for full inclusion in society are guaranteed only for Japanese nationals. In other words, as long as one is legally recognized as a due member of the Japanese state, s/he is included in the society in which s/he lives. This could be called a “state-oriented inclusion policy.”

It may seem legally reasonable, in principle, to grant the constitutional right of residence automatically to Japanese nationals and only in special cases to others. According to this logic, a foreigner who is eager to stay longer in Japan should abandon his or her original nationality and apply anew for Japanese nationality. However, such legal reasoning certainly excludes ethnic minority groups such as Korean residents in Japan who were born and raised and have been living in the country as due citizens, and yet have not been given the right to participate in national or local politics. Indeed, this has led to protests against this discriminatory policy.

These recent decisions regarding the rights of residents and nationals demonstrate the unchanging principle of Japanese government that regards inclusion into the state as the basic objective of the constitutional state. In the case of the Supreme Court’s decision to give Japanese nationality to the children of an unmarried Japanese/Philippine couple, both the media
discourse and the NPO that supported the family welcomed the court's judgment. However, the ruling and its public celebration must have been embarrassing and/or threatening to foreign residents without Japanese nationality. If it is assumed by the larger public that having Japanese nationality is the indispensable condition for residents in Japan to have full citizenship, including the political right to vote, non-nationals might feel compelled to change their nationality to be included in Japanese society. Regardless of the government's intentions, the court's judgment and the administration's legal procedures regarding the recognition and entitlement of Japanese nationality seem to function as a powerful mechanism against including all residents in Japan into the state.

Unintended consequences of social inclusion policy: As discussed in the previous sections, the Japanese government and local administrations have tried to cope with problems of social exclusion through policies and institutions. Certainly, their social inclusion policies seem to remedy the socio-economic or socio-political problems caused by social exclusion. However, at the same, they risk excluding others from society. Here we consider the contradictory character of the social inclusion policy from the viewpoint of "unintended consequences," as discussed by R. K. Merton (1957) and R. Boudon (1982).

In the case of homelessness, the special measure to support independent living aims to transform people without jobs but with the will to work ("job-seekers") into good employees in the labor market (turning welfare into "workfare"). It is not easy to determine which policy (welfare or workfare) is more effective and desirable, but the fact remains that implementing the workfare type social policy causes the emergence of a newly excluded group of people, namely those that are unable to work (Handler 2004). This is, it can be assumed, a typical example of an unintended consequence in Merton's sense. Similarly, in the Japanese nationality cases, the state-oriented inclusion policy inevitably excludes non-nationals born, raised, and still living in Japan. Thus, both policies of inclusion have had unintended consequences. If the ideal underlying the policy of social inclusion is to make the socio-economic conditions as inclusive as possible for all residents of society, this phenomenon should be critically reconsidered from the viewpoint of not only feasibility but also desirability.

One reason inclusion policies may cause unintended exclusions is the absence of a sufficient concept of inclusion when making and implementing social policies. Certainly, inclusion in the market and state are indispensable
conditions for people to enjoy the rights of citizenship guaranteed by the Japanese constitution. However, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for social inclusion. To realize a more inclusive society, which is one of the most important ideals in the Constitution of Japan, the necessary and sufficient conditions for social inclusion must be reconsidered. To engage in such theoretical and practical tasks as envisioning the potential of a more inclusive Japanese society, one must pay close attention not only to market-economic and state-political conditions but also to civil-social ones. That is, to realize the ideal of its constitution, Japanese society should become as inclusive as possible for all people, ideally including not only nationals but also non-nationals.

**Policy task for the realization of the universal ideal of the Constitution of Japan**

The ideal of “all people” manifested in the Constitution of Japan: To include both non-nationals and nationals in society, we need a different conception of social inclusion from those discussed above. For this purpose, the Constitution of Japan seems to suggest a multitude of philosophical and political insights (Sakai 2008). Conservative nationalists of postwar Japan have long complained that the constitution was not written and enacted at Japan’s initiative; rather, the country was compelled by the occupying powers to create the document. Therefore, they argue, the constitution should be rewritten for the nation to be truly independent and sovereign. It is true that the present constitution was established as a consequence of the country’s defeat in World War II and the concomitant occupational policy led by the United States. However, here we will focus not on “who” made the constitution but “what” was achieved by implementing it in the postwar era.

As is well known, the basic ideal of the Constitution of Japan is international peace and the renunciation of war, as declared in Article 9, which states that, “[a]spiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” While the constitution is effective in affirming Japanese sovereignty, studies of law and constitutions often point out that such principles are universally applicable and valid for all human. For example, the constitution declares the significance of human rights in Article 11, which states that, “[t]he People shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights.” The importance of human rights has recently attracted worldwide attention in the age of globalization.
The words "all people" often appear in the Constitution of Japan. For example, Article 25, which guarantees the right to livelihood for individuals, states that, "[a]ll people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living." It is reasonable to interpret "all people" as meaning "all Japanese nationals" because the constitution was written to affirm Japan's sovereignty. Indeed, regarding all people as all Japanese nationals seems to be taken for granted when the constitution is discussed. However, we dare to insist that such an interpretation risks restricting the universal potential of the Constitution of Japan. In other words, as long as we interpret the meaning of all people in a conventional way, we might miss the true ideal embodied in the constitution.

For us to reassess the universal potential of the constitution, it seems indispensable to interrogate how and to what extent its universalism was restricted by the implementation of exclusionary policies. However painful it may be, learning from the history of the Constitution of Japan in the postwar period will give us suggestions for envisioning a more inclusive Japanese society.

According to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed in San Francisco in 1951, postwar Japan has recovered its sovereignty. However, in this process of Japan's returning to the international community, the ideal of all people was betrayed. At the time of implementing the Treaty, the former Korean and Chinese residents in Japan, who were considered members of the Empire of Japan during wartime and were given Japanese nationality, were robbed of their Japanese nationality without having an opportunity to choose a nationality (Japanese or Korean, Japanese or Chinese). As a result, those Korean and Chinese people who decided to stay in Japan after 1953 were put into excluded socio-political positions where they could not enjoy the rights that the constitution guaranteed because they were no longer considered Japanese nationals. As far as one assumes the narrow conception of the constitution, where the sovereign state should be responsible only for its nationals, this legal and administrative treatment of Korean and Chinese residents in Japan could be legitimized as completely legal. However, if we adhere to the universal ideal of the Constitution of Japan, it must be concluded that not granting Japanese nationality to Korean and Chinese residents in Japan and excluding them from the state amounts to self-deception about the ideal embedded in the constitution.

As we mentioned in Sections 2 and 3, contemporary Japanese society has still not fully realized the universal potential of the Constitution of Japan. It is apparent that the life circumstances of the people newly excluded through the
enactment of the policy supporting independent living for homeless people are far from "the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living" guaranteed by the constitution. Here we can see the insufficiency of the Constitution of Japan in practice. Even if it is ideal and brilliant in guaranteeing the rights of all people, the actual functioning of state institutions, governmental policies, and administrative procedures are far from this ideal.

Recognizing this reality of contemporary Japanese society could cause one to be disappointed and lose hope in the political feasibility and desirability of the constitution. However, it is in the contradictory relationship between the ideal of the constitution and the reality of policy where we can discern the liberating potential for realizing the universal ideal and resist the static and nationalistic interpretation of "all people."

The concept of dialectical imagination for the Constitution of Japan
As discussed in Section 4, the dominant legal and administrative actions taken to address exclusion have been the implementation of policies that foster inclusion into the market and the state. Through these policies, excluded groups are categorized into the dichotomies such as "industrious job seekers"/"lazy homeless" and "Japanese nationals with rights of residence"/"non-nationals without rights of residence." These categories based on policy objectives thus include some people in the market and the state but exclude others. As pointed out earlier, the recent inclusion policies in Japan that inevitably exclude new groups of people seem to have a strong affinity with the ideology of neoliberalism in that the resultant socio-economic exclusion is legitimized as the consequence of the self-choice and self-responsibility of individuals. Certainly, the neoliberal policy of social inclusion is very realistic and strategic in that it encourages as many people as possible to become due members of the labor market. Policy encourages excluded people to get jobs so that they can survive the harsh conditions they face. Such a realistic orientation might be one reason why social policies based on a neoliberal philosophy are supported and even welcomed by a majority of people, in spite of the miserable outcome of such policies all over the world.

However, when we remember the ideal of the Constitution of Japan, the social inclusion policy of neoliberalism desperately lacks the universal ideal of "all people." The realism and strategy of neoliberalism easily legitimizes the fact that some people are excluded from both the market and the state. Although those who are excluded are certainly members of "all people."
judging from the viewpoint of the universal ideal of the constitution, they are in fact neither regarded nor respected as a due part of all people. Thus, the more political power and populist support that neoliberal social policies gain, the more this ideal of all people promised by the constitution will be diminished. If this is the current state of social exclusion and inclusion in Japan, then how can we revitalize the universalism of the Constitution of Japan?

Conclusion: Toward the necessary and sufficient condition for the inclusion of all people
As a concluding remark, we would like to point out the importance of “dialectical imagination” when considering not only the strategic but also the ideal policy tasks of the constitution. Certainly, for people to have a constitution, the state that addresses the national constitution is indispensable. Without a political entity that represents the people, the constitution cannot function. However, if the state dominates and appropriates the constitution, a crisis emerges with regard to the fading universal and cosmopolitan ideals embodied in the constitution. We now see such phenomena not only in Japan but also in other countries. This can be called a crisis of the constitution in its idealistic dimension.

To prevent state- and market-type logic, which is paramount in the policies of neoliberalism, from exhausting the universal and liberating potential of the constitution, we have to cling to the ideal of a society that includes all people. Insofar as the state can establish a constitution that declares the rights of the people, the universal ideal of all people can be realistic in society. In this sense, the political presence of the state might be a necessary condition for realizing a society that includes all people. However, that society should and can react to - and, in some cases, resist - the state when it violates the human rights guaranteed by the constitution. Here, we can see the dialectic between the constitutional state and civil society. As long as this dialectical relationship is vital and energetic, we can still have hope for realizing a more inclusive society for all people. In other words, if the contradictory relationship between the state and civil society perishes, the liberating potential of the constitution will be difficult to achieve.

Therefore, it is extraordinarily important for those of us who would like to cling to the ideal of the Constitution of Japan and at the same time seek social policy oriented toward a more inclusive society to maintain a dialectical imagination when discussing the tasks of the Constitution. The
state is necessary for a constitution to be effective, but it is not sufficient for realizing the ideal of the constitution.

Writing a constitution is indeed indispensable in the struggle to create an inclusive society for all. However, without the convivial civil society that reacts to and resists the state, the constitution might as well be nothing but empty articles.

Notes
1. The main text of the present paper was drafted by Abe, and the technical note was written by Kosaka. However, the concepts presented in this paper as a whole are the products of intensive academic discussion among the three authors, which focused on several topics concerning social exclusion and inclusion, the relationship between the constitutional state and civil society, and policy tasks for realizing a more inclusive society in Asian areas.


3. The number of homeless people in Japan decreased between 2003 and 2008, from 25,296 in 2003 to 18,564 in 2007 and 16,018 in 2008. It is expected, however, that the number may have increased drastically since the end of 2008 in parallel with the increase in unemployment caused by the latest worldwide financial recession, although the formal statistics have not yet been disclosed.

4. Some people living on the streets may own houses of their own but live as homeless to avoid loan sharks to whom they are unable to repay debts because of dismissals or layoffs, typically resulting from the nationwide
bursting of the economic bubble in the early 1990s and the occurrence of the Great Hanshin Earthquake in Hyogo Prefecture.

5. The reason the 13-year-old daughter was permitted to stay in Japan is that the immigration office considered a guideline that the Minister of Justice released in 2006. The guidelines outlining conditions for special permission of residence provide an exception "in case one has settled down in Japan, and it is difficult to live in one's mother country."

6. According to statistical data released by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistical Bureau, Director General for Policy Planning & Statistical Research and Training Institute, the percentage of unemployment in Japan changed from 2.9% in 1994 to 3.4% in 1995, from 3.5% in 1997 to 4.4% in 1998, and from 4.8% in 2000 to 5.4% in 2001. These data indicate how serious the problem of unemployment has been since 1995. We can see that at the time the policy for homeless people was implemented most of them were unemployed.

7. The political situation concerning the relationship between the rights of residence, the right to vote, and the nationality of Korean residents in Japan should not be considered only on the level of law and administration. It seems that those who insist on rejecting the right of Korean residents to participate in politics in Japan fear the potential takeover of Japanese politics, or more correctly the National Polity (Kokutai), by the Korean people. Judging from the social and political scientific viewpoints, that scenario is unrealistic. However, at an irrational and sentimental level (instead of at a rational level of law and legislation), an ungrounded fear of and disgust for Korean people may persist in contemporary Japanese society. The phenomenon is closely related to Japan's colonization of Korea before the end of World War II.

8. We take the term "dialectical imagination" from Martin Jay's work on the Frankfurt School (Jay, 1973). His way of discussing the topics in the book is both descriptive and normative. Historical investigation of the traditions of the Frankfurt School gives us rich suggestions for envisioning a more rational society in the future. The title of his book, Dialectical Imagination, promises, we believe, a means of sociological endeavor that aims to intervene in the irrational (in our context, "exclusive") society in which we live.

9. The concept of "civil society" has attracted both academic and political interest since the end of the Cold War. As the ideological confrontation between the Western and Eastern blocks disappeared with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political potential
of civil society came to be reassessed. Cohen and Arato's book *Civil Society and Political Theory* is a typical endeavor that tried to shed new light on the liberating potential of civil society, tracing the political and philosophical discourse about the conditions of historical civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1992). Habermas is also a prominent proponent who regards the existence of civil society as the indispensable condition for democracy to fully function (Habermas 1989, 1996). We basically agree with the political stance of these Western theories of civil society. However, we should not forget that the historical traditions and the present situations upon which the discourse about civil society focuses are mainly European and not Asian ones. Therefore, it is indispensable to non-Western academics to claim the Western ideal of civil society on the one hand, but try to reinvent it considering the present socio-political conditions of Asian societies on the other. With this dual task in mind, it seems very important to interrogate both the conditions and the potential of a civil society for all people in the non-Western historical–political contexts in which we live. In this respect, we emphasize the significance of the ideal of "all people" in Asian areas, an ideal that should embrace not only the wealthy and educated but also the poor and illiterate. For the social sphere of civil society to be a sufficient condition for realizing an inclusive society for all people, it must overcome the dividing lines of race, ethnicity, language, and religion that are prevalent in Asian areas.

**Theoretical Notes**

**Overview**

Social exclusion and inclusion are seen everywhere from early times to modern times; hence they are universal phenomena both as state-spaces and as processes. The following discourse delineates a general conceptual framework for examining social exclusion and inclusion that can be applied to any corner of the globe at any point in historical time. Here, the basic framework is based on the ideas of Peter Blau (1977) and Thomas J. Fararo (1989), although these authors were not entirely conscious of their applicability to problems of social exclusion and inclusion.

Related topics of social exclusion/inclusion may well be captured along the lines of the social differentiation, both horizontal and vertical, of social structure: heterogeneity and inequality. People are socially excluded with respect to or deprived of some sort of resource such as associations, opportunities, outcomes, information, and so on. Let us take a simple hypothetical constellation of ten actors, say, eight Whites and two Blacks,
with different marked characteristics with respect to some parameters of, say, race, who are living in a given geographic area that is not necessarily a legitimate territory demarcated by a given state (Fig. 1).

The outer demarcation delineates a geographical area, which is given at the beginning of the discussion, within which another line represents an internal demarcation intended to include only the eight Whites. The two Blacks are excluded by this demarcation, although they are living within the outer demarcation that we call "society." Thus, the two Blacks are actually living within the society, but they are excluded from the inner domain. The intended demarcation of the inner circle may or may not represent the nation-state in its modern sense. It may be a market or a fuzzy open system. It may be visible or invisible to those involved. It is an "intended" demarcation, but we do not know explicitly who intends to demarcate it as shown in the figure because social phenomena are full of "unintended consequences."

We call the existing mode of (inner) demarcation "existing policy." Thus, in Figure 1, under the existing policy, eight actors are included and two
are excluded. A policy change may occur in the future for instance, so that one of the two Blacks comes to be included in the inner circle. The process of a policy change is shown simply by an arrow in Figure 1. Once a policy change happens, the constellation of actors changes. One of the Blacks is now in the inner circle. Then, within the inner circle, nine actors are homogeneous in terms of resources allocated, no matter how different they look. Figure 2 shows the implications of such a policy change and its consequences. The outer geographical demarcation remains quite the same as before. Because one of the two black circles in Figure 1 is now included in the inner domain, the nine actors now shown as white squares in Figure 2 are regarded and treated as homogeneous. One of the black circles remains outside the inner demarcation. It is to be noted that the mode, hence the underlying principle, of the inner demarcation is now changed, as is shown by the shape of the inner demarcation.

As this primitive presentation implies policy, i.e., the nature of inner demarcation, and the constellation of actors that results as a consequence of social inclusion/exclusion are linked.
Parameters
In the above fictitious example, we used race as a demarcating criterion for simplicity. But after the policy change, race is no longer the working criterion because one Black is included in the inner circle and the other Black remains excluded from the circle within the society. The demarcating criterion is now race plus, say, money or geographic area, depending on the (less visible) difference between the two Blacks. If money were used as the additional criterion of inclusion, and the poor were excluded, a new criterion would determine that nine white or black rich people are within and one poor black person is outside the inner demarcation.

Blau calls such a collection of possible criteria or dimensions parameters of social structure, which he categorizes into two basic types: nominal and graduated. A copy of an illustration he shows (Blau 1977: 8) follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Parameters</th>
<th>Graduated Parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Affiliation</td>
<td>Prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Socioeconomic Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Work</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Residence</td>
<td>Administrative Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Origin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from these lists, nominal parameters differentiate people on a nominal scale and are categorical and not ranked, whereas graduated parameters differentiate people on an ordinal scale and classify actors by rank order. Each individual can be socially characterized in terms of some parameter or combination of parameters. The list is not comprehensive; it is an empirically open question how many groups (for nominal parameters) or status (for graduated parameters) can be distinguished within a historically determined time and space.
**Heterogeneity and Inequality**

Social structure is differentiated according to those parameters. Heterogeneity refers to a horizontal differentiation that involves the distribution of a population among groups based on a nominal parameter. On the other hand, inequality is a vertical differentiation that refers to status distribution in terms of a graduated parameter.

Heterogeneity is determined by the probability that a pair of randomly chosen actors in the population/society (circumscribed by the outer demarcation in the above figure) are in distinct groups as determined by their position on a given parameter. The measure of heterogeneity, denoted by $H$, is defined as:

$$H = 1 - \sum p_i^2,$$

where $p_i$ is the proportion of group $i$ ($i = 1, 2, \ldots, k$).

In the above example in Figure 1, $H = 1 - \{(0.8)^2 + (0.2)^2\} = 0.32$. Note that the maximum possible value of $H$ is 0.5 for the case where $p_1 = p_2 = 0.5$.

The baseline assumption concerning heterogeneity is that heterogeneity promotes intergroup relations and lessens overall insulation from intergroup contacts.

Insulation is defined as the ratio of those who do not have associations to those who belong to groups other than their own group. When a society is dichotomous, that is, divided into only two groups on a given parameter, the insulation of the majority group (e.g., Whites in Fig. 1) is likely to be greater than that of the minority group (e.g., Blacks in Fig. 1). The difference in insulation between the majority and minority group is determined under the assumption of randomness of intergroup relations.

If we manage to include one of the Blacks in the inner group, as shown in Figure 2, then the new $H$ after the policy change is 0.18 ($H = 1 - \{(0.9)^2 + (0.1)^2\} = 0.18$), reflecting a decrease in heterogeneity. This also implies that, under a new policy of inclusion, overall insulation is likely to increase. Thus, we see a paradox of inclusion: Inclusion decreases heterogeneity and is likely to increase overall insulation within the outer demarcation. The present version of this paradox is no more than a version of the more general paradox of inclusion: “positive acts of inclusion necessarily result in exclusion” (Handler, 2004: 8).

Fararo (1989) adds a new relevant notion to the concept of heterogeneity: relation heterogeneity, denoted by $H_R$. $H_R$ is the probability that a pair of actors in the relation are in distinct institutional groups as defined by a given parameter. Just as $H$ is defined with reference to the
population, $H_R$ is defined with reference to ties. The relationship between $H$ and $H_R$ is expressed as follows:

$$H_R = (1 - \tau)H,$$

where $\tau$ is the homophily bias parameter. See Fararo (1989: 291) for the derivation. Intuitively, the homophily bias means that Whites associate only with Whites, whereas Blacks associate only with Blacks. When this homophily bias parameter is zero, heterogeneity and relation heterogeneity become the same. When the homophily bias parameter approaches unity, $H_R$ approaches zero. Inclusion decreases the relation heterogeneity and is also likely to increase overall insulation within the outer demarcation.

The salience, denoted by $S$, of a given parameter is more directly captured by the difference between $H$ and $H_R$ as follows:

$$S = H - H_R = \tau H$$

The greater the homophily bias is, the greater the salience is; conversely, the greater the heterogeneity is, the greater the salience is.

The notion of heterogeneity is coupled with the notion of inequality, which is measured by the conventional statistics of the Gini coefficient, denoted by $G$, given by:

$$G = E(D)/2E(X),$$

where $E(D)$ is the average difference between every pair of members of the population with respect to the amount of the resources they have, and $E(X)$ is the average computed with respect to that distribution of differences. Similar to the case of $H$ and $H_R$, $G_R$ is suggested by Fararo (1989) to express the inequality in relations. As before, we get:

$$G_R = (1 - \tau)G$$

$$S = G - G_R = \tau G.$$

We are interested in possible changes in $G$ and $G_R$ caused by a policy change of inclusion, which is partly subject to empirical assessment of the constellation and distribution of resources among actors, and is partly to be determined theoretically.

The concept of the “inclusion of all people,” addressed in the main text, represents the inclusion of all actors within the outer demarcation, that is, the simultaneous inclusion of eight Whites and two Blacks in Figure 1 or the inclusion of nine white squares and one black square in the inner domain in Figure 2. A new policy would form a different type of inner demarcation by leaving no one outside the circle.

A more important problem, both theoretical and empirical, is to query the relationship between “exclusion by heterogeneity” and “exclusion by inequality.” Here, we implicitly assume that associational exclusion and
exclusion in terms of formal entitlement is generated in line with heterogeneity (and insulation). In this situation, those who are located below a given poverty line are excluded from a society as a group, as are those whose social standing or relations consign them to low status when an index of disparity or inequality in $G$ and $G_R$ surpasses a given level. In reality, however, those who are excluded often embody two different dimensions of heterogeneity and inequality. For example, the two Blacks in Figure 1, who are naturally and originally discerned as comprising a group in terms of a nominal parameter, may be exploited and located lower/higher with regard to a given graduated parameter. Here, heterogeneity and inequality are obviously intertwined, but in a parallel way. A much more complicated situation would result when heterogeneity and inequality are intertwined in a crosscutting way, as was anticipated in Figure 2. Perhaps a practical strategy and way to see a complex of exclusion that is generated by both heterogeneity and inequality is to first identify a constellation of actors in terms of heterogeneity and then to measure the degree of inequality with regard to a given graduated parameter of interest from, say, a policy-making standpoint.

Acknowledgment
The present work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences (JSPS), KAKENHI: 20330114, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) for the project on ‘Re-distribution of global wealth and the increase of subjective well-being,’ with Kenji Kosaka as Project Leader.

References


