CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

REVIEW ARTICLE
Oral Epic Poetry in the Central Himalayas (Garhwal and Kumaon):
Claus Peter Zoller ........................................ 1

TOPICAL REPORT
Higher Education and Liberal Values in Nepal: Dipak Raj Pant ............. 8
An Introduction to the Fortifications of Central Nepal: Neil Howard ....... 20

INTERVIEW
'Nepalese in origin but Bhutanese first'. A Conversation with Bhim Subba and
Om Dhungel (Human Rights Organization of Bhutan): Michael Hutt and
Gregory Sharkey ........................................... 32

ARCHIVES
The Himalayan Collection of the "Völkerkundemuseum der Universität Zürich"
(Ethnological Museum of the University of Zurich): Gitta Hassler and
Susanne Grieder ........................................... 43

NEWS/ANNOUNCEMENTS
Nepalese and Italian Contributions to the History and Archaeology of Nepal.
Seminar held at Hanuman Dhoka, Kathmandu, 22-23 January 1995 .......... 50
Interdisciplinary Workshop: "Himalayan Space in Language and Culture",
Nijmegen, April 3-4, 1995 .................................. 51
Himalayan Languages Symposium Rijksuniversiteit Leiden,
June 16-17, 1995 ........................................... 53
Symposium Series on "High Mountain Remote Sensing Cartography" ....... 54
Information Centre and Archive Central Asia/Himalaya ..................... 56

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE ................................ 58

NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS
EDITORIAL

It is our pleasure to announce that the production of the Bulletin will be taken over by our French colleagues from the CNRS at Meudon, starting with the next issue (No. 10), for a period of two years. The editorial board will include Pascale Dollfus, Corinne Jest, Marie Lecomte-Tilouine, Anne de Sales and Gérard Toffin, while the present editors will continue to be involved. The responsibility for editing and producing the Bulletin is thus beginning to rotate within Europe, as was originally planned. There is a good chance that after two years the Bulletin will be produced at SOAS in London. So we hope that it will develop to become a truly European publication.

After October 15, 1995, contributors are asked to send their manuscripts either directly to the following address:

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or, as usual, to the contributing editor of their country. Also, matters of subscription should be sent to Paris (see subscription information sheet enclosed).

Thanks to all who have filled in and returned the questionnaire which we sent with our subscription reminder. The response was basically positive, reconfirming our general policy. There were suggestions to extend the review section (which is in fact planned) and to introduce a letters section (so we do encourage you to send letters). Our French colleagues are planning further improvements, and we are confident that the Bulletin will grow steadily as a topical English language news bulletin and discussion forum for scholars working on the Himalayas.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Oral Epic Poetry in the Central Himalayas (Garhwal and Kumaon)

Claus Peter Zoller


Even though non-European literature is no longer dismissed as folklore, oral poetry still is widely treated as a special form of literature, as terms like "oral text" or "folk literature" illustrate. Oral poetry is generally associated with such expressions as "anonymous," "traditional," "simple," and "authentic"; many regard it as a precursor to true literature, and thus a survival of something original. This promotes a sort of alienation from this poetic form, by treating it as somehow inferior to the printed word. It is then the task of scholars to mitigate the alienation thus created. I want here to introduce briefly a few approaches through which oral forms of poetry, in particular oral epics from the central Himalayas (Kumaon and Garhwal), are made "intelligible" to outsiders.

Oral poetry in the central Himalayas is still a dominant art form, although its existence is now threatened by the new media and by radical social change. The majority of books about oral poetry are modeled either on British folklore studies (the paradigm here is Himalayan Folklore, by Oakley and Gairola) or, in the case of Indian authors, on the systemsatics and terminology of the Sanskrit Kavya Śastras. Thus, both approaches generally do not use indigenous terminology and classification. The first oral epic I want to introduce, Mālauṣāḥi Rājūla, is listed by Oakley and Gairola under the heading "Legends of Heroes," whereas it is classified by the Indian folklorist Cātāk as a prapar gāthā 'love song' (1973: 258),1 and by Meissner as a "ballad" (see below).

This epic is in fact the only one from the central Himalayas2 which has been "completely" transcribed and translated, by Meissner (1985). The
author of this very laudable project comments on the present situation thus (p. xv): "we now possess learned publications about the oral literature, but no editions of the texts themselves. And soon there will be no more singers alive, so that all that is left of these wonderful songs will be meagre summaries standing in library shelves." Meissner provides a survey of such "meagre summaries" (Part I, Introduction [xiii-xvi], Appendices [251-278]).

The version of the Kumaoni bard Gopi Dās recounts the love story of the trader's daughter Rājulā and the Katyūri king Mālāśāhī. Her parents promise her to a Tibetan prince, but during a trading expedition with her father she falls in love with Mālāśāhī. When her father realizes this, he brings her back home immediately. But she runs away and after many adventures reaches Mālāśāhī. However, she leaves him again, because she wants to be "conquered" by him. While attempting the conquest, he is poisoned by her yogic parents but revived again by two Gurus of his family. (1985: 218). Near the original" (1985: vii), translation and glossary (see the reviews of Buddruss (1988) and Kimmig (1985: 213). or he questions his trusworthiness with statements like the following (1985: 213): "at 14 he could already sing the whole song - at least that is how he remembers it."

Attempts to shift the focus of authority from the bards to the experts are perhaps the rule rather than the exception. Upreti's book (n.d.) on the same epic is even more instructive. Upreti, who is "a well-known expert on Kumauni folklore" (Meissner 1985 I: xv), stresses the "secular character of the story" (Upreti n.d.: 7). There is a "complete freedom from ritualistic taboos. Its singing may sometimes send a listener into a trance, but that is not what it is meant for..." (ibid.). "This secular character demarcates Malusahi from other ballads of Kumaon in which the hero or the heroine, even though human in origin, gets transformed into a deity" (Upreti n.d.: 8-9). This last sentence bluntly contradicts the statements of Gopi Dās and (other) bards. Upreti is certainly right "that a search for authenticity would be futile" (Upreti n.d.: 41), but he is also convinced that "[h]is [Gopi Dās] seems to be nearest to the original" (Upreti n.d.: 42).

Among the main actors of the epic are Gurus, whose names all end in Dās, which is a common designation of members of various yogic orders. Upreti says of them (Upreti n.d.: 60): "they are low caste professional drummers endowed with all kinds of magical powers." He goes on to stress that the Katyūri kings depended heavily on them and, "This relationship of the king with his professional drummers who belong to the lowest rungs of the social ladder sounds rather strange." This relationship, however, is basically the same as the one between Gopi Dās and his (deified) King Mālāśāhī, which, in turn, is a special case of the relationship between a so-called jagaria and a deity.

Even though Garhwal is one of the major centers of India's oral Mahabharata traditions, Meissner's observation regarding the "learned publications about the oral literature" seems to prove true here as well. Despite the following statements, no "complete" oral Mahabharata has been published so far. Sax (forthcoming) observes: "Nowhere, however, does the Mahabharata have such a tremendous social and religious importance as in the former Himalayan kingdom of Garhwal... The Mahabharata is the greatest single source of folklore in this predominantly Hindu region..." According to Leavitt (1991: 451), "the oral tradition in Kumaoni includes an enormous mass of Mahābhārata-related material." And according to Hiltebeitel (1988: 132), there are "astonishing parallels and significant variations... in the ways these two cultural trajectories and the epic: one in the high mountains of India's far north, the other in the lowlands of the deep south, and with nothing to link them geographically or historically but Hinduism."

I cannot pursue the question of what Hiltebeitel actually means by "the epic," but I would like to say that he himself asks with regard to the Mahabharata "whether one should privilege the classics" (1995: 26). Moreover, there are not only "cults" of "the epic," but also "complete" oral regional versions, locally called Panduan or Pandavani. The author of this paper has made tape recordings of one of them in the valley of the river Tons in western Garhwal. This version has been transcribed and translated (into German) and will probably be published next year. The existence of another "whole" oral epic in eastern Himachal Pradesh has been pointed out by Nanda (1993: 48) who notes, "B.R. Sharma has also attended night-long sessions held during Budhi Diwali in Nirmand where Fakiri Brahman sing the Pandava Kavya narrating the entire battle of the Mahabharata," and by the afore-mentioned B.R. Sharma himself (1993: 41): "The Pandavas are so powerful characters in the folklore of the State that a ballad of Pandavayan has special significance in Shimla, Solan and Sirmour regions." On page 42 he gives a short summary of the so-called ballad "Pandain or Pandavayan." More summaries of various regional episodes of the Mahabharata are found in many references given at the end of this paper.

Besides trends to "mythologize the epic" through natives and attempts to demythologize it again by experts on folklore, another possibility is to pursue
A.K. Ramanujan's question, "What happens when classical myths are borrowed and retold by folk performers?" Leavitt has taken this up (1991: 453) and formulated a number of answers in two similar articles (1988, 1991). He starts by bringing together what he regards as three "versions" of the "same" story: (1) The Pāṇḍavas' escape from the burning lacquer house and their subsequent encounter with the giantess Hidimā - from the Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata (Ādi-pravāna 1.139-143). (2) A retelling in Hindi of an originally oral Kumaoni story - written by Upādhyay (1979: 79-80). In this story all of the Pāṇḍavas except Bhīma are kidnapped. Bhīma later manages to rescue them but has to deal with Hidimā before he finds his family members. (3) A tape recording of an oral version of this story, sung by the Kumaoni bard Kamal Rām.\textsuperscript{11}

Leavitt now tries to show that Ramanujan's four well-known features, which are supposed to characterize the process of borrowing - fragmentization of the text, domestication (humanization) of gods and heroes, localization of plots, and contemporization of action (1991: 453) - can be shown in various degrees in his two regional texts. Though he does not assume a straightforward transfer from the classical to the folk level, he nevertheless believes that this is the fundamental direction of movement (thus, he relates the Kumaoni versions to "their common source" (1991: 470; similarly 453). However, in light of Hildebrandt's above statement regarding parallels between Tamil and Garhwal Mahabhharatas, Leavitt's assumption appears unlikely.\textsuperscript{12}

Let us briefly consider the four features:

1. Fragmentation: In some contexts only selected episodes of the oral epic are performed (Leavitt 1991: 455ff.; Sax 1991), whereas in others "complete" versions are sung (cf. Nanda, Sharma above). The version from the Tōns valley is sung annually from beginning to end during a festival in the month of February. Thus it seems as if we "members of a bibliocentric profession" (Sax forthcoming) see only the classical Sanskrit text as a physical whole, thereby forgetting that it was or is almost always recited in fragments.

2. Domestication: Leavitt mentions "Bhīm's prodigious urination" (1991: 453) in the bard's version. According to numerous local statements, however, Bhīma's "funny" nature is not at all human, but the result of a combination of divine and demonic elements in one person. On the other hand, a very human portrayal of Bhīma appears in classical Sanskrit dramas of Bhāsa (e.g. Madhyamāvyāyoga).

3. The notion of localization makes sense only when original geographical structures have been projected onto a secondary plane. But again this does not coincide with. Various place names in the Pāṇḍuāra from the Tōns valley are located in an otherwise worldy space rather than in a terrestrial province. Incidentally, the hypothesis is also up against Berreme's impression that the Pāṇḍavas "may well be indigenous objects of worship in these hills who have been universalized to become part of the literary tradition of Hinduism." (1963: 382).

4. Even the fourth feature of contemporization is problematic, when we note that many Garhwalis regard the Pāṇḍavas as their ancestors (Leavitt 1991: 452; Sax 1991: 289).

Finally, the classical version and the version of Kamal Rām differ not so much because of "extravagant local developments" (Leavitt 1988: 11), but because the lacquer house episode of the classical text does not correspond to the Himalayan story of the abduction of the Pāṇḍavas, but has parallels with another episode of the Himalayan Mahabhharatas.

Sax's interest in the Himalayan Mahabhharata, especially in the performances called Pāṇḍavālī, is guided by different motives: "It [the Mahabhharata] illuminates social issues, and informs local culture more, perhaps, than any other text" (1991: 275). Thus, he not only deals with the fact that, "[e]ach village has its own tradition of dance and recitation" (1991: 277), but also thinks that one can "infer the folk cosmology of these Uttarakhand peasants from their rituals" (1991: 293-94). In fact, many aspects of life in Garhwal have been influenced by the local Mahabhharatas, for example, agnostic festivals (Hānda 1988; 112; Lalit 1993; Nanda 1993: 50; Zoller 1993), traditional warfare (Hānda 1988: 60), or ancestor worship (Sharma 1993: 41-42; Sax 1991: 289; Zoller 1994). And yet the Himalayan oral epics are neither shadows of classical models nor mere encodings of farmers' conceptions of the universe. Many bards known to me say that the epic "awakens" in them during performance, and it is not they who perform the epic, but the epic which celebrates itself.

Notes:
1. In Hindi literary dictionaries gāhār are defined as forms of folklore literature in which sung and spoken passages alternate.
2. Its center is Kumaon, but there also exist Garhwali versions.
3. The following critical remarks are not intended to detract from the enormous value of the work done by Meissner.
4. There exists also a Kumaoni version based on the epic (Vaishnav 'Askot 1973).
5. The notion means 'prose and verse'.
6. Fanger 1990: 173: "A jagar is essentially a spirit possession dance in which a designated deity or deities (devatas) is induced by ritual drumming and the singing of traditional devata legends to possess a prearranged oracle/medium of the spirit."
7. The jagari is the main officiant of a jagar ceremony" (Fanger 1990: 173). Cf. note 6 above.
8. The author works in Kumaon, but he is rightly aware that "[t]he association [of the Pāṇḍavas] is particularly strong with Garhwal..." (Leavitt 1991: 452).
9. His is a paraphrase of the same question raised by Richman (1991).
10. In fact, two tape recordings were made with two different bards. The two versions are, however, quite similar. A video recording of the performance has also been made.
Leavitt's concern for what may happen to the classical myths is also expressed orthographically: he distinguishes the Kumaoni oral *mahābhārat* from the Sanskrit "Mahābhārata" (1988: 11). Also he seems to fulfill Meissner's prophecy: "As might be expected, such ritually-embedded sung poetry...presents special problems of editing, translation, and presentation. Rather than attempt this here, I offer instead a translation of a mahābhārat story as it was retold in ordinary Kumaoni prose (with occasional asides in Hindi)." (1988: 5).

Zumtor has pointed out (1990: 23) the widespread attitude of regarding written poetry as 'one's own' and oral poetry as 'other.' To overcome the apparent paradox of oral poetry being simultaneously "original" (see above) and 'other,' Chandola has found an elegant solution (1977: 18): "The development of the Mahābhārata tradition from its earliest form to the Garhwali form of today seems to have this pattern: Folk to Classic to Folk." Here the first "Folk" is the 'original' and the second the "other."

References:


Higher Education and Liberal Values in Nepal*

Dipak Raj Pant

Higher education in the Nepalese context: Tradition and history

Higher education, in general terms, can be defined as formal training at post-essential level with a specialist orientation, implying a wider cultural exposure and some critical-theoretical exercise. In the context of Nepal, formal education beyond the School Leaving Certificate (S.L.C.) level can be called higher education.

According to official sources (CBS/NPC 1993: 284-285), there were 110,239 enrolments in institutions of higher education in Nepal in the academic year 1991/92. In view of the trend over the past years the number is bound to grow steadily. But still only a very tiny section of Nepalese youth manages to make its way into higher education.

According to the above-mentioned sources (CBS/NPC, in the academic year 1991/92), total enrolments in the Humanities and Social Sciences were the highest in number (46,487) followed by Commerce/Management (29,314), Education (26,232), Natural Sciences and Technology (12,113), Law (7,991), Engineering (2,268), Medicine (1,777), Agriculture and Animal Sciences (731), Forestry (454), and Sanskrit (578, according to the latest available but unreliable data referring to the academic year 1988/89). More reliable data about enrolments in Sanskrit studies refer to the academic year 1986/87, in which total enrolments were counted to be 365 (new enrolments 167, carry overs 198).

Sanskrit used to be the only form of higher education - both as the medium of instruction of traditional letters and sciences and as the subject in its own right - till the early decades of this century. Now, it seems to be one of the least preferred. Together with Forestry and Agriculture and Animal Sciences it has been one of the least demanded subjects in past academic years.

It is a paradox that Sanskrit is so neglected in Nepal, the only Hindu Kingdom on earth and the cradle of Mahayana Buddhism. The scriptures of both orthodox Hindu and Mahayana Buddhist traditions are in Sanskrit.

Another paradox is constituted by the fact that Forestry is one of the least attended disciplines in Nepal where 37.6% (CBS/NPC 1992: 78) of the national territory is covered by forest and the forest is a major source of energy and revenue. Even more paradoxical is the fact that Agriculture and Animal Sciences is one of the least developed disciplines in a country where the overwhelming majority, 80.49% (CBS/NPC 1993: 126ff), of the economically active population (aged 10 years and over), is engaged in agro-pastoral (including fishery) activities.

Certainly, the lack of adequate facilities and infrastructures can be blamed for this. But only to some extent. The facilities and infrastructures of Engineering, Medicine and Law are not better, in either quantitative or qualitative terms, but these sectors have been gradually enlarged due to the continuous pressure of high demand. The decisive elements seem to be the value and the priority (and consequently, high demand) accorded the latter subjects by the young aspirants and their seniors and, as a whole, by society.

Sanskrit is considered to be "old" (equivalent to "rotten"), "un-modern" and "un-scientific" by the dominant elites as well as by the vast majority of upwardly mobile, lower-middle and middle class Nepalese of today.

The prevalent common wisdom of the urbanised or urbanising Nepalese equates everything modern (in the sense of "new", "recent" and imported from the West) with "scientific" and vice versa. For them, science is not an approach, method or research which can be applied to Sanskrit and other traditional disciplines too, but is only relevant to modern, Western subjects. Research in and solution-oriented applied studies of traditional disciplines such as Ayurveda (medicine, in Tibetan gSo-ba' rig-pa, Jyotivijnana (astronomy), Vyakaraana (grammatics), Dravya-Gupta-Vijnana (metallurgy-chemistry), Tarka (logic), Darshana (philosophy), etc. could be very helpful - not only for overall cultural and scientific advancement, but also for economy and self-reliance.

The traditional Hindu (Vedic-Upashadhic-Puranic) and Buddhist (Mahayana-Vajrayana) education based on Sanskrit used to be imparted through the centuries-old master-disciple tradition (guru-si$ya parampara). Today, this seems to be obsolete and impractical for the solution of many of the needs and problems of the people, but it served to shape the cultural and intellectual background of Nepalese society. In the past, it produced high quality classical scholarship. In the last decades, the Sanskrit schools (including the Sanskrit University at Dang, south-western Nepal) have been producing only a few priestly workers (Nep. karma-kindri) and some diploma and degree holders aspiring to government employment. No significant contribution has come from contemporary Sanskrit schools. The modern scholars of Nepali letters have limited themselves to the historical and contemporary aspects and problems of the Nepali vernacular and its creative literature. In sharp contrast to those of India and Tibet, the classical studies of Nepal have remained virtually neglected.

The beginnings of modern higher education: Social and political background

The history of modern formal higher education in Nepal is not a long one. The first institution of higher education (Tri-Chandra College in Kathmandu, then affiliated to Patna University of British India) was established by the then Rana premier Chandra Samsher in 1919. The Rana rulers were reluctant to initiate modern institutions while the populace was dormant. But growing contact with British India stimulated both the rulers and the people. The rulers...
took a few timid steps towards modernisation and a section of the upper class intelligentsia became exposed to liberal values. The ruling establishment crawled hesitantly toward modernity. By doing so, it exposed its own contradictions to the intelligentsia. The intellectuals' progressive attitude and dissonance paved the way for eventual rebellion against the Rana regime. Both developments - the Rana rulers' reluctant opening and the Nepali intellectuals' growing dissonance - were due to their exposure to the liberal values articulated by the British education in the Indian subcontinent. Even the anti-colonial (anti-British) attitude of some was, in a way, caused by the higher education made available by the British. The British colonial regime could not afford to place man-power brought in from the British Isles in all the clerical and administrative positions that we needed to govern the vast territory of the Indian subcontinent. Neither could it accept some aspects of the local social structures. So intermediate and higher education was made available locally for the sake of local recruitment and reform.

The first agents of political change in modern Nepal were those who had received their higher education in British India and who were in contact with the British-educated Indian liberals, nationalists and anti-colonial forces. The Rana regime (hereditary premiership and command of the armed forces by the Rana clan) drew its support from the British to a great extent. After the British departure from the Indian subcontinent the Ranas became politically and strategically orphaned. In 1950-51, the reigning monarch, King Tribhuvan, succeeded in ending the Rana rule. Alongside the king, the Nepali liberals were the protagonists of a series of events which paved the way for a more democratic administrative setup in Nepal. The new rulers of the Republic of India played a very supportive role in favour of the liberals and the King.

During the 1950s, the Nepali liberals, former dissidents and revolutionaries, went on sharing power with the royal palace in a confused manner. Between 1951 and 1958, the political atmosphere in Nepal was confused, factional and extremely unstable. As Michael Hutt remarks on the creative literature of that period, a growing sense of disenchantment prevailed among the literati as well as among the ordinary people (Hutt 1989:143). Besides, the liberals' insensitivity to the tradition-minding masses gradually alienated them. The liberals were soon discredited as "immoral", "messy" and, above all, "anti-religious".

The liberals of Nepal had (and still have) a very confused and compound ideology made up of disparate elements. The post-colonial euphoria (later fully developed as "Third-World-ism", i.e., a tacit admiration and desperate imitation of, along with a loud antagonism to, the West) and a pronounced anti-traditional attitude have been the hallmarks of the Nepalese liberals as well. The incapacity to deliver socio-economic results, political stability and justice weakened the liberals' hold on power. Their anti-traditional reputation isolated them from the socio-cultural mainstream. The Nepali Congress, which represented the most liberal political force in the country during this period, soon lost power.8

The late King Mahendra,8 a staunch nationalist and a mild Third Worldist, took full advantage of the chaotic situation and Nepali Congress alienation (Subedi 1978: 63-64). He imposed himself as the saviour of the nation, overthrowing the elected government led by the late Mr. B. P. Koirala9 and, with that, the whole multi-party parliamentary system, in the year 1960. However, during the brief and turbulent period of pluralistic democratic experiments in the 1950s, higher education had become one of the priorities. In 1955, the first university (Tribhuvan University) was established. Many colleges were opened and the number of people approaching the institutions of higher education in the country and abroad (mostly in the Indian universities) increased. Even after the end of multi-party democracy, higher education continued to be a priority.

In 1962, the Panchayati (partyless) constitution10 was introduced in Nepal and, for the first time, the country was formally declared to be a Hindu Kingdom.11 It was a shrewd (and successful) move to play the "tradition" card at home, and to de-legitimize the liberal (anti-traditional) intelligentsia represented by the Nepali Congress leadership and its supporters. Externally, it also served to obtain tacit approval and legitimacy from an influential section of the political and cultural elites of India (the "high" caste and aristocratic Hindus) which still regards Nepal as the pure and pristine Hindu land and considers so-called "Hinduness" (in the Hindu neologism, hindutva) more crucial than democracy or dictatorship. Therefore, the declaration of Nepal as a Hindu Kingdom was related to the question of self-legitimacy not only of the liberal anti-traditional intelligentsia but also of the Hindu élites and the majority of the citizens of neighbouring India, where it was felt that Hindu identity was suppressed by the self-imposed, official "secularism".12

The Panchayati establishment also accorded priority to the development of higher education. During the last three decades (1960-1990), the institutions of higher education expanded and the number of individuals entering higher education grew rapidly. The quantitative growth in the higher education sector was favoured by growing contacts with the outside world, a diversifying socio-economic life, an increased population and also, to a great extent, the Panchayati government's favourable policies. In 1973/74, a new education plan (inspired and aided by the U.S.A.) was implemented in higher education, and resulted in a total fiasco. The old system (of British-Indian type) was then reinstated with minor and nominal changes. In the meantime, the number of Nepalese youngsters seeking enrolment in Nepalese campuses and neighbouring Indian colleges and universities continued to grow.

Education, economy and ethics

One of the most important factors favouring the expansion of the higher educational establishment has been the upward mobility of the Nepalese lower and middle classes. Today, for an average Nepalese of lower and middle classes (and, "clean" or "high" castes) the most rewarding job is a "not-to-
work" job, i.e. a "sitting-in-a-chair" type of job. The "sitting-in-chairs" upper and middle class (and, of course, "clean" or "high") castes fellows have been the models of success in Nepalese society. A typical Nepalese success story usually concerns a son of a village farmer who has left his home and village, educated himself, become a big shot in the government administration, bought a piece of land in the urban area of the Kathmandu Valley, and built a two-storyed brick house.

Those employed in the government machinery constitute the model and reference group for all, including the young of the occupational castes ("low" and "unclean") and ethnic groups. An average schooled Nepalese adolescent (of any caste or ethnic group) aspires to get rid of the rural-based, agro-pastoral and traditional duties. Higher education provides an instrument of evasion from manual work. It constitutes the stairs by which one may reach the upper echelons of society and polity by gaining employment in Nepal's labyrinthine politico-administrative set-up.

It is noteworthy that, despite the fact that Nepal is an overwhelmingly agrarian country, enrolments in agricultural and animal sciences have been very scarce in comparison to other fields of study. The high priority accorded to the office employment jāgir (originally a Persian-Urdu term meaning the feudal allotment of land properties and local administrative responsibilities to courtiers by a sultan) by the lower/middle classes and the government's indifference to vocational and technical training have caused this discrepancy. The same can be said about forestry and related disciplines. The rapid increase in foreign aid (which serves mainly to sustain offices, projects and personnel) and a quantitative boom in higher education all coincide. Growth in these inter-related sectors, and in the process of urbanisation was spectacularly fast in the late 1970s and 1980s. The growth in the number of individuals being sent from the higher educational institutions to the job market soon outpaced the capacity of the administrative machinery to absorb them.

Higher education has been able to stimulate a critical attitude towards the authorities, traditions and socio-political status quo, but has not been able to generate true liberal values in the socio-economic sphere. The Nepalese establishment has never been serious about socio-economic liberalism. It has been doing its best to check criticism and disidence. The so-called "mixed" economy (adopted by most of the "Third World-ist" regimes) of Nepal was in reality a government-controlled one. Corruption was the natural outcome. Not because Nepalese high officials are particularly immoral in public affairs; but because corruption is a direct consequence of the complexity of the government intervention. And, if the government is not accountable for its deeds to any public forum (as was the case in Nepal for the last three decades until the advent of democracy in 1990), matters get worse.

The widespread corruption angered socially and politically conscious individuals engaged in higher education, while for others of them it also showed the "right" path to follow: get the right placing (through the help of your castemen, kinsmen, alliances etc.) inside the most "fruitful" sectors of the government machinery (e.g. customs or taxes or forest department) and grab as much as you can. Thus kinship, friendship and bureaucratic alliances became much more important than professional training or competence. But, at the same time, as pro forma, diplomas and degrees from higher institutions were indispensable in "modern" Nepal.

The Nepalese state has been, until recently, a mosaic of several fiefdoms commanded by "big shots" (thālo māńche) to whom many longed to be close and kin (āphno māńche). The ultimate sources of power of the various thālo māńches were the overt and covert lobbies operating around the central "power-house" (i.e. the royal palace). Many of the pro-establishment, educated individuals have been entering the race to become an āphna māńche of some thālo māńche in order to get a better and higher placement (rāmro jāgir). Many of the educated Nepalis had to content themselves with lower ranks and "bad" placements (e.g. in the postal services) and, therefore, marginal opportunities to "earn", while for a large section of the educated there was no job but just frustration and anger. Naturally, a large section of the educated youth embraced radical ideologies.

One of the most disheartening outcomes of higher education in Nepal has been the distortion of the traditional work ethic. Traditional work concerned with agriculture, forests, livestock breeding and related services and craft businesses (specialties of particular caste groups) have been looked down upon by the new, educated generation. There has been an incessant unrelenting campaign against caste for decades. So anything related to caste (including specialisation of occupations, knowledge, etc.) is implicitly condemned. Naturally, no local craftmanship and entrepreneurship could develop in such a climate. Education has alienated the youngsters from their rural-based, native communities and from their knowledge, skills and traditions. At the same time, truly urban, free individual enterprises and a realistically ambitious entrepreneurial youth have not emerged. In the meantime, rapid urbanisation and the growth of tourism generated a substantial market for a broad spectrum of services, crafts and businesses. Even the high-potential agro-alimentary sector, where Nepalese have good experience and no outside competitors, was left aside. The jāgir-oriented lower/middle class Nepalese could not cash in on the new situation.

So far the entrepreneurial void has been filled by Indian migrants. Today, craftsmen, traders and service-workers of Indian origin are the busiest economic operators in Nepal. Even the petty hawkers, selling fruits and vegetables and offering semi-skilled services, in the Nepalese urban centres are mostly migrants from the adjoining Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. It is unthinkable for an average Nepalese with some education to make money by venturing and working hard. He/she prefers, if it is affordable, to get higher education and wait in long queues to enter the administrative service or, even better, any foreign-sponsored development project's office. The Nepalese experience of the last three decades has shown that higher education may also distort traditional morality and the socio-economic fabric and that it alone cannot generate liberal values.
The population of unemployed and inadequately employed (i.e. "lower" rank despite "higher" diploma) youngsters has been growing rapidly in the last decades. The economic omnipresence of the Indians too has been pinching the Nepalese. Foreign aid has been viewed by most critics as legitimacy conferred upon the regime, and as a nice opportunity for a few already enshrined in the power structure. The drop-outs, dissidents and unsatisfied ones have increased in number. Radically anti-Indian, anti-western and anti-regime sentiments have been swaying the majority of the highly educated "have-nots". Left political forces, until recently outlawed and underground, gained more from this situation.

Another interesting development, closely related with higher education in Nepal, has been the assertion of ethnicity. Many educated individuals belonging to different ethnic/territorial/religious groups have become "aware" of their "separate" identity. In the last few years, Nepal has witnessed a proliferation of cultural and recreational groups of different ethnic/religious/territorial belongings. Gradually, these groups have been assuming a more aggressive political posture. With the advent of democracy (after the popular revolt of 1990), these groups have become openly and loudly political with many claims, demands and vindications.

It is interesting to note that most of the ethno-political groups are organized by individuals who are modern-educated, urban-based and, to some extent, pseudo-westernized. They claim to struggle for their traditions while their life-styles and ideologies have nothing to do with their own traditions. Their relations with the native rural area are limited to vacations or special events, and they mostly dwell and operate in the capital or urban centres. It is also noteworthy that many of the top leaders of such ethno-political organisations have been actively involved in leftist politics in the past. But most have already dissociated themselves from the mainstream left party.

To a greater extent, higher education has reinforced radicalism (e.g. the left politics, renunciation in ethnicity) in Nepal. Higher education provided a critical attitude to the status quo. But it failed to stimulate a constructive approach such as the invention of new and re-qualification of old métiers, economic enterprises, social reforms, participation in existing programmes, environmental consciousness and ethics, critical revaluation of the traditions, and so on. It taught to disobey but not to discern. Instead of encouraging a rigorously scientific attitude to tradition (which, nevertheless, presupposes an initial curiosity and a sympathetic attitude) it has been turning the youth blindly against it. The bigoted and uncritical attitude of the old establishment has further stiffened the blind opposition of the educated, young generation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, in between the radicals and the bigots, the cultural and religious patrimony (particularly the Hindu tradition) of Nepal is in great danger of distortion and the gradual loss of many of its valuable tenets.

In the political arena too, higher education has not been able to articulate liberal values in Nepal. Liberalism has been mostly misunderstood and misrepresented (as being "alien", "free for all", "messy"). As in many other parts of the so-called "Third World", in Nepal the average intellectual's fascination with modernity or progress has been tinged with Marxism (which, curiously, is not labelled "alien"). Marxism seems modern and legitimate to many intellectuals who identify liberalism just with the free import of cars and cosmetics and free access for foreign multinationals to the national economy. It is precisely because the intellectuals themselves articulate such misrepresentations and give them legitimacy, while the oppressive and corrupt establishment tries to negate all possibilities for free debate, that the youngsters in the campuses embrace fire-brand radicalism. Three decades of the Panchayati regime has bred more far-leftist radicals than liberals or any other type. This is borne out by the outcomes of the 1991 and 1994 parliamentary elections (the first multi-party elections since 1958) in the areas renowned for more educated and well-exposed youth.

**Liberal values and "barefoot" capitalism**

Liberalism in the Nepalese context should be explained as "barefoot" capitalism. This means a free enterprise society right from the lowest levels. It requires a kind of legislation which supports and protects grassroots-level enterprises through credit, service, market and other facilities. It also demands, contrary to what exists, a non-obstructive, people-friendly and streamlined education. There is a great need for streamlined intermediate and higher education, capable of providing necessary skilled man-power at all levels and a critical but constructive intelligentsia. Nepal cannot afford to have a huge, money-losing, diploma-distributing academia. Nor can it sustain a sterile and born-tired intelligentsia, equipped only with negative attitudes.

A cobbler (Särki) in the highlands or a rickshaw-puller in the lowlands finds it hard to cope with the changing reality. He cannot improve his devices and skills due to the lack of training, credit and other facilities as well as sufficient protection. He cannot compete with goods from the modern leather and items manufacturers or, say, with the motorized three-wheeler's passenger services. But there are no socio-economic designs to make him more competent and to improve his devices and skills through training and financial facilities. There are young, educated radicals who are quite eager to make him hold a revolutionary flag. There are others who would like to turn him into a welfare-recipient citizen. There have always been the pundits who could console him with explanations regarding other "worlds" and other "lives". The intellectuals and politicians shed tears for him. They also have elaborate theories concerning the causes and remedies of his malaise. But they all are really against him because his tools and manners are un-modern. His existence is an "ought-not-to-be" because it reminds them of nasty things such as casteism, exploitation, class conflict, backwardness and so on. He is forced to make his living in a system which, notwithstanding the indispensability of his services for the time being, is increasingly working against him. The whole system is set to move towards the elimination and replacement of "old" and "backward" jobs without worrying about the worker who is making his...
livelhood through them. Instead, it would make more sense to improve gradually the conditions of the worker and to qualify, little by little, his instruments, organisation and environment in order to let him be the protagonist of the whole development process.

More refined products and services from bigger and better organized companies (mostly Indian and foreign) on one side, and the indifference of the élites regarding his training, devices and finances on the other, are pressing the traditional barefoot entrepreneur of Nepal to economic irrelevance. His "lower" social standing (in terms of caste and class) becomes more unbearable due to his growing economic irrelevance.

Present-day liberalism in Nepal is only of the head-level. If a big businessman (usually, he/she belongs to a "clean" caste or middle or higher class) wants to start a new venture, he/she gets almost all the facilities and protection he/she needs. The contrary is to be found in the case of a small local artisan or serviceeman, e.g. a blacksmith (Kámí), tailor (Dámí), a cobbler (Sárkí), farmer, livestock-breeder, craftsman or rickshaw-puller. In this regard, the Small Farmers Development Programme (SFPD) of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADB/N) has been a nice exception and a good attempt. But it has too many limitations and snags. Its implementation has not been quite satisfactory due to widespread corruption and opaque and unstable politics. Corruption along with the lack of stability and transparency in the government's policies and plans stand in the way of socio-economic betterment, because these preclude an average individual's or household's ability to take long-term decisions, to make plans and to participate effectively in existing socio-economic programmes.

At present (early 1995) Nepal has a liberal political set-up. The major political players (the Nepali Communist Party in Government and the Nepali Congress in opposition) declare themselves to be committed to liberal and democratic values. The mainstream left (Nepali Communist Party) looks more like a modern social-democratic and less like a hardline communist organisation. The international community views Nepal and the Nepalese with sympathy. It is the right moment to overhaul the existing administrative and educational set-up in order to establish new and efficient ones.
his opponents believed and gossiped, in his real life, too) Koirala seems to be overly preoccupied with the role of sex. His literary "obsession" with libido was quite successfully exploited by his opponents to depict him as "immoral" and "hedonistic". Besides, his much publicised anti-traditional, anti-religious stand discredited him in the eyes of the tradition-minding Nepalese. The most representative of his works are Doli Čāsmā, Samānmā, Tīn Čāsmā, Narendra Dāl etc.

10Pāliyāt (lit. 'council of five') used to be a grassroots-level socio-juridical platform in the older times. It used to be a public tribune of five (Skt. pāñca, Nep. pāñca) eldest (and, supposedly, wisest) members of a village community for decision-making, conflict-resolution and so on. The term had a cozy and respectable place in the people's minds. The notion was utilised to establish a new political order in 1962. After years of corruption, mismanagement and repression of dissenting voices at all political levels, the term 'Panchayat' has lost its original significance and has been completely discredited even at the grassroots-level.

11After a passionate and controversial debate on "secular" vs. "Hindu" state, and despite some hue and cry by the neo-Buddhist and ethno-political organizations, and by some leftists and democrats, against the "Hindu state", the term "Hindu Kingdom" has remained in the Nepalese constitution (see Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990), Part I, Art. 4.)

12In modern India "secularism" has been translated as dharma-nirapekṣat; if defined strictly, it would mean 'indifference to dharma'. Dharma is a very wide and all-inclusive term (righteousness, duties, 'cosmic order' or just 'order' and so on). But modern Indians have confusingly equated it with 'religion' in the Judeo-Christian or Islamic sense. Even today, after almost half a century of the constitution of the Indian Union, dharma-nirapekṣat is still a very important and contested issue which has caused much equivocation and tension. And, to some extent, it can be held partially responsible for the increasing political clout of the fundamentalists on all sides.

13The share of agro-pastoral activities in the gross domestic product of Nepal was about 56% in 1990/91 (cf. C.B.S./NPC 1992: 36).

14Forests are the main source of energy (fuelwood) in rural Nepal. It covers about 95% of the total fuel-terms for the whole country. Revenue from forest products was about 4% of the total revenue in 1986/87. The forests cover more than 50% of the total supply of animal food in the country. Deforestation constitutes the major threat of an environmental, economic and energy-related crisis in Nepal.

15Anti-Indian sentiments have always been a marked feature of both the so-called nationalist (pro-Panchayati) and leftist forces of Nepal.

16Since the early 1980s, most of the students' unions of various campuses of Nepal have been offed by the leftists; many of the teachers' unions too have been captured by them (naturally through free and fair elections).

17The eastern region (comprising Mechi, Koshi and Sagarmatha zones) and the Kathmandu Valley have the highest number of educated persons. In the past general elections (1991 and 1994) the major mainstream leftist party, Nepal Communist Party - United Marxist-Leninist (N.C.P.-UML), won most of the parliamentary seats in these areas.

References:


An Introduction to the Fortifications of Central Nepal

Neil Howard

Reconnaissance fieldwork has indicated that there are at least five different types of fortification between Kagbeni in the north and Butwal and Sindhuli Garhi in the south: artillery forts in the border districts of the south; earthwork forts on the edge of the Kathmandu Valley; hill-top terrace forts in the central hills; and defensible settlements and tower houses in the Tibetan border lands. It appears probable that these fortifications date from four distinct historical periods: the thirty or so years following the end of the Anglo-Nepal War in 1816; the years between the late 18th century and the first years of the 19th (before 1814); the mid-18th century; and a period of unknown length before the mid-18th century. The relationship between the stylistic and the chronological divisions is not direct. The accompanying sketch plans should be treated as diagrams indicative of general arrangement, not as accurate surveys.

The artillery forts (fig. 1)

An artillery fort is a fort designed both to resist attack by artillery and to be defended by artillery. However, in the context of the Nepal hills it must be remembered that in practice both defence and attack would rely heavily on small arms and traditional hand weapons. The Nepal government learned a serious lesson about the significance of cannon in warfare during the war of 1814-1816, and afterwards built a number of impressive forts in the south of the country to prevent future incursions by the British. Each fort guarded a main route through the front ranges of the Himalaya.

Jitgarh (Jiitgarh) in Butwal (Butwai) may have been the first to be built; it appears not to have been there before 1814 and local historians attribute its building to Bhimsen Thapa. Jitgarh stands in Butwal town, on the west bank of the river where it debouches on to the North Indian plain, and where the main trade route begins to Tansen-Palpa (Tansen-Palpa), central Nepal and Tibet via the Kali Gandaki (Kali Gandaki) river. Its original complete form is unknown. What remains today is shown on the sketch plan; any other defensive works there might have been are covered by the closely packed buildings of the town. There may have been a ditch, but none is to be seen now. The rampart is built of hard-fired, tile-like Nepali brick, with a slight batter on the outer face. The top was plastered with mortar. Three guns fired from each bastion (their platforms survive) through distinctive trifurcated embrasures which provide wide fields of fire without exposing the guns and the gunners, who would be exposed if the embrasures were single wide openings. A firing step runs round the interior of the ramparts for the use of musketeers.

Probably a little later a systematic fortified barrier was instituted, consisting of forts of a different design, close to or on the chief passes through the front ranges. These forts were either entirely new or older ones upgraded.

Chisopani Garhi (Chisopani Garhi) guards the old main route to Kathmandu and the winter capital of Nuwakot (Nuwakot). The present building presumably replaced the brick fort reported by Kirkpatrick and Hamilton around the turn of the century. It stands on a shoulder of the mountain looking over the path which passes its south-eastern side, the barracks and check post lying behind it. The interior of the fort seems originally to have been empty of buildings. In front of the fort the slope of the hill has been smoothed and revetted to deny cover to any attacker. At its foot there is a well. Inside the fort there were (in 1983) several bronze field guns on rolling carriages and piles of rusting shot. The trace of the ramparts is formed of shallow triangular bastions with cannon embrasures on the three sides of the fort facing attack from the south. Outside there is a ditch which provides both additional defence against escalade and a covered way for the garrison when counter-attacking. The mortared masonry is finely finished and fitted together.

Makwanpur Garhi (Makwanpur Garhi) stands on a hill top guarding the old road to Patan (Patan). Here the same elements of fortification have been arranged around a rectangle to provide a slightly bigger and more complex fort. Behind the ramparts there is a broad fighting platform, in the middle of which there is a sunken area containing barracks, stores, etc. In front of the gate there is a small ravel in to protect it from cannon bombardment; a sally port on the east side gives access to the ditch. Again, the masonry is fine and mortared, but here the stones are irregular and cut to fit each other.

The ornamental cornices of Makwanpur fort, the cordon detailing of the gate (shown restored in fig. 1), the incised edge of the flat top of the ramparts and the stonework of the barracks suggest the influence of the French engineers who are known to have built the arsenal in Kathmandu and to have advised the Nepali government. Presumably they advised at Chisopani Garhi too.

On a lower hill, a few hundred metres to the west of Makwanpur fort, there is a large outpost built of equally good masonry in the same style but with a much less systematic or regular trace. There are the remains of another outpost just below Chisopani fort, but this is much more roughly built. Possibly both were purely Nepali additions made later to improve the tactical utility of the forts, built in the manner of, but not by, their original builders.

H. W. Tilman published a photograph of, and described, a fortification at Rasuwa Garhi (Rasuwa Garhi) on the Tibetan border which appears to be somewhat similar in building style to the outpost at Chisopani. He records the local tradition that it was built in the middle of the last century (Tilman 1952: 53, plate 7).
Transitional forts (fig. 2)

These two forts seem to show an awareness of contemporary fortification technology in British India, but less than a full understanding.

Nuwakot (Nuwākot) above Butwal (Butavāl) guards the first pass on the old road to Tansen Palpa etc. It is only about half the size of Chisopani Garhi, yet it has six circular gun bastions to provide all-round cover, double ramparts to provide defence in depth (the inner protecting a sunken refuge), and shallow small-arms embrasures on the tops of the outer rampart where it is necessary to command the easiest approaches. Such complexity in so small a space would probably have prevented the defenders making effective use of the defensive structural elements. The fort is built of stone and is presumably the one described by a British Indian spy in 1813: it was armed with 16 guns (Stiller 1973: 28-29). Iron balls of approximately 50 mm diameter kept in a local shrine as Shaivite relics indicate that the guns were probably simple long-barrel muzzle loaders, bigger than a camel gun but lighter than a three-pounder field gun, somewhat similar to the falconet of Europe.

Sindhuli Garhi (Sīdhuli Gārhi) is a double fort: two enclosures fortified by low walls stand on top of adjacent knolls with the old road to Bhadgaon (Bhāḍāgāū/Bhaktapur), via the Sun Kosi, passing between them; it may be the Pauw Garhi (Pauvā Gārhi) where Kinloch was defeated in 1767 (Stiller 1973: 126-127, 344). Here we are concerned with the larger, south-eastern, fortification. The ramparts are built of roughly dressed dry stone. The strangely irregular trace of the outer rampart may indicate some knowledge of the theory of flanking fire in defence of faces; it is certainly different from the traces found elsewhere in forts of the 18th century and earlier (see below). However, the flanking wall projecting by the gate belongs to an earlier Nepali tradition in hill fortification; it is there in order to ensure that an attacker approaches with his unshielded side exposed to the defenders. There is no provision for cannon. The small loopholes for muskets in the parapet cover the easiest approach to the fort; further off there is a ditch. There are no buildings inside the ramparts; in the centre there is a circular inner refuge, but the purpose of the other interior structures was not apparent.

Approximately half an hour’s walk downhill towards Sindhuli Bazaar (Sīdhuli Bajār) the path passes through a strong gate, consisting of a stepped, masonry passage below defensive positions and a loopholed breastwork of dressed masonry. It is possible that this may represent a strengthening of the fort’s defensive capability after 1816.

Earthwork forts (fig. 3)

A short distance to the north-east of Namobuddha, on the old path from Bhadgaon and Dhuilikel to the Sun Kosi and Sindhuli, there is a striking earthwork fortification on a hilltop. It consists of a man-made conical earth mound, approximately 38 m in diameter at its base and 6 m high, having a slightly hollow top approximately 12 m in diameter (on which a tree grows).

On the top and sides of the mound there is debris of brick and tile from former buildings. It is surrounded by a ditch about 3 m wide and 2 m deep today, cut into the hillside; the material from the ditch has been thrown up outside to form a bank. On the north-east side there appear to be the remains of a gateway in the bank and there may be remains of buildings outside. There is another break in the bank, of unknown age and purpose, on the east side.

This is the type of fortification known in Britain as a motte, and is of much the same size too. These are simple but effective fortifications for use with small arms and hand weapons, giving their defenders the advantages of height and a good view. There is ample room for a small accommodation building on the summit. Approximately half a kilometre to the south-east there seem to be the remains of a second such fortification, more degraded, but with similar brick and tile debris. The road passes between them.

At Dhuilikel there is another pair of earthworks of a similar size: one is close to the town with a temple on its top, and the other is less than one kilometre to its north-east. Local tradition says they were built by King Prithvi Narayan Shah to blockade the Valley during his campaign of conquest.

The circular structure carrying a building in the middle of the defences on top of Sheopuri Lekh (Śivapuri Lekh) seems also to be a motte; and the circular mound under the temple at the northern end of the old winter capital of Nuwakot by Trisuli Bazaar (Nuvākot, Trīśuli Bajār) may be another. Both these sites are associated with King Prithvi Narayan Shah. He may have built more. The origins of this type of fortification in Nepal cannot at present be deduced.

Hill-top terrace forts (fig. 4)

Hill-top terrace forts have been inspected at Tanahun Sur (Tanahū Sur), Kaski (Kāski) (i.e. the central defensive structure of the three structures on the ridge above the village), Lamjung (Lamjung) and Gorkha (Gorkhā). Each consists of terraces of different heights which once carried buildings (probably not the buildings to be seen today). The terraces are revetted with dry-stone masonry to present a sheer, wall-like face to the attacker, above which the defender would stand, and a flat surface for palace and temple buildings, etc. The hill-top site gave the defenders all the advantages of superior height; a good view and the assistance of gravity. At Kaski there is an entrance gate barring the (restored) approach path, outside that a stepped passage between platforms for the defenders (like a smaller version of the gate on the path below Sindhuli Garhi), a ditch cutting the approach over the easiest ground to the north-west, and a loopholed wall around the summit terrace. At Tanahun Sur there appears to be a small earthen defence bank reinforcing the south-eastern corner of the lower terrace, and other surface features which would repay investigation. Some of these elements are to be seen at Lamjung.

Gorkha is the sole complete example of such a fortified palace of a small hill state, having revetted terraces with palaces, temples and other
buildings, and gates barring the approach path; but all the structures to be seen there today have been extensively restored or rebuilt since the death of King Prithvi Narayan Shah. There must have been many more of these terraced defensive places in Nepal since they are also to be found in locations in the Himalaya to the west of Nepal, some of which may have their origins many centuries earlier.

Tanahun Sur was deliberately replaced by the new Gorkhali foundation of Bandipur; and it, Tanahun Sur and Kaski lost their defensive function after the capture of these states by the Shahs in the late 18th century.

Other types of fortification in the central hills (fig. 5)

At Lig Lig Kot (Ligligkot) there are three strong, rectangular defensive structures, like low towers built of dry stone. Each consists of a platform with a rectangular projection on each side and all its faces are steeply sloping, not vertical. On top of the platform is a smaller vertical-sided structure on the same plan, with very thick walls. Traces of loopholes were found in the parapet of one of these structures. One was surrounded on three sides by ditches. No entrances were to be seen in any (fig. 5, a). These isolated structures are not part of a larger, encircling, or linear, defence work. It is difficult at present to understand how they were used.

A similar structure was found at the summit of the ruins (of a town?) of Lamjung Puranakot (Lamjung Purankot), above Lamjung. On the evidence of its name, it may be possible to say that fortifications of this type pre-date the terrace forts, but supporting evidence is not as yet available.

Perhaps one more fortification tradition is to be deduced from the evidence of several small defensive structures in the central and southern hills. These are essentially gated rectangular enclosures of stone breast-works, and variations on this theme. They would repay further fieldwork. The simplest, and largest, is Sarankot (Sarankot) at the eastern end of the Kaski ridge above Pokhara (Pokhara), commanding the old road to the Kali Gandaki river and Mustang (fig. 5, b). It consists of a sub-rectangular enclosure of dry-stone ramparts with a firing step on the inside and a revetted platform outside, beyond which there are ditches and, perhaps, a bank. The gate has a flanking projection like that at Sindhuli Garhi; the thickness of the walls on either side of the entrance suggests that these must have been for defenders to stand on, as they would have done above the gate passages at Sindhuli Garhi (south-eastern structure, above) and the fortified gate on the path from Sindhuli Garhi to Sindhuli Bazaar.

At Kaski there is a slightly more complex defensive position (to the west of that already discussed) which consists of a sub-rectangular enclosure of dry-stone ramparts with a single projecting gate bastion, having one loophole to cover the blind side. There is a firing step inside (which continues on an unusual high line through the gate), possibly a sally port, and a large platform outside (fig. 5, c). There are also ditches to cut off the easier approaches. There is a similar defensive work at Nuwakot near Syangja (Nuwako, Syangja), south-west of the Pokhara Valley.

Among the defensive structures at Lig Lig Kot there is a more complicated version (fig. 5, d - very approximate) with projecting bastions on three faces, one of which may have contained the gate; there are also two loopholes. At Lig Lig Kot there is also another rectangular fortification surrounded by ditches and banks but it has not been investigated.

Near Nuwakot above Butwal, half a kilometre up the slopes from the transitional fortress already described, there are the remains of yet another of these fortified positions (fig. 5, e). It is badly nined and its gate has not been located, but its plan is clear. It is separated from the higher ground to the north-west by a ditch.

Finally, a more complex enclosure of this general type is to be found at Sindhuli Garhi to the north-west of the fortification already discussed and presumably of the same age.

The Tibetan Borderlands

In the Tibetan borderlands around Kagbeni, tower houses and defensible settlements have been identified but there is no secure evidence for fortresses with free-standing walls, as in Ladakh (c.f. Howard 1989; and forthcoming).

Tower houses are to be seen in the district of Baragaon (Baragaa) at Kagbeni (Kagbeni) fort, Jarkot (Jarkot/Jharkot/Dzkar) fort, Lubra (Tib. Klur-brag) and, perhaps, on the highest point of Dzong fortress (Tib. Rab-rgyal-rise). There are others in Mustang and it may be the dominant local type. A tower house may be defined as a residence built for defence, in which the lower floors are purely for storage and often have no access to the outside; living quarters begin two or more floors up; and the entrance passage or stair has some form of defensive position where it enters the living quarters; there may also be some provision for defence from the roof. Not all of these features have yet been identified in these four examples.

All four are built of shuttered mud above mud-mortared stone foundations - i.e. mud moulded in layers inside a shuttering of wooden boards. There are two variations in the building technique here from that used in Ladakh: the layers of mud are not overlapped at the corners of the buildings, which are, consequently, weak; and timber lacing is used in both the mud and the stone foundation. These tower houses have the usual structure of small cells in the lower levels (fig. 6) with larger rooms spanning two or more cells at higher levels. In Ladakh such a construction method seems to be confined to the second half of the 16th century and possibly the beginning of the 17th. Interestingly, preliminary dendrochronological investigations in Nepal reveal building activity during this period at Jarkot and at Kagbeni (Ancient Nepal No. 130-133, pp. 20-30).

Kagbeni was a trading centre and boundary fort between Baragaon and Lo/Mustang. Dzong was the seat of the ruler of Baragaon (Schuh 1990: 6) but also the guardian of the alternative route to Lo. Crawford's map of 1802-1803
and Tanner's and Namgyal's of 1887-1888 both show the road up the Kali Gandaki river turning east at Kagbeni, ascending to Muktinath and then turning north towards Lo (Ancient Nepal, No. 130-133, pp. 40-41). There is no reason to suppose that this is not an ancient route. Lubra, on the Panda Khola, may have been a boundary fort between Baragaon and Som-bu (Garab Dzong and district). All became obsolete at the end of the 18th century when the district came under Gorkhali rule.

A defensible settlement is a village or town which has been built with the houses and buildings of its perimeter against each other, having no doors and few windows facing out (and only high up), so that an attacker cannot enter except through a gate which can be defended. The roofs of the buildings can be used by the defenders for counter-attack. Kagbeni town, west of the Red House, is a clear example (in 1982); Jarkot town and Garab Dzong (Tib. dGa'-rab rdzong) appear to have been others. Archaeological investigation may reveal whether Dzong was a defensible settlement or whether it had free-standing walls which have been destroyed.

Garab Dzong appears not to have had a fort, unlike Kagbeni and Jarkot, but it is so ruined that it is difficult without excavation to deduce much from the site. The dendrochronological work already referred to yielded building dates between 1533 and 1779. It is a strikingly large ruin, and the absence of major buildings in shuttered mud may indicate that its period of wealth and importance was over by the 16th century. It may once have been the chief citadel of Thag (Snellgrove 1979: 80). Tradition in Thini has it that Garab Dzong was the original centre of Thakali power in the district; it may have a history dating back into the first millennium AD (Jackson 1978). The large quantities of pottery fragments seen in the ruins - some of them mixed into the mud of walls, accompanied by bone fragments - would suggest a long period of occupation. Garab Dzong would repay excavation.

Acknowledgement

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fig. 1 Artillery forts of Jitgarh in Butwal, Chisopani Garhi, Makwanpur Garhi
fig. 2 Transitional forts of Sindhuli Garhi, Nuwakot above Butwal

fig. 3 The earthwork fortification near Namobuddha

fig. 4 Hill-top terrace forts of Tanahun Sur and Kaski
fig. 5 Examples of small fortifications in the central hills - 18th century and earlier?

References:
INTRODUCTION

‘Nepalese in origin but Bhutanese first’
A conversation with Bhim Subba and Om Dhungel
(Human Rights Organization of Bhutan)

Michael Hutt and Gregory Sharkey

The political problem in Bhutan that has now led to the presence of over 86,000 Nepali-speaking refugees in Southeast Nepal first began to emerge during 1988 when a census in southern districts began to implement the 1985 Citizenship Act. Various complaints about the census exercise were brought to the notice of the king in a petition signed by two royal advisory councillors, Tek Nath Rizal and B.P. Bhandari. The drafting of the appeal (which has since been widely published) involved no less than eight senior Nepali Bhutanese bureaucrats, one of whom was Bhim Subba, who was subsequently promoted and made Director General of the Department of Power. After public demonstrations across southern Bhutan in the autumn of 1990 and the subsequent government crackdown on ‘anti-nationals’, Subba defected to Kathmandu in April 1991 and was granted political asylum.

Om Dhungel, formerly an engineer officer in the Department of Telecommunications, left Bhutan in April 1992, allegedly after his parents had been evicted from their home in Chirang after refusing to sign voluntary emigration forms.

Subba and Dhungel produce the monthly Bhutan Review which comments, often irreverently, on developments in Bhutan and among the refugees. HUROB (the Human Rights Organisation of Bhutan) is one of three different human rights organisations active on this front: the others are AHURA (the Association of Human Rights Activists) and PFHR (the People’s Forum for Human Rights). Rightly or wrongly, HUROB is identified with former bureaucrats and the Bhutan National Democratic Party, and although it has an office in Birtamod, Jhapa, its centre tends to be Kathmandu. Similarly, PFHR is identified with the Bhutan People’s Party, and appears to be more active in Delhi and at the UN in Geneva. AHURA has a more visible presence in and around the refugee camps, and claims to be free of political affiliations: it concentrates on casework, liaison with bodies such as Amnesty International, and lobbying. The three approaches are perhaps complementary, although tensions and differences undoubtedly exist between the three groups.

The following discussion took place between Bhim Subba, Om Dhungel, Michael Hutt and Gregory Sharkey on the evening of 10 March 1995 in Kathmandu.

MH: What makes Bhutanese Nepalis different from Darjeeling Nepalis or Nepalese Nepalis? Are there cultural factors that make them distinctive or different in some way?

BS: I think the major difference is that the Nepalese in Bhutan are by and large from the farming community. In Darjeeling the literacy rate is generally very high and most of the people are now semi-urban dwellers. They have perhaps picked up a certain lifestyle that is not really there in rural Nepal. Now that we have come to Nepal, we realise that Nepalese society has undergone a major transformation in the sense that it has picked up a lot of elements which are not strictly Nepalese. Perhaps it would be unfair to say that the Nepalese Bhutanese are unique, because I think they are more akin to the Nepalese in the eastern hills: I haven’t been there, but perhaps the Ham, Panchthar areas. I think the same thing still exists in Bhutan, mainly because they have not been exposed to the outside world. What was taken to Bhutan in the last century perhaps remains in terms of dress, functions, weddings etc.

We have not incorporated ideas from the south, even though the southern part of Bhutan is supposed to be closer to the Indian general environment. I don’t think that has really impacted on Bhutanese society. So if you look at a southern Bhutanese Nepalese village today perhaps you will see Nepalese culture as it was in the early 20th century.

MH: What about the composition in terms of jat and so on? Is that pretty much the same as you would find in the eastern hills of Nepal, or are there more Tibeto-Burman-speaking groups?

BS: In the southern part of Bhutan almost every village seems to have almost all the Nepalese sub-cultures. In fact I was surprised to see somewhere in Sindhu Palchok a village of only Sarkis. In Bhutan we have Rais, Magars, Tamangs, Chetris, Bahuns (Brahmans), Kamis, Damais, Sarkis, all in one village. And we do not have a system of segregation or suppression by supposed higher castes. Again, I think we in Bhutan are fortunate in the sense that we did not take those negative aspects of Nepali culture. He (Om Dhungel) is a Bahun, I am a Matwali. Intermarriage is common, like, he is married to a Gurung, I am married to a Gurung, we are married to sisters (laughs). And we have another sister-in-law married to a Tamang, another sister-in-law married to a Magar, one sister-in-law married to a Drukpa.

OD: My own parents were initially a little bit reluctant when I said I wanted to marry a Gurung girl, but they had no strong objections to it. We are very well integrated in that way.

BS: I guess the main reason is that that superiority complex or that the fact that somebody was a higher caste and therefore had an inherent right to suppress - that is not feasible in Bhutan. And this is true of all villages in Bhutan.

MH: Have particular castes or ethnic groups suffered more seriously during the recent problems than others?

BS: Well, there was a supposed, off-stated intention on the part of the government to target especially the Brahmins and Chetris. I say ‘supposed’ because that was what Thimphu wanted people to believe. I was told very often that ‘it is these characters who are the likely trouble-makers and we have nothing against Matwali jat’ and so on. But this was in effect not true, and we can prove that because we [HUROB] were actually recording the number of
people in the camps by name and by family name. I personally was entering them on the computer, and I can guarantee that out of the first 6,000 or so more than one third were Matwalis. If the government’s plan was really true, then that should not have happened. There were fewer Bahuns and Chetris in the initial stages than other sub-categories, mainly because it was a matter of who had the resilience to somehow manage to cling on. And it so happened that many people who were supposedly the targets of the government were not in the first batch of refugees. So that was only something to play one group off against the other.

GS: Someone told me this afternoon about an article in a newspaper here which was trying to play up this point. It claimed that it is largely the Brahmans and Chetris, the Parbatiyas, who have the greatest sympathy for the refugees, and that the Matwalis don’t have much sympathy for them.

BS: Actually, one thing we would like to make very clear is that if there are any sentiments in terms of jat or in terms of caste we will have learned them in Nepal. Otherwise in Bhutan, I cannot even think of an instance... Untouchability, of course, that has unfortunately always been there. But generally in terms of a clash, or some problems between, let us say, Mongoloids versus Aryans, that never existed. But now in Nepal people have heard about it and it is feasible that people talk about it.

OD: People from outside do go into the camps and try to play up these things.

BS: When you say that you were told that there is a greater sense of sympathy from the Aryan side of society, it is likely to be true because in Nepal it seems to be such a big issue that when the Matwalis relate to the problems in Bhutan they see themselves closer to the Bhutanese, the Tibeto-Bumian Bhutanese, than to the supposedly larger percentage of Aryans among the southern Bhutanese. Which is not true, actually, because these people do not know the actual percentages. I think in Bhutan there is a larger percentage of Mongolid Nepalese than Aryan Nepalese, I think that is correct if you put all the castes together.

MH: Is this lack of caste consciousness a consequence of your generation becoming rather more Bhutanese and integrating more, or is it something else?

BS: Not so much Bhutanese, perhaps, let us say westernised, that would be more fair. One reason is that when people moved from Nepal to Bhutan they moved as equals, so whoever had the ability to clear more land had more land. Also, it was not that if you were a Brahman you had the right to go to school and others did not. That system was not there in Bhutan. So because every person of any caste had equal opportunity it was a case of the entire society as a group growing up together.

OD: Since the education system started in the early 1960s, we all started at one level, not as different castes.

MH: But there were pāṭhāsālas (traditional schools) before that...

BS: Very few and far between. In fact I studied in the first school in our district, Chirang. For most of the week it was a school, and on Thursdays, we call it “chanchay bazaar”, what is the Nepali word? Yes, bihiḥāre bujār, it was a teashop. And that was the first school.

MH: Was that a community initiative?

BS: Yes. The pāṭhāsāla system, when did that come? I don’t know, quite late, I think.

MH: I met the pandit from Dagapela pāṭhāsāla, and he told me that Lamidara was the oldest pāṭhāsāla, established during the 1940s.

OD: Yes, Lamidara was the oldest. I went to a pāṭhāsāla for a year and then I switched over to school because in the school they used to go for picnics (laughs). So I opted to go to the school.

BS: We have studied in Darjeeling, Kalimpong, under the missionaries. As far as our house was concerned it was open house, we could bring anyone inside. It’s because we were educated and therefore our entire family could accept it. So it was nothing to do with real Bhutanisation, it was westernisation in concept...

MH: Is it possible to delink the issue of the repatriation of the refugees from the question of political change inside Bhutan? Is it conceivable that the present regime could ever welcome the refugees back?

BS: If you ask us about whether it is feasible on our part, that is one part of the question. The other part of the question would be whether it would be feasible on the part of the current government to accept such a situation. Those are two different questions. Now from our side, as refugees, it would be I think suicidal for us to take a ticket home until and unless there were minor or, let us say, essential reforms which guaranteed that this thing could not happen again. There is a need for some reforms, though not necessarily of the type that political parties may desire. But to the extent that our rights are protected and that this exodus will not be repeated in the future - we need to ensure that there is that much change. This does not mean that we are trying to overthrow the current government, we are not trying to say that the system that is in place should be replaced by something totally new. But within that system I think what we need is an adequate voice, which is absent at the moment. And when we say we need a voice, it must be a voice that can be heard. If a representation of 20% or even 100% has no really meaningful say in the legislation, then what is the point?

Now let me take it from the other side. Somehow I do not see the possibility of... of half a solution. Given that we are in a society where ‘face’ plays a major role, saving face. It’s not so much reality that counts, it’s perceived reality. To think that the government of Bhutan could say, ‘look, we made a mistake, we’ll take all of these guys back and everything will remain the same’. No, not feasible. Not because we don’t want it, but because they cannot accept it. I mean today there is the government that has been raising hell in the country, saying that these guys are illegal immigrants, we should take them out from the roots. Tomorrow the government cannot be seen to be putting its tail behind its legs and saying ‘OK, we’ll accept these chaps because there’s international pressure’. I wish they could accept that, but that is not feasible. So we have to consider that if there is a solution it will be a solution
with some level of reform. This reform would have to be acceptable not only to us here but to the people inside - western Bhutanese, eastern Bhutanese - who would recognise that these people are here because of these reforms, and these are reforms that we also feel are necessary. In the normal scheme of things this is what would eventually have happened. Therefore the monarchy’s role as it is today will have to give way to some extent. As I say, it is not to the extent that the political parties or the people with vested interests inside might desire, and we don’t subscribe to the view that there should be major changes. We don’t believe it is feasible, we don’t think it is advisable, we don’t want that.

MH: But the trouble is that your demand for repatriation has to include a demand couched in terms of human rights, democracy and so on, so you are rather fulfilling the government’s prophecy. You look as if you are dissidents now, not just refugees.

BS: No no, we are dissidents! Please understand! We would like to make it very clear that if people talk about refugees and repatriation simply from the angle of people suffering etc., that is a major error in their views. We believe that this is not simply a case of people suffering and therefore a need to redress their suffering. It is a case of trying to right a wrong, OK? But in the process, if there are certain threats to another party, it is for us to be compromising. It is for us to recognise that they have as much right to protect their interests as we have a right to demand ours. So now, what is the minimum? We are as concerned about people with vested interests lurking within the southern Bhutanese community as they are, but that does not mean that everyone must suffer. Our position is that if Bhutan is going to survive as a sovereign nation with its current identity and international status there has to be a system which will take into account the views of the southern Bhutanese community, because until and unless they kick out the entire southern population, which is not feasible, this problem will persist. We may be outside, but we will continue to hassle the government, because it is our right to go back. So we are saying that, because we are also scared about our own brethren (laugh) we want to ensure that there is a mechanism which will be a safeguard against people with dangerous designs. We suggest that the system which may appear to be democratic should not be democratic in its complete sense. But we should have a break-up of power blocs - western, southern and eastern - each with 33% of the votes. Then any legislation would only be passed with a three-fourths majority, which would mean that the southern Bhutanese and the eastern Bhutanese combined could not harm the interests of the western Bhutanese unless there were some traitors within the western Bhutanese community. Similarly, the western Bhutanese and the eastern Bhutanese could not gang up and act against the interests of the southern Bhutanese unless I decide to sell out my people and go and join them. So unless there are checks and balances between the three communities we do not see the possibility of political harmony. In terms of cultural harmony, we have already explained that there is no case of real disturbance or interference between the different communities, because the eastern people live in their area, the southern Bhutanese live in theirs. We are not trying to create federalism in that sense. It should operate as it is doing now. The only thing is the share of people’s representation should be such that no community can even by combining with a second community harm the interests of the third community. If that is acceptable to the government I do not see how they can be afraid of southern Bhutanese inundation. So this is our position, we believe this is feasible, and we have always believed that it was something that the government also would have known all along. But they believed that this current situation was a possible solution. This we believe is totally ill-conceived and should never have happened in the first place... Even today, this question of peoples being against each other is still just... How can somebody in Bumthang have anything against a person from, let’s say, Lamidara? They have never seen each other, they have nothing... Once we are in urban areas we are friends, the same age group, we have worked together. But in the villages they do not interact in any way whatsoever. There is one other question that many people ask us. They say, ‘Oh, but when all these refugees go back there will be mayhem, there’ll be murder!’ Why should there be? When we go back we will go to a village which has no northern Bhutanese. We were all driven out from areas which were... it’s not cosmopolitan, there’s no mix, it’s not like Kathmandu.

GS: Can you go further in drawing a distinction between your claims as dissidents and those of people we can maybe call Nepalese nationalists, who are one of the vested interest groups? There is this perception in Kathmandu that there is Nepalese nationalism in the dissident literature. It’s the sort of thing that people on the outside might see and say, ‘ah, this is the proof, this plays right into the hands of Thimphu’. Who are the elements that you don’t want to work with, that you want to keep at arm’s length?

BS: I am not saying that any such element exists. What I am saying is if you have a system, whether you provide for or leave scope for people to fulfill that kind of prophecy, even in the distant future, then you are already asking for trouble. I am not saying that anyone among us has that kind of design. One thing we have to make very clear is that the movement we have today has always been a reactive movement. If it was a political movement it would have happened inside, not out here. Politically conscious people would have had a network, would have started activities within the country. They would not have come out and hoped to go back with democracy or whatever. So first we were refugees. When I say ‘we’, of course individuals are different, but on a bulk level. And because we were refugees we saw the need to fight for our rights. So we are reacting to government injustice, it has not been a planned, concerted movement to bring political reform to the country. Because we are where we are today, we recognise the need for reforms to protect our interests in future. It is not that we wanted to have the reforms, and therefore became outcasts or were expelled. So I don’t think there are any dangerous elements at the present moment, which would want to, as you say, fulfill Bhutanese prophecies or fears. These are misplaced fears on the part of Bhutan, or anybody who sees it in that fashion.
MH: Tell us something about western academics and this problem. What coverage has there been, and what are your comments on it?

BS: One thing that seems to be of concern to many people, including of course people from our own dissident community, is that we have not received adequate attention. I don’t buy that theory. I believe that for a country of Bhutan’s size, for its level of economy and political importance, I think we have received adequate attention. The only thing is perhaps that often it has not been of the correct... (laughs) You know, that has been a minor problem now and then. But in general I think we have enough coverage. Perhaps now there is a need to focus on the issues rather than have coverage of ‘oh, the poor refugees’ or the ‘culturally endangered Bhutan’. Both of those are two extremes. We should not be looking at the poor refugees, we should rather be looking at what caused them to be refugees. And it is a far larger problem than it seems if people look at it properly. Today you have here a country showing that for whatever reasons it has decided it does not want a certain section of its people. And if the government of Bhutan tries to argue with that, the very fact that they say people are voluntary emigrants and they have no compulsion or obligation to let them come back in - that in itself speaks volumes. Today it is Bhutan doing it, what if tomorrow Bangladesh decides to say of all those below the poverty line, ‘we have no obligation, if we do not want them we will simply kick them out’. We are asking for major problems, because nations are not made by boundaries, they are made by people. Bhutan constitutes a nation with a certain number of people, and I think it is very dangerous if a small country like this is allowed to say, ‘OK, we don’t want one third because for whatever reason we made a mistake in 1958, we should never have granted them citizenship, now we are going to correct that error’.

This is what the international community should look at, rather than saying ‘oh, 100,000 people are suffering’. Because it is not the issue of 100,000 but the setting of a precedent for much more serious problems. If Bhutan can do it, why not Nepal tomorrow, India the day after?

MH: Do you want to talk about refugee unity? It’s one thing that everyone points out. As somebody said today, aren’t you Thimphu’s dream, arguing with one another and forming a new organisation every week?

BS: Today, the bilateral talks and the categorisation [of the refugees] are excuses for many governments not to act - they say ‘oh, the bilateral talks are going on, let us see what transpires’ - all of these are basically excuses. And this talk about refugee disunity, this is another excuse on the part of many governments and agencies. Because, OK, if today we are not united what difference has it made? We are not a party to anything that involves the solution process.

MH: But if you were united you might be.

BS: Well, the current movement... Actually I shudder to call it a movement, it’s not really a movement as such, as I say it’s a reaction of people to a situation that has been forced upon them. Anyway, it is such that it has not really called for concerted action as people tend to believe is needed. Yes, if we were talking about an insurgency programme where one had to coordinate many physical activities and plans, then there would be a need for everyone to sit down together and thrash out details, strategies. But when the only issue at hand is basically to provide information and background documentation, to be able to respond to, typically, refugee-related issues, I somehow do not see what pure unity would do. Of course, if it happens then that is good, and I believe that would be helpful, at least to ensure that people do not have nasty things to say (laughs). But otherwise we are not going to take Delhi by storm or make a major change in Kathmandu. I think this is just an excuse. When there is a need for the groups to come together, the situation will force them together. What I would like to emphasize is that forcing people together when the time hasn’t come only serves to push them further apart. They will talk about differences because they have nothing else to do. Of course I am not against unity, please note, but I am against enforced unity.

MH: Do the human rights organisations have contacts in Bhutan?

BS: When you say contacts, I think those are meaningless contacts really, whichever organisation we are talking about. In Bhutan the level of fear is so high that, forget about others, if I go to the border area and I happen to meet my sister she won’t recognise me. So what are we talking about, a network of dissidents? No, it is not possible. Yes, by chance we may have a particular individual who might give us a little feedback, but not in terms of an organised information network, this is impossible. People are too afraid to talk to that. My own sisters would disown me, so forget about trying to get somebody else to give me inside information.

OD: Even now we get our information on an individual basis rather than on an organised basis. It is too dangerous for them to do it on an organised basis, because they don’t know whom to trust and whom not to trust.

BS: I think you might wonder ‘what is all this?’ Bhutan is so small, everybody knows everybody. You can do things when you are an unknown entity, when you are faceless. But nobody’s faceless in Bhutan. You do something, let us say, against the government today. There is every chance of you getting caught. Suppose you are passing some information to him (Om) - maybe in Kathmandu nobody would know because nobody knows either you or me. But, even if it is in Thimphu, if we were doing something like this, everybody would know that those two chaps were together at such and such a time. It is very difficult to do underground dissident activity, and that is why we are out, you know.

In fact in southern Bhutan in 1990, I think you know, the people finally demonstrated against the government policies. It was easy for the government to say exactly which person in which household went for the demonstration, all of them were listed. In one place they actually had a chap with a video camera. So you know, in slow motion - ‘that fellow, write down his name’. You just catch one chap and he’ll be able to tell you ten fellows, then you catch the other ten and they’ll be able to tell you the next hundred. It’s a place where anti-government activities are very difficult to undertake. But if it happens on a broad scale...
OD: Once it begins I think it will not be able to be controlled.

BS: It is beyond control, because everybody will be related to everybody. Whether you are talking about eastern Bhutanese, western Bhutanese, northern Bhutanese or southern Bhutanese, if something drastic takes place the police chief will not be able to catch somebody because he will find that his sister-in-law or his brother-in-law is involved. Rongthong Kunley is the brother-in-law of the present police chief, and he has come here. He is the chairman of the dissident northern Bhutanese political party [the Druk National Congress]. So, you know, it is all in the family.

MH: There are several aspects of the refugee propaganda that I always feel uncomfortable about. The main one is this thing about 'Nepalis have been in Bhutan since the 17th century' and the talk about Ram Shah of Gorkha and so on. This shouldn't really form part of the refugees' case, should it? It seems to me that the Nepalis in southern Bhutan came in 1890, 1900, or whenever. How do you feel about that?

BS: We are very uncomfortable with that ourselves. As far as we are concerned, 1958 is the only thing that matters, and it is not necessary to go back to 1624. It is not only irrelevant, it is generally wrong, because not a single family from southern Bhutan would be able to draw their roots from that point. Yes, there may have been people but they have assimilated totally.

OD: We can produce our grandfathers sitting in the refugee camps who were born there, and that is good enough. We don't need to go further back.

GS: That's right, otherwise you get into the silly, endless back and forth like between China and Tibet, trying to draw something out from the time of Kublai Khan.

BS: The two of us are ex-bureaucrats, so we know that if you speak the truth you must speak the truth. But we have difficulties because some of our friends don't realise that if you undertake one bit of untruth it undoes a lot of your credibility.

MH: Are there any other things like that?

BS: Oh yes, there's one major thing. Unfortunately, there have been so many newly-born politicians (laughs). As I said, our movement is one where we are reacting to a new situation that has been forced upon us. Some people are now dissidents whereas they were actually farmers in the past. Some people are now dissidents who actually were teachers in the past. Our entire argument is that we are seeking justice because unjust treatment has been meted out to the people of southern Bhutan. Now there are some people, perhaps it is not intentional, perhaps they really believe it, who tend to portray this as 'oh, we were politically more conscious than the rest and so we demanded human rights and democracy and the government kicked us out'. Now that is a major, I mean that is a lie! That never happened. But if it were true, I think the government of Bhutan would have had every right to do what they did, because these guys would have been politically motivated. Which is absolutely not true. As far as I am concerned, I never wanted any change, because I was very happy with the system as it was. Frankly, under a monarch in a country where you are not a son of the soil, to be treated with that amount of fairness seemed fine. It was only when evil intentions were introduced that we realised it was necessary to dissent.

MH: Why aren't you a son of the soil?

BS: I mean it in the sense that for southern Bhutanese 1958 is fairly recent. Of course our children will never see it like that...

GS: This distinction might not mean much to you, or to someone sitting in a refugee camp in Jhapa, but in terms of world perception it might be important. To what extent do you think the government's objective was forced integration as opposed to eviction?

BS: Perhaps one of the reasons why this policy took the turn it did was because the assimilation was going a bit too fast for their own liking. You see, here was a society that was deliberately kept apart for nearly a century, by government decree and rules and regulations. I entered the northern part of Bhutan after my college degree. I went with a special permit stating that Bhim Subba is a bonafide national and a resident of this block, "thram" number this, and he may be permitted to go to Thimphu without let and hindrance. OK? We were kept separate. We remained separate until 1979 or 1980. There was that National Council for Social and Cultural Promotion, the NCSCP, where they encouraged assimilation. But it was stupid because they also encouraged physical assimilation: for intermarriage there was an incentive, which was nonsense, you know! But within that five years it basically did give southern Bhutanese a sense of belonging and they felt more comfortable showing their loyalty. And perhaps this was what was frightening, because they saw this group which was always considered 'outside' suddenly now not only accepting the offer but also accelerating the process. You know, when you talk about the dress and so on, all that took place without so much government intervention. The compulsory wearing of national dress came only in 1989, whereas people were already comfortable with it in the early eighties. So perhaps it was because of the success of integration. Maybe. From 1980 to 1985 there was this big programme, then in 1985 it suddenly disappeared overnight without any explanation. Now it is very difficult for us to say why this problem began. The threat has always been there, it would be wrong to say that southern Bhutanese were always welcome, always looked upon as harmless. No, that's not true. From the British days, as far as the northern Bhutanese were concerned, the southern Bhutanese were always considered a threat. If citizenship had not been granted in 1958, then - fine, I would not be making a huge hue and cry. But if in 1958 a decision was taken to consider us Bhutanese, now 30 years later nobody has the right, even god-given, to reverse that. Why was this sudden decision taken in 1988? There is a lot of conjecture about that. But if my house is burgled I can't tell you why it was burgled, you have to ask the burglar.

MH: Wasn't it Sikkim?

BS: You can consider events in Sikkim as able to influence events in Bhutan, but I would like to give our government some credit for realising that Sikkim was a creation of external forces. It was not that the Nepalese in
Sikkim suddenly overnight took up their kukris and said ‘we want this chap out!’ If you say that Sikkim can be repeated in Bhutan, the only way I can see it is if these people are also unwittingly playing the same game.

MH: But when you start proposing things like power-sharing and more share for the Nepalis and so on they must think ‘ah, this is what happened in Sikkim’.

BS: No, we never talked about power-sharing and all this...

MH: But you are now!

BS: Now we have no choice! If there ever is a Sikkim-like situation, then as in Sikkim there must be an external hand. I would beg to be corrected, but Sikkim [i.e. its incorporation into India in 1974-5] was not a creation of the people of Sikkim, it was a creation of external forces which set up the situation to enable events to take place as they did. If there is a Sikkim situation in Bhutan, then not only we but the government is being used. I shudder to think that is a possibility, and I hope it is not, but if it is then we are all pawns being moved around on a chessboard... When you talk about these different citizenship acts and so on... The government has never really been comfortable with the southern Bhutanese, and these acts are based on that kind of perception rather than trying to safeguard itself against a Sikkim-like situation. One thing has to be made clear, which fortunately Professor Leo Rose allowed me to interject in New York. He said that the Bhutanese refugees received no sympathy or support from the Gorkhaland people and that was why they moved into Nepal. His point was that these people could not even get support from their own kind. So I said ‘precisely, Professor Rose, the reason why we did not receive sympathy or support is that we refused to be a part of the Gorkhaland movement in any form.’ The Bhutanese did not even take an interest, forget about providing them with any support, because we found the whole issue out of our interest area. So we provided no support, and when we came out we got that tit-for-tat. Even though we were Nepalese in origin we were Bhutanese first.

ARCHIVES

The Himalayan Collection of the "Völkerkundemuseum der Universität Zürich" (Ethnological Museum of the University of Zurich)

Gitta Hassler and Susanne Grieder
Translation: Neal MacKenzie

A brief history of the museum

In 1989 the Völkerkundemuseum der Universität Zürich celebrated its 100th anniversary. The most important milestones in its history are outlined below.

The seeds were sown in 1888 when the Zurich Ethnographical Society was founded with the avowed goal of establishing an ethnographical museum. The driving forces among the founding members were the zoologist Conrad Keller and the geographer Otto Stoll. The museum was inaugurated the very next year in the cupola of the old stock exchange, and encompassed collections from Conrad Keller (Madagascar), Otto Stoll (Guatemala), Hans Schinz (South-West Africa), Johann Kaspar Horner (South Sea Islands), Gottlieb Spillmann (India) and Hans Spörri (Japan). Otto Stoll was appointed director and remained in office until 1899, becoming the first university member in Zurich to hold the post of professor of ethnography and anthropology. This tradition of combining the functions of museum director and university professor has continued to the present day.

During the period of office of Hans Joseph Wahr, a professor of geography and the third person to hold the position of collection director, the collection, consisting entirely of donations, was relocated in the new university building, which was completed in 1914. 1916 saw the opening of what was now the national ethnographical collection of the University of Zurich, and one year later work began on the setting up of an ethnographical library with an archive of photographic material.

The museum experienced a period of considerable growth, both financially and in terms of staff, during the long directorship (1963-1992) of Karl H. Henking, an anthropologist specialising in religion and art who was recently appointed as emeritus professor. The first edition of the Zurich Ethnological Journal (Ethnologische Zeitschrift Zürich, now published as Ethnologische Schriften Zürich) appeared in 1970, edited by the curators, Walter Raunig and Martin Brauen. A year later the Swiss Ethnological Society (Schweizerische Ethnologische Gesellschaft: SEG) was founded with support from various Zurich anthropologists, and in the same year the anthropological seminar was called into being, with Lorenz G. Löffler in the new professorial chair. Now, at last, anthropology in Zurich had achieved the status of an independent discipline, and from then on the collection was known under its
present title of the "Völkerkundemuseum der Universität Zürich". Its present Director is Michael Oppitz.

Its location in the university buildings was not only unfavourable from the point of view of visitors, it also gave it an air of "ivory tower" isolation. Combined with a lack of space as the collection grew in size, these considerations led to the call for a new, self-contained location, a demand that could not be satisfied until 1979 with the move to its present site in the buildings of the former botanical institute in the grounds of the old botanical gardens ("Zur Katz") in Pellikanstrasse.

The main function of the museum is to carry out research on behalf of the university and to act as a sort of display cabinet, bringing the results of research activities to the attention of the general public. Particular emphasis was also laid on intensifying cooperation with schools. Having begun with the aim of providing material for teaching purposes, the collection has evolved into a museum with a strong focus on public relations activities.

The Himalayan collections

Switzerland provides asylum for more Tibetan refugees than any other country except India, Nepal and the United States of America. A whole range of institutions (such as the Völkerkundemuseum der Universität Zürich, Tibetan Institute at Rikon, University of Lausanne, Historical Museum of St. Gallen, Centre of Tibetan Studies in Mont-Pèlerin) have devoted their energies to this area and are eager to furnish each other with mutual support.

The museum boasts an internationally renowned Tibet and Himalaya collection focusing primarily on: thangkas; instruments used in rituals; wood engravings; and everyday tools and textiles. For reasons of space, only the most important collections - presented first according to collector, and then according to object category - are outlined below, with particularly interesting objects being singled out for special mention.

Hürlimann/Wehrli collection, 1927, 109 objects
In 1926/27 the then director Hans Wehrli undertook an expedition to India and the neighbouring Himalayan territories together with the explorer and photographer Martin Hürlimann, Hürlimann, who was later to found the Atlantis publishing house in Zurich, described his journey to India in 1927 in a special edition of the New Zurich Newspaper (Neue Zürcher Zeitung) and subsequently published a book on the same subject. The Zurich India expert Emil Abegg examined and catalogued the pieces brought back, most of which were used for worship, and they were shown to the public for the first time in 1929.

- Crown of a lama, Nepal
Copper decorated with silver and brass. With representations of the Adibuddha Vajrasattva and the five Tathagatas.
Inv.No 7278; height 43 cm

Prayer wheel, Darjeeling
This large drum stands in a wooden pavilion; it is lined with embossed sheet copper and Sheet brass and decorated with glass stones.
Inv.No 7276; height 65 cm

Imhoff/Heim collection, 1933, 26 objects
In 1930 the geologist and cartographer Eduard Imhof and the geographer Arnold Heim undertook an expedition to South-West China for the purpose of exploring Minya Konka, the highest mountain in Sichuan. From their collection are taken:

- Two clay figures, Tatsienlu
These two figures represent Saints. One of them represents Thang-stong rgyal-po (b.1385), who was the first to perform the stone-breaking ceremony.
Inv.No 8360ab; 16 cm x 10 cm

Harrer collection, 1973, 1108 objects
When the Second World War started, the Austrians Heinrich Harrer and Peter Aufschneider were on an expedition to explore Nanga Parbat. After fleeing from internment in India in 1944 they made their way to Lhasa. Harrer remained in Tibet for seven years.

After lengthy negotiations, the canton of Zurich finally succeeded, in 1972, in acquiring the Harrer collection for one million Swiss francs. The money being raised with the aid of the state lottery. The purchase included the library (comprising several hundred volumes), the photographic material and all the written documentation.

The museum has chosen not to store the Harrer collection as a self-contained set of objects, electing instead to spread the various pieces over its overall collection. The Harrer collection includes maps, several amulet boxes, a large number of medium and good quality thangkas with traditional iconographical motifs, and a small collection of Buddhist literature including a particularly interesting book dealing with the various Tibetan scripts.

- Saddle, Tibet
Wooden saddle from the estate of the minister Tsarong Dadul Namgyal, finished in sheet bronze and covered by a saddle-cloth of silk brocade with a floral pattern.
Inv.No 14927a; 28 cm x 51 cm

- Figure of Chenresi (Avalokiteshvara)
Gold-plated bronze figure with eleven heads and eight arms. Two of the hands embrace Emptiness in front of the breast, and in the three right hands it holds prayer beads (missing here) and the Wheel of the Law. One hand makes the gesture of giving. The left hands hold a lotus
The museum contains all the written material from the estate of Peter Aufschnaiter, including the manuscript for a book published 10 years after his death in 1983 by Martin Brauen (Peter Aufschnaiter - Sein Leben in Tibet, Innsbruck: Steiger Verlag 1983). There is also a small collection consisting primarily of thangkas, statues and cartographic material (sketches, map of the city of Lhasa, lists of altimetric measurements).

Collection of the Swiss Nepalese Society, 1967-78, 300 objects
In 1971, a number of visitors to Nepal who felt the need to maintain a permanent contact with the country founded the Society of Friends of Nepal ("Verein Freundeskreis Nepal"). They planned a variety of activities designed to keep the public informed of events in Nepal and to encourage them to take a greater interest in the country. The society has a collection of Nepalese pieces, mainly metal objects of the Newar community and objects used in the daily life of tribes such as the Gurung and the Rai. These have been loaned to the museum on a permanent basis.

Seeland collection, 1979, 37 objects
A further 37 objects from the Rai tribe of Nepal - likewise primarily objects from everyday life - were bought by the museum from the private collection of the sociologist Klaus Seeland.

Groups of objects
The objects from the southern Mustang area comprise primarily agricultural implements and objects from daily life, such as a horizontal treadle loom. Further everyday objects from Ladakh and Bhutan, accompanied by a number of musical instruments, were also collected.

Textiles
Materials from the culture of Bhutan are represented above all by a large collection of textiles, originating in part from the estate of Barbara Adams and acquired in 1994 with funds from the lottery. This collection includes:

Shingkha
This garment, similar to the Latin American poncho, was worn on ceremonial occasions by women in certain villages of the Kurtoe district. It is made of wool, dyed in indigo, and has brightly coloured ornamental decorations sewn round the neck section and along the seams at the sides.
Inv.No 21494; 120 cm x 80 cm

Canopy or throne cover
This decorative work can be seen in a blanket, used as a canopy or a covering for the throne of a king or a high-ranking lama. It depicts a circle of lotus blossoms enclosing a phoenix with two blossoms in its beak and, in the middle of each side, a kinnara above Mount Meru. A dragon is sewn into each corner, above a kūrtimukha entangled in tendrils.
Inv.No 18416; 130 cm x 130 cm

The textile objects also include a small collection of textiles from Tibet. Most of these were contributed by Martin Brauen, but there are also a few objects from the Harrer collection.

Wood engravings
The museum possesses a large collection of Tibetan wood engravings, some of which are together with the original blocks.

Thangkas
The cornerstone of the Tibet and Himalaya section of the museum is the thangka collection. The principle underlying the compilation and extension of the collection lies less in the age of the objects than in their iconography; there are virtually no thangkas from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In assembling the collection, preference was given to rare motifs of particular iconographical interest. Work on extending the collection continues, focusing above all on works by contemporary artists, a particularly fine example of which can be seen in:

Thangka of Kalachakra cosmos
The cosmos as represented in the Kalachakra Tantra, painted in 1991 by the Nepalese artist Kumar Lama. The lower half of the picture depicts the elementary discus, seen from above, and the beings who inhabit them. Mount Meru rises up in the middle of the picture, with the 24 heavens above it; in the middle of the heavens a transparent head can be seen.
Inv.No 21299; 89 cm x 79 cm

Thangka of the Buddha's footprint
Another interesting thangka from Nepal is one with a footprint of the Buddha Shakyamuni on lotus blossoms scattered in the form of a manḍala. Each of the gold-coloured feet is decorated with a Wheel of Law and four auspicious emblems. The text at the bottom of the picture explains that it was commissioned by way of expiation by a married couple who were prevented from fulfilling mourning rituals by a lengthy period of absence.
Inv.No 19824; 64 cm x 55 cm
Individual objects

In the course of the years, however, the Tibet and Himalaya section of the museum was expanded not only by complete collections of varying sizes but also by a large number of individual pieces, which could be added where appropriate. Objects of this type which are of particular interest include:

500 miniature paintings
The 500 miniature paintings from the category of the tsag-li comprise a total of 4 volumes and constitute a rare find, being the only known version to exist in colour. The paintings probably come from China or Mongolia and can be subdivided into three groups: Rin-byung brgya-brtse, Shar-thang brgya-brtse, rDor-phreng (Sanskrit Vajravai). Inv.No 17942; 10,5 cm x 29 cm

Altar fragment
The altar fragment is fashioned in gold-plated copper and depicts a bodhisattva (possibly Avalokiteshvara). To the right of this figure are three animals - an elephant, a lion and a fabulous creature - one on top of the other. At the top of this tower, standing on the back of the fabulous animal, is a small human figure. The rest of the surface is taken up with perforated arabesques, and the whole object is bordered by decorated edging. The companion piece belongs to a private collection.
Inv.No 13575; 51 cm x 38 cm

dPal-idan lha-mo
This gold-plated bronze figure (with traces of red colouring) depicts Lhamo riding a mule while Makaravara walks before her and Simhavara behind her. The mule is making its way through a sea of blood - indicated by the waves on the base - and over the dismembered limbs of corpses.
Inv.No 14113; 18 cm x 8 cm

Exhibitions

Since the early seventies there have been regular exhibitions, each centered on a particular theme and each designed to present selected segments of the museum's panoply of objects to interested visitors.
1. Art treasures from Tibetan monasteries (Kunstschätze aus tibetischen Klöstern), 1972 - 1977
2. Impressions from Tibet (Impressionen aus Tibet), 1974 - 1977
3. Journeys through Tibet (Reisen in Tibet), 1975
4. New exhibits from the Himalayas (Neues aus dem Himalaya), 1977-1979
5. The art and culture of Vajrayana in Nepal and Tibet (Kunst und Kult des Vajrayana in Nepal und Tibet), 1980 - 1983
6. Tibetan merchant nomads in western Nepal (Tibetische Händlernomaden in West-Nepal), 1983
7. Life and survival in Nepal (Nepal - Leben und Ueberleben), 1984
8. Touching allowed: Dancing gods (Berühren erlaubt: Tanzende Götter), 1987
10. Somewhere in Bhutan - where women do the talking (Irgendwo in Bhutan Wo Frauen das Sagen haben), 1994 - 1995
11. Spinning, weaving and wearing - textiles from Bhutan (Gesponnen gewoben getragen - Textilien aus Bhutan), planned for 1995

Staff

Since 1962, the "Völkerkundemuseum der Universität Zürich" has had a separate department devoted to Tibet and the Himalayas. This department was managed and systematically expanded for a period of thirteen years by Eva Stoll, daughter of the first museum director. Among her achievements was the initiation of the thangka collection. Martin Brauen came to the museum in 1971 and became Eva Stoll's successor two years later. Since then, as well as occupying the position of vice-director of the museum, he has been in charge of this department and has devoted his considerable enthusiasm to making significant contributions to the scientific research carried out on this region.

The library

The library currently encompasses some 20,000 publications, with approximately 1,700 volumes and some 15 periodicals being devoted to the area of Tibet and the Himalayas. In terms of subject matter, attention focuses on works dealing with art and religion, especially Tibetan Buddhism. The collection also contains the major works on Tibetan iconography and a wide range of travel reports.

The museum library is one of four libraries devoted to Tibet and the Himalayas in Zurich. The others are the Nepal library of the Ethnographical Seminar of the University of Zurich, the Nepal library of the Swiss Nepalese Society (housed in the Zurich Municipal Library) and the library of the Tibet Institute in Rikon. Taken together, these libraries constitute an extremely comprehensive collection of the scientific literature available on this subject area.
NEWS/ANNOUNCEMENTS

Nepalese and Italian Contributions to the History and Archaeology of Nepal. Seminar held at Hanuman Dhoka, Kathmandu, 22-23 January 1995

A seminar on "Nepalese and Italian Contributions to the history and archaeology of Nepal", organized by the Italian Institute for the Middle and Far East (IsMEO) and by the Department of Archaeology of HMG, was held in Kathmandu on January 22nd and 23rd 1995. The event, which was held to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Giuseppe Tucci (*1894), was presided over by the Honourable Minister of Education, Culture and Social Welfare of HMG of Nepal, Mr M.N. Praschit, by the Director General of the Department of Archaeology HMG, Mr K.M. Shrestha and by the President of IsMEO, Prof. G. Gnoli. Papers were read by Nepalese and Italian scholars on recent historical, archeological, epigraphical and art historical research done in Nepal.

The role played by G. Tucci since his first pioneering explorations in the '30s, and above all in the '50s - when his pupils, R. Gnoli and L. Petech, began their own important research on Nepalese epigraphy and history - was underlined at the beginning of the seminar. D.R. Regmi began by saying that G. Tucci "... was the first to initiate the second line of Italian travellers' who revived a tradition which goes back to the 17th century when Italian missionaries first came to Nepal, and began a tradition of fieldwork which Italians have since continued, particularly during the last ten years when archeological activities were undertaken in the Kathmandu Valley (Harigaon, Dhumvarahi, Deopatan, Patan) and in the Terai (Simraongarh, Gothawa, Sisiana) along with the restoration of wall-paintings in the palace of the Fifty-five Windows and of the Pujari Math of Bhaktapur.

L. Petech and G. Verardi gave a joint paper reviewing the results achieved by Italian scholars on the ancient and medieval history of Nepal. T.N. Mishra presented a wide ranging survey of Nepalese architecture based on Licchavi epigraphy. Starting from an analysis of some technical terms, the Nepalese scholar demonstrated the abundance and specificity of architectural elements in the monuments of the Kathmandu Valley.

An interesting paper concerning post-ancient Nepal was given by H.R. Joshi, who linked several different aspects of late-Licchavi culture and historical reality. He highlighted some of the problems concerning the social and religious conflicts and dynastic changes characteristic of a period of crisis in the 7th and 8th centuries.

G. Verardi's paper provided the archaeological evidence found during the excavation of the Satya Narayana temple at Harigaon where Narendra_deva's Buddhist phase was cancelled by the successive phase related to the Vaishnav restoration. Verardi aimed to clarify the social and economic nature of the political and religious conflicts of the 8th and 9th centuries, comparing them to the conditions in which Buddhists found themselves under similar circumstances in China and India.

Preliminary reports on the archaeological sites of Dhumvarahi, Patan and Simraongarh, were presented by O. Volpicelli, S. Pracchia and M. Vidale, who, in the last five years, directed several archaeological campaigns at these sites. Besides presenting some new data and documenting their activities, the lecturers demonstrated the archeological importance of these sites during the Licchavi and medieval periods.

R.N. Pandey outlined the preliminary results of his recent research on the artistic evidence found in Western Nepal. He stressed the importance of some sites (Dulul for example) for the development of the sculptural style that characterises the western Himalayan regions. Light was thrown on numerous series of sculptures (mostly ignored by scholars) made in this area during the medieval period.

A careful analysis of the sources and of the historical and archeological data concerning the identification of Kapilavastu was made by M.R. Aryal who underlined the more obscure points of the Anglo-Indian research.

A contribution to the study of the dhanu_dhara of the Kathmandu Valley was given by R. Pradhan; in addition to stressing the historical and artistic importance of these monumental fountains, she emphasised their specific ritual character and their function as social aggregate which, in many cases, is still valid.

An attempt to show the diverse paleographic and epigraphic aspects of the inscription recently discovered at Mahankal was made by R. Garbini who made a preliminary analysis of the historical and chronological problems (pertaining to the calendar) found in this text.

In addition to the seminar there was an exhibition on view where photographic and didactic panels documented the different activities of IsMEO, G. Tucci's explorations, the different archeological campaigns and the restoration of paintings.

A.A. Di Castro (IsMEO, Rome)

Interdisciplinary Workshop: "Himalayan Space in Language and Culture" Nijmegen, April 3-4, 1995

The workshop, which was organized by Balthasar Bickel, Eve Danziger, and Martin Gaenszle on behalf of the Cognitive Anthropology Research Group at the Max-Planck-Institute for Psycholinguistics at Nijmegen (Netherlands), brought together anthropologists and linguists concerned with Himalayan societies. The aim was to enter into dialogue and to compare what has been found in cultural conceptualisation and symbolisation to linguistic patterns of encoding spatial relations.
The first day was dominated by papers dealing with the constitution of spatial orientation through ritual journeys which are an important feature of the religious traditions of Tibeto-Burman speaking communities in the Himalayas. Martin Gaenszle (Heidelberg), taking up ideas developed in an early article by Nicholas J. Allen, focused on the vertical dimension in Mewahang Rai oral ritual texts. That local case suffixes marking the vertical dimension in various parts of grammar are indeed a unique phenomenon found only in Kiranti languages was stressed in the contribution by Karen Ebert (Zürich). Michael Oppitz (Zürich) spoke on the cardinal directions in Magar mythology as expressed in the auxiliary chants which deal with the origin of ritual tools. The paper presented by András Höfer (Heidelberg) discussed various examples of Tamang oral ritual texts (e.g. an "incensing of the universe", a ritual journey and a song on the wanderings of a mythic hero) and inquired into their poetical techniques of constructing spatial orientation.

On the second day Alexander Macdonald (Paris) spoke on the "Mandalaization" of the Himalayas and described the installation of a mandala in a landscape in terms of an "intellectual colonization". The contribution by Asif Agha (Los Angeles) dealt with spatial anchoring, orientational schemas, and spatialization effects in Lhasa Tibetan and focused particularly on deictics. Gérard Toffin (Paris) spoke on the inside/outside opposition which is one aspect of spatial categorization among the Newars of Kathmandu. This opposition reappears on various levels, e.g. in domestic space, temple symbolism and urban space, and is enacted in ritual. Returning to the issue of the vertical dimension, Tej Man Angdembe (Leiden) demonstrated the importance of "up"/"down" metaphors which are at the base of Limbu emotion terms. Finally, Balthasar Bickel (Zürich) discussed the interrelationship of formalised practice and spatial language in the case of the Belhara (a Kiranti group). In this context he raised the crucial issue of pragmatic knowledge.

Most papers pointed out the strong grammaticalization of spatial categories in various Himalayan languages, a feature which became particularly clear in the case of the Kiranti languages' emphasis on the vertical dimension. But while these grammatical inscriptions in some cases seem to be directly correlated with cultural phenomena, this is by no means necessarily the case as historical processes have lead to a highly complex situation in the Himalayas.

Martin Gaenszle (Heidelberg)

Himalayan Languages Symposium
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden
June 16th and 17th, 1995

This year the first international Himalayan Languages Symposium was convened in the Netherlands under the auspices of the Himalayan Languages Project of Leiden University. For over a decade, scholars in France, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands had expressed the desirability of a regularly convened forum for scholars of Himalayan languages. This year the research team of the Himalayan Languages Project in Leiden took the initiative of organizing the first such symposium in the Netherlands. The symposium proved to be highly successful, and Zürich has already been proposed as the venue for next summer's meeting.

Participants expressed the shared hope that this symposium will establish a tradition. The first Himalayan Languages Symposium brought together scholars stationed in Europe, and it is hoped that the symposium will grow into a global forum for Himalayan language scholars. The Himalayan Languages Symposium was envisaged as a podium for contributions from linguists and specialists from kindred disciplines on any language of the Himalayas, whether it be Tibeto-Burman, Indo-Aryan, Burushaski, Kusunda or any other tongue. The fact that the first Himalayan Languages Symposium included contributions on the languages of Sichuan and the Tibetan Plateau demonstrates that the term 'Himalayan' is intended not in a restrictive, but a panoramic sense.

The keynote speaker at the Leiden symposium was Bernard Comrie. Participants presented contributions on a variety of Himalayan languages, viz. Bantawa, Dumi, Byangsi, Tibetan, Limbu, Mewahang, Lepcha, Belhara, Yamphu, Kulung, gya-rong and Nepali. No proceedings will be published, but many of the symposium contributions will be included in a Trends in Linguistics volume to be entitled Himalayan Linguistics (Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin). This volume will also comprise contributions not presented at the symposium.

The Himalayan Languages Symposium will convene each summer at a location to be announced one year in advance. More information about the 1996 Himalayan Languages Symposium will be made available in the autumn. The Himalayan Languages Project at Leiden University will act as the caretaker of the permanent mailing list of the symposium. You can be put on the mailing list by sending your name, complete address, e-mail address, fax and telephone numbers to: Himalayan Languages Project, Leiden University, Postbus 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands. Abstracts for next year's symposium can be sent for review to the same address.

George van Driem (Leiden)
The symposium series on "High Mountain Remote Sensing Cartography" (HMRSC) was created in 1989 by M. Buchroithner to provide a forum for scientists to facilitate the exchange of experiences and ideas on sustained interdisciplinary remote sensing studies in high mountain areas and to promote these activities. Topics addressed within the technical sessions of the HMRSC symposiums represent many fields of remote sensing application and integration of geoscientific information into geographic information systems (GIS). Besides presenting new developments in the field of remote sensing, major topics discussed during the symposium were interdisciplinary studies dealing with remote sensing techniques as a useful tool for thematic mapping and environmental monitoring of high mountain areas. Papers dealing with the production of suitable satellite tracking maps were also presented as different thematic mapping approaches in the fields of geology, geomorphology, glaciology etc.. The lectures given showed clearly that the scientific goals of one major topic: integration of geoscientific information into geographic information systems these activities. Technical sessions and post-symposium field excursions will take place in the important mountain chains.

The first symposium in 1990 was organized and hosted by the Institute for Image Processing and Computer Graphics (Buchroithner M.), Joanneum Research, Graz, Austria. After the technical session in Graz, the post-symposium field trip visited the Schladminger Tauern area in the Austrian Alps.

The second symposium in 1992 was co-organized by the Institute of Geology, University of Vienna/Austria (Häusler H., Leber, D.), the Institute for Image Processing/Joanneum Research, Graz/Austria (Buchroithner, M.), and the Institute of Remote Sensing Application (Liu Jiyuan), Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing/China, which also hosted the symposium. After technical sessions in Beijing and Lhasa/Tibet Autonomous Region, the participants had the opportunity to discuss in the field the topics addressed in the conference presentations. The post-exursion field trip, in the south of the Tibetan plateau and in the northern part of the Himalayas, covered the route from Lhasa, via Xigaze, Dingri and the Qomolangma (Mt. Everest) base camp to the Tibetan/Nepalese border at Zhangmu. It closed with a visit to the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Kathmandu/Nepal with the presentation of the Mountain Environment and Natural Resources Information System (MENRIS).

The third International Symposium on High Mountain Remote Sensing Cartography, in 1994, was organized and hosted by the Institute for Applied Research in Space Sciences (Leguizamón S. - Instituto de Investigaciones Aplicadas de Ciencias Espaciales, IIACE) at the Regional Center of Scientific and Technical Research (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, CONICET) in Mendoza City/Argentina. The post-symposium excursion led from Mendoza to Uspallata, Puente de Vacas, Puente del Inca to Las Cuevas, near the Chilean border, where the Central Argentinian Andes culminate in the impressive Cerro Aconcagua (6959 m), the highest mountain of the Andean chain. References to papers dealing with the Himalayas presented during the HMRSC symposiums are given below.

The fourth HMRSC symposium, scheduled for September 1996, will be hosted by the University of Karlstad, Sweden. The technical session will be held in Karlstad, the post-symposium field trip will lead to Kiruna in northern Sweden and finish in Troms in the fjords on the Atlantic coast in northern Norway.

Further information concerning HMRSC-IV: Dr. Gerhard Bax, Remote Sensing Laboratory, University of Karlstad, P.O. Box 9501, 65009 Karlstad, Sweden.

Papers of the HMRSC series dealing with the Himalayas:


In present times the whole of Central Asia is undergoing dramatic changes leading to a highly volatile state of affairs. This has been caused first of all by the breakup of the former Soviet Union, but also by the reawakening of local and ethnic independence movements in many of the above-mentioned areas. No end to this phase seems to be in sight.

The recent political changes caused an urgent demand for information about the whole area which up until now had only been recognised - if at all - as belonging to either the Soviet Union, China or India. While the dominance of Moscow, Beijing and Delhi decreases, the importance of regional and local conditions and processes for Central Asia increases proportionately. In view of the increasing economic and geopolitical importance of Central Asia these regional conditions and processes themselves exercise a growing influence on the surrounding powers. Recently it has been felt and lamented that there is a grave deficiency of information about these regional circumstances. On account of this deficiency the Institute of Central Asian Studies at Bonn University is currently preparing an Information Centre and Archive on Central Asia and the Himalayas. This is planned to be a joint project of Turkish, Mongolian, Tibetan and possibly Iranian studies. This long-term project aims at collecting, processing and passing on sound and dependable information on the politics, societies and cultures of Central Asia. Special attention will be given to the present processes of transition and transformation while constantly considering the historical backgrounds and the traditional norms and values of the respective societies.

Constant analysis of local and regional media, unpublished, scientific, and other relevant literature plus making use of a large net of informants will supply the necessary basic information. This will be filed in a data base which includes a central file for "facts", a "Who's Who" of important persons and institutions, and several other files (time tables, indices of maps, photographs, films, etc.). A specially designed complex retrieval system helps to find and list information under thematic, geographical, chronological and formal criteria. The original documents will be collected and made available in the archive. Besides the availability of the materials in the data base and the archive, the results will be published in periodical reports, and enquiries by all interested parties (scientists, politicians, development workers, journalists, economists, etc.) will be answered. The structure of the data base as well as the retrieval system can be used by other similar projects with a different geographical focus. This project shall establish interfaces between the various areas of Central Asian studies and the systematic academic disciplines on the one hand and academic research and development projects in Central Asia on the other.

For further information, enquiries and suggestions contact Thierry Dödin or Heinz Räther / Institute for Central Asian Studies / University of Bonn / Regina-Pacis-Weg 7 / D-53113 Bonn. Phone: (+49)-228-737465/Fax: (+49)-228-737458.

Heinz Räther (Bonn)
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NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

The European Bulletin of Himalayan Research welcomes for consideration manuscripts and short notices dealing with any of the following topics:

1. Topical reports on ongoing, or recently completed, research projects.
2. Information about archives with literary, historical, archaeological, ethnographic, botanical, etc. materials collected in the Himalayan region.
3. Reviews of books on the Himalayas, including books published in Nepal, India, Pakistan and China which because of poor distribution may be inadequately known in Europe.
4. Current political developments in Nepal, India, Pakistan and China and the implications of these developments for research carried out by European scholars.
5. News about recent or forthcoming conferences, and on funding opportunities for European scholars working in the Himalayas as well as for scholars from the Himalayan region itself to visit Europe.

Manuscripts should not exceed 5,000 words (ca. 20 pages) in length. All contributions will be published in English. Anything submitted in English by a non-native speaker will be copy-edited in Paris or London.

Contributors are invited to submit their articles as hard copy and possibly on disk. (If your article is send on disk, please also send hard copy.) All formats are acceptable. If your article is not on disk, please type it boldly, in a large font, and avoid hand-written additions to facilitate scanning.

Please submit your articles with notes attached at the end of your contribution, don’t use footnotes at the end of the page. Non-English words should be underlined or written in italics throughout the text. The titles of books etc. cited should be written in italics. Titles of articles should be in plain text within quotation marks, together with the title of their source (book or journal) in italics, e.g.


The deadline for submissions for our tenth issue is October 31, 1995. Anything received after that date will go into the eleventh issue, expected in summer, 1996.

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