European Bulletin of Himalayan Research

The European Bulletin of Himalayan Research (EBHR) was founded by the late Richard Burghart in 1991 and has appeared twice yearly ever since. It is a product of collaboration and edited on a rotating basis between France (CNRS), Germany (South Asia Institute) and the UK (SOAS). Since January 2006 onwards the French editorship has been run as a collective, presently including Pascale Dollfus, András Höfer, Marie Lecomte-Tilouine, Boyd Michailowsky, Philippe Ramirez, Blandine Ripert, and Anne de Sales.

We take the Himalayas to mean, the Karakoram, Hindukush, Ladakh, southern Tibet, Kashmir, north-west India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and north-east India. The subjects we cover range from geography and economics to anthropology, sociology, philology, history, art history, and history of religions. In addition to scholarly articles, we publish book reviews, reports on research projects, information on Himalayan archives, news of forthcoming conferences, and funding opportunities. Manuscripts submitted are subject to a process of peer-review.

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EDITORIAL

Now nearing its fifteenth year of existence, EBHR goes to show that imagining an editorship rotating between Germany, Britain and France was not such a silly idea after all. Though all collaboration and technical tasks are now running smoothly enough, the bulletin still suffers from an irregular volume of subscriptions. Delays in subscription renewals compel us to “juggle” with our finances. We are therefore taking this opportunity to kindly request our former subscribers to check the status of their subscription. May we also appeal to regular readers to subscribe so that we can guarantee the future of our bulletin. We would like to remind everyone that EBHR does not benefit from any funding other than subscriptions and that these rates are kept to the lowest possible.

We have decided that issue 31 will be a double issue with a single number. Therefore, this will not affect its price, nor the number of issues sent to subscribers, nor the publication of a second issue next autumn. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the publication of two double issues over the last three years had caused a gap and the problem had to be solved. Secondly, this issue includes an article which is particularly long and which could only be published as a single piece. It is exceptional for the bulletin to accept texts of such length, and this was done only by taking into account the very peculiar nature of the data offered.

We would like to renew our appeal for contributions, especially among young researchers, for whom we would be very proud indeed to offer an opportunity to bring their findings and thoughts to the public eye.

Let us finally dedicate this issue to the memory of our colleague and friend Karen Lunström-Baudais. We will never forget her passionate and exceptionally rigorous fieldwork reports. Her demise is a great loss for Himalayan Studies.

Philippe Ramirez
Notes on contributors

Mr. Kedar Bhakta Mathema started his career from the educational sector. He has been lecturer at Tri-Chandra College and Vice-Chancellor of Tribhuvan University. He then served as Senior Program Officer of World Bank in Kathmandu and as Nepali Ambassador to Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

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Dr. Claus Peter Zoller has completed a PhD on A grammar of a Bhotia language… His habilitation pertained to the Stylistic analysis of an oral Mahabharata. He has been scientific supervisor of the Hindi text database (http://salcorpora.com). His areas of scientific interest include Hindi language and literature, linguistics of West Himalayan and Dardic languages, North Indian folk traditions and epics.
IN MEMORIAM
Harka Gurung
by Monique Fort

With the tragic death of Harka Gurung on 23 September 2006 in a helicopter crash in far eastern Nepal, Nepal has lost one of its most brilliant intellectuals and statesmen. Harka Bahadur was born in Bhulbule in the heart of the Gurung country, on the sloping left bank of the Marsyangdi River, not far from Khudi bazaar. His father, a colonel in his Majesty’s Gurkha regiments, sent him to study at the finest schools in India, at a time when the school infrastructure was practically nonexistent in Nepal. His frequent trips back and forth between Nepal and India, led Harka Gurung to write his “Vignettes of Nepal”, in which he recounts a number of choice anecdotes, and in particular how he got away from highway bandits who, with the opening of the country to foreigners and the development of the trekking industry, have gradually died out. After obtaining a B.A. Honours from Patna College, India Harka left for the University of Edinburgh to prepare his post-graduate diploma, and a Ph.D. (1965) devoted to the geography of the Pokhara Valley, a remarkable piece of work carried out under the guidance of Pr. Geddes. At the same time, he was demonstrator at the University of Edinburgh (1963-64) and Research Fellow at the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London (1964-66), thanks to which he realized that his calling was indeed research and multi-disciplinary studies which he was to keep throughout his political career.

This started barely a few years after his return to Nepal. After two years as lecturer at Tribhuvan University (1966-68), he was rapidly appointed member, then Vice-chairman of the National Planning Commission (1968-1975), then Minister of State for Education, and Industry & Commerce, and finally Minister of State for Tourism, Public Works & Transport (1977-78) in the Nepalese Government. His vision as “geographer”, his sound knowledge of Nepal and its populations, strongly contrasted with that of other ministers, who had often never even been outside the Kathmandu Valley. His knack of grasping local situations made Harka Gurung de facto a real expert on Nepal’s development, marking out future tendencies whereby Nepal, in the medium term, might progress from a situation of great underdevelopment: the creation of schools, the tracing of roads, the opening of trekking routes, the increasing share conceded to populations of tribal origin… Greatly appreciated by foreign research and cooperation organisations, especially for his capacity to stick to the point and for his objectivity, he carried out work as expert for structures as varied as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), The World Bank, The World Conservation Union (IUCN), UNICEF, the Asian and Pacific Development Centre of which he
was director for 5 years (1993-97), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)... It was on his return from a mission with this last organisation, aimed at relinquishing to the populations living at the foothills of Mount Kangchenjunga their rights to use the forests which they had been deprived of following the creation of the National Park, that the helicopter bringing him and his companions back to Kathmandu crashed into the mountainside.

Harka Gurung leaves behind him an impressive list of publications tackling the most varied of subjects: geography, demography, ethnography, environmental planning and political economics. He loved the mountains in Nepal (throughout his life he sought to christen the summits climbed by mountaineers with vernacular names attributed by the populations living at the foot of these different ranges) and chaired the Nepal Mountaineering Association. He was the main actor in creating the International Mountain Museum, Pokhara. Having chosen to retire from political life over the course of the last years, he was no less active in the different research and development structures: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), International Institute of Educational Planning, UNESCO, or Lumbini Development Trust board. He was the driving force behind New ERA, a research and consulting firm which he created in Kathmandu and which, despite the vicissitudes of the country’s political life, always remained true to his line of action: to work towards a coordinated development in tune with the country and its people. Harka Gurung was a great humanist, he loved his country and its people. Throughout his life he managed to combine a university approach (relying on objective facts) and a political approach taken in the noblest meaning of the term. He contributed a lot to Nepal and always tried to promote “tribal” populations. His untimely death deprives us of the analysis he was about to make of recent events in his country. It above all deprives Nepal of this dominant figure dedicated to his country, with an exceptional mind and real political farsightedness.

Harka Gurung was the author of numerous books including: Pokhara Valley: A Geographical Survey; Annapurna to Dhaulagiri: A Decade of Mountaineering in Nepal Himalaya 1950-60; Vignettes of Nepal; Nature and Culture: Random Reflections; Janajati Serophero; a dozen monographs and atlas; and over 500 published papers on culture, demography, development planning, environment, geography, political economy, and tourism.

A complete bibliography of his works is available on the website created by his children on http://www.harkagurung.org
Castes among the Newars. The Debate between Colin Rosser and Declan Quigley on the Status of Shrestha

Bal Gopal Shrestha

My aim is to present a discussion on caste among the Newars, focusing on the debate about the status of the Shrestha between two scholars: Colin Rosser and Declan Quigley. Colin Rosser is among the earliest scholars who carried out anthropological study on the Newar society and presented interesting discussion on their castes and the status of the Shrestha. Declan Quigley later conducted field research among the Newars in the eighties, and, finding Rosser’s views on the status of Shrestha controversial, he criticised them in several articles. In these pages, I shall provide a short description of the Newar castes before presenting both scholars’ viewpoints. Finally, I will offer my own view, based on my research in Sankhu and on my own experience as being a Shrestha.

The complexity and ambiguity of the caste systems on the Indian subcontinent proved one of the most fascinating subjects for scholars involved in this region in the past century and will remain so for many years to come. From Bouglé to Hocart, Weber to Dumont and Dumont to Quigley, the discussion on castes continued without a break, so that a vast literature dealing with this question is now at our disposition. Among recent publications, Declan Quigley’s Interpretation of Caste can be considered one of the most remarkable because it provides a dynamic discussion of caste in the Indian sub-continent.

1 David Gellner, Gérard Toffin, Peter Webster and many other scholars have written on the Newars and their castes. For the present purpose, however, I shall restrict myself to the debate between Colin Rosser and Declan Quigley.

2 Discussion on castes presented here is basically drawn from my PhD research (Shrestha 2002). I would like to acknowledge the Research School CNWS, Leiden, The Netherlands for the excellent opportunity that I received to accomplish my dissertation at Leiden (1996-2002). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop: Themes in Newar Culture, History, and Identity at University of London (SOAS), London, UK on June 30, 2003. I am indebted to Dr. David Gellner, the convenor of the workshop and to the other scholars present at the workshop for their helpful comments on my paper. I am grateful to Dr. Marie Lecomte-Tilouine and Dr. Philippe Ramirez of CNRS Himalaya, France for their helpful comments to earlier drafts of this paper.

The Newar Castes

The Newar society is hierarchically divided into various castes. A nineteenth century chronicle, the Bhaṣāvaṃśāvalī, credits the fourteenth century king Jayasthiti Malla for introducing the caste system into the Nepal Valley. However, Nepalese historians showed that the caste system already existed in Nepal during the Licchavi rule (5th to 8th century) and that King Jayasthiti Malla only reinforced or restructured it. For this purpose, several Brahmins from India who were masters of Hindu scriptures assisted him. According to the Bhaṣāvaṃśāvalī together with their subcastes, a total of 725 different castes were created during the reign of King Jayasthiti Malla. However, the Bhaṣāvaṃśāvalī does not provide their names and only presents some detailed regulations for 53 different castes. Hodgson, Hamilton, and Oldfield distinguished between Hindu and Buddhist Newar castes. Chattopadhyay provided a more detailed treatment of Newar castes. He not only critically treated and compared the lists of Hodgson, Hamilton, Oldfield and Levi, but also compared them with other caste systems of the region. Chattopadhyay, who was entirely dependent on textual sources, saw that the lists he found did not match with each other and that the duties described for many castes were inaccurate. Regmi also elaborately discussed Newar caste structure and presented its historical background.

Despite the Brahminical basis of the Newar caste structure, it is difficult to apply the four hierarchical orders of Brahman, Kṣetri, Vaiśya and Śudra to the Newars. The adoption of the Hindu caste structure by the Newar Buddhists is also not easily explained, because, in principle, Buddhists oppose the Hindu caste system. The Vajracarya and the Sakya as the top Buddhist priestly castes parallel the Hindu Brahmin priests. Therefore, Gellner rightly stated that Newar society is double-headed because of these two different priestly castes. As the Vajracarya perform...
priestly duties, people consider them as Buddhist Brahmins. Below the Brahmins and Vajracarya are other high castes called Syasyaḥ (Joshi, Pradhan and Shrestha); below them are middle and lower castes and “unclean” and “untouchable” castes. It may be said that the hierarchical levels of the Newar castes are numerous. However, their ranking will remain a matter of dispute because claims and counter claims of positions remain unresolved.

Before the Gorkha conquest, a social stratification existed, but there was no written legal code until the implementation of the first legal code of Nepal (Muluki Ain) in 1854 AD. This code subordinates all the Newar castes to the Parvatiya castes despite the Newar’s own caste stratification. It ranks the Newar Brahmins not only below the Parvatiya Brahmins but also below the Kṣetris, and ranks the Newar Brahmins above all other Newar castes including the Buddhist Vajracarya priests. Though the Newar Brahmins are legally ranked below the Parvatiya Brahmins, they claim a higher position than them and prohibit marriage with them. In case of such a marriage, the children are prohibited to perform priestly tasks for high caste Newars. Newar Brahmins are relatively few in number and share their priestly tasks with non-Brahmin assistants: the Joshi astrologers and the Karmacarya. This apparent lack of unitary hierarchy, perhaps, led Dumont to state that the Newars do not have a caste system.

So far, no written evidence has yet been traced to define the exact structure of the caste system during the Malla period (thirteenth to eighteenth century). However, the nineteenth century chronicles, which are believed to have been written for the new rulers of Nepal to understand the Newars, describe it. The 1854 legal code came only after Prime Minister Jung Bahadur’s returned from England and Sharma assumes that it was inspired by this visit. In the matter of caste stratification and caste-bound duties, the 1854 law is very detailed and

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11 All Newars were ranked in the Matawali or alcohol-consuming category. The category was considered the Shudra, the lowest among the four varṇa of the Hindu society. See Sharma (1977: 284). Nepali (1987: 319-20) presents eight hierarchical levels for all castes and ethnic groups of Nepal.

12 Höfer (1979: 45) provides a ranking order of Newar castes among other Nepalese castes in his study of the 1854 legal code.

13 In Kathmandu, the Karmacarya are also in charge of the temple of the royal goddess Taleju.


15 Sharma (1977: 278).
defines the punishments for misbehaviour by each caste.\textsuperscript{16} Until the New Legal Code (\textit{Nāyāṃ Muluki Ain}) of Nepal in 1964 was introduced, the 1854 legal code continued to prevail, with amendments.\textsuperscript{17} Then, all restrictions regarding castes have lost their legal ground, but it did not prevent people from continuing their traditional beliefs. Therefore, despite the New Legal Code, traditional caste distinctions continue till today, which can clearly be seen in villages or small towns like Sankhu, and in a lesser degree in the cities of Kathmandu and Patan.

Fürer-Haimendorf provided the first field-based anthropological discourse on Newar society and discussed in detail its castes and hierarchy.\textsuperscript{18} He distinguished only four castes: the Deo Brahmin, Jha Brahmin, the Syasyah (Sheshyo) and the Jogi as Hindu while considering the rest as Buddhist castes. He rightly noted that all the Newars were pollution-conscious and maintenance of caste-status was common even among the Buddhists.\textsuperscript{19} Discussing caste hierarchies among the Newars, Rosser put them into two categories as dominant block (\textit{ju pim>jyupim}) and subordinate block (\textit{ma ju pim>majyupim}), and in the first category he listed six levels and in the latter three.\textsuperscript{20} His table provides 26 different castes in Newar society, which he gathered from his survey of the 33 Newar settlements in the Kathmandu Valley.\textsuperscript{21} He saw a growing trend among the Shrestha of substituting their Gubhaju priests for Brahmins.\textsuperscript{22}

Gopal Singh Nepali was the earliest to provide an in-depth view on Newar social life and culture in his book \textit{The Newars}. Nepali divided their caste system into six hierarchical blocks with twelve levels.\textsuperscript{23} Gutschow and Kölver presented a list of Newar castes from Bhaktapur, which ranks them into nineteen levels.\textsuperscript{24} Gérard Toffin presented a more elaborate list of Newar castes in a hierarchical order.\textsuperscript{25} In Panauti, he recorded fifteen

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Macdonald (1983: 281-308) presents English translations of the code with comments on the law made for the lower castes. See also (Höfer 1979).
\item \textsuperscript{17} Pertaining to marriage, lifecycle rituals and divorce, the 1854 Legal Code and its later amendments (1936, 1948 and 1952), which was in effect until the 1964 Legal Code was implemented, provides special regulations for different Newars castes. See Regmi (1978: 21-48) appendixes 1, 2 and 3.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Von Fürer-Haimendorf (1956: 15-38).
\item \textsuperscript{19} Von Fürer-Haimendorf (1956: 23).
\item \textsuperscript{20} Rosser (1979: 89).
\item \textsuperscript{21} Rosser (1979: 85-86).
\item \textsuperscript{22} Rosser (1979: 104).
\item \textsuperscript{23} Nepali (1965: 150).
\item \textsuperscript{24} Gutschow & Kölver (1975: 56-58) say the ranking is from the Rajopadhyay’s viewpoint.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Toffin’s (1984: 231, table XIII) list contains 34 castes but these days some of them are not to be found anymore.
\end{itemize}
Newar castes and considered ten as “pure” and three as “impure”. He classified the “pure” into three and “impure” into two hierarchical levels.²⁶ Presenting micro status levels (thar) of Newar Hindus in Bhaktapur, Levy listed 31 castes in a hierarchical manner. He distinguished three levels of Syasyah and three levels of Jyapu and put the third category of Syasyah even below the Jyapu, which is controversial.²⁷

More dynamic views on Newar castes have been elaborated in the study entitled Contested Hierarchies, and characterised by its editors (D. Gellner and D. Quigley 1995) as a “collaborative ethnography of caste among the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal.”²⁸ Parish’s Hierarchy and its Discontents is another intriguing study on the Newars with regard to caste complexity. Discussing Newar caste stratification, Parish shows sociological and psychological contradictions between untouchable and high castes.²⁹ Gellner presents a pyramidal image of the caste hierarchies dividing them into six different levels.³⁰ Sharma also ranks the castes into a similar hierarchical chart.³¹

Among the clean castes, there exist several internal layers and traditional hierarchies. These caste hierarchies can be discovered when a marriage partner is selected. The Newar castes maintain caste-endogamy, although hypergamy is allowed. Inter-caste marriage is a transgression of rules, and if a girl marries somebody lower than her own caste, she looses her former caste. In case a man from a higher caste marries a girl from a lower caste, their children belong to the mother’s caste. A marriage between a clean and an unclean caste turns out more stigmatising for the higher caste, if it is a man who has taken a girl of lower birth.³² After the implementation of the New Legal code (Nayaṃ Muluki Ain) of Nepal in 1964 liberal changes have been taking place, but the concept of higher and lower caste is still prevalent among the Newars. Especially in small towns like Sankhu, caste stigmatisation and caste discrimination is still obviously apparent. However, the degree of social control depends on a person’s social and economic status.

²⁶ Toffin (1984: 278-9, table XV).
²⁹ See Parish (1997).
³² Anil Sakya (2000) presents an interesting discussion on caste and kinship among the Newars in southern Kathmandu in relation to marriage.
Caste hierarchy

In the traditional Newar settlements, like Sankhu, hierarchical order of castes is still apparent, even if it is disputed. In Sankhu, different castes dining together was taboo in the past. Nowadays, those castes that accept water from each other do not mind eating together anymore when they observe communal feasts such as marriage or other ritual initiation feasts. This change has taken place during the last two to three decades. However, eating rice cooked in the kitchen of a lower caste remains a taboo for many castes. Especially people from the old generation hardly eat cooked rice from other kitchens. The Syasaḥ (Joshi, Pradhan, Rajbhandari, Malla, Maske and Shrestha), finds it impure to eat cooked rice from any other caste than their own. In this regard, Owens’ observation concerning commensality is still relevant. He distinguished three different levels: those with whom one may share cooked rice (jā cale jupiṃ) or members of the same caste, those who share only feast food (bhvay cale jupiṃ) and those from whom one may not drink water (la cale majupiṃ). In Sankhu, accepting cooked rice from the Vajracarya is not common, even though they are respected as priests and are given the honorific term bijyāye as are Rajopadhyay priests. Some Shrestha even consider the Vajracarya lower in rank than them. On the other hand, the Vajracarya priests do not accept cooked rice from the Shrestha either.

The change of caste status from Jyapu to Shrestha status is still unimaginable in Sankhu as elsewhere in the Valley as Quigley and Webster stressed. Among the castes ranked below the Syasya˙ and above the “unclean” castes, the ranking is not without controversy, because each of them claims a higher position. Thus in Sankhu, the Malla Khacarā classify the Jyapu below them, while the Jyapu consider the opposite. Both are strict about marriage relations. Between Prajapati and Jyapu there is no restriction left for inter-marriage or inter-dining. In the past, the former used to claim a higher position than the latter, the Bhā claimed a higher position than the Jyapu, and so did the Gathu. However, such claims are not recognised by others. Most commonly, seven castes: Chipā, Bhā, Sāymi, Gathu, Nau, Kau and Duim, whose toenails are cut or ritually purified by the Nāy, used to be considered of the same rank, but claims and counter-claims on one’s position in the system is common between these castes. Although all these castes may claim a higher position to one another, today they still restrain from inter-marriage with other castes.

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34 Among the Nau, cutting of toenails or ritual purification is carried out by their own caste.
and endogamy is preferred. Among the younger generation, conservative caste rules are rapidly vanishing, either because of school-education or of western influences.

In the past, Nāju were considered an unclean caste and were not permitted to fetch water from the wells. Now, no such restrictions are left for them. Among the three unclean castes: the Nāy, Jogi, Danyā and Doṃ, it is common for each to claim a higher position, but generally higher castes consider the Nay first, then the Jogi and the Doṃ. The Dyola are considered the lowest Newar caste in Sankhu and there are no Cyāmkhalah and Hālāhulu castes in Sankhu. However, Dyola in Sankhu talk about Cyamkhalah and Halahulu as their subordinates because they do not want to find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy.

**The Shrestha or Syasyah**

Before we enter into the debate on the status of the Shrestha between Rosser and Quigley it is appropriate to elaborate about the Shrestha caste itself. In Newar society the Shrestha are ranked below the priestly caste Rajopadhyay Brahman. As we know, śreṣṭha is a Sanskrit word adopted by the Newar high caste Syasyah. Śreṣṭha simply means the best or excellent. It is believed that the word Shrestha is derived from the Newar word Syasyah, which itself is derivation of a Sanskrit word śyesta. The first use of the word śyasta is found in the oldest chronicle of Nepal, the Gopālarājavamsāvai, which dates from fourteenth century. The translators of the text spelled this word as Shrestha. When exactly the word Shrestha was popularised among the Newar is still a matter of debate. Shrestha was a title given to those who served as administrators at the Malla courts. Although many Syasyah began to adopt Shrestha as their caste name as early as the eighteenth century, it has become more common from the 1950s. Although the Shrestha are renowned as traders and administrators, they are found engaged in all sorts of occupations. A large section of them are farmers, especially in rural areas. For instance, in Sankhu, the Shrestha occupy the largest area of land (67.3%), which is natural because they form the most numerous group. Among the Newars, the Shrestha are considered to be the most educated caste. Shrestha are employed in governmental and non-governmental organisations, banks, schools, universities, industries and private sectors. Many of them also occupy high-ranking administrative positions at governmental and non-governmental organisations. They also come among the top ranking businessmen in Nepal.

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35 Vajracarya & Malla (1985: 119, 164 and folio 63a)
Shrestha are to be found as the patrons of many rituals performed in the Newar settlements because of their affluent position. They are responsible to perform or organise many rituals and processions of gods and goddesses.

The network of inter-caste relationships in the Newar society circles around the Shrestha; both the Rajopadhyay and the Vajracarya provide priestly services to them in their various domestic rituals and worships, while Joshi attend them as astrologers and priests. The Nau serve them as nail cutters and barbers, the Jyapu as labourers, cremators and messengers, the Gathu as flower suppliers, the Jogi as food collectors offered to deceased and as musicians, the Nāy as butchers and the Dyolā as cleaners.

In the past, all the Syasyah used their clan names (kunāṃ) or nicknames (benāṃ). All the Shrestha families have nicknames in Sankhu and they are still known by these names. However, many find it embarrassing to use them. According to Baikuntha Prasad Lakaul, an old Newar academician, Newar families used to receive nicknames from their society: when an absurd incident took place in a family, that family began to be known by that incident.36

Unlike other Newar castes, the Shrestha are found in every district of Nepal. One of the reasons behind it is the adoption of “Shrestha” as one’s surname once a family belonging to any of the Newar caste moves to settle far off places from the Kathmandu Valley. Keshav Man Sakya (2004) has recorded several such cases in eastern Nepal. He also found “Shrestha” surname is equated to all the Newars in the areas he visited in the East Nepal. He found out that Sakya, Vajracarya, Prajapati, Jyapu and Jogi all adopted Shrestha as their caste name. He also noticed that crossbreed children begot from Newar and Rai or Newar and Bahun also adopted Shrestha as their caste name. He believes that the Shrestha are the most accommodating castes in Newar society, which enabled them to spread throughout the country. Outside Nepal, for instance in Darjeeling, Sikkim and elsewhere in India, almost all the Newar used Pradhan, another surname of the Syasyah, as their surname. Recently however, there is a growing trend among the Newars in Sikkim to replace Pradhan with Shrestha. In Nepal, the Pradhan claim a higher position than the Shrestha and consider them as a diluted caste because anyone may claim being a Shrestha. In India, however, the case is different, because all the Newars were called Pradhan. The status of the Pradhan was not without debate in Darjeeling in the early days. When there was a dispute between two rival groups claiming higher status one over the other in Darjeeling, in

36 Personal communication from Mr. Lakaul in 1993, aged 100 in 2005.
connection with court proceedings in Darjeeling, Nepalese authorities had
to write a letter stating, “Pradhan is among the highest classes of the
Newars.” The Newars of Nepal see the status and purity of Pradhan from
Sikkim and Darjeeling with doubt as they do with the Shrestha in Nepal.

Although there are no exact data about Newar castes for the whole of
Nepal, the Shrestha are believed to be the second largest in number after
the Jyapu. In the town of Sankhu, they form the largest group with 442
households and 3,202 people.

Among the Newar castes, the Shrestha are the most controversial,
because of their unclear internal hierarchies. Colin Rosser noted six or
seven ambiguous levels of Shrestha. However, many scholars who
conducted their research later refuted his supposition. Among them,
Declan Quigley discussed the Shrestha caste at length.

Colin Rosser’s view

Colin Rosser was among the first anthropologists who came to Nepal after
the Kathmandu Valley was made accessible to the outside world. The first
field-based materials on the Newars, however, were collected by Fürer-
Haimendorf and published as: “Elements of Newar Social Structure”
(1956). His study is enlightening in the sense that he succeeded in
providing a deep view on the Newar society for the first time. However, it
includes a number of misinformation, which complicated the matter for
the later researchers. For instance, his distinction of Hindu and Buddhist
castes by examining the employment of family priests was misleading,
because inviting either a Hindu or a Buddhist priest or both according to
need is a common practice among the Newars. Gopal Singh Nepali, the
author of the first monograph The Newars (1965) provided more
exhaustive materials. Finally, Rosser’s essay “Social Mobility in the Newar
Caste System” (1966) provided intriguing views on the complicated Newar
caste structure and presumed the probability of upward mobility among
the Newar castes especially from the Jyapu to the Shrestha, which became
the topic of debate for the researchers for many years to come. Most
importantly, it saw remarkable criticism from Declan Quigley in several of
his essays. Therefore, I felt it is timely now to evaluate their debate from
the side of a native Shrestha.

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37 The author did not provide exact year of the incident, but from his description it
can be gathered that his recall was from the AD 1930s (Singh 1991: 102, also 97-99).
38 See Rosser (1966: 101). Owens (1989: 84) also presents different categories of
Shrestha.
Rosser’s essay “Social Mobility in the Newar Caste System” was first published in 1966 in the Führer-Haimendorf edited volume *Caste & Kin in Nepal, India and Ceylon*. This 72 pages long article proved to become the only that Rosser ever wrote from his study on the Newars, but this powerful essay has immortalized him through numerous new researches on the Newars. It provides a detailed view on Newar caste stratification and their social value. For Rosser, “caste” simply means “social stratification” (p. 69) and “status positions” derive “from the distribution of political and economic power within that system.” He was clear in saying that “it is incredibly difficult if not impossible to identify the vast bulk of the Newar population as being either Hindu or Buddhist.” (p. 79) However, he saw that “Hinduism had effected notably raising the prestige (and of course the tangible rewards) of the Hindu Newars in particular the Shrestha merchants and depressing the status of Newar Buddhism particularly the Gubhaju priests.” (p. 82)

His table 1 lists 26 Newar castes in a hierarchical order but he was straightforward in saying that it was his arbitrary decision. He includes estimation of household numbers for each Newar caste for 33 settlements that he studied in the Valley, except for Kathmandu and Patan. In October 1999, when I had a chance to interview Rosser in UK, he said that the number of households and population for the castes he presented were not exact because they were just estimations from his sample survey. His Table 2 presents “Dominant block (ju pim)” and Subordinate block (ma ju pim)” for ritual hierarchy with a rough and approximate picture of the caste stereotypes, but he was aware of the fact that such a categorization was disputable. He rightly said, “in a small community where everyone is personally known to everyone else, every individual’s caste membership is a matter of common knowledge” (p. 89). He assumed on the other hand that identification of caste was not an easy task “in the crowded streets of a large urban centre such as Kathmandu or in the other Newar towns...” (p. 89). He finally states that:

“From every Newar’s personal name it is possible to identify his caste at once. Once his name is known he is no longer anonymous, simply a Newar: he becomes immediately identified as a member of a particular caste to whom one behaves with a certain deference and respect or alternatively with authority and superiority.” (p. 89)

Despite this ground reality, Rosser believes that “individual social mobility among Newars” was common. To prove this argument he imagined four hypothetical steps for all stratified societies (p. 91-2):

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40 Later reprinted in India in 1979.
1. A public claim to equality with person of higher status
2. Modification or adjustment of behaviour to conform with that current among the higher status group aspired to.
3. Rejection of former peers of lower status and severance or minimization of interaction with them
4. Acceptance by the higher status group demonstrated and confirmed by social interaction with them on terms of equality.

He argued that completing these four steps for successful social advancement in a particular case can be achieved:

“Among Newars this process of individual mobility across the barriers of caste occurs predominantly and commonly at particular point in scale (at the point separating the large merchant caste of Shresthas from the even larger farming caste of Jyapus who come immediately below them in the scale of ritual precedence) though it is not confined to this point.” (p. 92).

He further added:

“Firstly they drop their former Jyapu surname and take to calling themselves “Shrestha” (p. 94). ...The second stage is the copying of the customary culture behaviour diacritically distinctive of the Shresthas as a caste group (p. 95). ...The third essential stage in this process is rejection of former peers of lower status. A Jyapu en route to becoming a Shrestha must quit Jyapu associations and seek membership of Shrestha Associations (p. 96). ... Finally we come to the ultimate obstacle-marriage. But by this stage of the process is set for the arrangement of the “favourable alliances, which will set the seal of success on this programme of individual social advancement. To achieve his goal, the new “Shrestha” must obtain Shrestha daughters for his sons or of course a bride for himself, and give his daughters equally to Shresthas in return (p. 98). “

Rosser claimed that this process of individual mobility between the Jyapu and Shrestha was sufficiently common among Newars. He noted that a Jyapu claiming himself a Shrestha could never make a chance to have a Shrestha bride for himself or his sons if he failed to obtain membership in a Shrestha sīgūthī, funeral association. He assumed that a Jyapu who claim himself a Shrestha obtains membership in a Shrestha sīgūthī of low grade Shrestha by bribing them financially, but makes no chance in obtaining membership in a high grade Shrestha sīgūthī.

Regarding status of the Shrestha, his “Table 3-Structure of Shrestha and Jyapu Castes” in Bhadgaon is very interesting. It presents four or five ambiguous levels of Shrestha, namely Chathari, Pāṃcathari, Cārthari, Sāretinthari and just Shrestha including their number of households. If we should count those in between Chathari and Pamcathari, and Jyapu
claiming “Shrestha” the total levels will be seven. We shall reproduce his Table 3 below:

Structure of Shrestha and Jyapu castes in Bhatgaon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Status Grade</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shrestha</td>
<td>A Chathare</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A/B doubtful A Status</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Panchthare</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C Charthare</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saretinthare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D “Shrestha”</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Shrestha</td>
<td>1,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jyapu</td>
<td>A Jyapu claiming “Shrestha”</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Jyapu</td>
<td>2,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C Sikami (carpenters)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D Kuma (potters)</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Jyapu</td>
<td>3,390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rosser’s various levels of Shrestha troubled researchers such as Declan Quigley, who was unable to find so many ambiguous layers among them.

Declan Quigley’s views

Quigley began his research among the Newars for his PhD at the beginning of 1980s. He contributed a number of important articles on the Newars besides his PhD thesis. For the present purpose we do not go into detail on his contributions to Newar studies but we just pick up some of his articles, which carry criticism on Rosser’s views, specifically on the status of Shresthas. Quigley’s first criticism on Rosser’s view came in his “Introversion and isogamy: marriage patterns of the Newars of Nepal” (1986). In this paper, Quigley disagrees with Rosser about the cross-caste mobility from Jyapu to Shrestha. However, he agrees to the existence of mobility among various levels of Shrestha. Thus, he argues in length in several of his articles that mobility between chathare (six clan) and pāncathare (five clan) does exist, but does not find the other levels, which Rosser suggested for the Shrestha, such as cārthare (four clans) and sāretinthare (three and a half clans). Quigley assumes that Rosser’s informants may have invented such levels to ridicule certain families (p. 81). Quigley also finds Rosser’s four steps towards elevating individual wealthy Jyapu into Shrestha inapplicable. His field data does not support
such mobility of castes, especially the upward mobility between Jyapu and Shrestha. He is not convinced that wealthy Jyapu can obtain membership in Shrestha sīguthī, by investing wealth in it. He also found it impossible to get marriage alliances between Shrestha and Jyapu.

In his next paper, “Ethnicity Without Nationalism: the Newars of Nepal” (1987), while agreeing the adoption of “Shrestha” surname by many, Quigley (p.161) reasserts his earlier assessment that none of the four steps Rosser presumes are possible in practice unless “one moves to a new settlement and completely severs one’s previous lineage and affinal connections” (p. 163).

About the status of the Shrestha, Quigley’s opinion can be considered as close to Rosser’s view. In his book The Interpretation of Caste Quigley writes:

“As with the Rajputs, however, it is extremely hazardous to describe the Shresthas as single caste. ...Newars often say that nowadays anyone can call himself a Shrestha. ...There are two main bases on which claims to Shrestha status in general, and to membership of a particular sub-division, are made. The first is genealogy-kinship and marriage connections; the second is economic standing.” (1993: 103).

This means that though Quigley does not agree with Rosser’s theory of Jyapu upgrading themselves to Shrestha caste, he does agree with some of the steps described by Rosser about caste mobility for those who claim themselves Shrestha. As Rosser, he asserts “half Shrestha” or “half-caste Shrestha”.

Quigley’s dispute with Rosser’s assumptions continues in his next essay: “Social mobility and social Fragmentation in the Newar Caste System” (1996), where he provides three basic arguments to refute Rosser’s view:

1. because neither Shrestha nor Jyapu are or ever have been castes in the same way that other Newar castes are;
2. because most mobility occurs not between Jyapu and Shrestha in any case but within the Shrestha category which is differentiated into a number of continually shifting caste levels;
3. because the amount of real mobility (i.e. jumping from one group to another, already established, higher group) is exceedingly limited: this was certainly so at the time of Rosser’s research in 1956-57 and while significantly more frequent in the 1980’s, it is still very difficult to achieve (p. 73)
Quigley’s disagreement with Rosser is that mobility into already established groups is not common at any level. He thinks that it is extremely difficult to cross the bridge from Jyapu to Shrestha, because everyone’s identity can be rapidly checked (p. 83).

Quigley’s latest essay in this sequence (“Śreṣṭhas: Heterogeneity among Hindu Patron Lineages”) once again discusses the status of Shrestha by recapitulating Rosser’s views (p. 82-9). For Quigley, Shrestha are endlessly fragmented and their status, both are often contested by themselves and by the others. Quoting Toffin’s view (1984: 382) “the Śreṣṭhas, one of the most numerous groups in Newar society, deserve less and less to be described as a caste”, Quigley even doubts if “Śreṣṭhas have ever been a single caste in the way that castes are normally thought to be—i.e. with a relatively homogeneous status.” (p. 80) He re-examines the various levels of Shrestha presented by Rosser with his own observation and shows that Chipi Shrestha, Bāgaḥ Shrestha, Lawat Shrestha, Dhulikhel Shrestha, Thimi Shrestha and Tokha Shrestha are used, but with a pejorative sense only. The distinction between Chathare and Pāṃcathare, on the other hand, is found very widely. From his survey of a hundred Shrestha households in Kathmandu, Quigley affirms that those who are able to trace their aristocratic descents’ claim of being Chathare are not controversial, but if someone claims to be Chathare and if he is not clear about his past, then he is not to be trusted. At the same time, he makes it clear that the categories chathariya and pancathariya are shifting rather than fixed. He says: “A family generally regarded as pāṃcathariya in one generation may, through skill or good fortune, be able to arrange a marriage alliance with a family generally regarded as chathariya and so itself effect a claim to sharing in this status.” (1995: 88).

Quigley’s study in Dhulikhel shows that differentiation in grades among the Shrestha is not to be found there. Through their sīguthi and dyah puja guthi Shrestha are considered to be of same status. He thinks this is characteristic to Dhulikhel and rightly noticed that the Shrestha of Dhulikhel are not accepted for marriage alliance by the Shrestha of other Newar settlements. They have to marry within their own circle, i.e. Dhulikhel Shrestha. With this regard, it is interesting to note the case of a Dhulikhel Shrestha, who has been living in the Netherlands but went back to Nepal to get his marriage arranged, and found a partner from Sikkim but a daughter of a person migrated from Dhulikhel.

A view from a Shrestha and concluding remarks

Thus, scholars have been facing difficulties in defining castes among the Newars because of intercaste mobility. Generally in a caste society,
claiming for higher a position is usual. In this regard, Newar society is a good example. For example, the Nāy or Newar butchers, who are considered to be an unclean caste, do always recall their mythical past to link themselves to royalty. Similarly, the Dyolā believe that they are the descendants of the Kirata kings. Therefore, within the complicated hierarchies of Newar caste system, positioning of each group at a fixed place is an extremely difficult task. At the top level, both the Brahmin priests and the Vajracarya priests are found, but Hindu Brahmin priests often claim a higher status than their Buddhist counterparts, whereas Buddhist Vajracarya do not fail to claim other way round. Similarly, each caste may be claiming higher a position than what other might do. The lowest considered caste, the Dyolā, also find their subordinates in Cyāme and Hālahulu.

In such a society, it is likely that status of every caste may be contested rather than accepted. Early researchers such as Fürer-Haimendorf and Rosser might have faced the situation confusing because of this reason. On top of that, when one hears about so many grades within a single caste such as the Shrestha, and notices the possibility of upward mobility from Jyapu to Shrestha, then one might get confused. Studying Rosser’s views on the status of the Shrestha, Quigley might have felt lost, which instigated him to carry out his own research. His studies made far clearer the position of the Shrestha than ever before. As it has become clear to us, contesting hierarchies among the Shrestha is not much of doubt but the perception of upwardly movement of Jyapu to Shrestha, which is non-existing, at least in traditional Newar settlements in the Valley, does not correspond to real practice. In fact, Rosser also admits that once a person’s caste name is known, his identity cannot be hidden any longer. However, his assumption of caste mobility is not simple to be understood, because as Quigley noted, in the Kathmandu Valley, a person’s identity can easily be verified. Certainly, there are examples of shifting identity to Shrestha by other Newar castes when they move to far away places such as to eastern or far western Nepal or to India but within the Newar settlements of the Kathmandu Valley, it is not simple.

From my own research in Sankhu, it can be said that in a small Newar settlement, upward movement from Jyapu to Shrestha is not achievable. Even the offspring of those Shrestha who married lower castes never attains his or her father’s status, although they may be carrying their father’s surname. Practically no transgression of caste is possible. People still talk about Chathare and Pāṃcathare divisions among the Shrestha, but the hierarchical distinction between these two categories, which was a reality until two or three decades ago, has been lost. It is interesting to note that among the Shrestha, to claim oneself Chathare Shrestha (the
highest status) and to point out others as Pāṃcathare Shrestha (lower) was very common, especially when marriages were arranged. Once the marriage was settled, such claims calmed down. In many cases, it happens that those claiming to be Chathare would find their affine among the Pāṃcathare Shresthas.

In the past, many stories were heard in Sankhu that once such and such a Chathare family’s daughter was married to a low graded Shrestha and that she was denied access to the kitchen of her own parental home, or the other way that she was denied access to her husband’s kitchen. Today, this kind of stories is not heard anymore. Some of the Shrestha in Sankhu have marriage relations with Shrestha of Dhulikhel, Dolkha, Tauthali, Tokha and Thimi but in general, such relations are still prohibited, because the Shrestha of these settlements are considered low graded. In Sankhu, there are no Chipi Shrestha, Lawat Shrestha, Bāgah or half Shrestha or any Jyapu claiming to be Shrestha, but in Bhaktapur and in Kathmandu, people still talk about these distinctions. Especially, Bhaktapur is still known for caste conservatism.

Sīguthi membership can be considered as one of the criteria to distinguish status differences between the Shrestha. In fact, this was true in the past when denying membership to a suspected lower status Shrestha in so called high graded Shrestha’s sīguthi used to be common. However, nowadays all the existing Shrestha sīguthi in Sankhu are flexible enough to accept members from other sīguthi. During my research, I recorded 27 sīguthi belonging to Shrestha in Sankhu. Usually, each son who begins his separate kitchen must obtain his own membership to a sīguthi and selects the sīguthi of his choice.

In practice, there is no barrier left among the Shrestha as far as marriage or commensality is concerned. In Sankhu, Maske, Rajbhandari and Pradhan share sīguthi membership with the Shrestha. Joshi also share their sīguthi memberships with the Shrestha and intermarry with them. They serve as assistant priests together with the Rajopadhyay priests in performing domestic rituals, but the Joshi are considered to be equal to the Shrestha in caste rank.

From my study in Sankhu, it can be concluded that status differences among the Shrestha are no longer found, but in other settlements the same may not be the case. Especially in places such as Bhaktapur, where conservative notions are still prevalent, differences of status among the Shrestha are still recorded. On the other hand, the status gap between Shrestha and Jyapu is still evident in all the Newar settlements. It can be said that change of one’s caste from Jyapu to Shrestha will not be accepted for years to come.
My study in Sankhu shows that traditional hierarchies of castes have lost their importance after the implementation of the 1964 new legal code in Nepal, but people are still maintaining them until today. Although a few strict conservative notions of castes have disappeared, their hierarchy is still prevalent and stigmatisation of low castes is still a fact. It may take years before the notion of high and low castes among the Newars disappear, especially in the traditional Newar settlements.

The most recent trend that appeared in the Newar society is the establishment of caste based organisations. In Kathmandu, the Vajracarya (the Buddhist priestly caste), Uray (the Merchant castes like Tuladhar and Kansakar), Citrakar (painters), Mali (gardener), Manandhar (oil pressers), Kapali (Tailor and Musicians), Khadgi (Butchers), Pode (Sweepers), Tandukar and Jyapu (farmers) have had their caste foundations for many years. However, the Shrestha did not feel necessary to have their caste organisation. It was only in 2004 that they initiated a Syasyāḥ Samaj or the Association of the Shrestha in Kathmandu in a bid to unite all the Shrestha of Nepal. It is expected that the Shrestha caste association would be the most influential one because of their affluent position, and as a high caste but accommodating all those who claim themselves Shrestha (K. Sakya 2004). There are also a number of organisations that were created to unite all the Newars to achieve rights to the Newar nationality. All these Newar national organisations, such as the National Forum of the Newars (Newa De Dabu) or the Association of Newar Speakers (Nepalbhāṣā Maṃkāḥ Khalah) talk about the abolition of caste hierarchies and caste discriminations in Newar society. They accommodate members in their organisations without caste bias. In 2005, when its fourth convention took place, eighteen Newar caste organisations appeared to have affiliated themselves with the National Forum of the Newars. The National Forum of the Newars has been working with these caste groups to produce profile of each caste. It presents the Newars as a single nationality and pleads for helping role from all the Newar castes in its bid to achieve equal rights from the State. However, in most Newar festivals and ritual each caste has to fulfil its own duties. Therefore, eliminating traditional notions of castes differences will not be an easy task to the Newars for years to come.

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Himalayan hill stations from the British Raj to Indian tourism
Isabelle Sacareau

National tourism in developing countries and especially its links with colonial tourism has been quite largely ignored by researchers, except for the pionner works of Mohamed Berriane on Morocco (Berriane 1992) and Nathalie Raymond on Latin America (Raymond 1999, 2002). Recently, several works about domestic tourism have been published, mainly by Chinese and South Asian researchers (Wen 1997, Wang and Yamamura, 2000, Ghimire, 2001), but their approach is more economic than geographic or historic. However, colonization was an important part of the spread of tourism outside Europe during the 19th century, especially during the British Raj, when many hill stations were built in the Himalayas and the Western Ghats. The main reason for ignoring this phenomenon is probably the general discredit attributed to tourism, which is generally viewed as a futile activity for rich people, especially when enjoyed in developing countries. While French research has no tradition of colonial and post-colonial studies in spite of its colonial history, English, American and Indian scientific literature has produced some important works on the hill stations of the British Raj in India (Spencer and Thomas 1948, Pubby 1988, Kanwar 1990, Hamilton and Bhasin 1995, Kenny 1995, Kennedy,1996). However it has generally analyzed them from a colonial and post-colonial point of view as a spatial and symbolic manifestation of British imperialism.

If the tourism dimension of such places is often evoked in comparison with similar places in Europe at the same time, most of these works do not study them as the result of the spread of tourist practices from Europe to a different cultural area and to a different socio-economic and political context. Hardly anything is said about the future of these hill stations, symbols of colonial power, after Independence. As a matter of fact, the Post Independence era might have put an end to such places, in so far as India first had to face underdevelopment. However they became the favourite destination for Indian domestic tourists, as a middle class was already emerging, especially in the 1980s.

This apparent paradox in the nationalist context of independent India needs to be explained. For us it reveals the extent to which these places attract tourists. This indicates their ability to survive the early conditions of their birth thanks to a process in Indian society of appropriating these places. This paper falls within a geographical approach to tourism developed by the French MIT research team (Knafou, Bruston, Deprest,
Duhamel, Gay, Sacareau 1997, Équipe MIT 2002, Stock (coord.) 2003, Duhamel, 2003-2004, etc.). It is based on field research conducted in April 2003 in Mussoorie and Nainital, two hill stations in the Indian Garhwal Himalayas, located in the state of Uttarakhand. Its aim is to show the relationships between the systemic combination of actors and practices that produced colonial hill stations and the Indian contemporary tourist system. It will first present how the colonial tourist system developed, and its links with the European models of practice and places at the same time. Then, it will examine the expansion of the hill station since Independence with the rise of Indian domestic tourism. It is argued that there is no break but continuity between the colonial system and the post-colonial tourist system.

The constitution of the colonial tourist system in Himalayan Gahrwal (1820-1880)

According to a geographical approach, tourism is defined as a system of actors, practices and places, which allow individuals to travel for their “recreation” and to live temporarily in other places located “outside their everyday life” (MIT 2002, Knafou and Stock 2003). According to this definition, the hill stations of the British Raj in India are one type of tourist place created ex-nihilo by British residents, and dedicated to their own recreation. These establishments were the result of the transfer of tourist practices in use in the early 19th century in Europe by people who belonged to the same social elite, who were the inventors of tourism and tourist resorts in England and on the continent. They were built for similar reasons but with some adaptations to the colonial and tropical context. Two phases can be identified during the colonial age concerning the development of hill stations. The first phase corresponds to the pioneering phase of building military cantonments and health resorts from 1820, when the Himalayan borders were secured, to the Great Indian Mutiny in 1857. The second phase, from 1857 to 1880, corresponds to how hill stations thrived by acknowledging their recreational nature and the diversification of their functions as administrative capitals of the Empire and as educational places for the children of British residents.

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1 The concept of “recreation” in French is considered as the reconstruction of body and mind, which differs from simple enjoyment or leisure activities (cf. Stock (coord) 2003, Le tourisme, acteurs, lieux et enjeux, p. 27).
The creation of hill stations in the Himalayas in the early 19th century is first a response to both sanitary and strategic considerations (Spencer and Thomas 1948, Kenny 1995, Kennedy 1996). British citizens who had to live in the tropics were particularly exposed to fever and disease. Until the second half of the 19th century, doctors were unable to detect the reasons for most tropical diseases or their links with transmission agents such as water or mosquitoes. Mortality was very high among them, just as during the great cholera epidemic of 1817-1821 (Kennedy 1996). According to the hygiene theories fashionable at that time in Europe, British people wanted to set up sanatoria in the Highlands. So, just like European civilians, convalescents and invalid soldiers were able to escape the heat and the
fever of the tropical plains in summer. As British doctors in Europe established winter resorts on the French Riviera and in the foothills of the Pyrenees, the British living in India looked for temperate climatic conditions, which they found at about 2,000 m in the Himalayas (cf. map Hill stations in India in 2006).

The Indian hill stations are a kind of transposition to the tropical world of villegiature in use in Europe at the same time. The difference lies in the inversion of climatic and seasonal conditions specific to the tropical zone: while their compatriots flew away from bleak weather conditions in the industrial cities of England to the softness and sweetness of the Mediterranean Riviera in winter, British colonists in India sought the cold and rainy weather of the tropical mountain climate in summer to escape the heat of the plains.

But the project to build such health resorts—cum—vacation resorts called for locating safe places within the up-and-coming new Empire. In the early 19th century, the Himalayas were still an unstable margin. The Gorkhali rulers of Nepal tried to extend their kingdom at the expense of their neighbours, the rajas of Sikkim, Kumaon and Garhwal. Their interests clashed with those of the East India Company, which wanted to establish trade routes to Tibet through the Himalayas. Following the victorious intervention of the British Army, Nepal’s boundaries were fixed. The British took the opportunity to annex some strategic territories in order to control and to secure the Himalayan border. They purchased land from local princes to establish military cantonments and to build sanatoria for their soldiers, as in Mussoorie in 1820, one year after Simla had been established.

The people mostly involved in developing these hill stations were British Army officers, administrators of newly conquered territories of the East India Company, military doctors, businessmen, suppliers to the British Army and planters. They succeeded in convincing the political authorities of the possibility of building European settlements in the Himalayas. They incited investors and colonists to settle there, or to sponsor the new hill stations. They did not hesitate to build their own residence there, as an example to their compatriots. They attracted numerous visitors who used to stay in the Highlands each monsoon season. For example, Mussoorie was founded by Superintendent Shore of the Doon valley, by captain Young, commander of Landour cantonment and by an English trader from Meerut, who opened a brewery in 1830 to supply the army. In the same way Naini Lake was discovered during a hunting party in 1839 by a sugar trader from the nearby district of Shahajanpur, Mr Barron, and by an engineer from among his friends (Gazetteer of the Simla District, 1904). Conscious of the quality of the site,
very similar to the romantic Alpine lakes celebrated by the Romantics at the same period, he gave up his business to promote the idea of building a new health resort. He came back in 1842, with official instructions, to mark out a dozen properties to be sold or rented.

Nevertheless, they would not have succeeded without the help of the colonial society and the British Empire’s authorities. The arrival of prestigious representatives of the Raj, such as the Governor General of India in Simla in 1827, brought fame to the young hill stations, just as the members of royal families did for European tourist resorts. All these stations were created *ex-nihilo* in mountain forests and on land that seemed to be uninhabited and ownerless with the exception of some local *zamindari*, tax collectors for the rajas. In fact, most of this land was appropriated and used by the mountain people from the nearby valleys as pastureland or to collect firewood.

As well as health considerations, hill stations had military functions which were obvious from their strategic location on high ridges at about 2,000 m. From there it was possible to check both the plains, where most Indians lived, and the Himalayan borders. This remote location had a great advantage in sheltering women and children during the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857 (Kennedy 1996). Its very characteristic morphology can be explained both by these strategic and physical conditions and by the aesthetic values prevailing at the same time in Europe, which shaped the hill stations’ landscape (*ibid.*).

Mussoorie or Darjeeling give good examples of the hill station morphology. Steep slopes and deep valleys limits the amount of flat land with the exception of the narrow mountain ridges. On the main ridge, the Mall is a tree-lined promenade, with benches and kiosks which link the station’s wards. It is the axis structuring the hill station, like the promenade in European tourist resorts. The highest ridges and hills offers a panoramic view of both the mountainside and the plain. Observatories are also set up at their summit, such as Gun Hill in Mussoorie. Shops and public buildings (churches, banks and post offices), leisure facilities (assembly rooms, libraries, gymkhanas and clubs) or outdoor playgrounds are to be found at the mall’s extremities (see Mussoorie map). All around lay the English station ward with its hotels and cottages. Cart Road serves the hill station. It allows cars and goods to access the foothills of the resort. Military cantonments and Indian bazaars stand outside the station, like a world apart and run in their own particular way. Crowded Indian bazaars that provides British supplies are strictly separate from the European settlement. This socio-spatial segregation reflects the domination of the indigenous society by the British colonist.
Approval of recreational places for colonial society and gradual investments by Indian society (1880-1947)

During the second half of the 19th century, thanks to progress made in medicine and to the systematic planting of cinchona for treating malaria, long stays in the highlands were no longer of any use. But in spite of this, doctors continued sending their convalescents and weaker patients, especially women and children, to the hill stations. As a matter of fact, in keeping with Victorian ideology and social Darwinism, the idea prevailed that long stays by white men in the Tropics could lead to race degeneration. On the contrary, a cold climate associated with sport and physical exercise was believed to produce the strong men that the Empire needed to rule India (Spencer and Thomas 1948, Kenny 1995, Kennedy 1996). This explains why a lot of boarding schools were established in the hill station. In the second half of the 19th century, they became educational places for English children, a real “nursery for a ruling race”, as the historian Dane Kennedy points out (ibid.). For example, according to the District gazetteers of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, there were 205 schools and 8,348 pupils in Nainital in 1932.

The hill stations were also supposed to be a good distraction from neurasthenia and spleen ailments which were very common among expatriates, isolated in the midst of the Indian masses. This was also one of the main functions of European spas where places of leisure were associated very early on with health resorts as a way of treating illnesses, but where distractions, socialising and enjoyment have progressively taken over from medical justifications. Mussoorie is described as being the “Ramsgate of the Himalayas” and Simla is compared to Brighton (ibid.). Like tourist resorts in Europe, hill stations enabled colonial society to escape the social constraints prevailing in the plains for a while. Staying there was a real break from everyday life in the colony. This break had a recreational effect on individuals (Équipe MIT 2002), as games, sports and entertainment allowed them to forget their self-restraint (Elias, Dunning 1994). As a matter of fact, tourist travel is based on the search for a “differential” which exists between one’s usual place of residence and tourist resorts (Équipe MIT 2002, Duhamel 2003-2004, Ceriani, Duhamel, Knafoù, Stock 2005). But this differential is inverted in the case of British colonial society. British residents experienced Indian exoticism on a daily basis. They were permanently confronted with the deep alterity of India. It therefore induced a feeling of insecurity. According to Marshall, there were fewer than 126,000 Europeans in the whole of India in 1861 (Marshall 1992). This much dispersed population experienced its own fragility during the Great Mutiny. Meeting each other in safe places like the hill
stations was a necessity for individuals if they were to put up with Indian alterity.

One can also understand why individuals, as well as colonial society itself, spent much of their recreational time in the hill stations which remind one of Swiss or Scottish landscapes. The number of native inhabitants was also very low in these remote mountains. This allowed foreign residents to avoid contact with local people as much as possible. The hill landscape satisfied the aesthetic criterion for what had been considered picturesque in Europe since the 18th century (Gilpin 1792) while the quite distant Himalayas corresponded to the romantic criterion of the sublime. The introduction of temperate vegetal species and orchards as well as the Swiss chalet and English cottage architecture created a differential with their tropical places of residence and a familiar place, “a home away from home” (Kennedy 1996). In the same way, these places allowed colonial society to assert its own values and identity in the alien world it had to rule, as Kennedy exemplifies in his work. In this sense, hill stations really were places for “recreation” (Stock 2001, Équipe MIT 2002, Stock 2003).

All this goes to explain the increasing flow of tourists in the second half of the century and the beginning of the 20th century. Their recreational dimension also asserted itself with the arrival of the railway in the stations (arrival of the railway in Kathgodam near Nainital in 1889, the building of the Haridwar-Dehra Dun Railway in 1902 providing easier access to Mussoorie). It allowed shorter stays for lower-income tourists from the middle-classes who were resident in India or who were travelling more easily from England after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. As they had neither time nor money to purchase villas or cottages in the hill stations, they stayed at hotels or boarding houses which were greater in number in the second half of the 19th century.

At that time, one can also see the diversification in the functions of the hill stations. After the Great Mutiny in 1857, some of them became British Army headquarters and summer capitals for civil administration. They asserted themselves as places of power for British imperialism (Kanwar 1984, 1990, Kenny, 1995, Kennedy 1996). Simla officially became the summer capital of the British Raj in 1902. But other stations became summer capitals at regional level, such as Nainital for the government of the United Provinces in 1862 (cf. map Administrative functions of hill station in earlier 20th century).

Consequently a large part of political centrality temporarily moved from the big cities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras to the mountainous periphery of the Empire, creating twin cities (Landy, 1993). With the arrival of administrative staff, civil servants, Indian merchants and
domestic staff, the hill station population in summer increased fourfold (Kanwar 1984). But their presence also attracted a considerable number of Indians to provide for their needs. They became the biggest part of the hill station population. As Kennedy notes, “at least ten Indians were necessary to support each European” (Kennedy 1997: 175).

Throughout the colonial era, British people tried to set a strict spatial and social segregation with indigenous society in keeping with the
Sacareau

Cantonment Act (Kennedy 1996, Sharma 2000). Indian people were housed in the crowded bazaars located below or at quite a distance from the English ward. But during the 1880s, new actors started to interfere with the colonial project. Local princes, representatives of the Native States, who also used to spend the summer season in the highlands in the same way as during the Moghol Era, started to build sumptuous castles as far as the English ward (Kanwar 1984, Kennedy 1996). For example, the King of Nepal owned the Fairlane Palace in Mussoorie. In 1853 Mussoorie also received Maharaja Dilip Singh, son of Ranjit Singh, the “Lion of Punjab”. The British could not avoid social interactions with these very rich maharajas as they did with the Indian people of the bazaars. They tried to limit the amount of land or the number of villas purchased by the Indian princes, but to not avail. When reacting to an attempt made by the Nizam of Hyderabad to purchase property in Simla, the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, made it known that “the presence of these Chiefs at hill stations is distinctly undesirable, and that we ought to discourage it in every way” (Kennedy 1996: 199).

Moreover these rajas were soon joined by rich Indian businessmen such as the Parsi of Bombay and by some westernized Indians working for the Civil Service. They purchased properties in the English ward, not only for their own recreational use, but also for rent to European tourists. They also built new hotels entirely reserved for Indian people (ibid.). The British could not stop the arrival of a class of Indian professionals, who were keen to take their holidays with their families in the hill stations. In the end a large part of the land in hill stations became the property of Indians at the beginning of the 20th century. Therefore, even if Indian people were not welcome in the hill stations, they could serve their apprenticeship in new recreational practices, as the Nehru family did, by spending holidays in Mussoorie. They succeeded in conquering the local tourist system for their own purpose, especially in places like Mussoorie where political functions were not predominant (ibid.). One can see that, in spite of unfavourable ideological conditions, part of the indigenous society took over the tourist system quite early. As Kennedy said, hill stations “were meant to be places where the British could define themselves according to an exclusive set of cultural values and practices but they attracted a westernized Indian elite whose adoption of some of the same values and practices subverted British claims of exclusivity” (ibid.: 229).

The main destinations of Indian national tourism since Independence (1947-2004)

After Independence, the departure of the British and the decline of the Maharajas might have ruined such places, a symbol of political and
cultural colonial domination. The economic and political conditions in the 1950s (starvation, wars with Kashmir) were not propitious to developing tourism and the 1950s were a critical period for most of the hill stations until the return of prosperous Indians from the emerging middle class in the 1960s. Many hill stations lost part of their administrative functions during the first years of Independence. But they recovered them again when new States were set up. For example, Simla which first lost its functions of Punjab Capital to Chandigarh, became the State Capital of Himachal Pradesh in 1966. In 1960 the Government of Uttar Pradesh decided to stop staying in Nainital over summer. However, this spelt disaster for the station, so it changed its mind in 1963. At the same time, the Indo-Pakistan war closed Kashmir to tourists who moved to the Gahrwal hill stations.

The recent creation in 2000 of the new state of Uttaranchal at the expense of Uttar Pradesh, provided the hill stations of Dehra Dun and Nainital with the functions of State Capital and District Capital respectively. These administrative functions are confirmation of their urbanity among the rural mountainous areas. Sixteen four percent of Uttaranchal territory is covered in forests and 13% in rocks and snow. Around 95% of inhabitants are of a rural population. There are only 75 townships but they look more like simple rural bazaars than real urban places. Therefore, except for Dehra Dun with its 447, 806 inhabitants in 2001, tourist resorts such as Mussoorie (29, 397 inhabitants) and Nainital (96, 116 inhabitants) became central places in the new urban hierarchy (Census of India, 2001).

Otherwise, the transition from the colonial tourist system to the post-independence system was partly ensured by the Indian elite who had already largely appropriated hill stations many years before Independence. As India did not have a satisfactory educational system, the rich and educated Indians, who could not send their children to study in foreign countries, sent them to hill-station boarding schools. Families joined their children during the holidays, so the hill stations again experienced a seasonal increase in the number of visitors.

It was these same elites who assumed the leadership of the independent Indian State. Their attitude regarding tourism was rather ambiguous. On the one hand, nationalist ideology condemned tourism as a neo-colonial practice. The Government first had to face underdevelopment, so tourism was not a priority. On the other hand, the Congress Party’s elites kept their holiday habits. For example, very rich Indian people rose to the head of the Nainital Yacht Club in 1948. They had very selective rules of entry as under British rule. But in 1970, they finally opened the Club to the Indian upper middle class.
Furthermore, let us not forget the interference by the Indian government in all the economic sectors of life, including tourism, through public enterprises and legislation. It offers 30 days holidays a year to civil servants. The Indian government also acts as tour operator via public travel agencies, public hotels and restaurants. For example at regional level, in tourist places, one can find tourist offices in charge of information and of implementing state policy, but also public tourist companies, such as GMVN (Gahrwal Mandas Vikas Nigam) created in 1976. It organizes package tours and runs many hotels and tourist bungalows throughout the area as well.

But international tourism figures remain very low compared to other developing countries and domestic tourism has not yet developed because of the population’s poverty level. Nevertheless, a middle-class has slowly emerged among civil servants and wage earners of private and public companies. These workers have obtained holidays and low fares on railway transport. For example, civil servants are allowed one free train journey every year. So they have begun to travel in their own country to visit temples and national heritage monuments, to go on pilgrimages, and also to visit hill stations. But the main change occurred after the 1980s with the free market, the opening to the private sector and the development of numerous small-scale companies in the tourism sector.

### Evolution of tourist flow in Mussoorie (1990–2001)
(Source: Mussoorie Tourist Office)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic tourism</th>
<th>International tourism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,369,772</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,069</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>1,756,000</td>
<td>1,127</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>1,473,000</td>
<td>1,176</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
<td>1,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,280,000</td>
<td>1,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,901,800</td>
<td>3,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,833,778</td>
<td>3,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,957,930</td>
<td>3,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,975,438</td>
<td>3,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,975,620</td>
<td>3,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,034,355</td>
<td>2,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of domestic Indian tourists has increased spectacularly, from 72 million in 1976 to more than 200 million today. For example, in Mussoorie, there were 1,369,772 Indian tourists in 1990 compared to 2
million ten years later. In comparison, there were around 3,000 international tourists in 2000, and the local population is estimated at around 30,000 inhabitants (Mussoorie Tourist Office).

Moreover, these tourists no longer belong to the elite of Indian society, even if some rich and famous families like the Princess Sita of Kapurthala still spend their holidays in Mussoorie. According to Indian field research conducted in Nainital in 1999, among 500 Indian tourists, 42% belonged to government services, 13% belonged to the private sector, 10% were small traders, 7% were students, and more surprisingly, 6% were farmers (Singh and Nag 1999). Fewer than 29% belonged to the high-income group (more than 2,000 Indian rupees per month), a little more than 53% belonged to the middle-income group (between 500 to 2,000 Indian rupees per month) and a little more than 17% had a low income (less than 500 Indian rupees).

Our own field research shows that in the hill stations one can find all categories of hotels, from the very simple Indian style hotel to more luxury ones. They are present in every ward of the hill station. The socio-spatial discrimination of the British rule failed for a long time. Some old hotels from the colonial age have also been converted into holiday centres, property of some Indian public or private companies (cf. Doc. 2). Few of them are still in use as heritage hotels. Most of these establishments belong to Indian investors, mainly from Delhi. Since 1996 new buildings are no longer allowed. In Nainital the official number of hotels is on the rise today, at 250 with around 10,000 beds, but there is also a large number of non certified hotels and guesthouses (source: Nainital Tourist Bureau).

Most of these Indian tourists come from North India (mainly Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and West Bengal). Tourists from South India are fewer because of the distance and because of competition with Western Ghats hill stations such as Ooty and Koddaikanal with tourists from Kerala and Tamilnadu or Mahabaleshwar and Mount Abu with tourists from Bombay or Gujerat. The pre-monsoon and monsoon seasons are still the main tourist seasons, as under the British Raj, with a peak in June and July. In Mussoorie, tourists in June come mainly from Delhi and the Punjab (Mussoorie Tourism Office). In October, they come mainly from West Bengal, and in November, the period of the Diwali Festival, most of them come from Gujerat and Maharashtra.

If some rich Indians from Delhi or Bombay have villas for holiday homes, and spend their holidays as the English did before them, most Indian tourists stay in the hill station for a couple of days. According to the Mussoorie Tourist Office, 20% of the station’s houses are second homes and a tourist’s average stay in Mussoorie lasts three days. Their main occupations are sightseeing, shopping, games and entertainment, such as
skating or horse riding. The main attractions for Indian tourists are the ropeways in Mussorie and Nainital which lead to the top of the hill station and admiring the sunrise from there. In Nainital, peddle boats and yachting on the lake are still in fashion as during the British period. Himalayan hill stations are also the favourite destination for honeymooners as they are the setting for many love scenes in Bollywood movies.

With the exception of pilgrimage places, hill stations are still the main tourist places for domestic tourism. Haridwar and Rishikesh are the holy cities of the Char Dham pilgrimage to the Gange sources which attract millions of tourists. The pilgrimage is organised from these old cities and from Delhi. Some tourist travel agents in Nainital provide packagetours to the Char Dham, but it seems that the pilgrimage activity is not really connected to the hill stations. On the contrary, the hill stations are the starting point of packagetours and excursions in the surrounding area, and also of a process of spatial spreading of tourism. In the vicinity of these old stations, new Indian resorts are cropping up. Hotels, restaurants as well as cottages, holiday homes for Indians and new tourist housing developments are on the increase in places like Bhimtal and Bhowali, an excursion circuit from Nainital. Another example is Dhanauti, where the GMVN has established a small tourist resort and organizes packagetours from Mussoorie. One can see the emergence of new tourist resorts there based on the hill station model.

CONCLUSION

Tourism is a system of practices, actors and places that move through time and space with the development of the society which produced them. The hill stations have not been ruined by the shift from the colonial era to the postcolonial age. On the contrary, they have become the favourite destination of Indian domestic tourism, probably because they were real places for recreation, and not only the symbol of imperialism. They have also kept and developed some administrative functions, a sign of their urbanity among the mountainous areas where they stand. The new tourist system that emerged in the second half of the 20th century has not broken with the older one. The Indians succeeded in their conquest of this symbolic place of power, a long time before Independence. However, they also found in these stations an alterity and an exoticism in precisely what was familiar to British residents. What is exotic for one is not exotic for the other... It exemplifies the amazing power of tourists to subvert places and of tourism to survive the conditions that governed its generation.
References


Crisis in Education and Future Challenges for Nepal
Kedar Bhakta Mathema

The modern education system in Nepal is one of the youngest in the world. In 1951 when Nepal emerged as a “new nation” after the fall of the Rana oligarchy, it had only 9,000 pupils in primary, 1,700 in secondary schools and a little over one hundred in two undergraduate colleges. There was no university. Adult education stood at a bare 5%.

Quantitative achievements
Over the last few decades, more particularly in the three previous ones, there has been a rapid increase in the number of students enrolling at all levels of education. In absolute figures, primary school numbers grew significantly from around 400,000 in 1971 to 3.9 million in 2001. Over the same period, the combined numbers in lower secondary and secondary schools increased from 120,000 to 1.5 million. At post secondary level, including tertiary education, numbers increased from 17,000 in 1971 to 210,000 in 2005, resulting in a current enrolment ratio of around 6%.(NLSS II).

The credit for these quantitative achievements in terms of schools, teachers and students at all levels of the education system is down to a strong social demand for education and the efforts made by the people as well as the government. Credit must also be given to bilateral and multilateral donors for providing the government with the necessary resources to develop the educational infrastructures required to meet the increasing demand.

Literacy
Nepal is also making steady progress in literacy. The overall literacy rates for populations above 6 years have improved significantly, from 23% in 1981 to 54% in 2001. Literacy rates are improving, both for males and females. Since the female literacy rate is increasing more rapidly than the male one, the gap between the two is narrowing. The bad news is that,

1 In Nepal, the school education system comprises of Primary (1-5 grades for 6-10 year olds), Lower Secondary (6-8 grades) and Secondary (9-10 grades). Grade 11 to12 (known as Certificate level or 10 + 2) is Higher Secondary Education but is still considered part of tertiary education. University education comprises Bachelor (13 -14) and Master (15-16). An analysis of recent trends in the number of students enrolling indicates that the rate of growth is slowing at primary level. It is, however, strong at Secondary level and very strong at tertiary level.
despite over 50 years of development, almost half the adult population is still illiterate. Since our literacy programmes are supply driven and not responsive to the local needs of learners, our several Five-Year Plans have failed to achieve their literacy targets.\textsuperscript{2} Studies show that only around 60% of learners complete courses and are literate. Many literacy-programme graduates give up due to the limited availability of reading material and of post-literacy programmes where new literates might practise their literacy skills.

The low adult literacy rate, particularly among females and underprivileged groups is a factor involved in the continuing lack of participation in the education system on the part of girls and children from underprivileged communities.\textsuperscript{3} Studies carried out in Nepal and elsewhere claim that the low level of adult literacy prevents people from reaping the full benefit of or contributing to the country’s socio-economic development. Studies have shown that while a farmer with some schooling is more productive than a farmer with no schooling, his level of productivity is even higher if most farmers in the community have had at least some primary schooling. However, in neither the Terai nor the Nepal Mountain belt does the male literacy rate reach 50%.

Studies have also shown that a woman with some primary education is less fertile, but has healthier children than an unschooled woman, and that the differences tend to be significantly marked if most of the women in the community have benefited from this level of education. Unfortunately, however, in none of Nepal’s five development regions does female literacy exceed 30%.

**Problems of access**

With regards to school education, the problem at this level is both access and equity. Although access to primary education has increased considerably, increasing this access and improving equity in education still remain a formidable challenge. The gross enrolment ratio is 131% at primary level. Net enrolment is, however, only 84%. This means that 16% of the 6-10 age group do not go to school and, given the high drop-out rate, there are many more in the same situation. A large number of pupils have to redo their school year, whatever the class, especially in poor rural schools. Most of the time when girls fail a year, they simply drop out. The

\textsuperscript{2} Nepal launched its first Five-Year plan in 1956. We are currently in the fourth year of the Tenth Five-Year plan.

\textsuperscript{3} According to the 2001 Census the 6 years+ literacy rate is 54% (65% for male and 43% for female).
gross enrolment ratios at the lower secondary and secondary school are 86% and 50%. Net enrolment is, however, only 44% and 33% respectively.\(^4\)

There are many reasons for these unsatisfactory enrolment rates at school level. Although primary school is free, parents have to bear many direct and indirect costs for their children’s education. Since public schools receive just enough grant from the Government to pay for salaries, they have to raise funds among parents to meet other expenses such as the procurement of teaching materials (blackboard, chalk and furniture). It is not therefore uncommon for public schools to charge admission or examination fees for the students in order to meet daily school needs. Some schools also introduce compulsory uniforms for their students, which puts additional financial burden on parents. On top of this, household demand for or the price of child labour discourages many parents from sending their children, particularly girls, to school. In addition, apart from the cost factor, some parents in rural areas do not see the point of education in everyday life and employment. Among other barriers that exclude poor children from educational opportunities in Nepal is the distance from school, the negative attitude of teachers toward poor children’s ability to succeed, language and cultural factors, and in the present context, the Maoist conflict.

**Problems of equity**

Participation in school education is unequal across social, gender, regional, and income groups. According to the recent Nepal Living Standards Survey II, fewer than 30% of 6-10 year old Brahmins and Chetris, and fewer than 29% of Newars, have not been to school compared to 43% of the Hill Dalits (occupational caste), 76% of the Terai Dalits, 62% of Muslims and 45% of Hill ethnic groups. The Dalits also have the lowest rate for completing primary education, followed by the Muslims.\(^5\) There are also gender disparities in primary numbers. The national net enrolment for 6-10 year old girls is 67% versus 78% for boys. Gender disparities are particularly higher in the Terai Middle Class/Caste group where only 58% of 6-10 year old girls are at school compared to 94% of boys. Traditional high-caste Hindus in rural areas adhere to strict Hindu rules that restrict a girl’s movements after they reach puberty. It is also distressing to note that among children from poorer households, the percentage of 6-10 year olds out of school rises to 36%\(^6\) and that more than two thirds of these are girls.

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\(^5\) Bennett, 2006.
\(^6\) World Bank, 2005.
The School Leaving Certificate examination (SLC) which is held at the end of 10 years at school is the only readily available means of assessing how well or badly children are learning, the strengths and weaknesses in terms of our efforts to improve the performance of girls and children of ethnic and underprivileged communities; and in a word how well our school system operates. An analysis of the 2000-2004 SLC results reveals widespread disparity in SLC performance between genders, between public and private schools, and among students from different regions and ethnic groups.

The average SLC performance of girls has been historically lower than that of boys. In 2000-2004 the average overall score for girls was around 7% lower than that for boys, and the pass rate for girls was only 41% compared to a 50% rate for boys. There are two compelling reasons why girls perform so poorly in comparison to boys. The Study on Student SLC Performance reveals that most families do not offer the necessary conditions at home for girls to do well at school. For instance, girls do not get enough time to study at home because they spend hours on household chores (more than 6 hours a day in some cases). The amount of support and attention that girls receive inside and outside the classroom from their teachers is minimal compared to boys. It is a fact that most teachers in Nepal perceive girl students as incompetent, lazy, submissive, and less intelligent than boys. Interestingly, even the girls themselves do not have much faith in their ability to learn and succeed. In rural areas there are also cultural and social barriers to girls being effective and successful in their learning role in the classroom, since both their family and community expect them to be shy, submissive and quiet.

The disparity analysis and equity analysis carried out under the recently completed Study on Student SLC Performance have documented sufficient evidence to suggest that failure and/or low-performance is a phenomenon which frequently occurs in districts or geographical areas with a low Human Development Index (HDI). Likewise, children belonging to ethnic and Dalit communities have a significantly much lower level of achievement than other groups. Evidently, school results are not a purely school-related phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in the socio-economic and ethnic composition of society. One of the shortcomings of the ADB- and World Bank-financed Primary Education Development Project and Basic and Primary Education Project in Nepal is that “No aspect of the (reform) package addressed factors such as parental education, nutrition and

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8 Bista, 2005.
health, household economy etc., which, though admittedly difficult to influence, are known to have a significant impact on student achievement, possibly greater than the effect of school inputs.10

Apart from home factors, many children from ethnic communities also suffer from the language barrier.11 It is found that even after many years of schooling in Nepali, most linguistic and ethnic minorities have difficulties in expressing themselves in the official language at school. It could be that the way Nepali textbooks are written and the way Nepali is taught in the classroom does not help students acquire language skills. In Nepali classes the emphasis is usually on teaching literary aspects rather than the language.

**Private schooling as a source of inequality**

One of the relatively new sources of inequality in the Nepalese education system is the mushrooming of private schools over recent years. One third of the total increase in school numbers has been in the private sector. The proportion of numbers at private schools is 10% at primary level, 21% at lower secondary and 23% at secondary level. This rate of enrolment is expected to grow by 12% at primary level, 22% at lower secondary and 27% at secondary level by the year 2010.12

One of the major reasons for the increase in private schooling in Nepal has been the growing disillusionment with the public school system as a result of its continual poor results. An analysis of the 2004 SLC results demonstrates that public schools, on average, lag far behind private schools in terms of performance. Compared to an average pass rate of 85% for private schools, for instance, the figure for public schools was only 38%. Similarly, while an overwhelming majority of private schools showed pass rates in the 80-100% range, less than 7% of public schools could boast such high pass rates. Also, the average SLC score for public schools was around 17% lower that of private schools.13

The large difference in performance between public and private schools betrays the regressive character of the Nepalese education system. Considering that generally only relatively rich urban families can afford private school education for their children, the continuing disparity in achievements between these two types of school will no doubt frustrate

whatever plans the government may have of bringing members of ethnic and underprivileged communities into the mainstream living conditions. More importantly this will further widen the gulf between the haves and have-nots in Nepalese society.

In recent years the student wing of the Maoists party has been demonstrating against the commercialization of the school system and demanding the end of two categories of school – one for the rich and the other for the poor. Indeed, education in Nepal has failed to serve as “a great equalizer of men” (Horace Man 1848). Although education in our society has been understood as a major gateway from poverty and it has served this function admirably for some, academic success has been elusive for a large number of young people, who are economically poor or culturally and racially different from the mainstream or both. The Marxist anthropologist, Stephen Mikesell, thus observes “The rural schools in Nepal basically serve the role of disqualifying rural young people from roles in society and turning them into failures. In the School Leaving Certificate examinations of 1996, my last year of residence in Nepal, not one child from rural schools passed in the first division, which means that rural kids are eliminated from more prestigious college tracks, particularly from being engineers and doctors, the aspiration of middle class parents for their children.”

Nepali elites, who regard this serious issue with a “dismissive attitude” and “theory of rejection”, somehow refuse to believe that the regressive character of our education system which offers quality education to few and denies it to the great majority will be a threat to social cohesion. It will also erode our trust in social institutions and weaken our democratic practices which we so badly need to build in post-conflict Nepal.

Problem of quality

Closely-related to the issue of the disparity in achievements between private and public schools is the problem of the quality of the school education system, particularly in public schools. The nationwide survey involving 450 secondary schools and approximately 22,500 students and the case studies of 28 effective and ineffective secondary schools carried out within the Study on Student SLC Performance reveal that hardly any teaching and learning take place in many public schools in rural areas. There is very little testing and no remedial support for students in difficulty. This practice of neglecting weak students starts at primary level, and carries on through secondary.

The report says:

It is not just the lack of physical, instructional, and human resources. Even when resources were available, there was no teaching and learning. Courses were not completed in time. Teacher absenteeism was high. Even if the teachers were present in schools, teachers did not teach.

In the recent past the abrupt closure of schools and the abduction of students by Maoists rebels for political training also adversely affected the already poor performance of many schools in rural areas. Besides, many parents were reluctant to send their children to school or they simply pulled their children out of schools fearing such abduction.

The teachers’ morale in most public schools is low for numerous reasons which include too much politicizing, a lack of professional support, poor school management, a shortage of resources and ineffective leadership. In recent years there has been a further knock to the teachers’ morale, especially in rural areas, due to the immense pressure that they have to work under in conflict-affected areas. They are often forced to pay donations every month to Maoists rebel groups out of their meagre salary. Often government authorities and security forces mistrust teachers because they are historically opposed to the establishment. The rebel forces, on the other hand, are said to have harassed, humiliated and tortured teachers affiliated to political parties.

To make matters worse, there is a total absence of support for monitoring and supervising public schools despite the fact that the Ministry of Education and Sport has on its payroll an army of school supervisors, resource specialists, and training staff. The District Education officer who is responsible for all the schools in the district hardly visits any schools outside the district headquarters, partly due to the ongoing conflict, partly because of his lack of commitment, and partly due to a lack of resources (travelling costs). Nobody in the public system – head-teacher, teacher, school management committee member, school supervisor or District Education Officer is held accountable for the poor performance of schools. The community served by the school has no sense of belonging to the school and does not feel accountable for its performance or non-performance.

Under the current Education Regulations, schools that perform below 15% levels (in terms of the SLC examination pass rate) over three consecutive years are penalized. More recently, schools with a pass rate of 50% or more for SLC have been awarded a sum of Rs. 300,000. Although these policies are the fruit of good intentions, it is usually the schools operating in difficult circumstances and serving children from poor households, ethnic minorities, and underprivileged communities that are penalized, for it is these schools which usually produce the worst results.
Private schools, which are mostly centred in urban areas and cater for relatively richer families however portray a different picture. Most private schools are better managed with strong leadership. Not only are classes held regularly, they are also supplemented by additional coaching and tutorials. Remedial support for weaker students, lesson drills and frequent class tests and assessments are regular features in private schools. Critics of private school education argue that these schools put too much emphasis on teaching to test. Since there is a furious race among schools to achieve high pass rates in the SLC examination, private schools spend too much valuable curriculum time on directly preparing for examinations while neglecting critical thinking, creativity and generally what is not tested. They also argue that the high success rate among private school-children is also largely due to their home backgrounds which provide them with the opportunity to succeed. Moreover, parents also expect results as they have paid higher school fees.

Despite the tremendous contributions made to Nepal’s educational development by private schools in providing increased access to and quality education without incurring any financial burden on the government, they are on the defensive at present time. The main line of attack concerns their high fees, which make them inaccessible to the majority of people. They are also being criticized for creating two classes of citizens and for being indirectly responsible for delaying reform in the public education system.

One of the major problems of overall school education in Nepal is the high attrition rate in terms of students failing, redoing a year and dropping out before the end of the course. Out of 100 children enrolling in Grade I, for instance, only around 18 complete the course after five years and less than 50% complete it at all. Although drop-out rates are lower at secondary level, the number of pupils having to redo a school year is very high. Only 40% and 50% of those who complete the lower and secondary cycles respectively do so without having to stay down a year. According to a recent study undertaken by Training for Employment Project, out of 100 who enter Grade 1, sixteen pass Grade 10 and only 8 pass the SLC examination.16

Apart from the waste of resources as a result of the high attrition rate at school, the system also produces young men and women who have some years of schooling but none of the necessary skills for future employment. Except for Grade 10 graduates, the education system offers these persons (84% of Grade 1 students who drop out before passing SLC) no opportunity of any career orientation toward technical and vocational

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training courses. Many young people who are now going abroad for unskilled or semiskilled employment send their families a substantial amount of their remittance. They could have done much better had they acquired technical training at home. A great many, who cannot go abroad or find employment in Nepal because of their lack of employable skills, fall victim to all sorts of temptations created by internal conflicts.

**Higher education**

Those who pass the national School Leaving Certificate examination have the option of going on to pursue a technical training course or higher education either in academic subjects or technical applications. At present, higher education is being offered by five universities and two autonomous institutes. The total number of students at these universities is estimated at 210,000 of whom 90% are at Tribhuvan University.

Tribhuvan University is the oldest and the biggest institute of higher education. One of the biggest challenges of this university is that it has grown too big and has become very difficult to manage. Being a state-financed university (a little over 80% of its budget comes from the government) with almost 190,000 students, this institute of higher learning is also highly politicized which makes it difficult to introduce any reform into this system.

**Problem of quality**

Except few technical institutes, Tribhuvan University (TU) does not offer high-quality education. Academic standards on most campuses are mediocre with teachers lacking dedication and scholarship. University classes mostly consist of lectures, and learning is simply the passive absorption of facts rather than any active intellectual discourse, participation or research. Seminars and discussions rarely take place and reading assignments, drafting term-papers, project work, and case studies are unheard of. University campuses provide neither the rigor nor the challenge of university life. Academic calendars do not exist and students leave early for vacation and return late. Unscheduled holidays, student meetings and teachers absenteeism frequently disrupt classes.

University students probably spend less time in the classroom here than in any other country. No wonder student failure rates in non technical faculties in 2002-03 were 75%, 74% and 73% at certificate, bachelor, and masters levels respectively. Some responsibility for this disappointing result, however, may also be attributed to students’ poor

17 Shrestha, 2005.
academic background due to inadequate schooling and the University’s almost open-door policy regarding student admissions.

**Problem of funding**

One of the many causes for the decline in the standard of university education has been the shortage of funds for spending on those inputs which contribute to improving standards such as libraries, laboratories and scientific equipment, extra classrooms, research and field work. Nepal spends 3.7% of its GDP on education which is 16% of the national budget. The share of higher education in the education budget has been on the decline over the past few years. It was 6% in 2004, which is one of the lowest in the world.

The university, on the other hand, has failed to increase its own income to compensate for the decline in government financing by leasing out its centrally-located landed property, encouraging university departments to offer research and consultancy services and organizing many other activities. Tuition fees are negligible and any attempt at increasing them is met with major resistance from students. Government funds for the university are approved by Ministry of Finance officials who have little understanding of higher education in general, of universities’ goals and potential and the context in which they operate.

The shortage of funding for capital investment and non-salary operating expenses has seriously undermined the institutional framework of higher education in Nepal. Most campus buildings are dismal structures with poor facilities and inadequate equipment. Campus management complains of having no funds to buy spare parts for equipment, books for the library, and even to pay for routine structural maintenance (for instance sanitary facilities). According to a study carried out in 1996, 60% of laboratories had no adequate space for practical work and 70% of laboratories had no basic materials in adequate amounts, while there was no renewal of supplies in more than 50% of laboratories. One of the fairly large campuses, with over 6,000 students near Kathmandu, has a library with only 3,000 books, most of which are out of date.

The internet revolution now allows people all over the world to access information on an unprecedented number of topics both instantly and relatively cheaply. However, hardly any campus in the TU system has computer facilities for faculty members and a very insignificant number of teachers have access to electronic networks and CD-ROMs. Faculty access to computer-based technologies contributes to reducing

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intellectual isolation while providing increased access to the very latest scientific information.

An acute shortage of resources has been compounded by its inefficient use. For instance, many campus libraries are closed evenings and weekends in accordance with civil service regulations. In some subjects there are more teachers than are required and the ratio of non-academic staff to academic staff is high. A sizable portion of the university budget is also spent on non-educational expenditures in support of student scholarships, grants and subsidized student services. Low student-teacher ratios on some courses, the high drop-out rates, the high number of students having to redo their year and low graduation rates have also gone towards putting up the cost for graduates on many university campuses.

**Politicization**

One reason which discourages management to take any initiative towards reform is the highly politically-charged atmosphere on university campuses. Politicization has its merits as it promotes the democratic practice of dialogue and debate on contentious issues among various groups and prepares a way for managing and solving conflicts. It is only a few highly political faculty members, students and student groups taking up positions as combative agents of rival political factions that affect the academic atmosphere of the campus and upset the university’s agenda for reform. Each campus has an elected student body which for the sake of protecting students’ interests opposes any attempt at cutting back subsidies or raising tuition or other fees even when these are unreasonably low.

When tuition fees were raised at TU in 1992 after remaining frozen for almost two decades, students unions across the country violently protested against the decision, although the actual increment was very low. When TU leadership introduced an entrance examination for students applying for science courses, the students were up in protest again and demonstrated for several weeks. Since 1992, no university management has dared raise the tuition fees again until now. Many other items on the agenda for reform have also been left in abeyance at the university due to the fear of a student uprising.

It is not just one elected student body which is active on the campus. Each campus has several student groups which are affiliated to the student wing of various political parties. There is much competition and rivalry among the various student groups and each tries to outdo the others in terms of protecting and promoting so-called student rights and privileges. Competition and populism have driven many student groups to
demand more and more concessions even on matters such as admission requirements and examinations. As a consequence of regular student unrest on campuses and the subsequent deterioration in academic standards, some students who can afford to pay higher fees go to Kathmandu University (the only university in the private sector) which to date remains unaffected by students politics. Many, however, prefer to go to other public universities on the subcontinent, particularly in India.

University teachers are not spared the effect of national politics either. There is a Nepal University Teachers Association (NUTA), a body elected every year by university teachers to protect and promote the interest of university faculty members. There is also TUTA, an association of Tribhuvan University teachers. Besides, there are two other separate organizations, one affiliated to the Nepali Congress and the other to the United Marxist Leninist (UML) Communist party. Those who hold office within these organizations regularly meet party leaders and exert influence on the Government’s political calendar.

The rivalry between these two groups surfaces whenever there is a senior university staff vacancy, with each group trying to get its own member or supporter appointed. Appointments to senior leadership or management posts and sometimes even to academic positions are highly politicized. It might not be wholly untrue to say that political beliefs weigh heavier in choosing a candidate than his or her competence, leadership qualities, academic credentials, and past track record.

**Impact on teachers’ morale**

One can imagine the effect all this has on the teachers’ morale. Hardly any teachers spend much time on the university campus. Quite a few professors on campuses located in Kathmandu spend more time negotiating donor-supported projects than on the campus giving lectures, supervising researchers or working on his or her own research. Some of them have their own consultancy offices in town. Others who are not in the consultancy business take up evening teaching sessions in other private schools or campuses. Those who teach Engineering or Law or Medicine act more like part-time teachers than full-time professors, as they spend more time working outside the campus than lecturing to students and devoting their time to research.

None of these professors working outside the university brings any overhead to their campus. Some years ago when the Japanese government built a modern teaching hospital as an annex to a Medicine campus in Kathmandu, doctors teaching on the campus were given a non-practising allowance on top of their salary so that they would teach, treat patients at the hospital and research on a full-time basis. A few years after its
implementation, this practice fizzled out as some senior doctors started practising outside the hospital, albeit clandestinely, much to the donor’s disappointment. This practice was reinstated in 1992 by taking sterner action against those who violated the rule, only to be discarded again after the reshuffle in University management due to a change in government in the first months of 1994.

One of the negative consequences of excessive moonlighting and absenteeism among teachers is that the country’s elite scholars and scientists slowly become isolated from the international community of academics and scholars and lose their ability to keep up with developments in their own field. As the university loses its ability to act as a reference point for the rest of the education system, the country suffers as it finds it harder to make key decisions on matters of national interest.

TU still has some very good professors educated at some of the finest universities in the world. Many of them are however nearing retirement age, and once they do leave there is a very serious threat of inbreeding in the system.

**Way forward**

*Literacy program*

The poor rate of adult literacy is one issue which the new government that will come to power after the election in 2007 has to address as a priority. As discussed earlier, almost half the adult population is still illiterate. One of the reasons for the high adult illiteracy rate in Nepal has been the slow progress towards universal primary education along with a sustained high school drop-out rate. Our success in reducing adult literacy for the next generation therefore depends on how much progress we make towards global school and university attendance, overall completion of primary school and a high standard of teaching.

While formal education systems hold the key to reducing illiteracy, schools alone cannot solve the problem. The huge delay in achieving satisfactory adult illiteracy rates needs to be addressed with special programs. Our past failure in achieving our literacy targets indicates that we should launch a nationwide literacy campaign, involving school-teachers, college and university students and young and prospective members of political parties, NGOs and community groups. Such campaigns should avoid any mistakes made by the regular national program and be responsive as far as possible to the learning needs of individual communities, by focusing on the real contexts in which people need to use their literacy skills. Considering the newly-earned air of freedom and democracy in the country, the combination of the literacy process with the empowerment process, based on people carrying out
their own detailed and systemic local analysis might be an ideal way of motivating adult learners.

**School education**
The government needs to make a special effort to attract to school the very poor, girls and children from underprivileged communities by adopting various strategies such as increasing the number of female teachers in order to increase girls’ attendance. Currently only 25% of teachers are women. Similarly more children from Dalit and ethnic communities need to be encouraged to attend school. A recent survey of 1,000 schools revealed that only 23% of pupils and only 2% of teachers were from ethnic groups and Dalits respectively, with most of them being from the Brahman-Chetri group. The Government should also make efforts to recruit teachers who are bilingual (speak local languages as well as Nepali) to help children whose mother tongue is not Nepali.

It is important for the government to adequately finance public schools which mostly cater for girls and underprivileged children and to make serious efforts to improve the quality of teaching in these schools. The Government’s policy of providing just enough funds to pay for teachers’ and other staff salaries will go no way to improving the standard of education in public schools. Several studies carried out in Nepal and elsewhere have revealed a strong association between spending per student and school performance, implying that schools with high expenditure per-child do a better job in terms of their students' achievements. Private schools in Nepal spend 11 times more than public schools. It is important that the Government ensures full funding for public education. Where communities are able to bear part of the cost of schooling for their children, schools should be allowed to raise funds locally in addition to what they receive from the government.

The near collapse of the monitoring and supervision system is one major problem public schools are currently facing. The Government must strengthen the supervision and monitoring of public schools to ensure that classes are held regularly, homework is given and marked, children in difficulty are given remedial support, class assessments and tests are conducted regularly and that they are used not just to assess learning but to help students with problem solving and to promote critical thinking. In short, each teacher and each school and school management committee should be made accountable for students’ performance.

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19 Bajaracharya, 2005.

20 Maoists, and in particular their student faction have been protesting against the practice of some public schools to raise certain student fees, claiming that education should be the State’s sole responsibility.
Each District Education Office must also develop parent/community roles in promoting children’s education or in improving schools’ performance.

Parents or community members could assume the role of monitoring teachers’ attendance, their attitude toward children’s performance and their overall management of the classroom. Many countries in Africa have influential Parent Teachers Associations which are doing a lot to improve the standard of primary education, especially in rural areas.

The Government should also monitor progress made in the social integration of Dalits and other ethnic groups via its District Education Offices. Rural schools with a rise in girls’ attendance and satisfactory achievements among girls and Dalits should be rewarded with cash prizes or additional government funding, in addition to awards for the best teachers. With this aim in mind, the Ministry of Education and its District Offices must reinforce the management of their monitoring and supervision system.

The Government must put a stop to two types of education which only offer quality education to a chosen few, while denying it to the great majority. This means that the Government must be fully committed to supporting the public education system at school level, at least from grade 1 to 10. One way to put an end to this dual education system is to help public schools to recover their lost credibility and thereby check the flight of students from public to private schools.

**Vocational and technical education or training**

As discussed earlier, a considerable number of cohorts of a given age group either never enters the general education system or leaves school before completing primary school. The Government must implement various technical and vocational training programs at different levels for students who drop out after primary or lower secondary or secondary education. Training in practical skills or vocational education should also be considered for boys and girls who fail to complete their schooling or those who have more aptitude toward vocational education.

**Higher education**

The biggest problem facing higher education in Nepal is the standard issue. The standard is abysmal due to a lack of funding, mindless bureaucratization and an excessive politicization of university campuses, with the subsequent effect on the teachers’ morale.

Higher education in Nepal, as elsewhere in the developing world, is heavily dependent on government funding, and unit costs are relative high compared to other segments of the education system. In recent
years, Nepal has been allocating about 3.7% of its GDP, which is around 1% of the national budget, to education. The share of higher education in the education budget has been on the decline over the last few years. It amounted to 6% of the education budget in 2004 which is considered to be one of the lowest in the world. While one can appreciate the government’s reduced capacity to support higher education as a result of adverse macroeconomic conditions in the country, it is very clear that unless public funding for higher education increases there is very little hope of improving the performance of university campuses.

A propos of what is said above, the bleak economic outlook makes it unlikely that public financing for higher education will increase significantly in the short to medium term. This means that universities have to learn to be more “cost conscious” and make effective use of the resources they have. This also means that the utilization of facilities such as libraries, laboratories, workshops and other specialized units must be improved. Teachers’ “time on task” and personal consultancy work outside the university needs to be monitored. “Casual leave” and other types of leave should be restricted. Teachers must be encouraged to bring in to their departments consultancy, training and research projects from the Government, aid agencies and private firms and industry which generate income for the university or faculty, to involve students in research and at the same time to promote the visibility of the university to the outside world.

Individual campuses must also be asked to raise funds by collecting donations and endowments from alumni and other donors in public and private sectors. These contributions, essentially gifts to universities, may take many forms, including funding for the building of new facilities such as a computer laboratory for a faculty and its students, the endowment of professional chairs, donations for scientific equipment, books or the provision of scholarships for students in need. The Government may introduce tax systems that encourage such donations. University management should also start rewarding campuses which try to diversify their financial base by leasing out their property located in commercial areas. Some campuses in Kathmandu have already been doing this as a result of reform measures initiated by TU management in 1992-93.

The other side to higher education in Nepal is the rapid increase in student numbers as a result of demographic growth and of increased access to lower levels of education. This has made it increasingly difficult for the government to finance and support universities. Considering the rapid increase in the number of students in higher education, which is partially fuelled by the high level of subsidization in public universities, it is important for the Government to encourage private education institutes
as a means of managing the cost of the increase in student numbers as well as broadening social participation in higher education. Since a purely private system will not adequately safeguard public interest, a mixed system of public and private institutes of higher education is the answer to Nepal's needs.

The private sector can also play an important role in promoting non-university higher education institutes such as short-cycle professional and technical institutes, undergraduate colleges and distance learning and open university programs. Their lower cost makes them both attractive to students and easier for private providers to set up. Some private initiatives have already been undertaken in this area. It is the Government’s responsibility to develop an appropriate policy to encourage such private initiatives and at the same time to create a mechanism for auditing educational programs conducted by such institutes.

A more complex problem to deal with is the excessive politicization within public universities and their campuses. Higher education institutes inevitably reflect the societies in which they operate and when a country suffers from deep rifts, these will be felt on the campus. No one would disagree that higher education institutes should enable opinions on broader issues facing society and the nation to be freely expressed and debated, and that student awareness and debate should be encouraged. There are situations, however, where the level of activism rises to the point where a high standard of education becomes impossible. Excessive political activism among students, teachers and administrative staff also makes governance of higher education institutes extremely difficult and causes inordinate delay in the introduction of any necessary reform programs.

Tribhuvan University, Nepal’s top institute of higher education, has become a beehive of political activism and has ceased to be an attractive place to work, though it once drew new PhDs (nationals or non-nationals) from foreign universities. TU, on the other hand, seriously needs to attract foreign-trained Nepali or foreign-trained nationals to join its faculty or to send some of its best elements to universities abroad for higher degrees so that the university will have the benefit of “cross fertilization” and acquire the much needed energy to revitalize the institute. In order to make TU an attractive place to work, TU must rid itself of excessive politics that have tarnished its image, hampered its academic program and hindered its agenda for reform.

The only way to rid this national university of excessive politicization is for all political parties to come together and make a pledge to keep university campuses free from party politics and government and party
interference. This is undoubtedly not easy to achieve but this is also the most opportune time while the country is trying, with efforts from all major political parties and the rebel force, to bring an end to a ten-year conflict and emerge as a new “fully democratic” nation.

Post-conflict reconstruction
The armed conflict has resulted in massive levels of destruction in Nepal, particularly in the countryside. Schools located in conflict-affected areas appear to be disconnected from the wider national system of education. Teaching in many rural schools has remained dysfunctional. A number of crucial educational activities such as school supervision, teacher training, delivery of free textbooks, calling School Management Committees and parent-teacher evenings, holding SLC examinations, etc. have been seriously disrupted. A rapid assessment of 28 Village Development Committees (VDC) carried out by UNICEF/Nepal revealed that 21% of 174 schools were seriously affected by the conflict.21 The report says:

Schools were closed for an average of 10 days a month, and children did not enjoy going to school, due to the threat of abduction for indoctrination. Four hundred and fifty students and 250 teachers are reported to have been abducted for indoctrination. Of an estimated 63,000 children under the age of 18 in 28 VDCs, 1,027 were reported to have moved as a result of the conflict.

There are reports that teachers are often harassed, humiliated, tortured and in some cases even killed. According to Human Rights Organizations, 171 teachers have been killed in the present conflict in Nepal. There are also reports of teachers fleeing their village or place of work, resulting in long periods of disruption in teaching and learning. The students most affected by the conflict are girls and children of mostly poor and ethnic communities - groups which are already at a disadvantage in terms of access, participation and educational achievement. Although no comprehensive study has yet been undertaken on the impact of the recent conflict on students, the rapid assessment of 28 VDCs carried out by UNICEF reports that out of 1,027 displaced children, 45% were from ethnic groups, 28% from Dalit and another 28% from other categories. Of 174 children who joined the rebel force most were from occupational castes. There are also reports of the fear of rape and abduction that kept minority children, especially girls away from school. The UNICEF assessment reports “The numbers of students enrolled and appearing for examination fell dramatically in all categories between 2003/2004 and 2004/2005. Most disturbingly barely half the number of girls took final exams in 2004/2005.”

It is indeed difficult to measure the impact of the conflict on children’s psychological state and education. Even when schools are officially open, the number of pupils is down and their attendance is irregular. And where children are lucky to go to school, their learning is often hindered by trauma, depression, untrained or ill-prepared teachers, or a shortage of sufficient teaching material and infrastructure.

Now that peace is tantalizingly close at hand, the Government should start preparing for post–conflict reconstruction of the education system in the areas affected. The Government’s first task would be to proceed with proper assessment and documentation of the loss or damage to the education sector and to prepare appropriate reconstruction strategies. The other priority would be to get schools running properly. Teachers and head-teachers may require psycho-social training to deal with children traumatized by the conflicts. Special programs need to be organized for teachers victimized by the atrocities of the conflict. The Government must closely supervise all schools in regions affected by the conflict and make a special effort to provide all necessary assistance to them. It is also important to reach a consensus whereby all political parties including the Maoists strive to keep schools free of “politics”. Special programs might have to be developed for young boys and girls whose schooling has been disrupted but who would now like to continue their education.

Conclusion

Education in Nepal as elsewhere around the world is intensely political. The prevailing system of education works well for the elites and those sectors of society which do not have to rely on public education for their children. Public schools are being now abandoned by those who can afford to send their children to private schools. Following the withdrawal by professionals, businessmen, government bureaucrats, university professors and even school-teachers of their children, public schools in Nepal are now attended by girls and children from poor backgrounds and those living in difficult conditions. It is exactly for this reason that the problem of the massive failure of the SLC examination and the near collapse of the public school system are ignored and not seen as a national problem.22 What has happened at school level is slowly being repeated in higher education: public university campuses are being abandoned by those who can afford to go to private universities or abroad. The present

22 An analysis of SLC results over ten years (1995 to 2004) reveals an average failure rate of 60%. Further analysis of the 2001 SLC results shows that public school students, with a pass rate of 25.4%, perform alarmingly poorly compared to private school students (75.3%).
system therefore produces two classes of citizen who are schooled and prepared very differently and who would perhaps never meet in their youth anywhere except, after their graduation, in the work place. The failure of the public education system may have a negative impact on the creation of a national culture and a cohesive society, among other things, which is so important in post-conflict Nepal. It not only frustrates government plans for social integration and the empowerment of women, Dalits and ethnic groups but also forces the nation to enter the twenty-first century insufficiently prepared to compete in the global economy. It is for this reason that an education reform in Nepal is far too urgent and important to be delayed by a few vested groups and short-term political gains for individual political parties.

References


Our hymns are different but our gods are the same: Religious rituals in modern garment factories in Nepal

Mallika Shakya

This article deals with the emerging literary convergence between the two strands of literature that examine the rise of modern capitalism among the inherently acapitalistic societies of South and East Asia. Singer’s (1972) ethnography of the Indian industrial leaders of Madras establishes a case for “a palimpsest for continuity and change” in terms of modernization of business and socio-religious organisation among the elite industrial leaders. An essential supplement to it are Ong’s (1987) ethnography of the Malaysian modern factory workers and Parry’s (1999) study of the Indian industrial labour, both of which explore the inherent psychological and cultural dilemma that the predominantly rural workforce faces as they proceed towards adapting to the Fordist and Taylorist methods of industrial production. Such converging literature reiterates the falsity of the linear dogmatism of the modernisation theory, on both counts – among the industrialists as well as the workers. Drawing from an ethnography1 of a readymade garment industry in Nepal, which is at the forefront of the course of globalisation in the country, I offer a discussion on the extent to which the changing religious rituals in the modern industrial sphere support the Singerian deduction on the incessant coexistence of religious creed with capitalistic calculations, and the extent to which the two pillars of industrialisation, i.e., the industrialists as well as the workers, are part of and share this entangling temporal conundrum.

Milton Singer’s book When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization (1972) is one that has a similar stature as Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus in Indian anthropology, or Weber’s Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism in economic sociology, both as an exploration of “culture” in economic territories and as a critique of the stale old comparative static of the conventional sociological modernization theory. Singer concluded that the modern features of industry are not likely to displace the traditional features overnight, nor are the two sets of features necessarily incompatible. He showed that the challenges that an industrialist encounters in his industrial ventures which he is powerless to solve in a mercantile way, as well as the conflicts he encounters with traditional institutions, beliefs,

1 Conducted from October 2002 to July 2004.

and the values he contains are often mitigated by developing a “compartmentalisation” of industrial life from domestic and social, and thereby seeking a “rational adaptability” rather than an “irrational resistance” of Hinduism to change.

The ethnographies of the industrial labour force so far have not documented such “compartmentalisation;” instead the ethnographies of the workers in the emerging capitalisms – the most prominent ones being Ong’s (1987) and Parry’s (1999) – have shed light on the second important feature of industrial modernization, which is that the workers have come to use cultural symbolism for sheer resistance to the new industrial order. These ethnographies claim that the imposition of the “new” order, and the interruption to the idyllic agrarian life that it generates, is ritually evaded and consciously or subconsciously retaliated.

Ong (1987) sought to illuminate the cultural change in an industrialising society by talking about changing peasant beliefs and practices in a situation of “shifting, complementary, and contradictory” meanings. Her study of spirit possession amongst Malaysian factory women begins with a portrayal of the traditional Kampong life where a young woman’s work followed easy-going rhythms of day and night, seasonality and social harmony. This pastoral idyll is shattered by a Taylorist factory discipline, by reduction of work to time-motion manipulation, and by the constant surveillance of, often male, supervisors. What this dislocating experience gives rise to is a series of minor acts of resistance, of which, seizure of the hantu hallucinations is a kind of ritual rebellion against a loss of autonomy and a “residual image” of remembered village (p. 9). Similarly, Johny Parry’s (1999) muhurat of the ethnographic study of the Indian industrial workforce is an anthology of various forms of worker resistance to the industrialists’ construction of “new” industrial labour loyalties based on the credit and payment systems as well as the reconstruction of “old” loyalties deriving largely from the social ethics of caste, age, gender and obligational hierarchies. Parry argues that the “shirking” behaviour of the industrial worker in the “new” capitalistic order in India is an expression of their pre-emptive resistance to the capitalistic efforts to usher in change to their rhythm of work.

These ethnographies on labour resistance leave us with a pertinent question: Does a “compartmentalising” phenomenon that has come to embody the industrialists’ adaptation to modern capitalism also extend to the industrial workers who follow the same process of change? Does the natural process of resistance preclude the workers from developing any compartmentalisation of their personal and industrial spaces as a more

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2 A ritual launch.
encompassing tool for resistance? Owing to the cohabitation of workers and industrialists in industrial spaces, is it sensible to use the compartmentalisation or resistance theories to jointly explore the common industrial and cultural circumstances shared by these two groups? These will be the key questions this article will try to address in its ethnography of the industrialists and workers of large-scale Taylorist garment factories in Nepal.

**Religion’s role in building trust**

The readymade garment industry in Nepal is largely dominated by Hindus because the garment industry flourished in Nepal as a direct aftermath of the international Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) of 1974, whereby the United States which held over ninety percent of the global garment market introduced a country-specific global garment quota among its primary garment supplier countries. MFA quotas largely curtailed the supply potentials from India and redistributed the surplus among the smaller South Asian countries — Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Owing to an open border between India and Nepal, the MFA prompted an overnight, large-scale relocation of the Indian garment capital to Nepal. The Garment Association of Nepal (GAN) estimated that more than ninety per cent of the garment factories registered in Nepal in the 1970s and 1980s comprised of substantial Indian capital. Contemporary commercial law in Nepal had made it mandatory that any alien capitalist seeking to invest in Nepal, including the Indians, must do so under the formal business partnership with a Nepali national. This had important implications for the relocation of the Indian garment industry in Nepal: Although the Indian garment industry originally comprised of a large number of Muslim and Christian industrialists, it was primarily the Hindu garment factory owners who chose to relocate their operations to Nepal. Not surprisingly, almost all of them chose to form business partnerships with Nepali Hindus.

Among the 93 garment manufacturing firms that I surveyed, 49 factories were business partnership firms. Sixteen of these had been closed by March 2004. Among the 33 that were still operating, the business partnership was almost always between the people of a common religion – in this case Hinduism. Only one of the 33 factories that I surveyed was a business partnership between a Nepali Buddhist and an Indian Hindu, while thirty were partnerships between the Hindus. Within this, fourteen of the business partnerships were between Nepali Hill Hindus; eleven were between Indian Hindus and Nepali Hindus of Indian origin; and five were between the Nepali Hill Hindus and Indian Hindus. It was not possible to
ascertain the religions of the owners of the two remaining firms. The business registration records of the Garment Association of Nepal (GAN) and my informal interviews with the key officials of GAN as well as other specialists of the garment industry confirmed that hardly any non-Hindu Indian garment industrialists had moved to Nepal over the past three decades. What this suggested is that religion provided a source of cooperation and a platform of trust among industrialists when they were bound by common religious values. In the absence of a sound legal framework for commercial agents to abide by, factory owners often resorted to religion for settling financial disputes. The following case of a complex financial dispute between three garment industrialists from one of the factories where I undertook my ethnographic research substantiates my argument further.

A tripartite partnership between Ram Lamichhane (Nepali Hill Hindu / NHH), Suresh Sharma (NHH) and Ajay Manandhar (Nepali Hill non-Hindu) was undergoing a serious financial crisis. Within this partnership, Suresh Sharma and Ajay Manandhar were not only long-standing business partners but also friends from childhood whereas Ram Lamichhane was much older and had only recently offered Suresh and Ajay business partnerships in his firm. Within a year of the partnership, worrying symptoms were appearing, and Ram expressed his wish to opt out. A separation deal was reached where the three partners agreed that Ram’s investment was worth 1.5 million Rupees – a fairly substantial sum by Nepalese standards. Suresh and Ajay made a verbal agreement with Ram that they would pay back his capital within a year. The spouses and sons of the three business partners were brought in as informal witnesses to this agreement. Nevertheless, no legal formalities were done and no documents were signed.

The unrecorded verbal promise among the three business partners - Ram, Suresh and Ajay – came to a major challenge within six months as the factory came to a standstill and the government blacklisted all three partners for non-payment of interests to their bank loans. The response of the two business partners to this crisis marked a stark contrast. Owing to major financial pressure, Ajay Manandhar denied his financial obligations to Ram. Not visibly different in his financial and social positions, Suresh Sharma still abided by his commitment. It took more than five years for Suresh to materialise his commitment, but he finally paid back the debt in October 2004. This earned him great respect among his professional and social circles, that “as a Brahman he would not let down another Brahman.” Ajay Manandhar’s refusal to respect his credit obligations was less attributed to his individual dishonesty and more to his socio-religious standing, and as Ram’s son Sameer put it: “Why would he pay back when
we did not have a single common kin ... and [more importantly] even [our] Gods [are] different.”

Religion’s role in dealing with uncertainties

It was customary among industrialists in Nepal to invoke the power of religious rituals to bestow protection and recovery from organisational and transactional crises. The protection of such rituals was especially sought at the time of a major industrial crisis in 2004 where a new WTO provision would end the quota privilege the Nepali garment industry had been enjoying since the 1974 Multi-Fibre Agreement, which was key to the rapid growth of this industry between 1974 and 2004. While the new WTO provision was inflexible with regard to the industry, it would have different implications for the various garment factories within the industry: For example, smaller-scale factories basing their trade on the value of their produce rather than the sheer quantity of their produce would be only marginally affected by this new policy whereas larger-scale factories solely focusing on the economies of scale would be hit hard.

It is important to highlight that the two types of garment production in Nepal differed not only in scale but more importantly in the underlying factors which led them to pursue different scale economies: The former was dominated by the practising members of traditional elite castes pursuing niche markets by specialising in ethnic arts of fabric-making and dyeing, clothes-designing or pictorial icons while the latter was largely represented by world-travelled and Western-educated management experts. Rather than the social origins of the owners, it was the nature of their business products which largely influenced their organisational preferences at their workplace: factories producing ethno-contemporary garments adopted schedules that least disturbed the natural rhythms of seasons as well as the ethnic rhythms of festivities and religious rituals. These factories often kept the workers segregated by their castes and ethnicities so that the workflow was not interrupted when the workers were absent during their respective ethnic festivities and rituals. Industrial loyalties coincided with traditional *jajmani* loyalties where factory owners and workers were mutually bonded through a series of complex financial obligations with multiple temporal, contextual and social dimensions. This was a sharp contrast to labour organisation in large-scale factories which seemed to follow principles of a caste-neutral meritocracy, where workers of all castes, ethnicities and gender worked side by side in a Taylorist “chain” system. Where their adherence to cultural norms became more pronounced, they were faced with their escapism from market-aversion.
Contrary to the impressionistic notion that large-scale factories would be more pragmatic than their smaller-scale and more conventional counterparts in terms of ensuring cost-effectiveness in factory operations and work floor socialisation, they became more and more solemn in their pursuit of religious rituals as the industry headed towards the uncertainties brought about by the change in WTO trade policies. These would inevitably be detrimental to their economic well-being. As the industry approached the much-feared expiration of MFA in December 2004, the seriousness with which religious rituals were performed in large-scale garment manufacturing factories in Nepal had far outrun their conventional counterparts. Such an observation corroborates the conclusions drawn by the “economised” school of anthropologists and sociologists who interpret social and religious rituals to be the outcome of economic manoeuvres among essentially non-economic agents in societies. For example, Malinowski (1954) affirmed that the religious rituals for deep sea shark and kalala (mullet) fishing were more stringent than those for lagoon fishing in the Trobriand Islands. Such an observation is also consistent with Lewis’ observation that investment bankers in London followed clothing and paperwork rituals when they were performing transactions that were considered to carry greater risks than normal. In his second case study, on a large synthetic fibre factory in Japan, it was the theme of safety that permeated the religious and nonreligious contexts in which the religious rituals were observed. The supremacy of safety concerns made the religious ritual and business ethics mutually complementary rather than contradictory.3

Religion as an identity within the factory power constellation
This section will focus on what extent religion adds a dimension to the implicit power struggle intrinsic among the various actors in business operations. Arya-Nepal, one of the factories where I did my ethnography, was a large-scale ready-made garment factory, serving the global market of large-scale and low-cost ready-made garments through the India-based purchasing agents of American clients such as GAP, Walmart, Kmart, Kohl, etc. The factory was established in the year 2000 under the wing of an India-based garment/textile- manufacturing group, primarily to adapt to the MFA-related shift in the US import policy which curtailed India’s share in the American market and replaced it by an increase in Nepal’s share. By March 2003, the factory had grown to become one of the largest and most profitable in Nepal.

3 D. Lewis in Mullins et al. (1993), p. 170
Arya-Nepal senior management comprised of five full-time senior managers transferred from their headquarters in Ludhiana, and a Nepali Hindu CEO who had strong command over the Arya-Nepal workforce which was largely Nepali, and through them a strong voice in senior management decisions. The conflicting national identities among the senior management team inevitably led to conflicts on managerial issues such as recruitment of workers, supervision of the factory floors, promotion and disciplinary actions, etc. The Indian team within senior management was tight-fisted in granting approval for workers’ advance payments, promotions, etc., which were frequently overridden by the Nepali CEO, and as a result his managerial decisions were the ones that the workers heeded most.

It is important to describe an important incident in order to explain why an essentially Indian factory would have Nepali managerial staff in such a strong capacity. When the factory was established, two senior most positions were created to strike the balance between the Nepali and Indian presence within the factory management team: The Nepali CEO was expected to work closely with a Kathmandu-based Punjabi Vice-President. This arrangement went smoothly at the outset, but an implicit national-ethnic league soon emerged, which was exacerbated by a political incident in Kathmandu that gave air to general feeling of hostility to Indian “imperialistic tendencies” at times. In January 2001, the opposition political parties in Nepal protested against the Nepali government’s suppression of a peaceful demonstration march towards the Indian embassy to submit a letter to protest to the denunciation of a scandal over controversial statements about Nepal allegedly made by a famous Bollywood film star. This macro political crisis had acute implications for Arya-Nepal. Echoing the protests in the streets of Kathmandu, the workers at Arya-Nepal spontaneously formed a Madheshi Daman Pratikar Samiti (“Resistance Committee against Indian Domination”). Impulsive riots engulfed the entire industry, and like most other garment factories, Arya-Nepal was forced to close its operations for more than a week. The work floor returned to normal only after the Bollywood actor concerned clarified that the alleged remarks about Nepal had in fact never been made.

Within weeks after Arya-Nepal resumed its operations, a bizarrely analogous crisis took over the factory: The factory workers started a petition to denounce anti-Nepal remarks allegedly made by the Indian Vice-President of Arya-Nepal. After the petition had collected 400 signatures, the President of the factory flew from Ludhiana to resume dialogue with the aggravated labour union. He then suspended the Vice-President in an attempt to calm the labour protests. The position was
never filled again after the Vice-President was made to return to Ludhiana from where he sent his resignation. After that, the Nepali CEO took full control of factory operations.

Arya-Nepal had maintained its religiosity from its very inception, which evolved subtly through the ethno-political turmoil that it underwent on occasion. The factory entrance held a large picture of Ganesha, a Hindu god of auspiciousness. Every senior manager’s office, including the CEO, production manager and finance officer, had paintings and mantras of Ganesha hanging on their walls. The company greeting business cards bore large, stylised pictures of Ganesha. The company also granted regular employment to two Hindu priests. In addition, the factory employed two more practising Brahman priests in non-priestly positions, in production management, who also gave regular advice on the performance of religious rituals in the factory.

Both the Indian and the Nepali members of the senior management team took pride in the fact that the factory was pakka brahman, “genuinely Brahman”, and that dharma (religion) was observed sincerely as manifested in its regular undertaking of a series of religious rituals. It exclusively followed a policy of satvik ahar (holy food) whereby not only the canteen was strictly prohibited from serving tamasik (meat-based, egg-based, or garlic/onion-based) food, but the entire workforce was forbidden to consume such food anywhere near the factory premises. A story circulated among factory workers about the discovery of some egg shells on the Arya-India premises in Ludhiana: The owner apparently ordered an emergency factory closure for two days, which obviously incurred a substantial financial loss, in order to perform a religious cleansing ritual. While the Nepalis who followed a behaviourally liberal sect of Hinduism were slightly critical of such stringent norms, Punjabi managers thought satvik ahar to be of even greater importance in this context than the agghorpanthi⁴ sect of Pashupatinath that the Nepalis belonged to discounted for consumption of such tamasik food. A few months’ operations, however, the Nepali managers and workers requested permission to cook such food at least in the workers’ living quarters if not in the factory canteen. After lengthy debates, this permission was granted, but not before a wall was built to separate the living quarters from the main factory premises. Nevertheless, the fact that the Punjabi managers had given in despite their obvious unwillingness, indicated not only the

⁴ This is one of the important Hindu sects, which follows Shiva who is also known as Agghor baba — the non-follower of the rules of ritual purity, or Sanharkarta — the god of destruction, or Pashupatinath — the lord of the animals. Shiva is believed to be a dweller of the high Himalayas and hence this sect is particularly influential among the Nepalis who live near the Himalayas.
grip that the Nepali managers had on decision-making in overall factory operations, but also the sort of equilibrium the two sides often reached in terms of religious and business stances alike.

A factory order revealed through a Navagraha/Vastu Puja

In February 2003, the factory owners took the decision to add a new floor on top of the existing two-storey building in order to house four additional stitching lines, a new research and development (R&D) unit, and a new office for the Production Manager. It was perceived that an elaborate religious ritual was essential to inaugurate the new floor which was undertaken on Friday, February 14, 2003. The priest, flown in to Kathmandu from Ludhiana specifically for this purpose, set the date for the ritual, following an intense debate between the Nepali and Indian priests as to which days of a lunar calendar would be auspicious for such an occasion. The final resolution marked a compromise between the perceived ritual auspiciousness among the Nepali and Indian priests but also considerations for the factory owner’s business schedule. Nevertheless, the Punjabi factory owner had a sudden change of plan at the last minute, and he had to travel overseas which prevented him from attending the factory ritual.

The main priest from Ludhiana led a group of twelve priests brought in for the inauguration ritual from the Pashupatinath temple, the sacred-most Hindu temple in Nepal for both Nepalis and Indians. The two regular Nepali priests employed by the factory, and the two Brahman work floor supervisors who were practising priests elsewhere, assisted with several organisational tasks. Inasmuch as the ritual symbolically represented the power constellation of the factory, it was not a coincidence that the main actors during the organisation of the ritual were also the active members at various levels of factory operations. The CEO and his wife shared the role of the jajman, the patron of the ritual. The head priest sent from the Ludhiana headquarters, in addition to his priestly functions, also performed the role of a co-jajman during the ritual in the absence of the Punjabi factory owner. His priestly functions included the consecration of the ritual platform, formal initiation of the ritual and attributing holy script recitals to the other priests. His jajman functions included participation in ahuti (offering grains to the holy fire), godan (offering holy cow to the Brahmans) and prasad grahan (accepting the holy foods at the end of the ritual). It is not customary either in Nepal or in India for the same person to assume two functions, jajman and priest, but it was an improvisation carried out during this factory ritual. Both the Indian and Nepali priests seemed to accept it perfectly well. While the workers and
junior managers supervised the logistical part of the ritual, the senior management team played the role of the istamitras (kin and friends).

A small team of factory workers and supervisors took part in the preparatory tasks for the ritual. The composition of this meso-team was atypical and reflected compartmentalisation on the part of both managers and workers of the ritualistic norms followed in their private and professional lives. On the one hand, it showed preference to people who either came from Brahman families or families who were well versed in Hindu rituals. On the other hand, it marked a symbolic deviation from the theological claims on Hindu ritual purity. While a significant number of major actors were of Brahman and of Hindu origin, others were of lower status by pure theological standards; for example, one was a Muslim man married to a Hindu woman, the other was a married Brahman woman who had been childless for decades, which would have made her ineligible to participate in rituals at home. The third was a Newar woman, who would have been of too low a status in a conservative Brahman community to be allowed to be part of any religious rituals. During the factory rituals, the theological norms seemed to have been improvised in that genealogical and ritual purity were superseded by accommodation of “acquired” knowledge and “acquired” status – a departure that would still be seen as premature had the ritual been undertaken in factory owners or workers’ purely personal spaces. Where such an improvisation drew the line was in accommodating the so-called “untouchable” castes: The factory also employed a large number of “low-caste’ Magars and the “untouchable” Damais (Tailor caste). None of this staff even stepped on the floor on which the prayer was being observed although some of them had been working for the Nepali managers for several years.

Among the Punjabis, the openings rituals at the inauguration of commercial projects would normally commence with the worship of Vastu while the Nepalis would start with the worship of Laxmi and Vishwakarma. Vastu puja is the prayer to the Vastupurush who is considered to be the controller of all constructions, and finds its roots in Rig Veda, while vishwakarma puja is the prayer to the deity of construction and machinery that finds its roots in the Mahabharata and Laxmi is the deity of wealth. In a joint ritual where both prayers are recited, Nepalis tended to emphasise the latter while the Indians emphasise the former. Arya-Nepal followed the ‘Punjabi trend.

The havan-vedi (sacred fireplace) was built on the newly built floor, with four copper flasks in four directions symbolising four mythical oceans and an additional flask in the east symbolising all seven continents. The flask contained mango, gulmohar, var (the sacred banyan tree), amala (Indian gooseberry) leaves and kush grass, and was filled with holy water,
covered with a white cloth and placed on top of a small pile of rice grains with shells. The Indian norm neither stipulates the cloth nor the rice grains with shells. After some discussion, an improvisation was found by using a combination of white and red cloths to wrap the copper flasks in to obtain “the right colour combination” so it was said. The ritual then proceeded in the following order:

- Swastivacana: Invocation of all deities and purification of sanskaras
- Brahman-varani, abhisek and sankalpa: Formal appointments of the ritual participants
- Godan: Symbolic donation of cow to the priest(s)
- Diyo-kalash puja: Worshipping of fire and water
- Ganesha puja
- Sodasa-matrika puja: Worship of sixteen female deities
- Ahuti: Offerings to the fire
- Navagraha puja: Worship of the nine planets
- Vastu and Viswokarma puja: Worship of the building and machinery

Several discrepancies emerged between Nepali and Indian customs which were solved through discussions and ritual improvisations, something that would not have been easy in religious rituals within families and societies. The factory rituals, however, indicated a clear sense of compartmentalisation, on the part of both the factory owners as well as the workers, who took on the role of jajman and the priest/occupational worker respectively. This allowed both groups to moderate their reactions to any improvisations concerning the rituals. On a less controversial front, the Nepalis allowed themselves to be mildly ridiculed for using the inscribed image of cow on a five-paisa coin to perform the godan (offering of the cow) ritual as opposed to an Indian offering of a “perceived” price of the cow in cash. On a more controversial front, the Nepalis insisted on performing a sixteen-step ritual for the Ganesh puja although it was customary in India to perform a five-step ritual for Ganesh. The Indians laid more emphasis on the Vastu or the architectural deity, and this had to be accommodated. Improvisations that would have been unacceptable in a more personal space were easily accommodated in the factory rituals.
## Table 1: The similarities and differences between Indian and Nepali rituals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ritual</th>
<th>“Indian” [Punjabi]</th>
<th>“Nepali”</th>
<th>Compromise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selecting rituals for commercial entities</td>
<td>Worship of Vastu and sriyantra</td>
<td>Worship of Vishwokarma, Mahalaxmi and Hanuman</td>
<td>Worship of Vastu and Vishwokarma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting the day for ritual</td>
<td><em>A shukla pakshya</em> (bright fortnight) Saturday was regarded as auspicious. When that was not possible, the following Friday was chosen.</td>
<td>Saturdays in general were regarded as inauspicious for such rituals. The following Friday that was chosen did not fulfil the astrological conditions for the havana either.</td>
<td>The chosen day was the one that was convenient for the representative from Punjab to travel on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles in setting up the Yagyamandap or jagge</td>
<td>Mainly by women with <em>soubhaaya</em> (husband) and <em>putra</em> (son). Lower-caste people not allowed to take part in the ritual.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Including a childless Brahman woman, a Newar woman and a Muslim man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statue or Pratima</td>
<td>Gold statue to be worshipped</td>
<td>Gold statue to be worshipped</td>
<td>A pile of Ganesh-painted ceramic tiles was worshipped which were later plastered in the main entrance and other rooms of the factory after the ritual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layout of the Mandap</td>
<td><em>Matrika</em> painting on the <em>nairitya</em> (south-west) corner and <em>navagraha</em> on the north side.</td>
<td><em>Matrika</em> and <em>Navagraha</em> paintings on the north-east side.</td>
<td>Indian norms followed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnisthapana karma</td>
<td><em>Kalash</em> would carry <em>saptamritika</em> (holy earth from seven places) $^5$ <em>Kalash</em> not covered in cloth.</td>
<td>Four <em>kalash</em> covered in white cloth and placed on unpeeled rice with one <em>kalash</em> in the middle in the easterly direction</td>
<td><em>Saptamritika</em> involved and the <em>kalash</em> was symbolically covered in white as well as red cloth. No <em>saptamatrika</em> available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^5$ including earth from Kurukshetra, Gaya, warzone, soil under an elephant’s feet, and soil under a horse’s hooves.
| **Havana** | Two tiers of the *havana*, built by baked bricks | Either 3 (for *Swastik* prayer) or 5 tiers (*Tantrik*) for the *havana*. Only unbaked bricks are used to build *havana*. | Indian norm followed |
| **Roles of Yajaman and priest** | Two different individuals | Two different individuals | The main priest also represented one of the *jajmans*, and played a dual role |
| **Godan** | Godan optional in *Vastu puja*. A financial sum is donated that is perceived to be equivalent to the cost of a cow. | Godan essential in any *puja*. A five-paisa coin would be donated because it has the picture of a cow on it. | Godan carried out, but 100 rupees given to each Brahman as *Godan*. |
| **Significance of Kalash** | Mainly purity | Representation of Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh | |
| **Shodasha matrika puja** | Full version of mantras cited | Only abridged versions. This is not recited when Vishwokarma puja is also being carried out. | Longer versions recited on the Ludhiana priest’s insistence. |
| **Puja** | *Pancopacar puja* (with five worship materials) more common. | *Sodasopacar puja* (with 16 worship materials) more common on special occasions. | *Sodasopacar puja* carried out. |
| **Puja materials** | No “cooked” sweets in *naivedhya*. Mango and banana leaves hung above doors for auspicious entrance to house | One “cooked” sweet in *naivedhya*. In addition to mango and banana leaves, add palm | No cooked sweets used; no leaves hung above doors |
| **Havan** | All family members and guests perform *ahuti*. | Same | All senior and junior managers of all caste and religions. |
Concluding remarks

To summarise, it seems that the growing practice of cultural rituals and networking in modern factories can be understood as followed. In factories that produced garments for the (more profitable) niche markets, factory owners have attempted to follow caste-based labour desegregation to secure a cheap and stable labour force in the face of a fragmented labour market and a rapid expansion of market demand for their products in the 1990s as well as at the turn of the century. In factories that produced garments for the (more risky) homogenised markets, factory owners have attempted to follow a caste-averse labour organisation to reap the benefits of the economies of scale. Cultural practices differ on two fronts: first, factories producing cheaper garments for a riskier market tend to rely more on culture-based identities rather than culture-derived production-specific knowledge for their business networking; and secondly, factories producing cheaper garments also tend to use religious rituals more frequently as a “risk-handling” mechanism. Counter-intuitively, factories producing for the more profitable, niche markets tend to use their cultural heritages to generate production-specific knowledge while there is little evidence of their use of caste and ethnic identities at the face value for business networking.

Multi-faceted instances of the cultural and the capitalistic worlds overlapping lead to the conclusion that religion adds a dimension to the formal identities of factory managers and workers, thereby influencing the nature of business partnerships, transactions and alliances they are likely to take on. The study described the extent to which Hinduism provided both a source of commonality and cooperation between Indians and the hill-based Nepalese, and simultaneously a ground for dispute between them. Religion had come to fill the vacuum left by the anxiety arising from the industrial uncertainty that had come to overshadow the garment industry in Nepal.

The account of how modernity progresses in the industrial sphere in Kathmandu, based on the study of improvisation in religious rituals in the progressive but anxiety-stricken garment factories in Nepal, also showed – predictably enough – a kind of compartmentalisation of religious continuity and industrial change. I have tried to show that the changes taking place in business organisations in the context of economic modernisation and globalisation do imply what has been called a “deepening” of modernity – as opposed to “broadening” – in the sense that “disembedding” has proceeded further than before. On the other hand, industrial uncertainty which is also a characteristic feature of economic modernity has lent renewed vigour to the search for the renewal of the Hindu cultural tradition. Finally, though Singer’s case of
Chennai in the 1970s might appear to have little in common with Kathmandu in the 2000s, the “compartmentalisation” nature of industrial and personal life still appears to apply.

The problem of workers’ resistance in newly capitalising societies is that the “new” order is so anomalous that resistance is not necessarily limited to religious rituals but widespread in other fields such as political upheavals and social movements, as was the case in Nepal’s garment industry. What the study of Arya-Nepal shows us, however, is that resistance does not necessarily preclude compartmentalisation but that the two could coexist. For example, the workers adopted the political agenda to express their discontent to the control exerted by the Indian Vice-President of the factory; nevertheless, when it came to improvising factory rituals which at least partly served their common interests, workers compartmentalised their professional and personal spaces in accommodating the ritualistic improvisations as much as their factory managers did.

References


Is Bangani a V2 language?

Claus Peter Zoller

1 Introduction

The West Pahari language Bangani, spoken in the western Garhwal Himalayas of Uttarakhand between the rivers Tons and Pabar, has been a topic of controversy (see Zoller 1999). The controversy relates mainly to the question of whether Bangani contains Indo-European but non-Indo-Aryan vocabulary or not. I would like to continue the discussion on remarkable aspects of Bangani with two more articles. This first one discusses a central aspect of Bangani syntax, namely the relatively common occurrence of the predicate in verb-second sentence position. The article thus tries to answer the question: is Bangani a V2 language?

In V2 languages (like German, Dutch, Icelandic etc.) the finite verb or the auxiliary occupies the second position of declarative main clauses (e.g. German Er sieht sie “he sees her”). V2 languages are further classified with regard to the syntactic behaviour of the predicate in subordinate clauses, in combination with modal verbs, etc. Among the New Indo-Aryan (NIA) languages, the V2 phenomenon has only parallels in Kashmiri (plus three small varieties in the vicinity of Kashmiri) and—as only pointed out quite recently (Sharma 2003)—in some tongues adjacent and linguistically closely related to Bangani. For instance, it is common to say in Kashmiri

az kor mye baagas=manz seer

today made I.ERG garden=in walk

“Today I took a walk in the garden”

and in Bangani (with a light verb occupying the second sentence position):

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1 I am grateful to Joan L. G. Baart and Ruth L. Schmidt for their suggestions and critical remarks.
2 Throughout the article all grammatical phenomena being discussed are written in bold face. The presentation of the examples and the abbreviations used follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules. See http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/files/morpheme.html. For the list of abbreviations used in this article see p.142.
4 On the notion of light verbs see Miriam Butt and Wilhelm Geuder 2001 with further readings.

and in Outer Siraji (northwest of Bangan close to the Shimla district; see Sharma 2003: 57)

This is a dog

“This is a dog”

Before looking into the details of Bangani V2 structures I would like to say some words on the relationship between Bangani and Kashmiri (a topic which will be taken up at several places in this and the forthcoming article). I would first like to point out that the West Pahari languages (of which Bangani is a member) are the—or are among the—closest relatives of Kashmiri. For instance, Kashmiri and West Pahari (but also Gypsy), have preserved the three OIA sibilants ś,ṣ,s as the two sibilants ́ś and ́s. In addition to this I believe that from among all the West Pahari languages it is Bangani that has especially close affinities with Kashmiri despite the fact that Bangani is located at the eastern fringe of the West Pahari language and dialect area. Before I start discussing the V2 issue in more detail I would like to say that besides quite similar V2 patterns and interesting common vocabulary (discussed in the forthcoming article), there are additional remarkable parallels between Bangani and Kashmiri which are (almost) limited to these two languages. I will name here four parallels, two of which will be discussed in greater detail later in this article.

5 This hyphen indicates here and below a main verb stem of a compound verb extended by -i-.
6 As stated, the abbreviations used here follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules. However, due to their very frequent occurrence, the rather clumsy forms M.SG.PST.PTCP, M.PL.PST.PTCP, and F.PST.PTCP are further abbreviated to M.S.PS.PT, M.P.PS.PT, and F.PS.PT.
7 The Dardic languages have preserved all three sibilants; the rest of the Indo-Aryan languages have preserved only one.
8 Actually Bangani is part of what I will call the Satlaj-Tons group of languages/dialects. Other members of this group seem to share at least parts of the linguistic phenomena discussed here. And besides Kashmiri there are some other languages in its vicinity which too share at least parts of these features. Kashmiri and Bangani are thus better understood as distinct representatives of two language complexes.
(1) Kashmiri and Bangani are NIA languages that do not require the oblique case (frequently followed by a postposition marker of the oblique case) for direct object personal pronouns in ergative constructions (discussed in more detail below p. 103). The only other NIA language known to me with this feature is Khaśāli, a language spoken directly southeast of Kashmiri (see Siddheshvar Varma 1938: 45).

Kashmiri (see Peter Edwin Hook and Omkar N. Koul 2002: 143):
\[
tyimav \quad kyaa\!zyi \quad suuzu-kh \quad tsi \quad yoor?\]
they.ERG why \quad sent.M.SG-2.SG.NOM you.NOM here \textsuperscript{9} “Why did they send you here?”

Bangani:
\[
\text{gobr}uei \quad \text{dekh-}ɔ \quad \text{seu} \quad \text{Gabar.ERG} \quad \text{see-M.S.PS.PT} \quad \text{he.NOM} \quad \text{“Gabar saw him”}
\]

(2) Kashmiri and Bangani share a type of discontinuous nominal construction which is, to my knowledge, not found in other NIA languages.

Kashmiri:
\[
\text{tem-sund1} \quad \text{chu} \quad \text{asyi} \quad \text{makān2} \quad \text{baďi} \quad \text{pasand} \textsuperscript{10} \quad \text{he-of} \quad \text{AUX} \quad \text{us.DAT} \quad \text{house.NOM} \quad \text{very} \quad \text{like} \quad \text{“We like his1 house2 very much”}
\]

Bangani:
\[
\text{tesr}1 \quad \text{dekh-}ɔ \quad \text{gōr}2 \quad \text{ti}ñi \quad \text{his} \quad \text{see-M.S.PS.PT} \quad \text{house} \quad \text{he.ERG} \quad \text{“He saw his1 house2”}
\]

Also worth mentioning are two phonological features shared by both languages:

(3) Kashmiri and Bangani have practically identical consonant systems. Their stops display a threefold opposition, e.g. $p$, $ph$, $b$, i.e. both lack voiced aspirates. There are other Indo-Aryan (IA) languages showing the same

\textsuperscript{9} The original glossing here and in other cases has been adapted to that of this article.
\textsuperscript{10} See Bhatt 1994: 35.
threefold contrast (e.g. Panjabi and Shina), but it is remarkable that Bangani is surrounded on all sides by languages with a fourfold contrast.11

(4) Bangani does not have a phoneme h. Kashmiri has this phoneme, but it is remarkable that h has disappeared in initial position in its inherited core vocabulary. For example: Kashmiri athi “hand”, ala “plough”, asun “to laugh”, ada “bones”, etc. (OIA hasta-, hala-, has-, haḍḍa-), Bangani ḍh, ṣḷ, ṣṇḍ, ṣṛ. This suggests the assumption that Kashmiri, as well as Bangani once underwent loss of its inherited h phoneme, which was re-introduced into Kashmiri at a later stage.

Since the features (1) to (4) are, at least when taken together, limited to Kashmiri and Bangani, I want to formulate the following hypothesis:

Proto-Bangani was at some stage in the past spoken north-west to its present location, in the vicinity of the Kashmiri language area.

Besides the arguments presented in this article, further evidence corroborating this thesis will be provided in the forthcoming second article in which I will demonstrate the close relationship between the vocabulary of Bangani and those of the Dardic languages, especially Kashmiri. There I will also present Bangani vocabulary which appears to be of East Iranian provenance, plus additional vocabulary of possible Indo-European but non-Indo-Aryan origin.12 All this is intended to suggest a route that was followed by Proto-Bangani until the present location.

The only V2 language hitherto known in the area has been Kashmiri (and a small group of nearby languages like the Shina of Gures, Upper Poguli and Watali).13 Recently it has been shown that Bushahari (Simla district), and Inner and Outer Siraji (West Pahari languages spoken directly northwest of Bushahari) are V2 languages too (Sharma 2003). Moreover, Hans Hendriksen remarks (1986: 188) on Koci (a West Pahari dialect of Himachali spoken directly to the north of Bangani and south of Bushahari) and Kotgarhi (spoken to the west of Koci): “In subordinate clauses the sentence verb is generally placed at the end, while its position

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11 Already G. A. Grierson (1916: 377) discusses the common trend of loss of aspiration in West Pahari and Kashmiri. However, the West Pahari examples quoted by him seem to be largely limited to my Satlaj-Tons group; moreover, his examples show that the loss of aspiration in those languages and dialects has not been as complete as it has been in Bangani. Note also that Hans Hendriksen (1986: 7) shows a fourfold consonant opposition for Kotgarhi and Koci, the language varieties most closely related to Bangani.

12 There is no need to refer in this article to Georg van Driem’s dingy efforts on Bangani as he also failed, as expected, to recognize the V2 traits of Bangani (which he believes to be “irregular forms”!).

13 See footnote 3 with the internet address where these languages are quoted. Watali is spoken in Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir state. Examples of V2 sentences in the Shina of Gures can be found in Bailey 1924: 251f.
is in the middle in main clauses, especially in Kc. [Koci]; there is greater liberty in main clauses in Kṭg. [Koṭgarhi].”

Inner and Outer Siraji, Bushahari, Koṭgarhi, Koci and Bangani constitute one small but continuous geographic language/dialect continuum which I will call the Satlaj-Tons group, as it covers a language continuum between parts of the catchment areas of these two rivers (which are separated by a watershed). Recent enquiries by this author indicate that other languages in the vicinity, e.g. Deogarhi south of Bangani, Bawari-Jaunsari to its east, or other West Pahari languages further in the west do not seem to have this syntactic V2 feature.

Anvita Abbi, who confirmed my findings on the archaic vocabulary of Bangani (1997), has shown the existence of what she calls auxiliary raising in Bangani, a phenomenon closely connected with the issue of V2. She rightly points out that Bangani uses both V2 and V-last constructions, and she describes several differences in the syntactical behaviour of Bangani and Kashmiri. Then she concludes that V2 must have been the original word order, and V-last constructions might have developed through language contact. Finally she points out that the existence of V2 in Bangani indicates (old) language contact with Kashmiri (Abbi 2000: 48ff.). A similar opinion is expressed by Sharma (2003: 55 and 67) with regard to Outer Siraji and Kashmiri.

[Map 1. Location of languages.]
Neither Kashmiri nor the Satlaj-Tons group display all the syntactical features typical for a canonical V2 language. Rather, the majority of their features coincide with those of other NIA languages which are of the V-last type. Finally I have to stress that this paper does not offer an exhaustive syntactic analysis of V2 in Bangani. The paper is quite non-technical and does not explain the syntactic movements on which the examples below are obviously based.

2 Remarks on word order

Normal spoken Bangani—as well as its oral texts—displays a great freedom in word order. The same is reported for Kashmiri (Bhatt 1994: 31). And whereas Hindi written narrative texts (for instance the short stories of Nirmal Varma) appear to have a more rigid SOV word order, a comparable freedom is found in Hindi oral texts (for instance, in Hindi films) or in written texts intended for oral performance (as in Hindi dramas). In Hindi, this opposition is related to concepts like written/narrative/formal versus oral/dialogic/informal. In texts belonging to the latter category, a pronoun, noun or a whole phrase might follow the verb, or there are instances where the verb appears at the beginning of a sentence.

In their discussion of discourse structures in Hindi/Urdu, Miriam Butt and Tracy Holloway King (status 2005) point out (p. 1) that “differing possible word orders correspond to differing possible ways of packaging information.” They further state that (p. 2) “word order in Hindi/Urdu can only be fully understood through an acknowledgement and explication of the connection between word order and discourse functions,” and that (p.3) a “simplistic one-to-one correlation between position and function is rejected.”

Texts with a stricter word order—for formal Hindi it is Subject - Indirect Object - Direct Object – Adverb - Verb—alternating with texts with a freer word order is, perhaps, a trait characterizing many Indo-Aryan textual traditions. Vit Bubenik (1996: 131 ff.) mentions that, whereas word order was of a strict SOV type in Classical Sanskrit, it was much less rigid in Brahmana and Vedic Sanskrit, and in Middle Indo-Aryan (MIA). Here it suffices to say that Bubenik also relates change of word order in the latter languages with specific discourse strategies, and he shows that, contrary to the claims of Butt and King, there are cases of very direct correlations between word positions and their functions. For the moment we can thus say that the very free word order in Bangani and Kashmiri is perhaps the continuation of a typical trait which was once fairly widespread in OIA and MIA.
3 Bangani oral texts

Demonstrating the typical features of the Bangani verb phrase is perhaps best done with the help of an oral story, as this is an authentic reflection of how Bangani is used. However, wherever deemed necessary, additional material from interviews has been added.

The story which I have selected (and which is presented below beginning with section 13) is known under the name buro-khuro sadoru which means something like “the little old gentleman.” It relates the story of how god Mahāsu—actually four divine brothers named Botho, Povasi, Bāšik and Tsaldo—came from Kashmir to Bangan and established a divine kingdom. The story was taped by me in April 1983 in Bangan in the village Jagta. The storyteller was Shri Sardar Singh Chauhan. He is no longer alive. He was a farmer and shaman. The language he uses represents normal traditional Bangani, i.e. unlike the language used by the professional bards during performance, it is in no way artificial. It thus can be taken as a specimen of normal traditional Bangani narration. The interested reader can compare the Bangani text passages of this article with an amusing story collected by Hans Hendriksen from the Koci dialect (1979: 42ff.). He will note that the syntactical patterns of Koci and Bangani are almost identical.

4 The Bangani predicate

I will now concentrate on sentences with the predicate consisting of a main verb (MV) plus an auxiliary or a light verb (LV), because they are more instructive than sentences with simple predicates. The light verbs comprise in Bangani, as in most other NIA languages, a fairly small closed group of so-called simple verbs (“give” would be a simple verb and “entrust” a complex verb; on the notion of simple [or underspecified] verbs see Butt and Lahiri [2002: 31] and Butt [2003: 3 and passim]). In verb phrases (VP) with light verbs or auxiliaries the light verb or auxiliary inflects according to gender and number, and the main verbs consist of a stem plus the ending –i (or –ui in case of verb stems ending with a

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14 Main verb here always means the semantic head in a complex predicate.

15 Bangani uses an auxiliary tho/thi only in the past tense, and ola/oli in the future. The paradigm of the present tense continues the Old Indo-Aryan synthetic system, e.g. aũ korũ “I do”. However, in negative clauses (and occasionally elsewhere) the predicate consists of a participle, e.g. aũ na kordo “I don’t do”.

16 Light verbs are also called vector verbs; and a combination of a main verb (stem) plus a light verb is called a compound verb. A compound verb is characterized by a stable state of predicate fusion. Compare Miriam Butt 2003: 16.
Occasionally, the suffix -io or -ia (or -ui in case of verb stems ending with a vowel) is added to the main verb (see below section 10), which is usually the suffix for forming conjunctive participles.

Unlike other NIA languages, the predicate in the Satlaj-Tons group and in Kashmiri frequently has a discontinuous structure. This means that one finds, for instance in Bangani, other parts of speech between the two components of the predicate. In other NIA languages, for instance in Hindi, basically only negative or modal particles may appear between the two components. In the following sentence from the story (again discussed below) the object is bracketed by the two parts of the predicate:

(210) tiṇi thɔε dui gore koši-
He.ERG put-M.P.PS.PT two horses harness-
“He harnessed two horses”

It is also no problem for Bangani speakers to move the subject between the brackets formed by the components of the predicate, which leads to a shift of FOCUS from predicate to object: thɔε tiṇi dui gore koši- “he harnessed two horses”.

Bangani discontinuous predicates of this type are only possible when the light verb or the auxiliary precedes the main verb. When the light verb or the auxiliary follows the main verb, only an emphatic particle or a negator can be inserted between the two components of the predicate. I therefore assert that a Bangani compound verb (CDV) can adopt two configurations, a tight configuration (TC) or a loose configuration (LC). In case of TC the components of the predicate occupy the same syntactic position; in case of LC the finite and the infinite components occupy two different sentence positions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>loose configuration compound verb (LC.CDV)</th>
<th>tight configuration compound verb (TC.CDV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LV ................................ MV</td>
<td>MV-LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thɔε tiṇi dui gore koši-</td>
<td>tiṇi dui gore koši- thɔε</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LC.CDV is perceived by native speakers of Bangani as the normal word order. Thus, if a speaker of Bangani who knows English would be asked to translate “he harnessed two horses” into Bangani, he or she would most likely say tiṇi thɔε dui gore koši. Another example is English “he was here”, typically translated into Bangani as seu thɔ etke (he – was – here). So this is the normal or neutral (i.e. canonical) word order.

17 Below I will use FV (finite verb) as an abbreviation both for auxiliaries and light verbs.
Note that in section 9 I will discuss a predicate construction which is neither a compound nor a conjunct verb. I will call it composite verb (CEV) construction; it consists of an inflected verb plus one of a small group of simple local adverbs. As in case of light verbs in compound verb constructions, the local adverbs in composite verb constructions lose some of their semanticity as a result of verb-adverb fusion (compare above footnote 16). I will therefore call these adverbs light adverbs. I will show that Bangani compound verbs and composite verbs display similar syntactic asymmetries (with regard to tight and loose configurations), however in a mirror image way. Then I will go on to show in section 10 that there exists another predicate construction that parallels composite verb constructions: under specific syntactic conditions (again related to tight and loose configurations) a fusion can take place between a converb and a main verb. I will call this combined verb construction. In combined verb constructions the main verb takes on the semantic role of a light verb (i.e. it loses semanticity) and the converb (in the shape of a conjunctive participle) that of the main verb.

 Conjunct and compound verbs are well-known phenomena in Indo-Aryan linguistics. The existence of what I call composite verb constructions (fusion of a verb and an adverb) in some NIA languages is much less common, but has been pointed out by Peter Hook for four small languages in Rajasthan and Sindh (2001: 124 f.; see also below section 9). Also the existence of so-called combined verb constructions (fusion of a conjunctive participle and a simple verb) seems to be very limited among NIA languages and has so far only been reported from Kohistani and Gilgiti Shina (Schmidt 2001: 438 and 445-447); but the construction is also found in Kashmiri (see examples in Kaul 2006: 28). I will show in sections 9 and 10 that, as against conjunct and compound verbs which are characterized by stable states of component fusion, composite and combined verb constructions are characterized by unstable states of component fusion in Bangani. This means that under specified conditions component fusion can but must not take place; in other words, these adverbs and conjunctive participles can switch between a “full” and a “light” state.

5 Topological fields

Sentences of the type of the preceding section are the reason why I will present the Bangani sentences using the model of topological fields. It is frequently used in German linguistics because German displays similar

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18 A conjunct verb consists of a noun or adjective plus a simple verb.
19 Note also Chris Tailor’s 2006 report on the occasional use of conjunct participles as full verbs in Sinhala.
discontinuous phenomena (see Höhle 1986, Debusmann, Müller, and the grammars of the Institut für deutsche Sprache: http://www.ids-mannheim.de). The model describes the linear dimension of sentence structures.\textsuperscript{20} It does not offer a comprehensive description of Bangani syntax because it doesn’t say anything about dependency relationships. However this is not the aim of this paper and it suffices for our purpose of a graphic presentation of bracketing processes in Bangani.\textsuperscript{21} The basic division between NP and VP is expressed in this model by distinguishing between the three topological fields (which can be occupied with NPs) and the two so-called sentence brackets (which are reserved for the VP). The topological fields are named pre-field (Vorfeld), middle field (Mittelfeld) and post-field (Nachfeld). Between pre-field and middle field appears the left sentence bracket (linke Satzklammer; abbreviated here l. s. bracket), and between middle field and post-field the right sentence bracket (rechte Satzklammer; abbreviated here r. s. bracket). The sentence brackets are of central importance for the topological structure of Bangani sentences. The brackets typically arise when the finite verb occupies the second position in a sentence. I illustrate the topological fields now with a few German sentences together with a literal English translation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
<th>post-field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hat</td>
<td>Mann</td>
<td>geliebt?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has</td>
<td>Mary a man</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johann</td>
<td>hat</td>
<td>ein Brot</td>
<td>gegessen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>has</td>
<td>a bread</td>
<td>eaten</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johann</td>
<td>ist</td>
<td>besser</td>
<td>geschwommen</td>
<td>als sein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>is</td>
<td>better</td>
<td>swum</td>
<td>Frieden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>than his</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>friend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the predicate of a Bangani sentence consists of a main verb plus an auxiliary or light verb, the latter may appear before the main verb. See the following three examples from the story (with sentence numbers in parenthesis):

\textsuperscript{20} Grewendorf has shown (1991: 217ff.) that this model is compatible with generative syntax.

\textsuperscript{21} I will not discuss here the problems in connection with the so-called virtual bracket in case of sentences without two bracket parts. For a critique see Martine Dalmas and Hélène Vinckel 2006.
(87) *seu deño tiní somzai* “He explained to him”

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<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>seu</em></td>
<td><em>de-no</em></td>
<td><em>tiní</em></td>
<td><em>somzai-</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>he</em></td>
<td><em>give-M.S.PS.PT</em></td>
<td><em>he.ERG</em></td>
<td><em>explain-</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(21) *te tetke ēr-o seu pakři tiuė* “Then they seized him there”

<table>
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<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
<th>post-field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>te tetke</em></td>
<td><em>ēr-o</em></td>
<td><em>seu</em></td>
<td><em>pakři-</em></td>
<td><em>tiuė</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>then there</em></td>
<td><em>see-M.S.PS.PT</em></td>
<td><em>he</em></td>
<td><em>seize-</em></td>
<td><em>they.ERG</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(101) *tiní deño boidi likhi* “He wrote (everything into) a register”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>tiní</em></td>
<td><em>de-no</em></td>
<td><em>boidi</em></td>
<td><em>likhi-</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>he.ERG</em></td>
<td><em>give-M.S.PS.PT</em></td>
<td><em>register</em></td>
<td><em>write-</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Permutation tests with the sentence *muī biale pōthi pōri- ēri* (I.ERG yesterday book read- see-F.S.PS.PT) “I read the book yesterday” show that, if the light verb precedes the main verb, a stable sentence bracket structure appears. Following word orders are possible:

- *muī ēr-i biale pōthi pōri-*
- *biale ēr-i muī pōthi pōri-*
- *pōthi ēr-i muī pōri- biale*
- *pōthi ēr-i biale pōri- muī*

These are not all possible permutations but these examples, and the examples further above and below, suffice to tentatively suggest the following with regard to what can appear in which topological field and sentence bracket:

- The left bracket contains the finite verb.
- The pre-field may contain one phrase at the most; it can also be empty.23

---

22 Normally, only one constituent is allowed to appear in the pre-field. One might interpret the *te* “then” as a copula between sentences. Such problems, however, are not important in our context and therefore ignored.
There seem to be no constraints on the number of phrases in the middle field and post-field.

The right bracket may be empty, or it contains one element: the main verb.

The restriction to maximally one element inside the right bracket is illustrated with permutations with the following sentence: "I want to read the book". If the sentence is put into past tense it is possible to say "I have wanted to read the book". But it is neither possible to say "*I read the book yesterday". A crucial difference between a) on the one and b) and c) on the other side is this: b) and c) express that the action has come to an end (perfective aspect), whereas a) does not express this. And a crucial difference between b) and c) is this: in case of b) the speaker is aware of the whole development of the event until its end, whereas in case of c) he or she takes note only of the end of the event. It is thus obvious that the opposition between b) and c) is related to the category of evidentiality (see Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald and R. M. W. Dixon 2003, and Elena Bashir 2006). The "evidential" character of b) is further explicated by my language consultants as follows: sentences with two sentence brackets [like b)] typically characterize an event that has found a successful completion, even though that was not clear before. The sentence "Having planned (in advance) to read

An apparent breach of the rule that the pre-field can only be occupied by one constituent seems to be present in the following sentence (the only one in the whole story, sentence 50): "(Regarding) Kullu-Kashmir he also advised him thus" It is probably a construction that somehow went wrong.
the book I succeeded yesterday in doing it.” Obviously, this construction also expresses purposefulness which a) and c) do not.

The movement of the dependents of the predicate (e.g., subject, object, circumstantial) to different sentence positions doesn’t seem to be subject to restrictions apart from those formulated above. The topological fields are connected with the category of focus, as already indicated above on p. 91. Focus correlated with sentence positions holds also true for sentences with predicates consisting of one element [see above on page 94 example a]), for instance for imperative sentences. The neutral word order for “give the book to the girl” is Bangani pōthi de tsheuri-ke (book give.IMP girl=to); in a Hindi-like construction like pōthi tsheuri-ke de focus is centred on “girl”.

6 Word order in various sentences types

Complement clauses: The last sentence (101) of the preceding section is part of a complement construction which begins thus: jeśoi seu aśo, tini... “As he came, he (wrote everything)...”. This example shows that in Bangani temporal complement constructions the FV of the main predicate, unlike in German, is not automatically fronted into verb-first position.

Traditional Bangani syntax does not know subordination in indirect speech of the type “he said that he...” Instead it uses report of statements which is facultatively introduced with the conjunction zo. Real subordination occurs rarely in Bangani. The following example shows both report of statement (without conjunction) and a subordinated complement clause within the statement:

(86) tε tiũ bol, “sε go+i amũ zāni bāt, zo koiluei tho tu śikai.”24 “Then they said: “The matter became known to us that Kailu has instructed you.””25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
<th>post-field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>se</td>
<td>go-i</td>
<td>amũ</td>
<td>zāni-</td>
<td>bāt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zo koiluei</td>
<td>tho</td>
<td>tu</td>
<td>śikai-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this</td>
<td>go-F.S.PS.PT</td>
<td>us.DAT</td>
<td>know-</td>
<td>thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that</td>
<td>was.M.S</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>teach-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 The sentence ends here, but not the speech.
25 Kailu is a guardian deity of Mahasu. Note also that the main clause is so to say framed by se and bāt “the matter”. It is presently unclear to me whether this is a discontinuous noun phrase or an inverted theme rhyme relationship. In any case, such constructions are quite common in spoken Bangani and in its oral literatures.
In contrast to German the Bangani and the Kashmiri auxiliary must not fall into the same final syntactic position as the main verb in case of a complement clause (see Raina 2002: 119). However, as in German, the verb phrase then marks the end of the clause and no NP is allowed to appear in the post-field. This is shown by the following permutation test conducted with Bangani speakers:

\[ \text{goi amû zâni bât, zo koiluei tho tu ts kaše ñi bât, zù koiluei tho tu šikai ts kaše} \]

“The matter has become known to us that Kailu has taught you the bad news (ts kaše)”

But not: *\[ \text{goi amû zâni bât, zo koiluei tho tu šikai ts kaše} \]

In independent Bangani sentences, the normal position of the object is after the verb (see below). In relative clauses, both in Kashmiri and German the verb must appear at the end (Hook and Koul, p. 1; see the internet address in the references). Not so in Bangani. There, however, the same rule as above obtains, and no NP is allowed to appear in the post-field.

Example: \[ \text{ziñi zatkei deñø döl uštai... “The son who threw the stone (he)...”} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ ziñi zatk-ei ]</td>
<td>de-ñø</td>
<td>döl</td>
<td>uštai-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which.ERG son-ERG</td>
<td>give-M.S.PS.PT</td>
<td>stone</td>
<td>throw-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again one is not allowed to say *\[ \text{ziñi zatkei deñø uštai döl} \] or *\[ \text{ziñi zatkei uštai deñø döl} \]. However, both sentences are correct Bangani when the relative pronoun \[ \text{ziñi} \] is exchanged with the personal pronoun \[ \text{tiñi} \]. The same rule holds also true for temporal adverbial clauses: \[ \text{zo zatkei deñø döl uštai “When the son threw the stone...”} \] But not *\[ \text{zo zatkei deñø uštai döl} \].\(^{26}\) All this suggests perhaps that the post-field actually only exists at the level of the sentence, and not at the level of the clause. This makes the post-field in Bangani look similar to what some theories of grammar call a right-dislocated position, which is a position that exists at the sentence level, not at the clause level.

That the Bangani auxiliary (or a light verb) must not move to the end of a clause in case of a complement clause is perhaps connected with the discourse function of bringing temporal, local, truth-conditional or other operators into prominence. Each of the above examples with auxiliary or light verb appearing before the main verb is potentially a temporal or causal subordinate clause. Thus, the above (see p. 93) \[ \text{tiñi deñø boidi likhi-} \]

\(^{26}\) The word \[ \text{zo} \] not only marks report of statements, but functions also as a temporal adverb “when”.

“he wrote (everything into) a register” can (depending on context) also mean “when he had written (everything into) a register, (then)...” or “because he had written (everything into) a register, ...

Bangani sentences with auxiliary or light verb appearing before the main verb do not require the complementizer zo “when, because, if” to introduce a temporal or causal subordinate sentence. However, if an auxiliary or light verb does not appear before the main verb, then zo is obligatory: zo tini boidi likhi- deno “when he had written (everything into) a register, (then)...” A similar discourse function is illustrated with the two English sentences “You will have to pay if something should happen” and “You will have to pay should something happen”.

**Embedded clauses:** A short look at two examples with embedded clauses shows a similar behavior for Bangani and Kashmiri (and German etc.). The verb has to appear at the end. Note, however, that auxiliaries can appear here but no compound verbs are allowed:

It is possible to say se pɔthi, zo muĩ biale pari, thi atshi (the book, which I.ERG yesterday read-F.S.PS.PT, was good) “the book which I read yesterday was good”, but it is neither possible to say *se pɔthi, zo muĩ biale pari- ēr, thi atshi nor *se pɔthi, zo muĩ ēr biale pari, thi atshi.

With regard to auxiliaries it is possible to say zo daktër, zesri davai aũ khaũ thɔ, seu dili thɔ dɛi- go-ɔ (the-one-who doctor, whose medicine I eat-1.SG.PRS was, he Delhi was go-go-M.S.PS.PT) “the doctor, whose medicine I have taken, had gone to Delhi”. But it is again not possible to say *zo daktër, zesri davai aũ thɔ khaũ, seu dili thɔ dɛi- go-ɔ.

**Alternative questions:** Unlike German or Kashmiri (see Kashi Wali, Omkar N. Koul and Ashok K. Koul 2002: 91) the verb must not be placed at the end. A sentence like “if Ram gives the book to Radha” can be said in Bangani both as zo rɑm rɑde=ke pɔthi de (if Ram Radha=to book give.3.SG.PRS) or as zo rɑm rɑde=ke de pɔthi. In the second variant there is focus on “book”.

**Non-finite verb clauses:** What has been said in the preceding paragraph also holds true here, again unlike German and Kashmiri (see Kashi Wali, Omkar N. Koul and Ashok K. Koul loc.cit.). A sentence like “he told Radha to give the book to Ram” can be said in Bangani both as tini bol-ɔ rɑda=ari rɑm=ke pɔthi de-nne=khi (he.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT Radha=to Ram=to book give-OBL.INF=for) or as tini bol-ɔ rɑda=ari rɑm=ke de-nne=khi pɔthi. Also here there is focus on “book” in the second variant.
Yes-no questions: They contrast with declarative sentences with regard to word order. A declarative sentence like *tu de-lo doti gore* (you go-2.SG.FUT tomorrow home) “you will go home tomorrow” is changed into a yes-no question as follows: *de-lo tu doti gore* or *doti de-lo tu gore* mean both “do you go home tomorrow?”

7 Constituent fronting

Constituent fronting is limited to one constituent in case of predicates with three arguments. In this respect as well, Bangani is similar to Kashmiri (see Bhatt 1994: 42):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{zatke}= & \text{ke} \quad \text{de-ni} \quad \text{pōthi tini} \\
\text{son}= & \text{to} \quad \text{give-F.S.PS.PT} \quad \text{book he.ERG} \\
\text{He gave a book to the son}
\end{align*}
\]

But not: \text{*zatke ke pōthi de-ni tini*}

This rule also generally holds true for transitive verbs with two arguments and the predicate appearing in two sentence brackets. A typical example:

\[(210) \quad \text{tiṇi thɔε dui gore koʃi "He harnessed two horses"} \]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{pre-field} & \text{l. s. bracket} & \text{middle field} & \text{r. s. bracket} \\
\hline
\text{tiṇi} & \text{thɔε} & \text{dui gore} & \text{koʃi-} \\
\text{he.ERG} & \text{put-M.P.PS.PT} & \text{two horses} & \text{harness-} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Whether the subject appears before the verb and the object after it, or vice versa, (sometimes, and not only with imperatives, the verb appears also initially) is a matter of great freedom and apparently also of discourse strategies. Besides a substantial number of cases where FV occupies the left sentence bracket, there are also not a few cases where FV appears after the main verb. The same holds true also in Kashmiri (see Bhatt 1994: 42 example 22 b). Let me point out again that there is a marked difference in the syntactic behaviour between these two possibilities in Bangani: when the FV appears after the main verb, it remains tied to it and a NP can never appear between main verb and FV. It is only possible, as for instance in Hindi, to insert a negator or an emphatic particle between the two.
8 Excursus: Ergative of personal pronouns

In the above Bangani ergative constructions with personal pronouns, it is remarkable that the object appears in the absolutive case, i.e. it is grammatically unmarked and thus identical with the nominative. Thus a construction like koiluei tho tu šikai (see above p. 85) still allows one to recognize the old basic meaning “You have been (a person) taught by Kailu”. Here Bangani differs from practically all NIA languages which have to have an object case marker in case of pronouns (Masica 1991: 342f.) or pronouns plus nouns. The only exceptions known to me are Kashmiri and Khašālī (see above p. 85). Masica quotes the following Kashmiri example (1991: 477): tse onuthas bi yōr “You brought me here” (-th- = 2rd Sg.Agent, agreeing with tse “you”; -as = 1st Sg.Patient, agreeing with bi “I”). Additional examples are given by Hook and Koul (2002), where they point out (p. 143) that, as in Bangani, explicit marking for direct object personal pronouns is not required “in the simple past and perfect tenses”. However, there exists a difference between ergative constructions in Bangani and Kashmiri: Marking or non-marking of ergative pronominal object in Bangani is optional (and the feminine pronoun has identical forms both for ergative and oblique). But Bangani differs from Kashmiri and from Hindi in that the verb shows agreement with the pronominal object even when this object appears in the oblique/accusative case. Thus, both tiā į šika-į tiā (sheERG(AGENT) teach-F.PS.PT she.ACC(PATIENT)) and tiā į šika-į se (she.ERG(AGENT) teach-F.PS.PT she.NOM(PATIENT)) mean “she taught her”. In this, Bangani resembles Gujarati (Miriam Butt and Ashwini Deo, see the internet address in the references). In the non-ergative tenses a pronominal object must always have an object marker: se šikā tiā į “she teaches her”, but not *se šikā se.

9 Composite verbs with “light” adverbs

As do most other NIA languages, Bangani uses conjunct verbs consisting of a noun or adjective plus the FV (Masica 1991: 368), and it uses compound verbs consisting of a main verb stem plus the ending –i (or –ui in case of verb stems ending with a vowel) plus a light verb. In addition, Bangani makes extensive use of FV plus one out of a group of half a dozen or so local adverbs for the formation of predicates. I call these formations composite verbs. Their grammatical function appears to be basically the
same as that of compound verbs, i.e. they typically express an aktionsart. In the story, only the following three adverbs occur in such constructions: oru “hither”, poru “there”, doni “down”. As in the case of light verbs, these adverbs lose their original meaning to some extent when used in composite verb constructions. The constructions frequently express the intensive or violent course of an action, in other cases an action that is beneficial either for the subject or the object:

\[ \text{te } zāṅ-g-o \quad \text{seu } \text{poru} \]
\[ \text{then kill-M.S.PS.PT he } \text{there} \]

(21) “Then (they) slaughtered (killed intensively) him”

\[ \text{te } aū \quad \text{oru } zāṅ-ū \]
\[ \text{but I him hither kill-1.SG.PRS} \]

(232) “But I slaughtered (kill intesively) him”

\[ \text{tiṇi } la-a \quad \text{teśe } \text{doni } \text{phāśi-} \]
\[ \text{he.ERG attach-M.S.PS.PT so down cut-} \]

(223) “He hacked (them) through (cut down intensively) like...”

Hook (2001: 124f.) points out that the following languages spoken in southern and western Rajasthan and in south-eastern Sindh lack the compound verb altogether and instead make use of constructions I have called here composite verbs: Bhitrauti, Gondwari, Pindwari, and Thari. He refers also to eastern Himachali (Koci and Kotgarhi) as a language area where instead of compound verbs composite verbs are used. But in Koci and Kotgarhi the same situation prevails as in Bangani: in order to realize aktionsarten all three languages make use of compound verbs (with light verbs) and of composite verbs (with “light” adverbs). The considerable geographical distance of Bangani and Eastern Himachali to the languages in Rajasthan and Sindh suggests independent origins for this construction. It is however remarkable that Bhitrauti of Rajasthan uses just the two adverbs paru “away” and (u)ru “hither” for its composite verb constructions, which are the same adverbs used for the same purpose in Bangani and Eastern Himachali. There are obviously the following correspondences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>compound verb with light verb</th>
<th>composite verb with “light” adverb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>main verb plus de- “give”</td>
<td>main verb plus poru/paru “away”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main verb plus jā- “go”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main verb plus le- “take”</td>
<td>main verb plus oru/(u)ru “hither”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main verb plus ā- “come”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “light” adverb *poru* (with basic meaning “away”) is used much more frequently in Bangani than the other adverbs. This parallels the situation with the light verbs: “go” is much more frequently used than “come” (also in Hindi and other NIA languages). There might be a universal base to this, because a subject typically acts towards an object, whereas reflexivity is less typical.

Interestingly, light verbs and “light” adverbs show a kind of complementary distribution in Bangani (or at least in our story). Consider the following examples, where the first has a “light” adverb, the second a full, and the third again a “light” adverb:

(201) “He used to fight *intensively* with the others”

(135) “My dear, why don’t you give it (= the sword) back”?29

(168) “He *devoured* (ate intensively) around half of the goats”

The examples show that composite verbs formed with “light” adverbs display a very similar asymmetric word order pattern as compound verbs formed with light verbs—however, in a mirror image way: the “light” adverb keeps a tight configuration with the (main) verb only when it precedes it, but in case of light verbs it is just the other way round. The second example shows that when it doesn’t directly precede the (main) verb, it is inadvertently a full adverb. And the first example is one of an LC with another word appearing between verb and adverb. As pointed out, when the adverb follows the (main) verb, it may (but must not always) be a light adverb. Compare (from above p. 91)

---

27 I can not estimate at this moment the relative occurrence of “give” and “take”.

28 Bangani *oru* “another (one)” is homonymous with *oru* “hither”.

29 This sentence is an example for the fact mentioned in the first footnote that in negative sentences in the present tense the verb does not have a finite ending, but has the form of a participle.
“he harnessed two horses”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>loose configuration compound verb (LC.CDV)</th>
<th>tight configuration compound verb (TC.CDV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LV .................................. MV</td>
<td>MV-LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thœ tiŋi dui gore kæi-</td>
<td>tiŋi dui gore kæi- thœ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tight configuration composite verb (TC.CEV)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>loose configuration composite verb (LC.CEV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LADV-MV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bakrie poru-khai tiŋi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In case of a loose configuration composite verb the main verb occupies the left sentence bracket and the light adverb the right. Note, however, that both in case of loose configuration compound and composite verb constructions the finite component is located in the left sentence bracket. The first example from above (sentence 201) would be structured according to the topological fields in the following way (the sentence has been slightly simplified):

“Then he fought intensively”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pre-field</th>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>te</td>
<td>lɔɔrɔ</td>
<td>seu</td>
<td>poru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Then</td>
<td>fight- M.P.PS.PT</td>
<td>he</td>
<td>there</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generalised we get the following contrasts: 30
a) Main verb and light verb:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 light verb/auxiliary</td>
<td>(NP)</td>
<td>main verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 main verb - light verb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 *main verb</td>
<td>*NP</td>
<td>*light verb/auxiliary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Versus

30In the following tables the parenthesis around an NP indicate its optional occurrence.
b) Verb and light adverb:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 verb</td>
<td>(NP)</td>
<td>light adverb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 light adverb-verb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 *light adverb</td>
<td>*NP</td>
<td>*verb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Bangani it is not possible that a light verb follows a main verb from which it is separated by an NP, and if an adverb appears before its verb and is separated from it by an NP then it inadvertently functions as a full adverb.

So far we have seen that a Bangani main verb can be modified either by a light verb or a light adverb. But Bangani has another construction where a conjunctive participle fuses with the finite verb. In this case the conjunctive participle loses its function as converb (i.e. dependency on a finite verb and sequencing of events) and takes on the role of the main verb, while the original main verb now functions like a finite light verb.

10 Combined verbs with “light” main verbs

Converbs in Bangani either appear (in a complex sentence) before or after the finite verb. In the former case they do not affect the status of the finite verb and they usually realize temporal precedence: one event occurs before another, and in most cases there is just one agent or subject for both converb and finite verb. In the latter case, if the converb appears after the main predicate, a change of grammatical function and semantic role facultatively takes place, provided that (a) both verbs are either transitive or intransitive, and that (b) the finite verb is a simple verb.

Moreover, this simple main verb must express either an “away” or a “hither” movement, and the only verbs I have found fulfilling all these conditions are “to give”, “to bring”, “to take” and “to go”. The similarity

---

31 The latter resembles to some extent German sentences where the predicate contains a preverb as in the following example: der Bus fährt den Mann um (the bus knocks over the man). Here the preverb um (infinitive umfahren) occupies the right sentence bracket.

32 This “transitivity restriction” is stricter than in case of normal compound verbs where it is possible in Bangani to have a transitive main verb and an intransitive light verb. That predicate fusion takes places only facultatively, depending on the context, is clear when compared with Hindi, where the same holds true: a sentence like usne kitāb likh dī can mean either “having written a book he gave it (to s.o.)” or “he wrote a book (for s.o.)”.
with the characterization of light verbs and especially with the light adverbs is obvious.\textsuperscript{33}

In the first example below, the conjunctive participle \textit{kh\textipa{t}am k\textipa{r}i\textipa{o}} “having finished” functions as a converb: it precedes the finite verb \textit{r\textipa{o}} “stayed”, and the finite verb consequently retains its status:

\begin{verbatim}
khatam k\textipa{r}-i\textipa{o}  te  r\textipa{o}-i m\textipa{ndr\textipa{e}}h m\textipa{\textasciicircum{s}}u
finished make-CP then live-M.S.PS.PT Mahendrath Mahasu
\end{verbatim}

(26) “Having killed (the giant), Mahasu lived in Mahendrath”\textsuperscript{34}

In the next example from the story, the finite (intransitive) verb \textit{\textipa{a}} “come” is followed by the intransitive conjunctive participle \textit{n\textipa{a}i\textipa{\textasciicircum{d}}oui\textipa{o}} “having bathed”. Also here no predicate fusion occurs, even though \textit{\textipa{a}} is a simple verb. The converb expression as a whole is intransitive\textsuperscript{35} and describes an event prior to the event of the main verb, even though the converb is syntactically in a postpositive position with regard to the main verb:

\begin{verbatim}
r\textipa{a}t  bi\textipa{\textasciicircum{s}}-li  tet\textipa{e}=khi  etke  \textipa{\textasteriskcentered}{\textipa{a}}  n\textipa{a}i\textipa{\textasciicircum{d}}oui\textipa{o}
night end-3.SG.FUT then=for here come.IMP bathe-wash-CP
\end{verbatim}

(209) “Exactly when it’s early morning, come here after taking a shower”

However, if “to come” of this sentence is exchanged with “to go”, predicate fusion is possible and we get a \textit{combined verb} with a “light” finite verb and a conjunctive participle as main verb:

\begin{verbatim}
seu  go-\textipa{o}  n\textipa{a}i\textipa{\textasciicircum{d}}oui\textipa{o}
go-M.S.PS.PT  bathe-wash-CP
\end{verbatim}

“He has washed himself”

Instead of the expected meaning “he went (away) after taking a shower” the actual meaning “he has washed himself” is a result of a semantic role reversal between main verb and converb. The results of the predicate fusion that has taken place in this example can be made clear with the following table:

\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textsuperscript{33}Above I have pointed out that fused predicates with light adverbs are preferably constructed with \textit{poru} “away”.  \\
\textsuperscript{34} Mahendrath is a village in Bangan.  \\
\textsuperscript{35} Note that \textit{n\textipa{a}i\textipa{\textasciicircum{d}}oui\textipa{o}} is a kind of echo formation—very typical for all IA languages—built from the intransitive verb \textit{nai\textipa{n}} “to bathe” and the transitive verb \textit{d\textipa{o}n} “to wash”. This compound is as a whole intransitive, and the first verb has the same suffix –\textipa{\textasciicircum{u}i} as main verbs ending in a vowel (the nasalization of the vowel is an effect of the preceding nasal consonant), and –\textipa{\textasciicircum{u}i\textipa{o}} is the suffix for conjunctive participles. Thus, \textit{n\textipa{a}i\textipa{\textasciicircum{d}}oui\textipa{o}} means basically “having bathed, having washed (oneself)”.
\end{tabular}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>grammatical function</th>
<th>main verb</th>
<th>conjunctive participle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>head</td>
<td>dependent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>light</td>
<td>full</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ simple</td>
<td>any</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the next example [sentence (7) from the text], a transitive conjunctive participle follows the grammatical main verb which is a transitive simple verb:

\[
tes=k\ e\ m\ās\u=\varepsilon\ dā\ne\ dē-\ne\ m\ōntr-\io\]

him=to pulse=Gen seeds give-M.P.PS.PT cast spell on-CP

This sentence can be translated in two ways:

a) “Having cast a spell on pulse seeds (they) gave (them) to him”
b) “They cast a spell on pulse seeds for him”

It is crucial to note that if the converb \( m\ōntr\io \) precedes the main verb, the sentence has only the meaning “having cast a spell…” In other instances of our story, the combined verb interpretation of a simple main verb followed by a transitive conjunctive participle is quite unambiguous:

\[
ku\̹lu-kāśmīr\ mā\u s\u=\varepsilon,\ ti\̹ū=kai\ dē-u,\ ti\̹ū=koi\ bōr\ ān\ māṅg-\io\]

Kullu-Kashmir Mahasu hear-3.SG.PRS them=to go-IMP them=from boon bring-IMP ask-CP

(38) “One hears that there is Mahasu in Kullu-Kashmir, go to them\(^{36} \) and arrange a boon”

\[
\text{ogonke seu bonda-}i\ tē\ an-\io\ deṇ-\io\ mās\u=\kappa\]

first he promise-FOC then bring-M.S.PS.PT give-CP Mahasu=to

(186) “Then he first made good his promise with Mahasu”

The text does not contain even one example of intransitive main verb and converb displaying predicate fusion, but such sentences are used in Bangani:

\[
\text{seu go-}\io\ sut-\io\]

he go-M.S.PS.PT sleep-CP

“He drifted away into sleep”

---

\(^{36}\) They are four brothers.
This differs from the compound verb form
\[
\text{seu go-} \quad \text{suti-} \\
\text{he go-M.S.PS.PT sleep-}
\]
“He fell asleep”

The above discussed constructions are used in Bangani much less frequently than those where conjunctive participles function as converbs that precede the finite verbs. Moreover, the number of “light main verbs” used in the text appears to be clearly smaller than the number of light verbs used in the other compound verbs. But we can extend now the above table from p. 102:

a) Main verb and light verb:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 light verb/auxiliary</td>
<td>(NP)</td>
<td>main verb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 main verb-light verb</td>
<td>*NP</td>
<td>*light verb/auxiliary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Versus

b) Verb and light adverb:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 light adverb-verb</td>
<td>*NP</td>
<td>*verb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Versus

c) (Finite) “light main” verb and conjunctive participle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>l. s. bracket</th>
<th>middle field</th>
<th>r. s. bracket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 “light main” verb-CP</td>
<td>*NP</td>
<td>*CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 **”light main” verb</td>
<td>*NP</td>
<td>*CP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in case of the above line 6 marked with asterisks, the structure of the last line 8 reflects a possible Bangani sentence, but also here no predicate fusion takes place (except under rarely occurring very specific circumstances, see below section 11). The tables show the following regularities:

- a) and b) allow two word orders for the realization of semantic fusion, c) allows only one
- In a) and b) one word order for semantic fusion implies tight configurations [in a) following the main verb, in b) preceding it],
whereas the other word order for semantic fusion implies loose configurations and placement of the concerned components into the two sentence brackets

- c) allows NPs appearing between the two components undergoing predicate fusion only if the NP and the semantic main component (the conjunctive participle) form one semantic unit, i.e. when they are something like a conjunct verb (apparently this happens very rarely, but for an example see below in section 11).

11 Noun phrases

If Bangani displays marked differences in its VP with most of the rest of NIA, the question suggests itself, whether there are also differences with regard to its NPs. This is the topic of the next section.

a) Genitive phrases: Bangani displays two movement patterns which can lead to discontinuous genitive phrases. The first one is the familiar type which is also widely used in Hindi, for instance in maine ghar dekhā uske bāp kā “I saw the house of his father”. Here the dependent part of the genitive phrase uske bā p kā ghar has been moved to the end of the sentence. Our story contains similar examples:

```
tēpē dēk哈-ē Zo tshoriare tiūre tāi-ong-ōnde uīte
then see-3.SG.PRS that skins they hang-M.P.PRS.PT inverse.M.Pl
```

(184) “Then (he) sees that their skins have been hung up inside out”

In this example the dependent tiūre “their” appears directly after its head tshoriare “skins”. But there are also cases where other words appear between the two components, which thus can be understood as another type of loose configuration. The next example is with the genetive phrase iūro bondēn “their promise” and involves a finite verb “give” and the light adverb poru “there”; so here there are in fact two loose configurations—bondēn ... iūro and dē-nde ... poru—which are interlaced with each other:

```
bondēn dē-nde iūro poru
promise give-M.P.PRS.PT their there
```

(116) “Had they given their promise” (i.e. had they given a promise to them, namely to the Mahasu brothers, then...)

In all cases discussed so far the dependent part of the genitive phrase, which precedes its head by default, is backed somewhere after the head. In Hindi it is generally shifted after the verb, in Bangani shift before or after the verb seems to occur roughly equally often. There is, however, another
possibility of movement in Bangani which is used quite frequently, and which cannot be used in Hindi:
The function of this shift is illustrated with the following two sentences:

phāḷī  

boṭhe māsu-ṛi  

lāt  

binu-i  

ploughshare.F Botha Mahasu=GEN leg stab-F.S.PS.PT  

“The ploughshare stabbed into Mahasu’s leg”

Versus

phāḷī  

boṭhe māsu-ṛi  

binu-i  

lāt

The bold faced and underlined last word of the second sentence shows the location of FOC(us). Thus, this operation serves to introduce a discourse function. Discontinuous genitive phrases of this second type are again also found in Kashmiri (Bhatt 1994: 35):

tem=sund chu  

asyi  

maka n  

badī pasand  

he=of  

is.AUX us.Dat house.NOM very like  

“We like his house very much”

Bhatt sees in this construction a symptom of nonconfigurationality in Kashmiri (after arguing against the nonconfigurational character of Kashmiri on pp. 33-37).

b) Attribute phrases: our story contains only two sentences with a verb breaking up an attribute phrase into a discontinuous construction. But first I present a few simple attribute phrases collected from my language consultants illustrating such movements. Here, too, the bold faced and underlined words show that the effect is FOC(us). The word that is not underlined is the dependent component of the phrase:

seu purāṇe  

māz-ε  

okhēr  

he old.M.PL clean-3.SG.PRS pots  

“He cleans the old pots”

seu gāra  

māz-ε  

okhēr  

he dirty clean-3.SG.PRS pot  

“He cleans the dirty pot”
Here now the first example from the story [again FOC(us) is bold faced and underlined]:

\[
\text{iar-ε, ame ni es sūne=ro ie can-de the } \text{toluātpu}
\]

friends-VOC we but this.OBL gold=GEN this make-M.P.PRS.PT were.M.PL sword

(131) “Hey friends, we should have made \textit{this sword} from (out from) this gold”

Here the \textit{cāndε the} “should have made” has been placed between the pronoun and the noun. The next and last example from the story is a little more complicated:

\[
\text{purane te gin-o lānke bir-ie}
\]

old so take.IMP clothes wear-CP

(128) “So let’s put on \textit{old clothes}”

It is more complicated because it is not a simple verb that moves “into” the attributive phrase \textit{purane lānke} “old clothes”, but there is again a kind of interlacing between NP and VP (compare above p. 107 sentence 116), leading to two discontinuous (or loosely configured) phrases. In section 10 it was said that in case of predicate fusions involving conjunctive participles normally no NPs can appear between the two verbal components. In fact, this is only possible where the intervening NP forms a semantic unit with the VP, in other words when the whole resembles a conjunct verb-like form.

In conclusion to this section we may say that Bangani shares with Kashmiri not only V2 traits and discontinuous VP constructions but also specific discontinuous NP constructions not used in other IA languages. The use of such discontinuous NP constructions realizes the discourse function FOC(us). Their construction looks similar to the above-described construction of discontinuous VPs with light verbs or auxiliaries.

12 Is Bangani a V2 language?

Predicate fusion and the emergence of compound verbs in Indo-Aryan is the result of a special case of clause combining (see Hopper and Traugott 1993: 168ff.): when a conjunctive participle co-occurs with a simple finite verb, the finite verb might bleach into a light verb and the participle become the main verb through semantic role inversion. In contrast to other Indo-Aryan languages, in Bangani predicate fusion only occurs
when the conjunctive participle follows the main verb, as examples above have demonstrated. From this we conclude that this is the original canonical word order for Bangani. Since the position of the light verb in the sentence corresponds with the position of the auxiliary, we conclude that Proto-Bangani was originally a V2 language. For speakers of Bangani, SVO is still perceived to be the normal unmarked word order. V2 is obligatory in temporal and causal subordinate sentences when no conjunctions are used, and it is at least not disallowed in complement sentences.

See the following clause oppositions with examples from the story:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V2 clauses</th>
<th>V-last clauses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tëñì ṗër-ò kã̄m kôrì-ňë see-M.S.PS.PT work make-</td>
<td>tëñì kã̄m kôrì-ër-ò he.ERG work make-see-M.S.PS.PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“he has completed the work” or “when/because he had completed the work”</td>
<td>“he has done the work”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>têtëkë ër-ò seu pakrö- tëüë there see-M.S.PS.PT he grab- they.ERG</td>
<td>têtëkë seu pakrö-ër-ò tëüë there he grab-see-M.S.PS.PT they.ERG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“they have hunted him down” or “when/because they had hunted him down”</td>
<td>“there they have grabbed him”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seu go-ò äšì- bitre he go-M.S.PS.PT come- inside</td>
<td>seu äšì-go-ò bitre he come-go-M.S.PS.PT inside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“he has walked inside” or “when/because he had walked inside”</td>
<td>“he has gone inside”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kôilù-ëï thô tu šìkái- Kailu-ERG was you teach-</td>
<td>kôilù-ëï tu šìkái- thô Kailu-ERG you teach- was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Kailu had instructed you” or “when/because Kailu had instructed you”</td>
<td>“Kailu had taught you”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both Kashmiri and Bangani use not only V2 sentences, but quite frequently also V-last sentences. We have seen above (sections 5 and 6) that there are rules governing the position of the predicate in different sentences types. They are, however, not identical for Kashmiri and Bangani. Variation of the position of the predicate in main clauses has been explained as due to a very free word order (Bhatt 1994 for Kashmiri) or as the effect of interference from surrounding SOV languages on SVO languages (Abbi 2000 for Bangani, Sharma 2003 for Outer Siraji). Abbi (ibid.) interprets these variations as an indication of redundant structures.
This factor certainly plays a role (for instance, predicate structures like verbstem + go, apparently copying Hindi structures of the type khā gayā, are spreading quickly in Bangani). However, I maintain that in Bangani the opposition between V2 and V-last in constructions with light verbs or auxiliaries is a systematic one expressing grammatical difference.

The opposition between V2 and V-last in the case of complex predicates is related to the category of evidentiality or, perhaps more accurately, to epistemic modality. Even though in both cases, as the examples above once more have illustrated, a past event is seen as completed, only in the case of V2 do the sentences express a kind of résumé of the whole event. And only in case of V2 is the action seen as having been conducted purposely, but sometimes also with a certain degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of the action. This is also the reason why my language consultants characterize V2 constructions as expressing “(unexpected) achievement” or “surprise”. In other words, Bangani V2 can also include a mirative dimension. Note however, that the mirative dimension, wheresoever it is found in these Bangani sentences, is not connected with knowledge/non-knowledge of an event, but with the “happy end” of an action, which is not taken for granted.

13 Introductory remarks to the text

The content of this text is remarkable insofar as it is a hitherto unknown Rajput version of the story of the coming of the four divine Mahasu brothers from Kashmir to Bangan. The sentences 1 to 33 are a short synopsis of the standard story as it has been published in various places (see Atkinson 1973, Ibbetson et al. 1911, Rose 1986). The remaining sentences 34 to 236 present a very different version of the events. The initial synopsis claims that Mahasu has come due to the efforts of a Brahmin in order to liberate the area from a man-eating giant. I have shown elsewhere (Zoller forthcoming) that this story apparently has been built on story patterns taken from the Mahabharata with a twofold aim: demonstrating that Mahasu is the rightful successor of the Pandavas of the Mahabharata, and demonstrating the superiority of the Brahmins. In the Rajput version, on the other hand, Mahasu is brought by the old gentleman, apparently a kind of feudal lord or small king. Also the reason for asking Mahasu to come is different: the old gentleman has seven wives who are all without offspring, also his cattle is without offspring. Other parts of the story are constructed according to typical and widespread Himalayan hero stories.
14 Original text with interlinear rendering

1. ṭsəría māsu kuḷ-kāśmīr=di poīda o-e, te se māndārēth an-e.

All-four Mahasus Kulu-Kashmir=in born become-M.P.PS.PT, then they Mahendrath bring-M.P.PS.PT.

2. se u bāmən de-o kuḷ-kāśmīr=khi.

That Brahmin go-M.S.PS.PT Kulu-Kashmir=for.

3. māndārēth ēk rākas pōiḍa o-o, tini sāre māṇūch khai- go-e the.

Mahendrath one giant born become-M.S.PS.PT, he.ERG all men eat- go-M.P.PS.PT were.

4. te tini rāks-ei sāri zanta khai- er-i thi, te se u bāmēn kuḷ-kāśmīr=khi tshār-o.

When that.ERG giant-ERG all people eat- see-F.P.PS.PT was, then that Brahmin Kulu-Kashmir=for send-M.S.PS.PT.

5. te tiūre sāte kā: koilu, kopla, koilāth, šērkuria, ie tsār bīr tsār māsu=re.

Then them with what: Kailu, Kapla, Kailath, Sherkuria, these four guardian-deities four Mahasus=GEN.

6. te tete=koi se u bāmēn aś-o gore.

Then there=from that Brahmin come-M.S.PS.PT home.

7. tes=ari kā bol-o, tes=ke māsu=re danē de-ne montr-io ki, “iū tu gai-ū=koi khiya-ya, te tiū gai-ū=re duī baštū o-e.”

Him=to what say-M.S.PS.PT, him=with black-gram=GEN seeds give-M.P.PS.PT ensorcel-CP that, “These.OBL you cows-OBL=to feed-IMP, then those.OBL cows-OBL=GEN two calves become-3.PL.PRS.”

8. ešo bi tiūce bōli- de-no māsu-e ki “ek-i rāt-i=di o-le, rāt se o-le. rati tu tiū ēl=ke lā-ā: sune=ri pahi cân-e, tśāndi=ro ēl cân-e, te māndroth bā-ā tes dokhr-ei.”

So also they.ERG say- give-M.S.PS.PT Mahasus.ERG that “One.EMP night-OBL=to eat-IMP, then that.ERG say- attach-IMP: gold=GEN ploughshare make-IMP, silver=GEN plough make-IMP, then Mahendrath plough-IMP that.OBL field-OBL.”

9. tiṅi bāmān-ei rati ugar-e se bolland, te gīn-e bā-ne=khi, te bā-ne=khi gīn-e.

That.ERG Brahmin-ERG in-the-morning release-M.P.S.PT those oxen, then bring-M.P.PS.PT plough-INF.OBL=for, then plough-INF.OBL=for bring-M.P.PS.PT.

10. tettegojike bothe māsu=di laḡ-i pḥali, bothe māsu=ri bīnu-i lāt, seu te go-o jero.

There first Botha Mahasu=in attach-F.S.PS.PT ploughshare, Botha Mahasu=GEN pierce-F.S.PS.PT foot, he then go-M.S.PS.PT lame.

11. bothe=basīc nikāl-o pavasi, tesro bīnu-o kāṅ.

Botha=after emerge-M.S.PS.PT Pavasi, his pierce-M.S.PS.PT ear.

12. te nikāl-o bāsīk, tesro bīnu-o ākha.

Then emerge-M.S.PS.PT Bashik, his pierce-M.S.PS.PT eye.

13. te nikāl-o tśāldō, tes=di na laq-i kethike na.

Then emerge-M.S.PS.PT Calda, his=in not attach-F.S.PS.PT somewhere not.

14. tsār bāi mōndrēth porkōt u-e, te porkōt u-e.

Four brothers Mahendrath manifest become-M.P.PS.PT, then manifest become-M.P.PS.PT.

15. te rāks-ei sāri duņia kori- er-i thi khatam.

Then giant-ERG whole world make- see-F.S.PS.PT was.F.S finished.

16. te laq-o mōndrēth ēk tāl, tes=di ro-e theo se u rākēs.
Then attach-M.S.PS.PT Mahendrath one pond, it=in stay-3.SG.PRS was.M.S that giant.  
17. tes=di bāz-i bādiū=ri beboši.  
It=in become-F.S.PS.PT all.OBL=GEN helplessness.  
18. te koīlu-ei koṇa-i te de-ṇi phāl tes tāl-e=di.  
Then Kailu.ERG Kabla.ERG then give-F.S.PS.PT jump that.OBL pond-OBL=in.  
19. te bōga-o seu rākēs, bāgi-bāg-o seu rākēs te de-o paṅgīle.  
Then chase-M.S.PS.PT that giant, chase-chase-CP that giant then go-M.S.PS.PT Pangla.OBL.  
20. tētē=khi potshoṇike koīlu, koṇa, koilāth, šerkuria bi por-e.  
There=for after Kailu, Kabla, Kailath, Sherkuria also fall-M.P.PS.PT.  
21. te tētē ēr-o seu pakṛī- tiūe, pakṛ-o te zaṅg-o seu poru.  
Then there see-M.S.PS.PT he seize- they.ERG, seize-M.S.PS.PT then kill-M.S.PS.PT he there.  
22. tēsro jidolo tshuṭ-o porē=koi.  
His heart escape-M.S.PS.PT there=from.  
23. te lāg-o dāke=pare, dāke=pare=koi de-o seu noī-noī= di potshoū.  
Then attach-M.S.PS.PT stone=on, stone= on=from go-M.S.PS.PT he river-river=in back.  
24. te de-o tipu=pāre, te tētē bōn-e tēsro jībālu.  
Then go-M.S.PS.PT Tipu=over, then there become-M.P.PS.PT his Jibalu.  
25. se tētē=koi gore aš-e ki “amū rākēs khatam kori- go-o.”  
They there=from home come-M.P.PS.PT that “We.ERG giant finished make- go-M.S.PS.PT.”  
26. khatam kori-o te ro-o mondṛēt hāsū.  
Finished make-CP then stay-M.S.PS.PT Mahendrath Mahasu.  
27. tētī=baṣie tiūē kā kor-o ki “ebe aṃe apanke=khi iec bāṭ-ile, ketke kuṇzo ro-elo, ketke kuṇzo ro-elo.”  
That=after they.ERG what make-M.S.PS.PT that “Now we ourselves=for this divide-1.PL.FUT, where who stay-3.SG.FUT, where who stay-3.SG.FUT.”  
28. onōli te de-no both-e=ke: “boṭhdo rāz”.  
Hanol then give-M.S.PS.PT Botha=for: “Sitting kingdom”.  
29. tsāldē=ke de-no “tsoldo rāz”.  
Calda=for give-M.S.PS.PT “Moving kingdom”.  
30. povasi=ke de-no pāṣi bīl, baśik-e=ke de-ni śaṭi bīl, povasi=ro thān-o o dēbēn.  
Pavasi=for give-M.S.PS.PT Panshi side, Bashik-OBL=for give-F.S.PS.PT Shati side, Pavasi=GEN residence become-M.S.PS.PT Devavana.  
31. tētī=baṣie iūe ēś-eśo toi kio,7 te tsāldō te ebe ēśo: śaṭi=di bi ḍe, pasī=di bi a-a.  
That=after they.ERG so-so decision make-M.S.PS.PT, then Calda then now so: Shati=in also go.3.SG.PRS, Pashi=in also come-3.SG.PRS.  
32. oṣō te de śiaie=zaī, ube ḍe besāre=di=zaī, tsāldē=ke te ebe “tsoldo rāz”, povasi=ke śaṭi bīl.  
Ahead then go.3.SG.PRS Shiaie=till, up go.3.SG.PRS Besar=in=till, Calda=for then now “Moving kingdom”, Pavasi=for Shati side.  
33. boṭhdo ro-e onōli, tētē thēr-ēṇ iec bāde apṛi lotī-poṭi.  
Botha stay-3.SG.PRS Hanol, there leave-3.PL.PRS they all own riches-property.  

37Here Hindi instead of Bangani koro.
Then he.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT so that “I how-how go-1.SG.PRS, my but go-F.S.PS.PT.EMP go-3.SG.F.PRS not.”

41. seu th make.IMP.

That.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT so that “so make.IMP, luggage make.IMP and stick

42. t

Then make-M.S.PS.PT 39 he.ERG so-so.

43. te ãë di bâte=di mil-o teske unêke=ro bât.

Then half way.OBL=in meet-M.S.PS.PT him Unaka=GEN Bhatt.

44. te tîni bâman-ei bol-o ki “bure-khure sâdru-a, tu eśo bol mû=ari ki tu ketke lâg-o ðëi-?”

That.ERG Brahmin-ERG say-M.S.PS.PT that “Old-elderly gentleman-VOC, you so speak.IMP me=to that you where attach-M.S.PS.PT 40 go-?”

45. seu bol-e ki “[aêi kinê de-û, aû de-û kulu-kâsmîr=khi mäsu=käi.”

He say-3.SG.PRS that “I where go-1.SG.PRS, I go-1.SG.PRS Kulu-Kashmir=khi Mahasu=to.”

46. te tîni bol-o “mu=ke dan-dâl at sab-kutsh, kháli ðlâd noðhi.”

He say-M.S.PS.PT “me=to riches-possessions everything, only issue is-not.”

47. te tîni bâman-ei bol-o ki “tu keê-kešo ðë tetke?”

Then that.ERG Brahmin-ERG say-M.S.PS.PT that “you how-how go-2.SG.PRS there?”

48. te tîni bol-o “ëbe ještô bi de-ûle, par aû ðë-û-i ðë-û.

He say-M.S.PS.PT “now however go-1.SG.FUT, but I go-1.SG.PRS.EMP go-1.SG.PRS...

49. te tîni bâman-ei tes-khi mantar kor-e, te seu kulu-kâsmîr poi iš 31 ð-ô.

*The whole phrase with genitive subject in Hindi: merâ to jâyâ hî nah jâtâ.

39 Here Hindi kîo instead of Bangani koro.

This is the basic meaning of the verb lâgño respectively lâgño. It is, however used in Bangani to realize inchoative aktionsart.

41 The final -i-, normally to be expected here, probably disappeared due to the following vowel.
That.ERG Brahmin.ERG him=for mantras make-M.P.PS.PT, then he Kulu-Kashmir arrive- come-M.S.PS.PT.
50. kulũ-kāśmir te tini ešo bi de-no seu somzai- ki “er-e koilu ā-ndo bāre, er-e seu taũ oru kха.”
Kulu-Kashmir then he.ERG so also give-M.S.PS.PT he explain- that “Look-IMP Kailu come-M.S.PRS.PT outside, look-IMP he you.OBL here eat.3.SG.PRS.”
51. tes=khi ešo kor-e: ēk te de pāṁts june=ro rōt, ēk de khāru.
Him=for so make-IMP: one then give.IMP five (times) 20kg=GEN bread, one give.IMP ram.
52. jeśo-i seu kulũ-kāśmir de-o, tesi-i māsu=bi bol-o, māsu=ro tho, kā, zāgro, zāgre=ri tsōth thi tādu, “bele īār, ēś zāgr-ēi poru puz-ule.”
As-EMP he Kulu-Kashmir go-M.S.PS.PT, then-EMP Mahasu-ERG say-M.S.PS.PT, Mahasu=GEN was, what, night-wake, night-wake-GEN fourth was then, “Dear friend, so night-wake-ACC there celebrate.1.M.PL.FUT.”
53. jese-i se khoro uzi-ṇe tesi-i “bele īār, mŏncchaṇ tshuṭ-i, bele koilu-a, tu de-u bāre, mŏncchaṇ tshuṭ-e.”
As-EMP they upright get-up-M.P.PS.PT then-EMP “Dear friend, smell-of-humans escape-F.S.PS.PT, Kailu-VOC, you go IMP outside, smell-of-humans escape-3.SG.PRS.”
54. koilu-ei bol-o zo “etke kā mŏncchaṇ tshuṭ-e, etka-i kūṇ ās-e.”
55. de-o koilu bāre, tini ēk mungra kio42 sāṭ mone=ro.
Go-M.S.PS.PT Kailu outside, he.ERG one club make.M.S.PS.PT sixty maunds=GEN.
56. jeśo bāre de-o, seu pērū de-nds lāg-o-i.
As outside go-M.S.PS.PT, he rounds.OBL give-M.P.PS.PT attach-M.S.PS.PT-EMP.
57. tini bure-kuṛe sāḍaru-ei teske āt zōr-ei tes=ari bol-o “mū te tu na khā, taũ=khi de-ū, ēk te de-ū phirū singe=ro khāru, ēk de-ū pāṁts june=ro rōt, tu merī ziān botsā-u.”
That.ERG old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman.ERG his hands unite-CP him=to say-M.S.PS.PT “Me but you not eat.IMP, you=to give-1.SG.PRS, one then give-1.SG.PRS turned.OBL horns.OBL=GEN ram, one then give-1.SG.PRS five (times) 20kg=GEN bread, you my life save-IMP.”
58. te tini kā kor-e?
Then he.ERG what do-M.S.PS.PT?
59. ēk tes=khi khār khon-i, tebe pā-o tethu tolē ēr ešo bol-o ki “ethu-i tolē ro-e be, tu er-e, ēbe šeʃkuriā ā bāre, er-e seu taũ poru kха. zu aũ a-ULE taũ=ke, aũ uktśāl-ULE te uzi-a, teti zaũ ro-e rōinge.”
One him=for hole dig-F.S.PS.PT, then place-M.S.PS.PT there down and so say-M.S.PS.PT that “here.EMP down stay-IMP PART.DISRESP, you see-IMP, now Sherkuria come.3.SG.PRS outside, see-IMP he you.OBL there eat.3.SG.PRS. When I come-1.SG.FUT you=to, I unearth-1.SG.FUT then rise-IMP, then till stay-IMP silent.”
60. de-o seu bitre “bele tsāl-o-tsāl-o, pūz-o es zāgre.”
Go-M.S.PS.PT he inside “Dear go-IMP-go-IMP, worship-IMP this.OBL night-wake.OBL.”
61. uzu-e se khoro, ā̄-ā ēlī=ke=zaũ, “bele īār, mŏntshān tshuṭ-e.”

42Here Hindi kio instead of Bangani koro.

62. te lāg-e bolt-de šerkuria=ari “šerkuria, bāre ċe-u tu; koilu-ei khai- go-i būr.”


63. koilu-1 lāg-o rōs, tini bol-o “šerkuria, de-u bāre, muī rispot khai- go-i, tu te na khā.”


64. māsu-ei bi bol-o eōo tes=ari k “šerkuria, tu ċe-u bāre, ini amū=ari zāli lai- go-i.”

Mahasu-ERG also say-M.S.P.S.P.T so him=to that “Sherkuria, you go-IMP outside, he.ERG us=to lie attach- go-F.S.P.S.P.T.”

65. šerkuria bāre ċiš-o, tini ċe te tip-o seu muṇgro-i ŋi tāń mone=ra.

Sherkuria outside come-M.S.P.S.P.T, he.ERG one then lift-M.S.P.S.P.T that club-ACC sixty maund=GEN.

66. ċesi tini ċe śer de-ni, teśo-i oro-sūko sab zal-o.

As:EMP he.ERG one whistle give-F.S.P.S.P.T, then-EMP green-dry all burn-M.S.P.S.P.T.

67. duji śer de-ni tini, tetra i zo ḍōko bi cut-o, noī-gāre bi ā-i.

Second whistle give-F.S.P.S.P.T he.ERG, then this which mountain also break-M.S.P.S.P.T, rivers-brooks also come-F.P.P.P.T.

68. tebe ċe-o seu bitre ki “ebe te tośōli ċi- go-i ċa-li tumū. muī te oro-sūko bi ḍo-o, ḍōke ie bi dāl-e.”

Then go-M.S.P.S.P.T he inside that “Now then satisfaction be- go-F.S.P.S.P.T be-3.SG.F.FUT you.OBL. I.ERG then green-dry also burn-M.S.P.S.P.T, mountains they also throw-M.P.P.S.P.T.”

69. to tūśe bol-o ki “sotso bol-o ċeni, ebe kān etke.”

Then they.ERG say-M.S.P.S.P.T that “True say-M.S.P.S.P.T he.ERG, now who here.”

70. tebe se bāre=ki uzu-e ki “poru puz-o zāɡr-ei,” bāre=khi uz-ui se ḍēli=ke=zaū ā-ā, tebe phir-e ozī bitr-ei.

Then they outside=for rise-M.P.S.P.T that “there worship-IMP night-wake-ACC,” outside=for rise-CP they threshold=for=till come-M.S.P.S.P.T, then turn-M.P.P.S.P.T again inside-EMP.

71. tini koilu-ei phir kā?

That.ERG Kailu-ERG then what?

72. lāte=koi bāre ki “oji kā se? muī te būr kha-i, ini te na kha-i būr? ḍōke bi dāli- go-e, oro-sūko bi dāi- go-o.”


73. ċeš-ei tini se lāt-o=koi bāre pā-ā, se bāre de-ṇe pai-, aphu tes manche=ke ċe-o.

As:EMP he.ERG that leg-OBLEMP=with outside throw-M.S.P.S.P.T, they outside give-M.P.P.S.P.T throw-, himself that.ObL man.ObL=to go-M.S.P.S.P.T.

74. “kā-re, uzi-ndo kela na tu? ebe āṇi- go-e muī se bāre. āt zōr iū=kai, tebe āešo bi bol-ṇo tāi teśo bol.”

“What=DISRESP, stand-M.S.P.S.P.T why not you? Now bring- go-M.P.P.S.P.T I.ERG they outside. Hands fold.IMP them=before, then as also speak-INF you.OBL so speak.IMP.”

75. seu buṛo-ṭhūro sādaru tebe go-o at- khūro tiū=kai.

That old-elderly gentleman then go-M.S.P.S.P.T be- upright them=before.
My wives, their also anything not be—M.P.PRS.PT, dear anything not be—M.P.PRS.PT
their.

80. ti
82. t
84. t
IMP cows-OBL=for, then your offspring be-3.SG.F.FUT.

"Dear, paddy=GEN seeds then give-IMP own wifes-OBL=for, pulse=GEN seeds give-

43 The correct word form here is not quite clear.
Old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman=GEN was brother one – Patia Sahib, he live-3.SG.PRS was him=from separate.

92. tiñi bol-ô ñpré nuñku-tsakru=ari ki “mēro ēk būro bai thô, ðë-ô dei seu ziiûdia ki mori-gô-a. amû têri somâle ne kî44 na.”

He.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT own servants-menials=to that “My one old brother was, go-IMP please he alive or die- go-M.S.PS.PT. We.ERG his care.OBL not make-F.S.PS.PT not.”

93. tepe tshâr-e tiñi düi zonê.

Then send-M.P.PS.PT he.ERG two people.

94. se ās-e nozikrê bi ās-e tiû bi dëkh-ê zo bitre seze sâêt morêd, ziiûr gûze bi lâmi-lâmi.

They come-M.P.PS.PT near also come-M.P.PS.PT they.ERG also see-M.P.PS.PT that inside those seven men, whose moustaches also long-long.

95. tiû te=as=ari ne ni bol-ô-i na, bâg-du rô-ê vâpas.

They.ERG him=to not not say-M.S.PS.PT-EMP not, run-PRS.PT stay-M.P.PS.PT back.

96. te bol-ô tes=ari zo “tu goñ-ê ni tesri loti-poûti khâ-ñô, par ese tetke sût zo têri loti-poûti se khâ-le.”

Then say-M.S.PS.PT him=to that “You say-2.SG.PRS PART his.F possessions-riches eat-INF, but such there seven who your.F possessions-riches they eat-3.PL.M.FUT.”

97. “bele, se kûñ?”

“Dear, they who?”

98. tiû bol-ô, “se ni tesre bêta, tes bûre-khûre sâdaru=re.”

They.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT, “They PART his sons, that.OBL old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman=GEN.”


Then he.ERG do-M.S.PS.PT so, that.ERG old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman-ERG: one then promise-M.S.PS.PT PART drum Mahasu=for, five kg promise-M.S.PS.PT gold, one promise-F.S.PS.PT cauldron, one promise-F.S.PS.PT wind instrument-alpenhorn that “they you=for.”

100. tsâr mâsu=khi tsâr tsîze ô-i.

Four Mahasus=for four things become-F.P.PS.PT.

101. te gor=ke jëso-i seu ās-ô, tiñi de-ñô boidi likhi-, seu boidi likhi- de-ñô.

Then home=for as-EMP he come-M.S.PS.PT, he.ERG give-M.S.PS.PT register write-, that register write- give-M.S.PS.PT.

102. poru de-nne=khi bisruî- mor-ô.

There give-OBL.INF=for forget- die-M.S.PS.PT.

103. tiûë, tesre bêti-bêta-ûe, se boi ne ni dëkh-i na, zo kâ likh-ûnda.

They.ERG, his daughters-sons-ERG, that register not not see-F.S.PS.PT not, that what write-M.S.PRF.PT.

104. tebe kâ zobê diû-nne=khi ās-ê=ñ na dûs?

Then what when drown-OBL.INF=for come-3.PL.PRS PART days?

44 Here Hindi kî instead of Bangani kori.
45Correct instead of tes-ari “him-to” would be tiû-ari “them-to”.
46Triple negation.
47Triple negation.
48Corresponds to Hindi likhâ huá.
Those things there not give-F.P.S.P.T.PASS not.

I say-1.SG.PRS was PART your possessions-riches eat-INF, but this.OBL my possessions-riches then eat-3.PL.M.FUT there.”

Go-IMP, here bring.IMP call-CP them.

go-M.S.PS.PT others-ERG, as-much I these.OBL others=for give-1.SG.PRS, that-much you.PL yourself eat-IMP.

Then dispatch-M.P.PS.PT he.ERG they men, they.ERG bring-M.P.PS.PT they here call-CP.

to call-CP them, they.ERG=for go ld-silver=GEN then us=to known, keys-

Then there who they others were, he.ERG attach- be-M.P.S.P.T.PASS, minister, they then remove-M.P.PS.PT there.

Their place=in attach-M.S.PS.PT they, that -is all dealings them=for give-M.S.PS.PT he.ERG.

Then where they old, he his wife.

When they.ERG all dealings manage-M.S.PS.PT, then who they there were, those servants, they.ERG think-M.S.PS.PT that “friends-VOC, these.ERG gentleman-fellows-ERG then we eat- go-M.P.PS.PT.

bele esō kor-in: ū=khī suna-tsāndi=rō te am=ke poto, tali-ū=ro bi am=ke poto, tsōri kor-de de-in ame.

Dear so do-1.PL.PRS: them.OBL=for gold-silver=GEN then us=to known, keys-OBL=GEN also us=to known, theft do-PRS.PT.OBL go-1.PL.PRS we.

kette, ebe ku jāṇi,49 la-i be īuē māśu-e.

Where, now who knows, attach-F.S.PS.PT PART these.ERG Mahasus-ERG.

If promise give-M.P.PS.PT their there, then why attach-F.S.PS.PT.WT was.F that who knows, that promise forget-M.S.PS.PT there.”

Then where they all dealings manage-M.S.PS.PT, then who they there were, those servants, they.ERG think-M.S.PS.PT that “friends-VOC, these.ERG gentleman-fellows-ERG then we eat- go-M.P.PS.PT.

bele esō kor-in: ū=khī suna-tsāndi=rō te am=ke poto, tali-ū=ro bi am=ke poto, tsōri kor-de de-in ame.

Dear so do-1.PL.PRS: them.OBL=for gold-silver=GEN then us=to known, keys-OBL=GEN also us=to known, theft do-PRS.PT.OBL go-1.PL.PRS we.

kette, ebe ku jāṇi,49 la-i be īuē māśu-e.

Where, now who knows, attach-F.S.PS.PT PART these.ERG Mahasus-ERG.

If promise give-M.P.PS.PT their there, then why attach-F.S.PS.PT.WT was.F that who knows, that promise forget-M.S.PS.PT there.”

Then where they all dealings manage-M.S.PS.PT, then who they there were, those servants, they.ERG think-M.S.PS.PT that “friends-VOC, these.ERG gentleman-fellows-ERG then we eat- go-M.P.PS.PT.

bele esō kor-in: ū=khī suna-tsāndi=rō te am=ke poto, tali-ū=ro bi am=ke poto, tsōri kor-de de-in ame.

Dear so do-1.PL.PRS: them.OBL=for gold-silver=GEN then us=to known, keys-OBL=GEN also us=to known, theft do-PRS.PT.OBL go-1.PL.PRS we.

kette, ebe ku jāṇi,49 la-i be īuē māśu-e.

Where, now who knows, attach-F.S.PS.PT PART these.ERG Mahasus-ERG.

If promise give-M.P.PS.PT their there, then why attach-F.S.PS.PT.WT was.F that who knows, that promise forget-M.S.PS.PT there.”

Then where they all dealings manage-M.S.PS.PT, then who they there were, those servants, they.ERG think-M.S.PS.PT that “friends-VOC, these.ERG gentleman-fellows-ERG then we eat- go-M.P.PS.PT.

bele esō kor-in: ū=khī suna-tsāndi=rō te am=ke poto, tali-ū=ro bi am=ke poto, tsōri kor-de de-in ame.

Dear so do-1.PL.PRS: them.OBL=for gold-silver=GEN then us=to known, keys-OBL=GEN also us=to known, theft do-PRS.PT.OBL go-1.PL.PRS we.

kette, ebe ku jāṇi,49 la-i be īuē māśu-e.

Where, now who knows, attach-F.S.PS.PT PART these.ERG Mahasus-ERG.

If promise give-M.P.PS.PT their there, then why attach-F.S.PS.PT.WT was.F that who knows, that promise forget-M.S.PS.PT there.”

Then where they all dealings manage-M.S.PS.PT, then who they there were, those servants, they.ERG think-M.S.PS.PT that “friends-VOC, these.ERG gentleman-fellows-ERG then we eat- go-M.P.PS.PT.

bele esō kor-in: ū=khī suna-tsāndi=rō te am=ke poto, tali-ū=ro bi am=ke poto, tsōri kor-de de-in ame.

Dear so do-1.PL.PRS: them.OBL=for gold-silver=GEN then us=to known, keys-OBL=GEN also us=to known, theft do-PRS.PT.OBL go-1.PL.PRS we.
Next-day come-M.P.PS.PT they, then say-M.S.PS.PT Patia Sahib=to that “We then dishonest were, but they then your own were.

120. ēbe tu khozhāṇo dekh- de-i: osti tinā kā ki kuts nothi? am=ke eśā zaṇu-ō ki iūe kuts na tshōr-ō tetke.”

Now you treasury look- give-IMP: is therein what or anything not-is? Us=to so known-M.S.PS.PT.PASS that they.ERG anything not leave-M.S.PS.PT there.”

121. diujī ni de-ō se, se bi de teere=sāte.

Next-day PART go-M.S.PS.PT he, they also go-M.P.PS.PT him=with.

122. dekh-ō tetke zo kuts nothi, seu tsōri- go-ō tho āphu tiū.

See-M.S.PS.PT there that anything is-not, that steal- go-M.S.PS.PT was oneself they.ERG.


He.ERG them=to say-M.S.PS.PT, “Go-IMP, you my possessions-riches bring-IMP, not then you.OBL I finished make-1.SG.PRS.” They go-M.G.PS.PT.

124. tiū=kai tho māmlō kāphi uga-ṇē=khi, zo kuts apke thā, seu kīō51 āphu māmlē uga-ndē āde.

Them=with was matter much collect-OBL.INF=for, what ever own was, that make-M.S.PS.PT themselves matter.OBL collect-M.P.PS.PT go-M.G.PS.PT.

125. tetke laji- go-ō poto zo, “amaro rāza ai- go-ō māmle uga-ndo, bele ēbe kā kor-ē, māmlo te bori ro-ō o-ndo uga-ṇē=khi.

There attach- go-M.S.PS.PT known that, “Our king come- go-M.S.PS.PT matters collect-M.S.PRS.PT, dear now what make-2.SG.PRS, matter then much remain-M.S.PS.PT be-M.S.PRS.PT collect-OBL.INF=for.

126. amare ne de-i-ndo eti, bāi māṭi bi de-ule te bi ne bāz-dō pūro.

Our.OBL not give-M.S.PRS.PT.PASS so-much, even-if earth also give-1.PL.FUT then also not become-M.S.PS.PT whole.

127. ēbe ēs kor-ō, de-nne te de-nne-i āja.

Now so make-IMP, give-OBL.INF then give-OBL.INF-EMP must.IMP.

128. purane te giṇ-ō lānce bīr-īs. ek līr agiē tale, ek līr pātshie tale, tepe de-ō tiū=kai.”

Old.M.PL then bring-IMP clothes.M.PL don-CP, one rag front-side.OBL, one rag back-side.OBL, then go-OBL them=to.”

129. tiūē seu māmlo thōro-thōro de-ṇo, te bi tesre sune-tsāndi lāiğ go-ō bāzī-

They.ERG that matter little-little give-M.S.PS.PT, then also their.M.PL gold-silver fit go-M.S.PS.PT become-.51

130. an-ō, tepe de-ṇo poru tī tsōri=re bōde, aze bi seu bond thō-ō

bīri-i

Bring-M.S.PS.PT, then give-M.S.PS.PT there that.OBL theft=GEN exchange.OBL, but still that promise remain-M.S.PS.PT forget-EMP.

131. ēbe zōbe seu pānts sēr sūno thō thō-ō o-ndo, tiūē ek-īei bol-ō zō, “īar-ē, ame ni es sūne-ro ie cān-de the toluāta.”

Now when that five kg gold was keep-M.S.PS.PT be-M.S.PRS.PT, that.ERG one-ERG say-M.S.PS.PT that, “friends-VOC, we PART this.OBL gold=GEN this.F make-M.P.PRS.PT were.M.PL sword.”

132. te tiūē tesri toluār cān-ne=khi sunār-ē=khe de-ṇi go-i ki, “esro ēsē toluār cān-u zo lōg bi bol-ele zo “kūni cān-i ie toluār.”

51 Here Hindi kīō instead of Bangani koro.
Then they.ERG his sword make-OBL.INF=for goldsmith-OBL=for give.F.INF go-F.S.PS.PT that, “His such sword make-IMP that people also say-3.PL.FUT that who.ERG make-F.S.PS.PT that.F sword.”

If keep-2.SG.PRS you alive them.OBL again also your possessions-riches there EMP cut-M.PL.PS.PT they all-seven brothers.

That make-CP so say-1.PL.PRS we him=to that “there make.IMP those.OBL all-there EMP cut-M.PL.PS.PT they all-seven brothers.

Then they cut-M.PL.PS.PT, then go-M.PL.PS.PT there=after their.OBL house=to.

Then they cut-M.PL.PS.PT, then go-M.PL.PS.PT there=after their.OBL house=to.
Then one young-EMP young-type woman was, she was pregnant.

147. Then that.ERG bard-woman-ERG own.OBL skirt.OBL=under.

148. He go-3.SG.PRS were, say-M.S.PS.PT that, “Additional then not-is here anyone them.GEN.”

149. He go-3.SG.PRS to, “Dear mother, mother-father=GEN name what whose, mother-father be-3.PL.FUT your.PL.”

150. eś-eśo kar-ō tīe, se kaṇṭišeri tsiheūṛ botsai go-i. te se poru de, se tīe maice tshār-i.

So-so make-CP she.ERG, that young-type woman save- go-F.S.PS.PT. Then they there go-M.PL.PS.PT, she she.ERG parents’-home send-F.S.PS.PT. Then hang-F.PL.PS.PT inversely balcony-OBL down.

151. Those.OBL all-seven brothers-OBL=for – their skins strip-F.PL.PS.PT, then hang-M.PL.PS.PT, she she.ERG parents’-home send-F.S.PS.PT.

Then others grow-3PL.PRS-EMP PART months=of, years=of, he grow-M.S.PS.PT quickly attach-M.S.PS.PT he bow-playing-PRS.PT.OBL.

152. se de-i maice=di, se ajkhu-i poru, tīrō u-o bēta, bēta u-o tīrō.

153. te or bor-e-i na mine=ro, borse=ro, seu bor-e duse=ro.

Then others grow-3PL.PS.PT EMP PART months=of, years=of, he grow-M.S.PS.PT days=of.

154. atsha, ze seu kuts bodiāro jai- go-o, te lāgi- go-o seu horu-kāṅḍa khēl-de.

Well, when he little older go- go-M.S.PS.PT, then attach- go-M.S.PS.PT he bow-arrow playing-PRS.PT.OBL.

155. tīu oru=ri lag-e-i na, tesri phaṭapāṭ lag-i nīśane=di: “bele ka-re, naũ jōt.”

Those.OBL others.OBL=GEN attach-F.S.PS.PT.EMP not, his quickly attach-F.S.PS.PT target=IN: “Dear what-DISRESP, name call.IMP.”

156. seu bol-e, “aũ kāro naũ jōt-ū?” “bele, keśo “kāro naũ jōt-ū”, bele keśo kāro, mā-bāp 5-le tērē.

He say-3.SG.PRS, “I whose name call-1.SG.PRS?” “Dear, how ‘whose name call-1.SG.PRS’, dear what whose, mother-father be-3.PL.FUT your.PL.”

157. seu aś-e apre ije=kai, “bele ije, mā-bāpu=ro naũ kā mēre?”

He go-3.SG.PRS own mother=to, “Dear mother, mother-father=GEN name what my.PL?”

158. “bele rāṁḍuṛia, mā ne aũ tērī, bāp nothi na tērā. bele, mūi kha-i kāṁde=ri zorīe, te o-o tu.”

“Dear rascal.VOC, mother PART I your, father not-is not your. Dear, I.ERG eat-F.S.PS.PT mountaintop=GEN roots, then become-M.S.PS.PT you.”

159. seu kā zo de-o dujie? dujie bi lā teṣi-teṣe. jōt-e seu naũ zo kāṁde=ri kumliē.

He what when go-M.S.PS.PT next-day? Next-day also attach.M.S.PS.PT so-so. Call-3.SG.PRS he name who mountaintop=GEN shoots.

160. se bol-ēn, se or zo, “āmbe, kāṁde=ri kumliē, ame an-iṇ doti, te de-iṇ tērī ije=khi deiki, ɔjī 5-le tīrē.”

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52 Triple negation.
53 Postposition is feminine because of feminine donu “bow.”
They say-3.Pl.PRS, those others that, “All-right, mountaintop=GEN shoots, we bring-1.PL.PRS tomorrow, then give-1.PL.PRS your mother=for little, more be-3.3.PL.FUT hers.”

161. dujje seu bāz-o koliar-ai khām-da, “bele na bōl mere bāba-ro nāu.”
Next-day he stop-M.S.PS.PT lunch-ACC eat-M.S.PRS.PT, “Dear PART tell.IMP my father=GEN name.”

162. tepe bol-o tū zo, “rāṃḍuria, paṇi anv-an muiv nāi=koi ubālu-ndo, te pi-o seu, tepe u-o tu.” Then say-M.S.PS.PT she.ERG that, “Rascal.VOC, water bring-M.S.PS.PT I.ERG river=from boil-M.S.PS.PT, then drink-M.S.PS.PT that, then become-M.S.PS.PT you.”

163. dujje bi dāl-o tini, te jōt-o tēś-teśo nāu.
Next-day also throw-M.S.PS.PT he.ERG, then call-M.S.PS.PT so-so name.

164. tiūe bol-o zo, “paṇi anv-āṇame sārī dūniā-ro goṭi- gāṭ-īo, te pi-a-īn dei, ozi o-le.” They.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT that, “Water bring-1.PL.PRS we whole world=GEN collect-collect-CP, then drink-CAUS-1.PL.PRS little, more become-3.3.PL.FUT.”

165. tini bi bol-o tī=ari tēś-i-teśo.
He.ERG also say-M.S.PS.PT them=to so-EMP-so.

166. ti=kai bāzī- go-o muškīl, “zo boli de-ū es=a=ri zo būre-kure sadaru=ro konalu tu, te tiū=kai potu laq-ṇo, tiūe ieu bi poru kat-ṇo, na bol-do, te ieu ne man-da.” Her=to become- go-M.S.PS.PT difficult, “If say- give-1.SG.PRS him=to that old.OBL elderly.OBL gentleman.OBL=GEN grandson you, then them=to whereabouts attach-INF, they.ERG he also there cut-INF. Not say-M.S.PRS.PT, then he not accept-M.S.PS.PT.”

167. te seu la-o tiūe bokrovalo. te ek dūs kā o-o, zo bakrie kha-i bag-ei.
Then he attach-M.S.PS.PT she.ERG goatherd. Then one day what be-M.S.PS.PT, that goats eat-F.S.PS.PT tiger-ERG.

168. ādi-ād bakrie poru kha-i tini, ādi tini gore anv-i.
Half-EMP-half goats there eat-F.S.PS.PT he.ERG, half he.ERG home bring-F.S.PS.PT.

169. atsha, te ezi bāṭi tes=di lagi- go-i kōṛ, potū sābe=di, kantshi ʊṭhi=di, ezi bāṭi lagi- go-o seu er-a-ndo- goṇa-ndo.
Well, then this direction him=in attach- go-F.S.PS.PT leprosy, Patia Sahib=in, little finger=in, this direction attach- go-M.S.PS.PT he look-CAUS-M.S.PRS.PT count-M.S.PS.PT.

170. tiū bol-o zo, “tesri gāṇḍi-i-ro khōz-e=ro mil-elo, tepe de taũ=koi ieu kōṛ, eś-ia ne dē-do.” He say-M.S.PS.PT that, “His smell-OBL=GEN trace-OBL=GEN meet-3.SG.FUT, then go-3.SG.PRS you=from this leprosy, so-EMP not go-M.S.PRS.PT.”

171. atsha, ezi bāṭi tshari- go-e tini tes lōr-de.
Well, this direction send- go-M.PL.PLS.PT he.ERG that.OBL search-M.PRS.PT.OBL.

172. ezi bāṭi la-o tiūe musliā-i zo, “se bakrie kinde go-i?”
This direction attach-M.S.PS.PT she.ERG reproach-F.S.PS.PT that, “Those goats where go-F.PL.PLS.PT?”

173. seu bol-e zo, “ezi na pār nāle=di.” tiū bol-o zo, “ie kele mor-i?”
He say-3.SG.PRS that, “These PART across ravine=in.” She say-M.S.PS.PT that, “They how die-F.PL.PLS.PT?”

He say-M.S.PS.PT, “Who know but.” “Dear but must.IMP here bring.IMP.” He.ERG bring-F.S.PS.PT.

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54 See above footnote 49.
175. “osi bi tetke kā?” “bele, bīrāḷṭo ek, ār nothi kuts na.”

176. tiūe er-o sūṭsi zo, “ieu te atsho bīrāḷṭo.”

177. sen de-o ozi poru, dekh-o sen bāg.

178. tepe sūts-o esō zo, “es bīrāḷṭ-ēi gin-ā aū poru, tepe bol-ū tiū=ari zo inī kha-i, aū kā kū.”

Then think-M.S.PS.PT so that “This.OBL tomcat-ACC bring-1.SG.PRS I there, then say-1.SG.PRS her=to that it.ERG eat-F.S.PS.PT, I what do-1.SG.PRS.”

179. ōṭe sen bāg, te pa-o kotshe=poru, te de-o tiū=kai.

Seize-M.S.PS.PT that tiger, then place-M.S.PS.PT jacket-bag=there, then go-M.S.PS.PT her=to.

180. tinē gar-o, tepe bol-o zo, “ezo be sen bīrāḷṭo, inī kha-i.”

He extract-M.S.PS.PT, then say-M.S.PS.PT that, “This PART that tomcat, he.ERG eat-F.P.PS.PT.”

181. tiūe dekh-o zo bāg, tepe bol-o tes=ari zo, “poru-i gin apre es bīrāḷṭe, am=ke ne tsāi.”

She.ERG see-M.S.PS.PT that tiger, then say-M.S.PS.PT him=to that, “There-EMP take-along.IMP own.OBL this.OBL tomcat.OBL, us=to not wished.SBJV.”

182. atsha, tes bāg-e chor-īo, zo gore=khi a-o, seu te mił-e se zo potia sāb-ēi the tshar-ōne.ŭ

Well, that.OBL tiger.OBL release-CP, who home=for come-M.S.PS.PT, he then meet-3.SG.PRS them who Patia Sahib-ERG were send-M.PL.PS.PT.PASS.

183. tinē bi go-o tho lai- poto aprī ije=koi zo, “mere bābae esē-esē zaṅge.”

He.ERG also go-M.S.PS.PT was attach- known own mother=from that, “My fathers so.PL-so.PL kill-M.PL.PS.PT.”

184. seu de-o gor=ke, tepe dekh-e zo tshɔriare65 tinē taṅg-ōne uḻte.

He go-M.S.PS.PT home=to, then see-3.SG.PRS that skins their hang-M.PL.PRS.PT.PASS inversely.M.PL.

185. tinē ugar-o kothār, dekh-o seu bond.

He open-M.S.PS.PT treasury, see-M.S.PS.PT that promise.

186. te ogebnike seu bond-ai te an-o de-niā māsu=ke.

Then first that promise-EMP then bring-M.S.PS.PT give-CP Mahasu=for.

187. seu bainō bi, suno bi, kornāl bi, seu kora bi.

That drum also, gold also, alpenhorn also, that cauldrong also.

188. seu aś-o, teti=basie tes=ke miłi- go-o se admi tetkē.

He come-M.S.PS.PT, that= after him=to meet- go-M.S.PS.PT those guys there.

189. te lag-e seu bol-de, “bele aū manūch, par tumē esō bol-ō ki tumē kūn.”

Then attach-M.S.PS.PT.OBL he say-M.S.PS.PT.OBL, “Dear I man, but you so speak-IMP that you who.”

190. “bele iār-e, amē esē esē potia sāb-ēi tho-e tshārī, zo bure-khure sadaṛu-re koi bi mił-ele, se jā lōr-ne. tesri őthi=di kōr lag-ondi, seu kōr de teb-ei zo se mił-ele.”

“Dear friend-VOC, we so-so Patia Sahib-ERG keep-M.PL.PS.PT send-, that old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman.OBL=GEN anyone meet-1.PL.PFUT, those must.IMP search-OBL.INF. His finger=in leprosy attach-PS.PT.PASS, that leprosy go.3.SG.PRS then-EMP when they meet-1.PL.PFUT.”

191. tes buśē sun-ē ognike lagī- go-o rōś.

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55The suffix -are corresponds to Hindi -vāle.
That.OBL speech hear-CP first attach- go-M.S.PS.PT anger.
192. tepe sūts-o tini, “bele, iū zang-ło kā kor-e.”
Then think-M.S.PS.PT he.ERG, “Dear, these.OBL kill-CP what do-3.PL.PRS.”
193. tepe bol-o esō zo, “bure-khure sādaru=ro konalo aū, bele tsāl-o te īje=kai, tsāl-o gor=ke.
Then say-M.S.PS.PT so that, “Old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman.OBL=GEN grandson I, dear go-IMP then mother=to, go-IMP home=to.”
194. bele īje-īje, es-eše aṣ-e dai amū puts-de zo bure-khure sādaru=re bi koi. se go-e ne tshāri-mūi poru.
“Dear mummy-mother, so-so come-M.PL.PS.PT two us.OBL ask-M.PL.PRS.PT whether old.OBL-elderly.OBL gentleman.OBL=GEN also any. They go-M.PL.PS.PT PART send- I.ERG there.
195. ār tes-di kōr lāg-ondi, zo tiūre ethuru mil-elo koi orkhe=ro, tepe ḍe seu kōr.”
And him-in leprosy attach-PS.PT.PASS, if them.OBL his meet-3.SG.FUT any blood-relative=GEN, then go.3.SG.PRS that leprosy.”
196. “bele, te ītā kešo bol-o?” “bele muī ni ēso bol-o zo aū.”
Dear, then you.ERG how say-M.S.PS.PT? “Dear I.ERG PART so say-M.S.PS.PT that I.”
197. tepe lāgī-go-i se lēr-di zo, “bās, ebe kāṭ-ēṇ be taū.”
Then attach- go-F.S.PS.PT she weep-F.S.PRS.PT that, “Enough, now cut-3.PL.PRS PART you.OBL.”
198. “bele tu kela lēr-e īje?” “bōlu zāng-ēṇ taū.”
“Dear you why weep-2.SG.PRS mother?” “PART cut-3.PL.PRS you.OBL.”
199. tepe bol-o tinī zo, “aū be tiūre guru ḍokr-ondi bād-iū=ro.”
Then say-M.S.PS.PT he.ERG that, “I PART their guru collide-PS.PT.PASS all-OBL=GEN.”
200. tepe ḍe-i se ṣpre tes bai=kai, “bele dada-re, mu=ke te tinī es-eśi khamti kī6 ḍo-i.”
Then go-F.S.PS.PT she own that.OBL brother=to, “Dear brother-DIM.VOC, me=to then he.ERG so-so cantrip make- go-F.S.PS.PT.”
201. tete ke eše zo oru=ari te lōr-e tho seu poru, ek zono tho durgurūgu, naū-ī tho teero durgurūgu.
There so that others=with then fight-3.SG.PRS was he there, one man was Durguragu, name-EMP was his Durguragu.
202. seu kā kor-ō tho, zo bādi-ū=ri bebośi jā thi, te lōr-e tho.
He what make-M.S.PS.PT was, when all-OBL=GEN helplessness go was, then fight-
3.SG.PRS was.
203. seu lōr-e tho gōr=ko, seu gōr kā, zo ek bēre ube ḍe tho akāś=khi.
He fight-3.SG.PRS was horse=with, that horse what, that one turn up go.3.SG.PRS was sky=for.
204. zo seu mathe lāg-e tho, tepe ḍe tho seu tēre pēte=augi.
When he above attach-3.SG.PRS was, then go.3.SG.PRS was he his.OBL belly.OBL=under.
205. dönī màṭe=di lāg-e-i tho, seu màlē cigare=maī de-ei tho.
Down earth=in attach-3.SG.PRS-EMP was, he up back=in go-3.SG.PRS-EMP was.
206. es-eśo lōrē tho seu gōr=ko zo bebośi o-e thi bādi-ū=ri, tepe lōrē tho seu.
So-so fight-3.SG.PRS was he horse=with that helplessness be-3.SG.PRS was others-
OBL=GEN, then fight-3.SG.PRS was he.

56Hindi instead of Bangani kōri.
Well, who that uncle his, he also was know-3.SG.PRS so.EMP
He.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT that.ERG uncle.ERG, “We also why fear-1.PL.PRS, we also two people not.”

Both uncle nephew.PL walk- fall-M.PL.PS.PT.

Both people themselves=among attach- go-M.PL.PS.PT try-M.PL.PRS.PT.

Both uncle nephew.PL walk- fall-M.PL.PS.PT.

Both uncle nephew.PL walk- fall-M.PL.PS.PT.

Both uncle nephew.PL walk- fall-M.PL.PS.PT try-M.PL.PS.PT.

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Both uncle nephew.PL walk- fall-M.PL.PS.PT try-M.PL.PS.PT.
222. seu potia sāb, tesri tsheuēr māl-ē de-iū tshāpre=maĩ, māle=koi tamāsē lām-de lag-iū. That Patia Sahib, his wife at-the-top-EMP go-PS.T.IMPS roof=in, above=from show.OBL attach-M.PL.PRS.PT attach-PS.T.PASS.

223. tini lā tēse doni phāstī jeśe gōdu=zaï. He.ERG attach-M.S.PS.PT so down cut-through- like pumpkin-like.

224. tebe seu durgurogu tini bol-o, “mero iar-ē, tāi te phāst-e oru, a-ū mā=ari=khi, a-ū oru!” Then he Durguragu he.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT, “My friend-VOC, you.ERG they cut-through-M.PL.PS.PT here, come-IMP me=near=for, come-IMP here!”

225. tini bol-o, “tāi=ari=khi bi bos-iū aū.” He.ERG say-M.S.PS.PT, “you=near=for also prepare-PS.T.IMPS I.”

226. bās, teeri buli phiri- go-e māsu, tini seu bond de-ṇo na puru.

Enough, their side turn- go-M.PL.PS.PT Mahasus, he.ERG that promise give-M.S.PS.PT there.

227. dūe zon-o ērurk-e se gore, te pai=go-e ube akās=khi. Both people.ERG drive-M.PL.PS.PT those horses, then throw- go-M.PL.PS.PT up sky=for.

228. jeś-ei māthe poīts-ē, teś-ei par-e duūā pēt-ē-augi. When-EMP at-the-top arrive-M.PL.PS.PT, then-EMP fall-M.PL.PS.PT both belly-OBL=under.

229. jeś-ei ādāre=ke aś-e, teś-i lā-i tini kēr-i=mātho.

When-EMP halfway=for come-M.PL.PS.PT, then-EMP attach-F.S.PS.PT he.ERG neck-OBL=on.

230. te ni kēr ek pośe ēr sōrūr oke pośe. Then PART neck one side.OBL and body other.OBL side.OBL.

231. atsha, teb kā kor-o tini, de-o potia sāb=e=koi.

Well, then what do-M.S.PS.PT he.ERG, go-M.S.PS.PT Patia Sahib-OBL=to.

232. te sūts-o, “zo te aū es oru zaṅg-ū, te te mù=di bi kōr lag-no jeśo iū=di lag-o.” Then think-M.S.PS.PT, “If then I him here kill-1.SG.PRS, then PART me=on also leprosy attach-INF as him=in attach-M.S.PS.PT.”

233. te tes āpre nāṇa=khi te kor-o be eso zo khursī=maĩ=koi doni bosāl-o. Then that.OBL own.OBL grandfather=for then make-M.S.PS.PT PART so that chair=in=from down place-M.S.PS.PT.

234. tī nāṇi=khi kor-o eso, naũ tho tīro sanši-maṅki.

That.OBL grandmother=for make-M.S.PS.PT so, name was her Sanki-Manki.


236. tini tip-i se, te pa-i tāl-e=di, rāz kio59 apu.

He.ERG upheave-F.S.PS.PT she, then throw-F.S.PS.PT lake-OBL=in, reign make-M.S.PS.PT oneself.

59 See preceding footnote.
1. All four Mahasus were born in Kulu-Kashmir, (and) then one brought them to Mahendrath.
2. That Brahmin had gone to Kulu-Kashmir.
3. In Mahendrath a giant was born who had eaten up all people.
4. When that giant had eaten up all people, then one sent that Brahmin to Kulu-Kashmir.
5. Who was then with them (namely the Four Mahasus)? (The guardian deities named) Kailu, Kapla, Kailath and Sherkuria. These four guardian deities were with the Four Mahasus.
6. Then from there that Brahmin came home.
7. What had they told him? They gave him ensorcelled seeds of black gram (and said), “Feed them to the cows, (and) then the cows will get two calves.”
8. Moreover the Mahasus said, “In just one night they will be born, they will be born at night; harness them in the morning to a plough: make a ploughshare of gold and make a plough of silver, then plough that field in Mahendrath.”
9. The Brahmin released the oxen in the morning, then took them along for ploughing, for ploughing (he) took them along.
10. Over there the ploughshare first hit Botha Mahasu, Botha Mahasu’s foot got pierced, and he became lame.
11. After Botha Mahasu emerged Pavasi, his ear got pierced.
12. Then emerged Bashik, his eye got pierced.
13. Then emerged Calda, he wasn’t hit anywhere.
14. The four brothers manifested themselves in Mahendrath, (there) they manifested themselves.
15. Then the giant had finished the whole world.
16. In Mahendrath there was a pond in which lived the giant.
17. It was impossible for anyone to stay in it.
18. Then Kailu and Kapla jumped into that pond.
19. They chased the giant; running a long distance the giant reached (the village of) Pangla.\textsuperscript{61}
20. Behind, in the same direction, hurried Kailu, Kapla, Kailath and Sherkuria.
21. Then they managed to seize him there, they seized and slaughtered him.
22. (But) his heart escaped from there.
23. It fell on a stone; from the stone it moved up along the rivers.
24. Then it went over to (the village of) Tipu\textsuperscript{62}; then it became the demon-deity (named) Jibalu.
25. From there they turned home, “We have finished the giant.”
26. After finishing him the Mahasus lived in Mahendrath.
27. What did they do after this? “We will now divide amongst ourselves: who will stay where, who will stay where.”
28. Hanol was given to Botha Mahasu: the “Sitting Kingdom”.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{60} The translation stays fairly close to the original constructions and is therefore not very smooth English.
\textsuperscript{61} A village in Himachal Pradesh.
\textsuperscript{62} Also in Himachal Pradesh.
29. Calda was given the “Moving Kingdom”.64
30. Pavasi was given the Panshi area, and Bashik was given the Shati area; the residence of Pavasi became Devavana.65
31. Thereafter they decided that Calda would come both into the Shati and the Panshi area.
32. Ahead (i.e. downwards) he goes till Shyaya,66 up he goes till Besar;67 Calda has the “Moving Kingdom”, Pavasi has the Panshi area.
33. Botha stays in Hanol; there they keep all their property.68

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34. Then who brought (them) from Kulu-Kashmir? The old gentleman brought them. How did he bring them?
35. He didn’t have any offspring at all.
36. He had seven, seven queens with him.
37. What did those queens say? “We have plenty all kinds of riches, but we don’t have offspring.”
38. The youngest woman said, “(One) hears that (there are the four) Mahasus in Kulu-Kashmir, go to them and arrange from them a boon.”
39. He said, “How could I go, I cannot go at all.”
40. She said, “Make it so: prepare some provisions and take a (walking) stick.”
41. He was already old, the old gentleman.
42. Then he did it in this way.
43. Halfway he met upon the Bhatt (Brahmin) of (village) Unaka.69
44. The Brahmin said, “Hey old gentleman, tell me, whither have you set off?”
45. He said, “Whither I go? I go to Kulu-Kashmir to Mahasu.”
46. He said, “I have riches and everything, I only don’t have offspring.”
47. Then the Brahmin said, “How do you (plan to) go there?”
48. He said, “In whichever way I will go, but I definitely go.”
49. The Brahmin made (some) mantras for him,70 then he arrived in Kulu-Kashmir.
50. Regarding Kulu-Kashmir he advised him thus: “Watch out if Kailu comes out (and wants) to devour you.

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63Hanol is the centre of the Mahasu kingdom. There is wordplay here with the name of Botha, which suggests meaning “sitting”. Botha Mahasu is lame and thus cannot move around.
64Until recently Calda Mahasu did not have an own temple, he was thus always moving.
65The Panshi and the Shati areas are respectively located to the right and left of the river Tons. This dual designation is also found in some places in Himachal Pradesh and seems to be connected with moiety ideas related to the Pandavas and Kauravas of the Mahabharata. “Devavana” is a highly located wooden temple in the interior of Bangan.
66A place near the town of Kalsi.
67A place in Himachal Pradesh.
68The possessions which the Mahasus acquire during their journeys.
69In Himachal Pradesh.
70Probably either as a protection or as a means for quick transport.
51. Do (then) the following for him: on the one hand give him a bread of five (times) twenty kg; on the other give him a ram.”
52. The moment he went to Kullu-Kashmir, Mahasu said—it was that, how does one say, the night-wake of Mahasu, that time it was the fourth day of the night-wake— “Dear friends, let us finish the worship of the night-wake.”
53. The moment they got up (Mahasu said), “Dear friends, there is human smell, o dear Kailu, go outside, there is human smell.”
54. Kailu said, “How (is it possible that) here there is human smell; who (would venture to) come here?”
55. When Kailu went outside he had a club of sixty maunds (with him).
56. When he went outside he started to make a round.
57. The old gentleman spoke to him with folded hands, “(Please) don’t eat me, I give you (something): on the one hand I give you a ram with twisted horns, on the other I give you a bread of five (times) twenty kg, (but) spare my life.”
58. Then what did he do?
59. He dug a hole for him, placed him therein and said, “Stay here inside. Watch out, Sherkuria comes now outside, watch out that he (doesn’t) devour you. When I will come to you I will dig you up, (and) then get up. Keep quiet till then.”
60. When he went inside (he said), “Dear, come on, let’s worship the night-wake.”
61. When they got up and came to the threshold (they said), “Dear friends, there is (still) human smell.”
62. Then (they) started to say to Sherkuria, “Hey Sherkuria, (now) you go outside, Kailu has taken a bribe.”
63. Kailu got angry and said, “Sherkuria, go outside, I have taken a bribe, you (will) not take it.”
64. Also Mahasu told him, “Sherkuria, go outside, he has lied to us.”
65. When Sherkuria went outside he lifted that club of sixty maunds.
66. The moment he sounded a whistle, all green and dry (plants) burned.
67. When he sounded a second whistle, this time the mountains broke and the rivers and brooks rose.
68. Then he went inside, “Now you must be satisfied. I have burned the green and dry (plants) as well as I have crushed the mountains.”
69. Then they said, “He (Kailu) has spoken the truth, who (should be) here now.”
70. Then they got up for (going) outside, “Let’s complete the worship of the night-wake.” They got up for (going) outside (and) came until the threshold, then they again returned inside.
71. That Kailu, what (did he do) then?
72. With (his) foot (he sent them) outside, “What’s the matter, I have been bribed (and) he has not been bribed? The mountains have been crushed as well as the green and dry (plants) have been burned.”
73. The moment he threw them outside with (his) leg, when he put them outside, he went himself to that man.
74. “What’s the matter, why don’t you get up? Now I have brought them outside. Fold the hands before them, and then whatever you have to say, say it (to them).”
75. Then the old gentleman straightened himself up before them.
76. Then they started to ask (him), “Why have you come, what do you wish, what are your sorrows?”
77. He said, “Otherwise nothing, I don’t have any sorrows.
78. I have sheep and goats, I have riches, everything, I only do not have daughters and sons; downstairs are the cows, they too have no (offspring).
79. My wives, they too have no (offspring), dear, they have absolutely no (offspring).”
80. They said, “What (will you) do now? After all you are old, where are (the descendants) of an old (fellow)?”
81. “No no, either you arrange for me daughters and sons or I (will) die right here on the spot (and) I (will thus) spoil your residence.”
82. Then they ensorcelled paddy seeds (and) pulse seeds.
83. “Dear, give the paddy seeds to your wives (and) the pulse seeds to the cows, then you will get offspring.”
84. Then (they wanted to) send him home.
85. He said, “How (can) I go home, send Kailu along with me.”
86. Then they said, “That we have already known that Kailu has instructed you. Come on, o Kailu, discharge him.”
87. Then he (Kailu) explained him, “Arrange for me a ram with twisted horns (and) give me a bread of five (times) twenty kg.”
88. He blew and transported him home.
89. The moment he arrived at home he gave the paddy seeds to his wives (and) the pulse seeds to the cows.
90. All right, then those wives got seven sons (and) the cows got calves.
91. The old gentleman actually had one brother—Patia Sahib; he used to live separate from him.
92. He said to his servant folk, “I had an old (brother), go (and see whether) he is alive or dead. We have never looked after him.”
93. Then he sent off two men.
94. They came into the vicinity (of the old gentleman); (when they) came (into the vicinity), they saw (that) inside there are seven men with very long moustaches.
95. They (the servants) didn’t say anything to them (and) hurried back.
96. Then they said to him (the brother), “Actually you claim (that) you (want) to take possession of his riches, but there are seven such (fellows) who will appropriate your possessions.”
97. “Dear, who are they?”
98. They said, “They are his sons, (the sons) of the old gentleman.”
99. Then he did the following, the old gentleman: (the old gentleman) had promised one drum to Mahasu, (he) had promised five kg of gold, (he) had promised a cauldron (and he) had promised a wind instrument (and) an alpenhorn: “This (will be) for you.”
100. For the Four Mahasus four items (were supposed) to be (given).
101. The moment he had come home he wrote (everything) into a register, into that register (he) wrote it.
102. (But he) forgot to give (the items) to them.
103. They, his daughters and sons, they did not look into that register what had been written (into it).
104. (So) what’s then when (suddenly) bad days come?\textsuperscript{71}
105. Those things were not given to them.
106. After that Patia Sahib said (to himself), “O friend, the others have got me; whatever I give to the others (the servants), that you (the seven brothers) get yourself.\textsuperscript{72}
107. Go and fetch them.
108. I always thought to get your (the old gentleman’s) possessions, but these my possessions they will seize.”
109. Then he sent those men (his servants), they brought them (the seven brothers) here.
110. Then those others, who were there, (whom) he had employed, (he) sent away.
111. On their place he put them (the seven sons), that is, he entrusted all dealings on them.
112. They themselves (Patia Sahib and his wife) were (also) already old, he and his wife.
113. When they (the seven sons) managed all affairs, then they, the servants, they thought, “O friends, these gentleman-fellows have got us.
114. (Let us) do the following: we know where his gold (and) silver is, we also know where (his) keys are, let us do a robbery.
115. The Mahasus have led them on a wrong path.\textsuperscript{73}
116. If (they) had kept (their) promise, then (they) had not led them on a wrong path; (they) have forgotten (to keep their) promise.”
117. What did they do? (They) brought the cattle far away to a meadow, (and) then they decided: “Today we do the robbing.”
118. They came in the night, then they robbed and took away everything, nothing was left behind there.
119. The next day they came (and) then said to Patia Sahib, “(Earlier) we have been dishonest, but they are your own (relatives).\textsuperscript{74}
120. Now have a look into the treasury: is there something in it or not? We have understood that they didn’t leave behind anything there.”
121. The next day he went (there), they too went with him.
122. (He) saw that there was nothing (left); they (the servants) had done the robbery.
123. He said to them (the seven sons), “Go, bring (back) my possessions, otherwise I (will) finish you.” They went (away).
124. They had quite a lot of revenue to collect; that which belonged to them (to the seven sons), that (they) collected; (they) went themselves to collect revenue.\textsuperscript{75}
125. Over there (all people) came to know, “Our king has come to collect revenue, o dear what to do now, the collection of revenue is long since overdue.

\textsuperscript{71}An idiom-like expression meaning more literally “What’s then when days come (when one would like) to immerse?”
\textsuperscript{72}The seven brothers are after all his nephews.
\textsuperscript{73}Literally: Where, who knows (this) now.
\textsuperscript{74}The servants try to put the blame for the robbery on the seven brothers.
\textsuperscript{75}The story teller wants to say that in olden days the landlords were able to collect much revenue.
126. So much cannot be given by us; even if (we) will give (our) land it (will) not be enough.
127. Let’s do now thus: (we) have to give (something) in any case.
128. Let’s put on old clothes, one rag on the front side, one rag on the back side, then let’s go to them.”
129. They gave (them) only very little revenue, still it was equivalent to his gold (and) silver.
130. (The subjects) brought (the revenue), then (the seven brothers) returned (the revenue) in exchange for the robbery; still that promise remained forgotten.
131. Now when those five kg of gold were still left, one (of the seven brothers) said, “O friends, we should have made this sword of gold.”
132. Then they gave it to a goldsmith to make a sword of (gold), “Make from it such a sword that the people will say ‘Who has made this sword?’”
133. When that goldsmith began to forge (it), then the death of all those seven brothers got written on it.
134. When (the announcement of) the death appeared (on the sword), then the goldsmith, after looking (at it) for a long time, did not give that sword (to them).
135. “Dear, why don’t you give it (to us)?”
136. “Dear, take it (if you want to) take it, but your death is written on it.
137. Don’t give it to anybody else, under no circumstances; if you will give it to someone else, then all you seven (brothers) are finished.”
138. Then what did they think, those servants who had stolen that gold? “O friends, if they will come here again, then these possessions have again to fall into their hands.
139. Before that happens\textsuperscript{76} we (will) say to him, “Finish all those seven (brothers), don’t leave them alive.
140. If you leave them alive, then again they have to snatch your possessions.”
141. He (Patia Sahib) called together all his subjects (and said), “Dear, on such and such day is a night-wake, come for (celebrating) it.”
142. He prepared the night-wake, (and) all came; they themselves took a seat on the roof, Patia Sahib as well as his wife.
143. He started to say from above, “The day has set, the cattle has been brought, what do you see? Ask for this sword, ask for this sword from them, (and) then kill them.”
144. As he (one of the brothers) gave that sword, (they) snatched that sword, then they killed all the seven brothers.
145. Then they killed (them), then, afterwards, they went to their house (the house of the brothers). Those who were their wives and children\textsuperscript{77} they killed as well.
146. Then there was the youngest of all the women, she was already pregnant.
147. A female bard hid her under her skirt.
148. When they all had been killed, (they) said, “Nobody of them here is (still alive).”
149. Then the female bard said, “Otherwise nobody is (left). (Except) I, I belong to you as well as to them, if you (want to) kill me, then kill (me).”

\textsuperscript{76}Literally: having made that.
\textsuperscript{77}Literally: Those who were their kept ones.
150. By doing so (she) saved that youngest woman. Then they (the servants) went away, (and) she (the female bard) sent (the woman) to the house of her parents.
151. For (= with) all the seven brothers (what did the servants before leaving?)—(they) peeled off their skins, (and) then hung (the skins) down inside out from the balcony.
152. She went to the house of her parents, she delivered there, she got a son, a son got she.
153. Then others actually grow (in terms) of months, of years; he grew (in terms) of days.
154. Well, when he had grown up a little bit, he started to play bow-and-arrow.
155. When the others did not hit, his (arrow) at once hit the target (so that the other children said), “Dear, call (your) name.”
156. He says, “Whose name should I call?” – “Dear, what (means) “whose name should (I) call”? Dear, what (means) “whose”? (We guess that) you have parents.”
157. He comes to his mother, “Dear mother, what is the name of my parents?”
158. “O dear rascal, your mother am I, you don’t have a father. Dear, I have eaten roots from a mountain top, (and) then you came into being.”
159. What (did) he (do) when he went there next day? The next day they did exactly the same. He calls the name of the sprouts of a mountain top.
160. They say, those others, “How now, sprouts of a mountain top. Tomorrow we bring (such sprouts), then we give a little bit to your mother, (then) she will get more (children).”
161. The next day he refused to have lunch, “Dear, tell me the name of my father.”
162. Then she said, “O rascal, I brought boiling water from a river, then (I) drank it, then you came into being.”
163. The next day he again hit (the target), then (he) called (his) name so and so.
164. They said, “When we dam up and bring the water of the whole world, then (we) give (your mother) a little bit to drink, (then) there will be more (children).”
165. Again he told her so and so.
166. It had become difficult for her, “If I tell him that you are the grandson of the old gentleman, then they (the servants) must come to know it, (then) they must kill also him. If (I) don’t say it, then he doesn’t accept it.”
167. Then she made him a goatherd. Then one day what happened: a tiger ate (some of) the goats.
168. He devoured roughly one half of the goats, (the other) half he (the boy) brought home.
169. Well, on this side (in the meantime) he got leprosy, the Patia Sahib, on the little finger—on that side he started to enquire.

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78 On the Bishu festival in April in Bangan and surrounding areas a mock bow-and-arrow contest takes place. A man who has hit with his arrow the calf of another player praises himself and his lineage.
79 “To enquire” instead of the more literate “looking-counting.” Patia Sahib went to a local Brahmin who used an oracle book in order to find out the cause for the leprosy.
170. He (the Brahmin) said, “(If you) will find (someone) whose smell (is like that of the seven brothers), then this leprosy goes away from you; just like that it will not go away.”
171. Well, on this side he sent (some servants) to search such (a person).
172. On the (other) side she (the mother) reproached (the boy), “Where have those (other) goats gone?”
173. He says, “They are over there in the ravine.” She said, “How have they died?”
174. He said, “Who knows?” – “Dear, then go and bring (them) here.” He brought (them).
175. “What is there?” – “Dear, there is one small tomcat, otherwise there is nothing.”
176. She thought, “This is a fine small tomcat.”
177. Again he went over there, (and) saw that tiger.
178. Then he thought thus, “I bring that small tomcat here, (and) then I tell her that he has eaten (the goats); what (else) should I do.”
179. (He) seized that tiger, then crammed (him) into (his) jacket pocket, then went to her.
180. He pulled (him) out, then (he) said, “This is that small tomcat; he has eaten (them).”
181. She saw that it’s a tiger; then she told him, “Put away your small tiger, we do not need him.”
182. Well, when he returned home after leaving the tiger, he met those whom Patia Sahib had sent.
183. He (the boy) had already come to know from his mother, “(They) killed my fathers so and so.”
184. He went to (their old) house, then he sees that their skins have been hung up inside out.
185. (Then) he opened the treasury, (and) saw that promise (written in the register).
186. Then he first made good on the promise for Mahasu.
187. The drum as well as the gold, as well as the alpenhorn, as well as the cauldron.
188. He returned, (and) after this he met those men.
189. Then he started to say, “Dear, I am a man, but you please tell me who you are.”
190. “O dear friend, Patia Sahib has sent us in such and such a way, so that we will meet anyone (who is a relative) of the old gentleman; (we) have to search them. There is leprosy on his small finger, the leprosy goes when (we) will meet them.”
191. Having heard that speech he got angry in the beginning.
192. (But) then he thought, “Well, what is the use of killing them?”
193. Then he said, “I am the grandson of the old gentleman, dear, let (me) go to (my) mother, (and you) go home.”
194. “Dear mummy-mother, two (fellows) have come in such and such way to ask us whether there is one belonging to the old gentleman. I have sent them back. And he has leprosy; if they will meet anyone of his relatives, then that leprosy goes (away).”
195. “Dear, then how did you reply?” – “Dear, I only said that I am (such a person).”
197. Then she started to weep, “That’s it, now (they) kill you (too).”
199. Then he said, “I encounter them as the guru of all of them.”
200. Then she went to her brother, “Dear little brother, he has played such and such nasty tricks on me.”
201. There it is so that if (the boy) would have (just) fought with the others (it would not have been a problem for him), (but) there was a man (named) Durguragu, his name was Durguragu.
202. What did he use to do? When the strength of all other (people) had gone, then (he) used to continue fighting.
203. He used to fight with a horse, the horse (was) so that at once it used to go to the sky.
204. When he reached the top, then he used to turn (himself) under its belly.
205. When (he) used to arrive down on the earth, he used to go up (again) on the back (of the horse).
206. So and so he used to fight with the horse that when all had become powerless, then he (still) used to fight.
207. Well, also his uncle used to know that (technique).
208. He said, his uncle, “Why should we be afraid, aren’t we also two people?”
209. Well, then (he said as well), “Do it the following way: First thing in the morning come here after having taken a shower.”
210. For that (occasion) he had harnessed two horses; with him (he) had kept two swords, blank swords.
211. Both the uncle and the nephew set out.
212. The horses jump up towards the sky, (and) come down onto the earth.
213. Both fellows started to try (to fight) with each other.
214. That uncle said, “Strike me softly.”
215. That nephew understood, “If I don’t hit you (properly), then you, the uncle, must think (about me) that I am defeated. (Better) than this is that I deal two blows on you.”
216. When they came down midway from above, he dealt a blow on him.
217. He (the uncle) said, “Damned, why have you beaten (me)?” He said, the nephew (said), “It has hit by itself very slightly.”
218. Thereafter (he) came down, then that uncle said, “That’s it, now we won’t be beaten by them.”
219. They (uncle and nephew) sent from there a message, “(We will) come on that and that day, keep yourself ready.”
220. He did it thus: the moment they arrived there, he started (to fight).
221. That uncle said, “Sit down, sit down!” – He said, “No,” and roughly half (of the servants) were killed. Well, they were killed.
222. That Patia Sahib, (and) his wife had gone up onto the roof, from above they set the stage.
223. He (the boy) hacked (the enemies) through like pumpkins.
224. Then that Durguragu told him, “O my friend, you have cut (them) through, come to me, come here!”
225. He said, “For you I was born.”
226. Well then, the Mahasus took side with him (the boy, because) he had kept that promise.
227. Both fellows goaded on the horses, then (they) jumped up to the sky.
228. When they arrived atop, both hung under the bellies (of the horses).
229. When they came midway (down), he (the boy) struck his neck.
230. Then the neck (fell off) on one side, (and) the body on the other side.
231. All right, what did he do then? (He) went to Patia Sahib.
232. Then (he) thought, “If I slaughter him (now), then the leprosy must affect me as it affected him.”
233. Then with his grandfather (Patia Sahib) he made it like this: he sat him down from his chair (onto the ground).
234. With his grandmother he did like this—her name was Sanki-Manki—
235. What does he say? He calls her name: “O Sanki-Manki, (your) appearance is good, (but) I throw (you) into the lake over there, then a fish will eat you up.”
236. He upheaved her, then threw (her) into the lake, (then he) ruled himself.

Abbreviations
1 = first person
2 = second person
3 = third person
A = subject of a transitive sentence
ACC = accusative
AUX = auxiliary
CAUS = causative
CDV = compound verb
CEV = composite verb
CP = conjunctive participle
DAT = dative
DIM = diminutive
DISRESP = (usually a particle signalling) disrespect
EMP = emphatic particle
ERG = ergative
F = female
FOC = focus
FV = finite verb
IA = Indo-Aryan
IMP = imperative
IMPS = impersonal (past participle) of intransitive verbs
INF = infinitive
JUSS = jussitive
LADV = light adverb
LC = loose configuration
l. s. bracket = left sentence bracket
LV = light verb
M = male
MIA = Middle Indo-Aryan
MV = main verb
NIA = New Indo-Aryan
NOM = nominative
NP = noun phrase
OBL = oblique case
PART = particle
PASS = passive
P or PL = plural
PRF = perfect
PRS = present (tense)
PS = past (tense)
PT = participle
r. s. bracket = right sentence bracket
S or SG = singular
SBJV = subjunctive
TC = tight configuration
VOC = vocative case
VP = verb phrase

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LECTURES
Digital Himalaya: Nepal in Context

Annual Lecture to the British Nepal Association, at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, on 27th June 2003

Alan Macfarlane

Introduction

I hope that I may be allowed the indulgence of looking back over work and visits to Nepal and what I have learnt from them. My first visit was part of the research for a Ph.D. in anthropology at the School of Oriental Studies, starting in December 1968, for 15 months. I was only able to return again in 1986 with my second wife Sarah Harrison. Since then we have visited the Gurungs almost every year for between 1-3 months. We have made over 15 visits, and I have spent about 36 months in Nepal. If I add on the time spent with me by my first wife Gill, and Sarah, this makes well over five years of data collection.

During that time I have concentrated my work on the Gurungs, and particularly the village of Thak (Gurung, Tolson) to the north of Pokhara, where Sarah and I have been engaged on a longitudinal study. We have gathered what must be one of the most extensive sets of data – annual censuses, crop and land surveys, photographic surveys of every person and house, over 120 hours of film and video and many other kinds of material– that has been made in relation to a Himalayan community over a period of 35 years. Here we are building on the work of earlier anthropologists such as Bernard Pignède, Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf who have worked in the area.

The problem, however, is that in a way we have too much knowledge and too much data. I would like to highlight two difficulties. The first is that one becomes so involved in a place and people that they become like one’s family. It is difficult to be objective or stand back, or to treat as a subject. The second is that there is so much material at so many levels that it seems very unsatisfactory to write just a few articles or even books on the community. Writing seems dry and fails to capture the spirit of what we have experienced. This article will try to address these two problems.

148 I would like to thank the Association for inviting me to give the lecture, and particularly Dr. David Gellner for suggesting the article be published in this form. I have not changed the content, except to turn some notes into full texts and add references.

The problem of storage, communication and representation.

As a historian as well as an anthropologist, I am aware that the materials we have collected are unique. They describe a world of Himalayan shamanism and village life which is changing rapidly, and will soon be largely a thing of the past (electricity and roads are reaching Thak even as I write). For future Gurungs, as well as others, I feel that this material should not only be preserved but made available to the Gurungs themselves.

This explains part of the title, “digital Himalaya”. With Mark Turin and Sara Shneidermann, Sarah Harrison and I launched a project called “Digital Himalaya” in 2001 to explore the potentials of the new communications media to store and distribute archival materials about the Himalayas. There are a number of aims, as explained on the web-site at www.digitalhimalaya.com. These include returning cultural materials to the places where they came from. This is a modern version of an earlier project to use optical videodiscs to store and return materials to the Nagas of Assam, which is currently also being put on my website.

As the philosophy and techniques of this project are described on the above website, and in a briefer form on my own at www.alanmacfarlane.com it is unnecessary to go into this in detail.

In essence, we are working with Gurungs and others (who have also started a cultural heritage centre in Pokhara in which we have long been involved) to preserve information of all kinds about the history and culture of these peoples. There are obviously considerable ethical and political problems in this kind of work, yet we are already finding it is considered to be helpful by many. We hope in due course to make as much of the immense body of data we have collected into a safe and accessible archive, and in particular to make the films of Gurung life available for teaching, research and to enrich the local community.

This endeavour, alongside formal accounts such as my book Resources and Population: A Study of the Gurungs (1976) was made accessible in a cheap copy (and with a new preface on what has happened in Thak over the last thirty years) when re-published by Ratna Pustak Bhandar in 2003. This describes the past and very briefly the collapse of the hill economy in the path of mass outward migration and capitalist penetration. Alongside Pignède’s pioneering work, which Sarah Harrison and I translated and edited, this creates the backdrop to the changes which have occurred among the Gurungs.149

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Nepal in Context

When David Gellner invited me to give this lecture, he alluded to my wider work on the development of western civilization and suggested that the way in which my Nepalese experience fitted into this might be of interest.

D’Alembert quoted Montesquieu to the effect that “Germany was made to travel in, Italy to sojourn in, France to live in, and England to think in.” For me, Nepal is above all good to feel in. What I have found is that both the personal experience, as well as the observation of a Himalayan community, have been a wonderful way of experiencing certain aspects of life more deeply.

I went to Thak originally to try to find out what it feels like to live in a “pre-industrial community” and to try to understand, from another viewpoint, something about my own privileged background. I believe working in Nepal over a period of 35 years has more than done this. I owe to my friends and family in Thak and Nepal more generally an immense debt, and in particular to the late Dilmaya Gurung and her family.

The flavour of what I have learnt can be seen in of one of my books, *The Savage Wars of Peace* (1997). There I wrote in the preface as follows.

“In order to broaden my framework into a comparative one I went to Nepal in December 1968 for fifteen months, to work as an anthropologist among a people called the Gurungs. It is difficult to analyse the effects of this experience and of nine further trips between 1986 and 1995, in altering the way I approached the English past. Much of the influence was at a deep level of perceptual shift which alters both the questions one asks and the implicit comparisons one has in mind when evaluating evidence.”

Witnessing the perennial problem of disease, the sanitary arrangements, the illness of young children, the difficulties with water, the flies and worms, the gruelling work and the struggle against nature in a mountain community made clear to me, in a way which books or even films alone could never do, some of the realities which the English and Japanese faced historically.

Of course it was different. Each culture is different. But to feel in the blood and heart and to see with one’s eyes how people cope with a much lower amount of energy, medical care and general infrastructure makes one aware of many things. Without this experience I know that I could not have written this book. Trapped in late twentieth century western affluence it would be impossible to feel or know much of what has been important to the majority of humans through history. Watching and studying a village over the years also makes one more deeply aware, as does all anthropological work, of the inter-connectedness of things, the holistic view of a society.

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It is important to stress this experience, for in the body of this text Nepal is scarcely mentioned despite the fact that much of what I have seen when examining England and Japan has become visible by setting them against a backdrop of Nepal. De Tocqueville once explained, “In my work on America...Though I seldom mentioned France, I did not write a page without thinking of her, and placing her as it were before me.”\(^\text{151}\) Nepal helped me to understand the Japanese case, which I shall shortly describe, and Japan helped me to get England into perspective. A straight, two-way, comparison of either England-Nepal or Japan-England would not have been enough.

At the theoretical level, the Nepalese experience enabled me to look at England and indeed the whole of western Europe from the outside and to see more clearly its demographic and economic peculiarities.” This summarizes as well as I now can some of the ways in which Nepal contributed to my intellectual and emotional development.

\section*{Some reflections on “How the World Works”}

I would like to expand this idea of the hidden comparative model and the way in which experience seeps into our little examined “habitus”. I would like to reflect a little further on the part which experience in Nepal over the years has shaped both the questions I ask and the answers I give in relation to various other parts of my work.

Over my life I have written over a dozen books in which I implicitly or explicitly compare the anthropology and history of western Europe, Nepal and India, Japan and China. Recently I have decided to try to bring together the themes in all these books and other writings into a set of short letters addressed to a wider audience – represented for the moment by my granddaughter Lily, imagined to be about 16 years old.\(^\text{152}\)

These letters try to answer a number of basic questions of a universal kind – why do people go to war, why do they believe in God or gods, why does power tend to corrupt and so on. There are thirty of these. Each is preceded by a “walk” to explain how I arrived at my opinions.\(^\text{153}\) Nearly all these walks nearly all take me through my Nepalese experience to show how it has radically altered my perception or awareness of larger topics. Let me briefly reflect on some of the questions I try to answer in my next book and a few of the ways in which working in Nepal has influenced both the questions and the answers.

Among the questions I ask in the book are a few of those which are directly related to what I have learnt in Nepal. The first is, “Why would


\(^\text{153}\) These “walks” can be seen on www.letters2lily.com
we expect human civilizations to develop rapidly? What is the intellectual potential of human beings?"

Here the very basic, but absolutely fundamental thing I learnt in Nepal was about the natural curiosity and strange determination of human beings. Watching and filming children at play, talking to and observing my adopted family, I realized that both intelligence and curiosity are distributed equally and universally throughout human societies. It re-affirmed that bed-rock of anthropology, the “psychic unity of mankind”. There was nothing pre-logical or intellectually challenged about the Gurungs with whom I worked. The potential for rapid growth was there. The nonsense written by many historians about how our ancestors were somehow less intelligent, or were emotionally stunted, is impossible to sustain for any length of time when one lives in a village such as Thak. Badrasing Gurung, Dilmaya Gurung and many others were as intellectually gifted and emotionally complex and sophisticated as anyone I have met at the University of Cambridge or anywhere in the world.

This leads me on to ask. “If humans everywhere are so bright and inquisitive, why has there been much less rapid development of knowledge and technology in some places than others? Why then do humans run into bottle-necks of an intellectual kind?”

Here the Thak experience informs my answer in various ways. For example, I consider the inhibiting effects of education. Experience in village schools in Nepal gave me a sense of what rote learning with poor educational materials could be like. Certainly, through a mixture of pressures much of the natural inquisitiveness of children is destroyed in many parts of Nepal by the time they leave school. Or again, watching the back-biting, competition and suspicion in certain groups in Nepal, though not really among the Gurungs, has brought home to me other inhibitions on intellectual adventurousness.

Clearly the answer to the question of the inhibitions on education and inquisitiveness has to be answered at a wider level than that of individual thought, or even village schools. So I go on to ask: “what other inhibitions are there on thought and initiative? So what are the effects of bureaucratic centralization?”

A major inhibition on thought systems and all kinds of initiative are certain forms of bureaucracy. Experience in Nepal, not mainly in the village, but in Pokhara and Kathmandu, helped put some flesh on the bones of what I had read about bureaucratic centralization and its inhibiting effects. When I encountered the local bureaucracy in Nepal it had many of the features of a debased version of an Anglo-Indian imperial system. There were many delays, advice to “come back tomorrow”. Deference and wasting of time was expected, offices were filled with meaningless paperwork. This is the sort of thing which Dor Bahadur Bista
has analysed in his book on *Fatalism and Development* (1991). This was so even though Nepal is a tiny and hardly governed country where I did not really experience a strong bureaucracy. In the village there was an oral culture and scarcely any bureaucratic structure. Yet I can see even there the tendency for bureaucracy to grow. The growth of bureaucracy is particularly evident in the attempt to deal with the tidal wave of educated, largely unemployed, young men and women.

I ask: “What makes for the development of large, fairly mindless bureaucracies?” One of the factors is political centralization and absolutism. Here the Nepalese experience provided a real contrast to my experience in England. On my first fieldwork in 1968-70 Nepal was even less of a political entity than it is today. The government was weak and far away, the villagers seemed to run their own lives in an informal and relatively harmonious way. Formal politics was largely irrelevant, though it has become increasingly intrusive over the years. The gradual intrusion of the State, and the difficulties of the tension between too much centralization and too much fragmentation, which we now see in Nepal, does however give food for thought. The tendency for power to corrupt and absolute power to corrupt absolutely is well illustrated in much Nepalese history and recent events.

This leads us into another area, that of one very powerful force towards political centralization in almost all parts of the world, namely the effects of war. It is clear that one of the most important factors in the growth of political absolutism is offensive and defensive warfare. So this has led me to be interested in the causes and effects of war on societies. To understand Gurung history and culture I had to understand the role of this famous “martial race” in the Gurkha regiments of the British army. Why had they been recruited, how had they performed, how did they adapt when they returned from service, were they mercenaries? Above all I had to try to resolve my surprise at the difference between the apparently very gentle, humorous, non-aggressive peoples I found in the village, and the accounts of the bravery, daring and martial spirit which had made them amongst the most famous warriors in history.

A great deal of what I have written about warfare is based on experience of working with this “martial” group, some of whose number served with my father and two uncles in the Second World War.

The effects of army life are often economically positive for the Gurungs. Yet army pay and pensions also tended, for a while at least, to increase economic differences in the village and has, of course, done the same at a wider level in Nepal. So this leads me on to the question of what effect warfare has on creating stratification and more generally what are the reasons for inequality in human societies.
It was only when I went to work as an anthropologist in Nepal that I began to feel some of the weight of inequality. I began to experience daily the unfairness of the struggle of poor peoples in the Third World, but also the internal differences they create in their own world. The Gurungs with whom I live are cross-comparatively extremely egalitarian in their social, gender and age relations. Yet even in a Gurung village there are two “strata” who were placed, at least by some, as unequal. On the fringes of the village there are also “out-castes”, Blacksmiths, Tailors, Leather Workers. To see people who are ritually unclean, who can not come into one”s house, cook us a meal, touch us, brought the curious human desire to place people on different points of a scale of status and ritual cleanness into context.

The contrasts between the Gurung village, and even more so the major Indian world of castes, and the world that I began to understand through the intensive study of the historical documents on English history became even more intriguing. How was I to make sense of these contrasts and patterns?

One aspect of this particularly interested me. This was how stratification was limited to the classic debates about the nature of peasant societies and the emergence of modern individualism and capitalism.

In my earlier training I had read about peasants in abstract, but it was only working in Nepal that made me understand what peasants really are. Although there were strong traditions of commercial wage labour in the army, and links to an earlier pastoral way of life, the Gurungs living in the villages were basically “peasants”. That is to say, the unit that produced the wealth was the family, consisting not just of the parents, but also children, brothers and other family members. What they produced was largely consumed within the household. Only a small part was sold in order to buy other things. So, basically, the family group consumed most of what it produced. All children had a share in the family land at birth and they could not be disinherited. This was a real domestic mode of production.

When I returned to England I read further about peasant societies in some of the classic books on China, India, South America, Eastern Europe and western Europe before the middle of the nineteenth century. I began to see that the deep patterns of peasantry were almost universal. The peasant path was an effective way to organize production and consumption with an agricultural way of life and it had come to be the form which existed in all settled agricultural systems in the world by the fifteenth century.

It was with this strong, experienced, structure in my mind that I returned to an intensive study of the English from the thirteenth century.
I found to my amazement that they had never been peasants in this sense. The privatization of property, development of market relations, manorial and other legal systems, meant that they had gone down a different path not only to that of the Nepalese, but most European societies nearby. This was what the great legal historian F.W. Maitland called “their individualistic path”. This was one of the major discoveries of my life. I could not have made it without the experience in Nepal.

This discovery was linked to another puzzle. This was the question of why was it that England was the first country to industrialize. Putting it another way: “Does being a peasant or individual based society also affect the chances of economic progress?”

It was only when I did anthropological fieldwork in Nepal, when my own body was stretched to its limits in walking and carrying, and I lived with people who were ground down by an unequal battle with a deeply inhospitable environment (steep mountains, no roads, poor soil, receding forest supplies) that I became really interested in toilsome work. In my first fieldwork I did very detailed time and motion studies of how people worked. As I did these, the contrast between this world of grinding labour, with periods of complete leisure, and the relatively leisurely agriculture and crafts of the English over the centuries began to strike me. I often wondered why the technologies to assist the human body were so under-developed in Nepal. I wondered why even the wheel was hardly used in Nepal and in particular why the use of animals was fading out in the hill villages.

As I learnt more, I began to discover that Nepal was not exceptional. Most of the world still lived in grinding work and only small parts enjoyed something different. It became even more amazing that an industrial revolution had occurred in England. And yet the “industrious”, hard working path which not only Nepal but Japan had followed began to become apparent.

One aspect of this situation of gruelling hard work that interested me was the question of hunger and malnutrition. I was so worried about this problem early in my academic career that I decided to make the interrelation between growing population and food supplies the centre of my doctoral research as an anthropologist. So in Thak I studied in meticulous detail the production and consumption of food from the steep hillsides and the way in which rising population was pressing on increasingly scarce resources. In Resources and Population I predicted that famine would soon stalk the central Himalayas. Famine has not occurred, even though malnutrition seems to be growing in some hill areas. The Gurung experience has given me a lot of background experience in my general discussion of the causes of famine and its absence in some places.
I have already quoted from *Savage Wars* to show how my interest in disease and sickness was made concrete by the experience of living in Thak. There I saw a population which had until recently suffered from major epidemics and who faced illness and pain almost every day in their lives. I did a detailed health survey with a doctor which showed the universal incidence of minor painful and debilitating conditions such as goitres, sores, coughs, scabies, worms, all of them easily preventable except that people did not have any money or medicines.

I also noted the numerous infant deaths from diarrhoea, as well as the numerous adults who suffered from amoebic or bacillary dysentery almost all the time. Comparing my village to other parts of Asia I became aware of the vast incidence of tropical diseases such as malaria and cholera. My thesis and book included an extensive study of mortality from various diseases and I tried to compare them to the patterns in the English parishes which I was working on. The puzzle of how the English and Japanese escaped from the Malthusian trap of rising disease rates which I have tried to solve became even greater given the experience in Thak.

The other side of the demographic coin is, of course, fertility. When I went to Thak in 1968 the theme of the world population explosion was at the front of my mind, so fertility and its social setting, that is kinship and marriage relations was a central interest. It was clear that attitudes to fertility were largely shaped by family structure and marriage patterns.

Frequent revisits to Nepal from 1986 have reminded me of the power of family systems in many countries today and the great difference between a familistic world among my Himalayan friends and that which I experience in England, where it is the individual and not the family which is primary.

Yet, clearly the reasons for variable fertility are wider than family and marriage systems. A major pressure on fertility are religious beliefs. So I needed to discuss the role of religion and culture.

In Nepal I had the privilege of actually experiencing an enchanted world where the Reformation separation out of religion (spiritual power) from ordinary life had not occurred. I learnt that what I had thought of as ritual, sacrifice, taboo, evil and so on in my English up-bringing were but pale shadows of the real thing. I learnt, or rather unlearnt, many fundamental things. That the Durkheimian separation of sacred and profane does not work in Thak. That the Judaeo-Christian lumping of ritual, ethics and dogma together into something called “religion” is not universal. That one can inhabit pluralistic worlds which combine Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Shamanism and western scientific rationalism and not see these as conflicting. It has led me to question completely all of the fundamentals of what religion and ritual are and do.
To take just one aspect, ever since I did my doctorate on witchcraft in England, I have been interested in the question of whether there are particular aspects of the supernatural which close the human mind and intellect? And if so, why are they so attractive? And how one can break out of them?

So, when I went to Nepal, the subject of witchcraft was constantly at the forefront of my experience, even if none of this was described in the thesis and book on the fieldwork. At first I was misled by the otherwise superb book by Bernard Pignède which I was translating. He had been told that the Gurungs did not believe in witches. I accepted his account. Fortunately, the proofs of my *Witchcraft* book arrived in the Himalayas and when I explained what they were about, and that Pignède had said there were no real witches, my best informant, Prembahadur, explained that of course the Gurungs believed in real witches.

So I spent many weeks documenting anti-witchcraft rituals. Then and over the years since we have attended and filmed a number of long shamanic rituals designed to cure and drive away witches. Unlike most historians, therefore, I have lived in a world of witchcraft beliefs and both felt and seen these beliefs in action and talked to those who believe in magic and witchcraft and try to counter its power. I have undergone rituals to cure me of witchcraft (a possible cause, the shaman said, of my deafness). I have talked to young, educated, town Gurungs who combine modern scientific knowledge with witchcraft beliefs. So I now have a better sense of the hold of witchcraft on the mind.

To accuse someone of witchcraft, is, of course, illegal in Nepal. So this brings us to the question of the effects of legal systems on belief and politics more generally.

My experience in Thak, where law as an instituted process hardly exists, again proved a wonderful foil to my English experience. The contrast with the English villages which I examined could not be more extreme. In Thak a small community seemed to organize itself on the basis of custom and consensus with hardly any legal apparatus at all. The police were far-off and feared, legal documents and the State interference were kept to a minimum. Consequently the written records available for a future historian would be almost non-existent. I was reminded of what an amazingly rich and complex system had existed for many centuries in England. When people were occasionally taken from the village or their homes in Pokhara to be interrogated by the police, I saw examples of the system of brutal, unchecked, abuse of power which again contrasted dramatically with the Common Law system of England.

In *Letters to Lily* I end by noting that the *Letters* suggest a somewhat grim picture of our world. So I write to my grand-daughter a letter on beauty and the senses. These cover the pleasures of smell, sight, sound,
taste and touch. Working in one of the most beautiful places in the world, with the Annapurna mountains towering up behind us, and full of birds, butterflies and flowers, has enormously enriched my senses. In my letter I end by talking of two areas where all the senses come together. One is in gardens. The other is in children. On the latter, also, I owe Thak a great debt.

As an anthropologist in Nepal, as I became close to my adopted niece Premkumari from the age of two, and filmed her growing up to be a young lady, I experienced the engulfing pleasure of watching and inter-acting with a child. Over a number of years I developed a relationship which had few of the responsibilities of fatherhood or power. I begun to consciously relish in small children their innocence, enthusiasm, playfulness, trustingness, physical snuggling, high expectations, loyalty, ingenuity and moments of sudden beauty in a gesture or look. It was this experience which inspired me to undertake a similar study of Lily and to write her the Letters. So once again I owe Nepal a great debt.

Through Digital Himalaya and the archives we are setting up I hope to repay part of that debt. By explaining to those who wish to know some of the deeper laws which govern “How the World Works”, I hope to repay my debt in another way.
Close-Up and Wide-Angle.
On comparative ethnography in the Himalayas – and beyond.
The Mahesh Chandra Regmi Lecture, Dec. 15th 2006

Michael Oppitz

When I arrived in Nepal for the very first time on March 10th 1965, I stayed a few days in a stucco palace on Kantipath, hidden behind a curtain of palm trees, – in the former Royal Hotel of Boris, before I moved to the thatched huts up in the eastern hills where I remained for the next six or seven months. These huts were in fact solid stone houses with wooden shingle roofs, built by the Sherpa of Solu Khumbu. Here, I collected data for a demography of the area and for a study of the local clan system. By chance I came across a number of historical documents, partly written in Tibetan, partly in Nepali, which were to shed new light on the migration of Sherpa ancestors from Kham in the eastern part of the Himalayas to their current dwelling places; on the subsequent segmentation of their clans; and on their relationship to the new Nepalese State. For the translation of the texts written in Nepali (on kāgat and on copper plates), I was led – after my return to Kathmandu – straight to Mahesh Chandra Regmi, who, for a reasonable fee, translated them offhand into English.

I was impressed by his one-man-show efficiency and his lively curiosity. He went about his scholarship like a stockbroker. However, I was impressed by his ability to put the historical documents I had found and considered unique into a serial context. They were, for the most part, lāl mohar decrees, stamped with a royal seal and dealt with land-taxation in the early 19th century, with hulāk porterage and transportation services, trade grants, the appointment of state intermediaries and tax collectors (mizhār or pembu), and with kipat and raikar, the systems of customary communal landownership and state landlordism. Moreover, they contained moral admonitions from the top of the crown down to tribal subjects during a period before the legal code (Muluki Ain) came into force, – documents, as Regmi had stored them by the dozen in his archives. This encounter with Regmi came to me as a sobering and clarifying shock: no matter how original you might find your discoveries yourself, they are in fact part of others made by others elsewhere. The Regmi experience was also a lesson to me. Whatever your findings as a researcher – at one point you have to see them from a wider perspective.

More than a decade later, I set out for a second field experience, this time in the northwestern part of Nepal – among the Kham-speaking Magar of the Dhaulāgiri region. Before I took off for the hills and my
companion, Charlotte Hardman, returned to her people, the Lohorung Rai in the upper Arun valley, we invited Mahesh Chandra Regmi one evening for dinner, to the house we had rented for a month in Chauni. We had bought a pound of shrimps and a bottle of white wine for the occasion in the hope of pleasing our guest. It was a disaster. While we had no difficulty in shelling the crustaceans with both our hands, poor Mahesh tried his best using only his right hand. It took him five minutes to peel a single shrimp, while ten more of the things lay waiting on his plate; he sweated and suffered; and we in turn suffered at his suffering. Yet, while we turned to the Burgundy to dissipate our unease, Mahesh asked for water and so helas he himself found no release. Our bookish knowledge of Robert Hertz and Rodney Needham notwithstanding, we had simply neglected the impact of left and right symbolism in its most mundane application. Even the best anthropological background had not prevented us from making a grave mistake. While we felt like silly hosts, Regmi remained hungry for the rest of the evening. As you know, he did at least survive his ordeal. Encounters of this kind must not end in a clash of cultures; they can be funny, food for anecdote or they can be food for thought.

50 years of local studies

If you take a synchronic bird’s-eye view over the last fifty-odd years of Himalayan studies, which happen to be also the first fifty-odd years of such research, – you can easily make two observations: one, a lot has been done, – in unequal density over the geographical range; and, two: the great majority of the work have has been local studies. By unequal density I mean that certain areas – and the people living in them – have received considerable attention, while other regions have been comparatively neglected. I shall not try to sort out the various reasons for this fact, but my hunch may be voiced: I suspect that researchers – especially foreigners – have preferred spectacular (and pleasant) places as their domain and have claimed them as their own. I am tempted to call this the Mountain Resort Syndrome. As for the number of fieldwork studies, the late Sixties to the early Eighties seem to have been the most fruitful decades.

Now, observation number two: the preponderance of local studies. This can be explained in various ways. One may begin with physical conditions. A long, uneven row of white teeth rising up into the sky divides the Himalayan landscape: to the north a huge, high-altitude plateau spotted with gentle cones; and a folded, rugged terrain on its southern and eastern fringes with high ridges, deep valleys, countless veins of downstream riverbeds, – many secluded biotopes. Such climatic and topographical conditions have caused nature to bring forth an astounding diversity in fauna and flora; and on a human level they have
also provided challenge and shelter. These many local biotopes in the Himalayas have favoured the emergence of – if I may say so – numerous localized sociotopes.

And here are the results: In the rugged folds of the Himalayas an immense variety of local cultures did come to the fore attracting, as soon as this country was open to foreigners, scores of anthropologists, who grasped this as their unique and unexpected opportunity in the second half of the 20th century. At first they were few and could be counted on a single hand; then on two hands; and soon they came flooding in in great numbers. It was like a goldrush – the promise of a lucky dig almost guaranteed for everyone. At one point there were so many foreign anthropologists that they were counted as the 42nd tribal population of Nepal. Today, there are other foreign groups populating the country: Foreign Aid –, NGOs –, the World Bank –, and the various Cultural Preservation tribes. Indeed there were many blank spots on the ethnographic map of the Himalayas to be filled: so many local cultures, unknown, unstudied; and in each locality local knowledge abounded, waiting to be registered, classified, translated and contemplated.

You may wonder why I put such emphasis on the expression local culture rather than on labels such as ethnic group or tribe. In my opinion, this term is a useful one, for it stresses geographical rather than racial, caste or ethnic criteria: limited geographical entities as boundaries of cultural membership. And due to the relative isolation, even seclusion of the ground on which these cultural micro-units came to flourish, it is the place more than the ethnos that constitutes them. Moreover, a spatial definition of a small cultural whole is more flexible than other such definitions: it is open to fluctuations between neighbouring cultural units, open to minimal variations from one valley to the next. This does not preclude further use of conventional ethnonyms such as Tamang, Gurung, Magar and so on, names the practical usefulness of which, as well as their arbitrariness and fuzziness, need no further discussion.

The expression local culture has not had the same success in academia as local knowledge, even though the latter presupposes the existence of the former. The latter was propagated in the Eighties by Clifford Geertz who put Local Knowledge (1983) even on the cover of a book of his, confirming his fame for popularising anthropological catch phrases. The former term had been coined half a century earlier, by the German sinologist Wolfram Eberhard, who spoke of Lokalkulturen im alten China (1942), denoting by this title the minority groups on the western and northern borders of Han-China, outside the Great Wall. Some of these were Himalayan local cultures, situated in the Sino-Tibetan marches, and of some interest in the later course of my talk.
The comparison of the anthropological rush into the Himalayan region with gold-diggers comes to mind not only because there were rich mines to be tapped, but also on account of similar attitudes between the two types of researchers towards the soil. Once an ethnographer had completed his or her reconnaissance trip and chosen a particular location as suitable, the place was soon considered to be his or her own property. Such possessive behaviour might even lead to raising invisible fences around the appropriated research area with a “no-trespassing” sign stuck in the ground. This fantasy was silently tolerated, because it was generally shared by other researchers in regard to their own claims. Absurd as this may sound to the outsider, the effect was that most ethnographers – and in particular those who carried out extensive field-work – transformed their plot of land into a closed universe, inside which they were the sovereign, whereas other local universes that sprung up around them, did not concern them, as they belonged to other sovereigns outside. These fences produced blinkers. And so we have, after 50 years of Himalayan ethnography, many disconnected small universes with numerous local accounts, but there are few glimpses over neighbouring fences.

The advantage of this state of affairs is that a good number of the reports coming out of these 24 Little Kingdoms are very detailed, very specific, rich in views and perspectives from inside – in short, they provide local knowledge. Ethnographies of this kind constitute the indispensable basis for any higher aspirations, – be these middle range or general theories or clear-cut comparative studies. The disadvantage is that most of these sovereigns over village worlds in all their industry to assemble the thousand snippets of detailed local knowledge, have neither had the time nor the intention of seeing beyond the end of their nose or – as the Germans say – “to look beyond the rim of their plate” über den eigenen Tellerrand zu schauen. The time has come to do this, and thanks to the elementary research carried out by ethnographic prospectors, the prospects to get somewhere are not too dim.

Realms for comparative ethnography

Before I touch upon two specific comparative domains I shall name some realms within ethnography, which in my opinion seem particularly suitable for such studies.

But first: What do I mean by comparative ethnography? Comparative ethnography in its simplest understanding signifies putting the facts of knowledge of one local universe side by side with those of other such local universes in closer and wider vicinity to one another. The facts to be assembled and held against each other should belong to the same kinds of things: apples to apples, pears to pears. The primary task of this exercise
would be to find similarities and differences between comparable sets of facts in the local universes thus confronted and, perhaps, to suggest reasons for such differences and similarities. A second step would be to sort out to what degree these local cultures confronted might be considered related within the framework of the things compared. And a third, optional step might be a speculation on how to explain such kinship between a series of local universes, i.e. a theory on interrelation.

As for the realms in which I think comparison might bring some promising results – or rather has already brought such results, I must warn you that their list depends totally on my own orientation and predilections and is, consequently highly partial. Everyone is invited to enlarge the list according to his or her orientation, expertise and gusto.

In the large sector of material culture (which I understand as materialized culture, as cultural production mirrored in physical things), comparisons “beyond the rim of the plate” might be made between artefacts: tools and objects of daily use; and objects and paraphernalia of religious use; in architecture, which combines physical shapes with immaterial concepts, such as the symbolic ordering of inhabited space; and in fields of aesthetic production with less apparent practical services, such as painting or sculpture, both in regard to style and meaning.

Other realms of cultural production such as dance, musical traditions, verbal arts such as folksongs, myths, legends and other narrative matter, as well as ritual practices which I gather under the general heading of Performative Culture, offer ample opportunity for comparison in view of content and form. Even culinary culture, which is both material and performative and offers insight into ways of thinking, provides with its rules of etiquette and food taboos solid ground on which to draw overregional comparisons. The greatest challenge for comparative studies lies perhaps in the immaterial realm of what, since Mauss and Durkheim, anthropologists have called collective representations. To these belong all sorts of classification systems, taxonomies, cosmological concepts and worldviews; and in particular social classifications, which mould the shape of social groups and determine the behaviour within and between them. Among such sociological concepts and practices I would particularly emphasize alliance systems generated by marriage rules, lineage systems and social stratification systems. Finally, there are the languages, by which material things are named and immaterial facts and significations are connected and expressed. For a long time historical or conjectural interrelations between languages, within language families and between branches of language families, were considered to be the absolute basis, the ultimate legitimation even, for any kind of cultural comparison.

Let me now turn to some examples of comparative ethnography selected from the fields previously mentioned which I happened to take
part in. As you will notice, the impetus to compare accrues, more often than not, right out of local research, – as a consistent next step. When I went to the northern Magar in the Dhaulāgiri region, I was attracted, first and foremost, by their ramified, rich and vivid shamanic traditions, and my film *Shamans of the Blind Country* (1981) tried to document this. But soon I realized that no matter what the people up there were doing, their conduct was channelled by social regulations which gave a particular hue to each and every one of their actions – religious, economic, festive or leisure.

**Alliance systems**

These social codes could be traced back to a single marriage rule: that a man must marry his mother's brother's daughter (or a classificatory equivalent of hers). When regularly followed over a period of time by all descent groups in society, this rule leads to the formation of fixed matrimonial alliance partners, whereby one group is always wife-giver to a second group and wife-receiver from a third such group. In order to function as an exchange system based on marriage, at least three such groups are consequently needed. Principally in such a system, any number of participating groups above two could be integrated into a single, matrimonial exchange circuit.

This system of social organisation is not a feature only typical of the Magar; it is, in fact, quite widespread over a vast expanse, stretching in various degrees of completeness, from the Amur region in eastern Siberia down to the east Indian frontier territories, and, leaving aside China, to northern Burma and even further south into the Indonesian Archipelago. Nowhere, however, it is in reality as close to the ideal model and as rigorously minimalist as among the Magar. If one compares both mythological and historical sources with contemporary demographic facts it can be stated that the Magar have always preferred exchange circles composed of three partner groups only. In the beginning, there was just one such triple-alliance; now, there are about 30 such independent circuits in a single village of about 2,000 inhabitants. This means that on average a present-day triple-alliance is composed of no more than 70 individuals, with each partner group including 20 to 25 persons.

The multiplication and transformation of triple-alliances result from a small number of effective mechanisms which are applied, when defective or worn-out circuits need remodelling. These mechanisms taken from the “emergency kit” differ according to the consequences they generate: One, called “breaking the bones” (ḥādhphorā), results in bisecting a patriline; another separating houses (zimla zimla cāhine) leads to the spatial separation and split of a previously cohabitant descent group; a third one,
participating in a single milk line (nui) called nagar bhāi is enacted, when two sisters are married to men of different alliance groups, the result of which is the merging of two exchange groups; the same happens, when a man marries the widow of someone belonging to a different exchange group than his own: the children from both of the woman’s marriages will be part of a single exchange unit, and this is called “teat brotherhood” (cuci bhāi); a forth one inverting the direction of exchange (ulte cakra) turns the fixed relations between wife-givers and wife-receivers upside down; and a last one forming a tie of blood-brother-sisterhood (mit-mitni) results, if the partners of such a blood-­friendship are of the same sex, in the proscription of matrimonial ties in subsequent generations, and, if they are of the opposite sex, in the creation of new mutual marriage options for their grandchildren. All these mechanisms to transform existing alliance circles, resulting in fusion, fission, participation or inversion, are final. They are applied only in emergency situations, when, under demographic pressure or irreconcilable feud, a triple-alliance is threatened with collapse. In positive terms, these measures, forbidden under normal circumstances, are antidotes: to repair, maintain and perpetuate the one and only rule – to marry mother’s brother’s daughter within a small circle of triple alliances.

The mode of alliance, the bond of union between different kin groups arising from this marriage rule, has been referred to in various ways by different authors: a system of unidirectional exchange, of indirect, delayed, circulative or asymmetrical exchange, depending on the characteristics they have wanted to stress. In his epochal study: The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949/1967) Claude Lévi-Strauss called this system, based on prescriptive matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, generalized exchange, juxtaposing it, after a world-wide comparative survey of marriage rules, with two further and different basic modes of alliance, isolated by him: with restricted, direct or symmetrical exchange, based on bilateral cross-cousin marriage; and with a discontinuous type of exchange, based on patrilateral cross-cousin marriage.

According to Lévi-Strauss and the sources available at the time, the patrilateral type of prescriptive alliance, although a logical possibility, was practically nonexistent in an undiluted form, the reason being its supposed lack of integrative qualities, whereas the matrilateral type had gained wide distribution for its sociological potential of integrating several, if not all exchange groups of a local society. The bilateral type of direct exchange, for its part, had its stronghold in the aboriginal societies of Australia, in ancient village China, and in tribal societies of South America and Indonesia.

The indirect mode of exchange was characterized by Lévi-Strauss as an open, yet risky structure, a Vabanque game, a sociological adventure even,
arguing that a specific group A that gave its daughters to group B would never be sure of being compensated by a group C or X with an equivalent set of women coming back into its own group. This speculative theoretical assumption can be tested by looking at how the Magar system actually works. No Magar wants to take risks, especially not where his/her most vital interests are at stake: the reproduction of the own group. What is sought, on the contrary, is some reassurance; and this is provided, according to their own experience, when matrimonial exchange circles are limited to no more than three partners and when participants are close neighbours. And this is why all their exchange circuits in past and present times are small and triangular. These qualities are the safest way to guarantee control over how the system functions, safer even than in a system of direct reciprocity. Indeed, in an arrangement with three exchange partners, there is – in any dual transaction pending between a wife-giver and a wife-receiver – a third party present keeping watch as arbitrator. In the next matrimonial transaction, this arbiter will be cast in the role of wife-giver or wife-receiver of one of the two other groups, leaving his function as arbitrator to one of the two partners who is not immediately involved in the actual exchange deal. In a direct exchange, on the other hand, the role of the impartial third party, is missing; consequently it lacks any supervision.

Seen in light of the security and risks involved in the system, the stark contrast between direct and indirect exchange, between the restricted and generalized modes of alliance that Lévi-Strauss had drawn in his early opus, seems obsolete, when confronted with Himalayan test cases. Both modes, in a different fashion, serve the same purpose: to ensure the unimpeded rotation of the social wheel.

**Kin classification**

In the pioneering book referred to, one chapter bore the title *Bone and Flesh*. In it Lévi-Strauss assembled a good number of Asian societies that made a distinction between relatives of bone and relatives of flesh, bone referring to those on the father’s side and flesh to those on the mother’s. He considered this distinction to be an unmistakable symptom, a leitmotiv in the presence of a generalized exchange. Indeed, in a system of generalized exchange, two exchange groups form a fixed pair of opposites, where one is exclusively “bone” to the other and the other exclusively “flesh” to the former. In a society with restricted exchange, on the other hand, the distinction would be a contradiction, as each of the two alliance partners would be both “bone” and “flesh” to the other. In other words, his central point is that the conceptualisation of bone and flesh makes sense in societies that favour the practice of matrilateral cross-cousin
marriage; whereas in those that prefer the patrilateral or the bilateral type, including all others that have a form of symmetrical exchange, a differentiation between relatives of “bone” and relatives of “flesh” would serve no distinctive purpose. I will now put this proposition to an empirical test by confronting it with a number of cases from ethnographic data collected in the Himalayas and not yet known at the time Les Structures were written.

Let me begin with the Magar, whose alliance system I outlined before. In this society a triangular relation between three exchanging partners is superimposed by three dual relations of a fixed nature, each patrilineal descent group being wife-giver to one and wife-receiver to the other of the two matrimonial partners. In this fixed dual relationship the local term for the patrilineal descent group, rus or bone automatically takes on the meaning of wife-receiver. Accordingly, the expression for the descent group of a woman, sya or flesh, (also alternatively called nui or milk) extends to the meaning of wife-giver. The double expression sya-rus consistently designates the unit of prefigurated dual alliance partners: the wife-taker/wife-giver pair. In other words, the Magar case fits in perfectly with Lévi-Strauss’s assumption.

The Tamang of central Nepal are divided into a number of patriclans which they call rui or bones. Bone can be characterized by the following features: by patrilinearity, by patrilocality, by a strict rule of exogamy according to which any breaking of the bone (hādpñhorowa), i. e. sexual union inside the own clan, will be pursued as incest; by the existence of clan-owned territories (kipat) and by the worship of clan-specific deities rui-gyi-pho-lha. Membership to a clan is inherited through the bones of father’s body, na khru. Tamang kinship terminology is predominantly symmetrical: parallel cousins and cross-cousins are separated by different denominations; cross-cousins on both sides, however, form a single category, whereas parallel cousins are grouped together with brothers and sisters. Sister-exchange with symmetrical modes of reciprocity is frequently practised and is preferably repeated in subsequent generations. Sister-exchange is locally called depa = swap or barter. This expression is used, when the Tamang refer to cross-cousin marriage of the bilateral type. According to Lévi-Strauss, all this should be incompatible with the distinction between bone and flesh-relatives.

The various Kiranti tribes of eastern Nepal also use the metaphors of bone and a complementary substance for affinal relatives. They call relatives on the father’s side hādor hādnāta; those on the mother’s side are called dudh or milk. Bone or hādare the agnates, milk or dudh the uterine kin. In their kinship terminology, cross-cousins are usually paired with sisters. Sexual joking between cousins is prohibited which indicates that marriage between them is not valued at all. Unions between agnates are
considered taboo for a period of seven generations, those with matrilateral kin for three. Once the taboo period of seven generations for bone relatives has run out, intra-clan marriages are not only tolerated, but intentionally sought. Such a marriage between agnates is termed *hādphora* or breaking the bone line. A single intra-clan connection of this type leads immediately to clan fission. What has been a solid exogamic clan group up to this moment is now split up into two separate marriage units, between which, henceforward, marital ties will be contracted intentionally. The members of the two newly-established clan segments receive different magical clan names. The institution of marriage does not promote outward communication. Instead, people prefer village endogamy and endogamy within those branches of clans that have split up by the breaking bone mechanism. This obvious tendency for endopraxis leads to an atomization and localization of society and may, according to Charles McDougal, have contributed to the fact that the Kiranti as a whole have split up into numerous tribes and subtribes to a much higher proportion than other hill people of the Nepalese Himalayas.

Even if cross-cousins of any kind are prohibited as marriage partners, the Kiranti nonetheless uphold one particular form of direct exchange as their ideal: classificatory sister-exchange. By thinking and acting this way, they join what Lévi-Strauss would have found incompatible: the division of kin into bone- and milk-relatives with a tendency to direct matrimonial exchange.

The kinship system of the Naxi in northwestern Yunnan is based on the assumption that the paternal relatives supply the bones of an individual and the maternal ones the flesh. Fathers are bone (*o*), mothers are flesh (*na*); sons are bone, daughters are flesh. Women are like trees, men like rocks; just like trees root on rocks, women take root on the bone of men. Coming from the bone-line of their fathers, women bring flesh into the bone-line of their husbands. Marriage within the bone is frowned upon and considered as incest to be punished severely by the people of one’s own bone. Relatives of the flesh can be both wife-givers and wife-receivers to the bone-line of a person. This follows from the logic of the preferred marriage rule which recommends taking home as wife the daughter of one’s father’s sister. In other words, the Naxi practice, at least in ideal circumstances, patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, which strongly contradicts the structural conclusions made by Lévi-Strauss to be drawn from the division of kin into bone and flesh.

The social organisation of the Sherpa is based on strong patrilineal and patrilocal clans – at least up to the time before they became an ubiquitous lot of city-dwellers. Their clans are called *ru* or bones. The complementary substance *sha*, flesh, designates relatives on the female side. There is nothing peculiar about this; it confirms the expected pattern, followed by
many Tibetan and other local Himalayan cultures. Two things, however, make this a special case. As can be reconstructed from their historical documents, all today’s existing clans and subclans, more than 30 in number, go back to four original protoclans. Although each of the split up subclans adopted a new clan name and some even acquired new clan territories, they all continued to operate matrimonially, as if they had never split up, following those rules of exogamy that were fixed long ago by the four protoclans. In other words: Sherpa clans are extremely solid – the bones may split or branch out, but they cannot be broken. This conspicuous feature of strict exopraxis over long periods of time – supported by long written genealogies – may be seen in the light of another characteristic of Sherpa social organisation: they have never adopted any elementary form of marriage alliance – neither matrilateral, nor bilateral, nor patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. And yet, they distinguish between bone-relatives and flesh-relatives. For them, this distinction has nothing to do with restricted or with generalized exchange; it is just a reminder to the bones to import flesh – once and for ever from the descendants of one of the other protoclan bones.

The last Himalayan case to be presented here – that of the Nyinba in the upper Karnali – introduces an additional element: stratification by rank. This local society of Tibetan origin builds, as Nancy Lévine has conclusively demonstrated, a complex genetic and social philosophy on the concept of rü or bone and its complementary substance of t’ag or blood, sometimes also referred to as sha or flesh. In Nyinba thought rü covers three meanings: bone, clan and membership to a social rank. As bone, rü refers to a corporal substance to be found in man and animals alike. As clan, rü describes people who share descent from a common agnatic line of acknowledged ancestors. The third meaning of rü (or rigs) hints at a social stratum to which one belongs by birth. All three meanings interlap. The Nyinba believe that the substance rü is transported from father to offspring via the male sperm, the white colour of which is associated with the white of the bones. The soft, fleshy and red parts of a child’s body, however, come from the bones of its mother and are transmitted by her uterine blood, or t’ag. No rü without t’ag. But t’ag is only complementary to rü, for the primary component for the production of uterine blood of a woman is the rü substance that she inherits through her father. Maternal relatives are collectively called t’ag-relatives; agnates are termed rü-relatives. Parallel cousins on the mother’s side are referred to as t’ag pun brothers and sisters by blood, whereas the children of brothers are spoken of as rüpa pun or brothers and sister by bone. Cross-cousins, on the other hand, are collectively called nyen affines, as they are considered possible marriage partners. In fact, marriage between real or
classificatory cross-cousins (no matter which side) is upheld as an ideal connection.

**Social stratification**

Nyinba society is divided into two social strata: higher-ranking *dagpo* landowners and lower-ranking offspring of former *yogpo* slaves. Only members of the upper stratum belong to established clans or *rü* with separate clan names; those of the lower stratum do not have clan names at all. Clans with names do not intermarry with clans with no name. Thus, one does not marry outside one’s own stratum. The norms for rank-endogamy are based on the premise that people of different *rü*, in the sense of social rank, represent incompatible types of human beings, whose mixture of substances is inappropriate.

As the example of the Nyinba shows, the concept of bone can be also used as a marker of social rank, indicating exopraxis within one’s own stratum and endopraxis against other strata outside. Such a correlation is not an isolated affair. The Yi (formerly called Lolo) of Yunnan and Sichuan for instance, used to pair clan exogamy with class endogamy. Society was divided into three social layers, forming two classes. The uppermost layer was constituted by the ruling class *nuoke*, the aristocrats, who held the biggest share of land property. This layer/class was spoken of as black bones, in contrast to white bones made up of the two lower layers of society: on the one hand by people of free origin, called *qunuo*, owners of small fields; and by people with no land, called *ajia*. Marriage between members of the two lower layers was admitted, i. e. within the limits of white bones, but strictly forbidden between the two classes of black bones and white bones. Each of the two endogamic classes was composed of several exogamic, patrilocal clans and the preferred type of kin alliance was bilateral cross-cousin marriage.

The division of society into white and black bones to denote hierarchical endogamous ranks, is also widespread amongst the peoples of the central Asian steppes – but with an opposite colour attribution. For instance, the Kazakhs of the Altai region used two different terms to denote their patrilineal clans, both with the meaning of bone: one was *sök* and the other was *uru* or *ruu*, the latter of which might be related to the Tibetan word *ru(s)*, also meaning bone, while *sök* can be found both in Mongolian and in several Turkic dialects. Just like the Kalmuk, the Altai Kazakhs distinguished between two layered ranks: the white bones *aq syek* (*sök*), designating the noble clans presumably descended from Jenghis Khan; and the black bones *kara syek*, consisting of the commoners. Just as it was prohibited to marry within one’s own bone, marriages between white bones and black bones were equally prohibited, – however, for
opposing reasons, too close in the former, and too separate in the latter case.

According to Lawrence Krader, the image of bone relatives for the agnates on the father’s side and the complementary image of flesh relatives on the mother’s side was a conceptual feature shared by all pastoral societies on the Asian steppes to express the supremacy of the principles of patrilinearity. Over time, this concept was also used to consolidate the interior division of society into classes, by separating the bones into white bones (for higher ranks) and into black bones (for commoners). The societies concerned were the Ordos, the Khalkha, the Chakas and all eastern Mongolian groups; the Kalmuks among the western Mongols; and the Kazakhs and the Usbeks among the Turks. The only societies to escape these developments of stratification were the Altai Turks, the Kirgiz, the Buryat, the Monguor of Gansu and the Turkmen, who never made the distinction between white and black bones.

Let me sum up this excursion into comparative kinship studies. All things considered, it does not seem justified to read the widespread kin metaphor of “bone” and “flesh” as a clue to one particular type of matrimonial alliance: that of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, or indirect exchange. Only one case – that of the Magar – fits this hypothesis. All other test cases point in different directions. The Tamang, the Nyinba and the Yi associate a preference for bilateral cross-cousin-marriage with the bone and flesh concept, which indicates, together with the Kiranti case, where classificatory sister exchange is sought, a compatibility with the direct mode of matrimonial exchange. The Naxi, for their part, link the kin metaphor of bone and flesh to a discontinuous alliance system, generated by a preference for the patrilateral type of cross-cousin marriage. And the Sherpa use bone as a signifier for the indestructibility of the patriline, without practising any of the three elementary modes of kin alliance. In some – or should one say many – cases, (if one looks from the Himalayas further north to the Mongolian and central Asian societies and further east to the Sino-Tibetan marches) the kin metaphor of bone (and flesh) is employed, by dividing it into colour components, to indicate social stratification. In short, bone and flesh have been considered apt for social classification in numerous local societies of the Asian continent, irrespective of the modes of alliance involved.

**Material culture**

Before drawing to a close, I would like to touch upon an area, in which I see considerable potential for comparative ethnographic research – that of physical objects. They have an advantage over immaterial subjects: They are visibly, tangibly, undeniably there; they have size, shape and
substance, independent of the observer. As objects they have objective qualities; as material things they are pieces of evidence. They are apples, unquestionably to be compared with apples.

When I studied the local religious practices of the northern Magar, I soon realized – as others had realized before and after me – that they were comparable not only to similar practices in neighbouring local societies, but displayed features similar to those found in the shamanic traditions of Siberia and other North Asian regions. These similarities covered various realms: the body techniques of the local experts, their gear and garment, the sequence and course of their acts, their repertoire of oral knowledge, their mythologies, their cosmological ideas and worldviews, their position vis-à-vis the society in which they stood out. Astounding as these similarities were, whenever I stumbled upon them, I found no convincing clue to assemble them into a coherent picture, let alone explain them. Any essentialist approach, such as Eliade’s, put me off. Finally, I decided to reduce the scale of an unassailable topic and to concentrate on a concrete and single object.

I chose one, which all these shamanic experts – north and south – shared; which they considered indispensable; which served a multitude of functions; which materialized immaterial concepts; which reflected or symbolized religious thought and ideas: a vessel of signification. This object, the ideal semiophore, was, quite obviously, the drum. The instrument’s aura was amplified – apart from the fact that it radiated with meaning – because it was venerated by those who made and used it. The respect it received, equalled the respect shown to books in societies taking pride in their scriptures. In fact, the shaman’s drum turned out to be, in those local cultures without writing, a worthy equivalent to the book.

So, I started to compare drums of shamanic use as physical artefacts, first in the Himalayas, later in areas of the classical North Asian tradition. The first surprising conclusion was: morphologically, all shamanic drums are of one and the same basic type. Wherever you look, from Lapland to Kamchatka, from the circumpolar regions down to the green Himalayan hills, from the Bheri to the Amur – the drum used by the shamanic experts is a frame drum with a wooden hoop, formed by a bent and overlapping lath; the frame is covered – in the great majority of cases – by a leather membrane stretched over one side, while a handle, fitted inside the hoop, is grasped from the other, open side; the membrane is beaten with a single, separate drumstick.

The second observation was: although all shamanic drums belong to one and the same class, no individual specimen is identical to any other. Each drum is a unique piece. To a certain degree, this may result from the circumstances and techniques used to make the instrument, which are the complete opposite of a modular way of production, invented and
perfected more than two thousand years ago in Ch’in China. But the individual shape of each shaman drum is also intentional – for drums are considered to be living organisms with their own individual birth, youth, adult life, ageing and death.

A single, elementary type on the one hand; and countless variation in the manufactured individual pieces on the other – within these poles unfolds the unlimited morphological wealth of the Asian shamanic drum.

As for the Himalayan region, two distinct types can be singled out, each of which spread out over its own area. The first and western type is found around the Dhaulāgīri and Annapurna ranges. Its main characteristics are: a frame covered with a membrane on one side only; a handle inside the hoop held through the uncovered open side; and a straight stick which beats the outer side of the membrane. This morphological group may be subdivided into several regional variations: a Dhaulāgīri variation can be found among the northern Magar, the Chantel, the inhabitants of the Bhūji Khola and among various Kāmi populations westward up to the Jajarkot region; an Annapurna variation is found among the Thakalī, the Kāli Gandaki Magar and the Gurung; whilst a jungle variation is used by the Chepang of the Terai slopes. All these variants entertain close morphological similarities with the drums of Siberian and Mongolian shamans.

The second basic Himalayan type extends roughly from the Daraundi Khola in the West through the entire range of the middle hills eastward up to Darjeeling, covering the areas of the Ghale, the western, central and eastern Tamang, the Thami, the Sherpa, the various Rai groups and the Limbu. This type is morphologically characterized by a frame, covered with a membrane on each side and an outer handle rising out of the bottom of the hoop; the drumstick is usually bent. This eastern, basic type displays organological affinities with the Tibetan Buddhist nga-chen drum. Even though the two elementary types of Himalayan shamanic drums appear to be rather different, they are in fact members of a single morphological class.

The North Asian drums are all of one single basic type, cognates to the Dhaulāgīri and Annapurna variants, with a few exceptions on the south-western and north-eastern (polar) fringes. These exceptions, found in Manchuria and in Chukotka, differ from the basic type in that they have a handle attached to the outer rim of the hoop, a bit like the eastern Himalayan type.

Until very recently, no formal comparison of the two large areas of the Himalayas and northern Asia has been made, one reason being that the histories and personnel of ethnographic exploration are different; and another reason being that they seemed to be separated by a gap. This gap was marked by the huge deserts between them and the little known areas
of the northern Sino-Tibetan marches. In regard to the shamanic drum, I was able to fill in a few of these blanks by studying the membranophones of the Naxi in northern Yunnan and those of the Qiang in the Min Shan Mountains of northern Sichuan. I made a discovery among the Qiang: their shaman drum closely resembles the Chepang type in the south of Nepal and the Darkhat drum in the north of Mongolia. It is a missing link, uniting, as it were, the two separate blocks.

Since then I have treated the two areas as a single comparative universe. The question remained as to how to deal with the apparent morphological similarities registered over such a vast territory with so many different societies and such divergent histories. I decided to put formal criteria to the fore, applying the tools of transformational theory, as had been developed successfully in modern biology to study the metamorphoses of living organisms, and in anthropology to study myths. In other words, I introduced to a science of form (as D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson had called it) an object of material culture, taking each particular drum as a transformational manifestation of those around it. This led to the emergence of a huge web of interdependent pieces. And the lack of historical evidence to prove movements of diffusion could be counterbalanced: by installing a morphological navigation system. This enabled me to locate any given shamanic drum with considerable precision on the geographical and cultural map of the marked out universe of comparison.

As with drums, so with shamanism – or more correctly – shamanisms. For in the same way, as the material manifestations of this type of religious practice vary from place to place, so do the corresponding systems of belief. Not regulated by any fixed written dogma, they change from one place to another, from one local culture to the next. Each shaman’s drum is a peephole into a localized shamanic universe, its most compact materialisation. On account of its manifold functions, the shaman’s drum paves the way for many entries: to the ritual practices it accompanies; to the mythological chants for which it pounds metre and rhythm; to the dances, kinetic movements and ritual journeys which it animates; and to the world of ideas and the supernatural, which it depicts on its membranes. Comparing shamanic drums on a large scale is an invitation to similar comparisons between those numerous localized cultures and their non-unified religions, – bound together only by an invisible web of constant transformations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, please let me end my talk as I started it: with a word of reminiscence. Last September was a grim month for Nepal. In a single blow the country lost a score of its best people and some of its best allies. One of them was a friend.
I met Harka Gurung through Fürer-Haimendorf, who, back in 1973, had convened a conference on Himalayan Anthropology at SOAS. Harka had come down from Edinburgh as if he had just walked down from the Lamjung hills. His stout presence impressed everyone. Over the years the places of our encounters changed: New York, Naxal, Zürich. In Naxal we had our best times together, in a stucco hut with no furniture in it. Fortunately, it had a fridge. In this house we would play our favourite game: daring ethnographic comparisons. The audacity of arguments was regularly stoked with the help of spirits stored in the fridge. Harka was always a few steps ahead. Our favourite topics were: the Pig Cultures of Nepal; the Green Religions of the Middle Hills; or the Bamboo Cultures of the East. In memory of you, and as you would have wanted it, Harka, let us continue with our comparative ethnography of the Himalayas.
In the Himalayan state of Uttarakhand, from Pithoragarh, to Mussoorie, Dehradun, Kedarnath, Pauri Garhwal or Almora, Nepalese workers are a highly visible but discreet population. Working as porters in market places and labourers on the roads, they are the “backbone” of the economy, as a wholesaler of Pithoragarh told me. In New Delhi, the Nepalese from the western part of the country are less visible but there too, they are present at every corner of the town. When meeting migrants in India, I was struck by the “new world”, in terms of environment, lifestyle, work, that migrants had to get used to. A statement made by a Bahun from Kalikot, working as a coolie in Mussoorie, helped me conceptualize the feelings of the migrants in India: “everything is the reverse (ulṭo) nowadays. My father was a moneylender (sāhukār) and I carry loads (bhāri boknu) in Mussoorie”. It seems indeed that almost every part of a migrant’s life is the reverse of the one they left in Nepal. Migration is an exile experience, it is also an experience of living in an opposite world, compared to the one every Nepalese migrant from the far-western region would dream of. The ideal life, often depicted with more emphasis while in migration, is seen as spent in one’s own village, where food is produced from one’s own field. In India, migrants work under an employer’s supervision and thus consider themselves as servants (nokar). Being in India implies a lot of economic, psychological and statutory hardships. But migrants have to find ways to adjust to their new position and status. In a way, they have to adopt a form of behaviour and practices to make migration bearable.

My study focuses on high-caste men from mid-western and far-western development regions. They are temporary migrants who spend their life coming and going (āune-jāne) between their village and India. They do not aim at settling down in India but always maintain strong links with their home154. From 2001 to 2003, fieldwork for my PhD thesis (Bruslé 2006) was done in Nepal (Dailekh, Doti, Baitadi districts) and in small towns of Uttarakhand and in New Delhi. Ninety-four in-depth interviews and countless informal discussions were held in Nepali, sometimes with the help of a Nepalese assistant. Observations of migrants’ behaviour in

154 A detailed study of migration processes and networks of far western Nepalese in Delhi is written by Thieme (2006). See review in this issue.

the city and in their lodgings enabled me to acquire a broad understanding of migrants’ experiences in India.

After briefly describing migration processes, I will focus on the migrants’ upside-down world as described by them. Finally, I will show how migrants manage to cope with it.

Coming and going as a way of life

Migrants encountered in India always consider working in India to be a normal means of sustaining their life\textsuperscript{155}. As agriculture or animal husbandry, temporary migration is not only used in the case of an urgent need but also on a usual basis. Young boys know that, after a few years at school, they are bound to join the streams of men from their family and village on their way to India. Most of the time, they eagerly look forward to it. Migration is a “rite of passage” as going to work in India means leaving behind one’s childhood and joining adulthood with family responsibilities. Many of them start working in India at an early age and stop at 45–50 years old or more, when someone else in their household can take over. Even if it is difficult to date the origin of temporary working migrations in India, I assume that they are inherited from seasonal movements undertaken by hill and mountain villagers towards other ecological belts\textsuperscript{156}. However, it seems that temporary migrations to India have intensified since the 1960s due to fast growing population in Nepal and economic development in India. Today, the majority of migrants follow a livelihood strategy: migration only helps the household to have access to basic needs, in particular by paying back loans taken out in the village. A combination of a lack of food, of money, of available jobs in Nepal and of existing migration networks in India explains the move by males between their village and Indian towns. They spend more than half of their working life in India employed as labourers. For a minority of them though, migration leads to the accumulation of social or economic capital: after years of coming and going, they are able to buy land, open a small shop or send their children to boarding schools. These migrants, who often choose to leave the path followed by their fellow countrymen, are the most enterprising, self-confident, but not always the most educated. As part-time peasants, all of them are also part-time proletarian workers.

\textsuperscript{155} No term such as “temporary migration” is used in Nepali. Most common expressions are “āune-jāne garnu” (to come and go), “bides/pardes jānu” (to go to a foreign land), “lāhure garnu” (to go to Lahore, i.e. ex-Gurkha recruitment centre).

\textsuperscript{156} Caplan (1972) states that temporary migration from Dailekh dates back to the 1930s. Bishop (1990) and McDougal (1968) describe seasonal migration from the Karnali zone and from far-western Nepal to the Terai and India in the 1960s.
Choosing a destination is part of a migration strategy, linked to constraints at home[^157] and ambitions, and reflects different attitudes to the outside world. To make it simple, those who have more manpower at home can go to Delhi. Those who work in the Indian capital are also more eager to be confronted with the Other than the ones going to Uttarakhand. In this Indian state, language, customs and physical environment are close to the ones of far-western Nepal. Therefore Nepalese migrants from this region do not have the impression of being in a totally foreign world. The kind of work available in the Himalayan state also enables migrants to come and go repeatedly, for agricultural work in their village, whereas working as a watchman in Delhi means a long stay. Belonging to a village network is almost necessary to get lodgings and a job in Delhi, whereas it is not so in Uttarakhand.

**Migrant’s life in an upside-down world**

When one is used to the quiet life in Nepalese mid-hill villages, meeting the Nepalese in India is a completely different experience. In Uttarakhand and in Delhi, the Nepalese are transferred from rural areas to crowded, noisy, sometimes dirty urban places. Situated at the bottom rung of society, their inferior status is completely interiorized. India as a whole is a place where people learn exploitation (śoṣan), modesty (lāj) and dishonour (bejat).

The general migration context is the opposite experience to an ideal life where a person should earn their living in their ancestors’ village. There is a paradox in the way people live and talk about their Indian experiences. Migration (āune-jāne) is described as a habit (bāni), a tradition (calan), something that was done not only by fathers (sometimes forefathers) but which is done by uncles, cousins and fellow-villagers. But at the same time migration is viewed as abnormal. One should not eat thanks to earnings from outside. One should live thanks to the products of one’s own land, cultivated by one’s own hands. As Khem Raj puts it: “what I would like is, in my own hills (āphnai pahāḍ), in my fields, in my own country (des), in my birthplace (janmabhumi), to cultivate, to raise buffaloes and to live in my own house (āphnai ghar mā basnu)”. The village, or at least Nepal, should provide ways to sustain one’s family life, but nowadays it has become impossible[^158]. There is a certain pride in not depending upon someone else, and in not being someone else’s servant. As an old woman from Dullu (Dailekh district) recounted that she was forced to eat bought food (besāera khānu parcha), she expressed the indignity of

[^157]: Particularly concerning farm work and manpower availability at home.
[^158]: People, with an idealised view, often consider that the situation was better a long time ago, when all villagers were self-sufficient.
buying daily bread from outside, especially for higher castes. This type of sentence shows discontent about their situation\textsuperscript{159}. If temporary migration is normal, it is also talked about and felt as an obligation (bādhyaṭā) and constraint (majburi). Men think that there is no choice but to come to India to earn money, if they want to achieve their goals, whatever they may be: “we have to come, leaving our house, family and land behind us (āphno ghar parivār jamin chōderā)”. In explaining the reason for their presence in India, migrants never describe themselves as decision-makers capable of initiatives, but rather as men driven away from their village because of circumstances beyond their control. Their ability to make choices is only seldom put forward. Despite temporary migration being practised for decades, being integrated in a farmer’s livelihood, working in the village still appears more normal than life in India. Their discourses all emphasise how reluctant they are to come to India but how inevitable it is. Eventually, even if India is considered as an alien country (bideś opposed to svades), due to its cultural proximity and to the 1950 Treaty\textsuperscript{160}, it has a lesser degree of foreignness compared to other countries.

The Nepalese consider work to be the main reason for their being in India. As they say, if work was available in Nepal, they would not come here. For Bista (1991), work, particularly manual work, is despised by Brahmans and none of the population finds any dignity in labour. This statement applies to work in India. In the villages of far-western Nepal, even though some young men might show off with talk of their experiences in India, none of them would greatly value their job, which might be summed up in two or three words. For example, roadmen, when asked about their job, simply say: “I throw stones” (ḍhunīgā phānu). It is also true that in India, the Nepalese do not show any pride in their work, because it is hard, badly paid and socially undervalued. The Bahun and Chetri working for wages feel the indignity (beijjat) of their situation, especially when their income does not give them the opportunity to enhance their living conditions in Nepal.

\textsuperscript{159} Other migrants said the same but in a different way: “we must earn money to eat” (paisā kamāra khānu parcha), “we must eat through wages” (jyālābaṭa khānu parcha).

\textsuperscript{160} Article 7 of the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship states: “the governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other, the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of similar nature”. Neither passport nor visa is required to cross the border.
The most common job taken on by the Nepalese in the Indian Himalayas is that of porter\textsuperscript{161}. In Uttarakhand towns, the Nepalese dressed in rags or in kurtā-suruvāl, a jute bag (bori) on their back, are part of the landscape, just as Bihari carpenters are. Hanging around markets or standing at strategic places, in front of wholesalers or at bus stops, they spend their day unloading trucks and carrying loads to every corner of the towns. They manage to fit in to the Indian labour market by doing what locals do not do: it is a classic case of labour substitution. As manual works are badly looked upon, it gives room for the Nepalese and Biharis to earn their living (Purohit 1994). The act of carrying is particularly undervalued and even “the illiterate and less educated, who could possibly do manual work at public projects, look more towards long-distance destinations due to both social status and caste reasons” (Bora 1996:89). The very low status of carrying is cultural\textsuperscript{162}. In the Tehri Garhwal state during the XIXth century, local people from every walk of life were forced into two kinds of coolie labour. Under Coolie Utar and Coolie Begar systems, “the hill people had to work for the officials on tour with payment” (Rawat 1989:155). It still existed in 1930, but it became possible to shun this duty by paying money or giving grain. In Central Nepal, former slaves (ghartī) were used to carry the groom’s palanquin (doli), from his house to his bride’s (Bouillier 1979). In Baitadi district, in 1968, lower-caste people confirmed that it was also their duty, even though nobody did it anymore (Winkler 1979). The cultural values of porterage are low on both sides of the frontier. The porter’s body position itself looks as if the worker is bending to his client. Apart from that, men are in a situation of demand. They often roam the streets, expecting traders to call them. A young man from Bajhang, who had just arrived in Pithoragarh, explained all the shame (lāj) he felt when he first put his jute sack on his back and the strap (nāmlo) on his shoulder: “I spent ten days, wandering for nothing (khāli ghumnu) in the city. I did not know what to do. Then, to earn my living (jīvikā calānu), I passed by traders’ shops, looking at their mouth wondering if they were going to give me work?” Carrying loads is a day-to-day activity, rather insecure, which ruins one’s health and above all does not really enable migrants to achieve high goals. Even years later, shameful feelings never really disappear. The Nepalese do not find any respectability in their job but think that “carrying loads makes life painful” (bhāri bokera jindaki dukchha).

\textsuperscript{161} I will not insist on the Nepalese working on roads, even though it may also be considered as a reverse experience.

\textsuperscript{162} A local Indian English teacher in Didihat College told me that he would never carry a pack of rice from the market to his house. It would have been humiliating for him: “someone who is educated does not carry loads; the Nepalese do it for us”.

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In Delhi, the job of guarding is a niche almost entirely occupied by the Nepalese, thanks to the Gurkha image attributed to all of them. Being watchman (caukidār) is a traditional occupation of the far-western Nepalese. They usually work for private house owners, in market or residential areas (colony). It is night work (“people call us owls”), which can be done along with cleaning cars in the morning. The job itself, which is not done with khukuri anymore, is not as respected as it used to be: “People used to give us a seat in the bus, there was honour (ijjat)”. Caukidārs spend their nights playing music with a stick (daṇḍā bajāunu) and playing the whistle (siṭi phuknu), making noise to deter potential thieves. The daṇḍāvālā’s job is risky, with the threats from rascals (gunḍā) and policemen. But the most humiliating part of it is collecting money (paisā uṭṭhāunu). It takes twelve to fifteen days in a month to get paid. This is a tough moment for higher castes (and perhaps for others, but they do not complain about it). They have to go from door to door to ask for their monthly payments: they have to beg (māgnu) and thus they finally eat by begging (māgera khānu parcha), which is of course connoted with low castes.

Whatever the job, working relations with Indians are stigmatised as being subjected to exploitation (śosan) whereas general feelings are that Indians despise them (helan garnu) and keep them under pressure oppression (dabāunu). For people whose place should be to give orders to other people, being dependent on employers is felt to be a reverse situation. Finally, the whole job experience is very much described as slavery (gulāmi), which is opposed to the freedom (svatantra) they are supposed to have in their village.

Another point of discontent is their living conditions, which are objectively bad and also viewed as unworthy. For first-time migrants, there are great contrasts between descriptions made in their village by returnees and what they themselves discover: “Before coming here, I thought that all the Nepalese live in big, clean houses”, says one of them in Delhi. The Nepalese live in marginal places within cities, in huts or in shanties, small unhealthy rooms where they are packed together. They feel that there is no dignity in living in such places for various reasons. First, lodging in India is the opposite of the village. In Indian towns, renting is not living. One can only really “live” (basnu in the sense of habiter in French) in his own house, whether it is inherited or newly built.

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163 As I have not focused on the Nepalese with a fixed job and income, I cannot say how wage earning is perceived.
164 This is of course an ideal description of the village where almost all migrants are bound by debts to money lenders.
165 Their situation is no different from the one of all poor Indian migrants.
Ownership of the house, land attached to it and links to the past determine special attachment to one’s place of birth. Mobility does not mean weak links to the one’s place of origin. On the contrary, it may enhance feelings of rootedness and of belonging. But in a migration context, Nepalese live in rented places which are called derā, never ghar. No attachment is felt for the room they live in, minimum investment is made. Secondly they complain about the promiscuity of their lodgings, the unhygienic conditions and the lack of access to modern facilities (suvidhā). A feeling of being rejected from mainstream society exists. The indignity of their living conditions is felt by men and even more by women. In Uttarakhand, it is particularly considered to be a total dishonour for a migrant woman to stay at home while her husband is out at work. It is not so much because of their material conditions but of the reputation of the couple. Talking about food is another way of opposing home and abroad. Contrary to people who say proudly that they stay and eat in the village (gaũma basera khānu), migrants are forced to eat purchased food. But rice in India is tasteless or tastes of dust and is not nutritive (khurāk): “we do not know where it comes from, how much time it was stored before being sold”. On the contrary, the rice from their own land is fresh and clean, and gives enough strength to work all day. Finally, religious life in India is also the opposite of the one in the village. Being out of the village and travelling are sources of pollution, as one Chetri says: “we do not know next to whom we sit in the bus, with whom we have meals in restaurants”. Therefore, going to temples is very rare, invoking gods is seldom done. Some workers have small shrines and light incense in the morning. The fact that it is impossible to bathe before prayer is one explanation. Dasai is not always celebrated and when it is, it consists mainly in eating goat meat on Dashami. Even if migrants always insist that they come back every year to their village for Dasai, this is rarely the case. Temporary migration does not enable men to perform the necessary rituals at places of belonging.

Towns are not considered to be places to live in, because they are seen as purely cultural (sāskṛtik) in opposition to the so-called natural (prakṛtik) village. For the majority of elder migrants, towns are places where they

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166 For a study of the allegiance to home in the migration context, see Subedi (1999).
167 Calling ghar the flat or rooms they live in is a sign of belonging to the place of migration. Only migrants who achieve the most express this kind of feeling.
168 As one migrant said: “How can I appreciate a place (i.e. India) where I have no home?”
169 They sometimes manage to send offerings (bheṭi) so that they are not completely absent.
are forced to live but they really aspire to return to their village. They complain that younger boys become influenced by Indians and learn bad habits: “people from Bajura are very simple, they do not steal, they do not threaten others (dhamkī dīnu). When they arrive, they are straight (siddha), they are respected, they behave properly (rāmro vyavahār). Today, while coming to work in India, they learn a modern lifestyle (ādhunik ājīva). They do wrong things (galat kām) in Bajura. They start to steal. In India, anything may happen (sabai kām huncha)”. Innocent villagers are therefore corrupted by Indian towns. Some of them even sever all links with their native place: they are the “black hill men” (kālo pahāde), about whom it is difficult to talk and to get information. The official discourse basically says that migrants’ sole aims are to earn money and to go back home. That is why, wandering aimlessly (ghumnu) in the city is acting like a fool (pāgal). How can someone who goes here and there be sane when one has to pay even for a glass of water? As a matter of fact, migrants’ knowledge of a town is limited to the area surrounding their place of work and dwelling place. It is as if workers do not consider themselves part of the city and do not wish to be part of it. Cities, where everything is expensive and where men can easily lose themselves (in a psychological way), are places of work only. Only vital investment is made.

Living in India induces a confrontation with an entirely different environment where all migrants’ experiences seem to be the reverse of an ideal situation where they could depend on themselves to sustain their livelihood (gujarā garnu).

How to fit in to this upside-down world?

Despite this dreadful description, migrants spend almost half of their life in India and manage to face it. In this world of compulsion, indignity, exploitation and misery, Nepalis succeed to make their way. They use strategies to cope with life in a foreign land, to make India liveable\footnote{One should bear in mind that as the years go by in India, migrants get used to their condition. Changes take place from the first stay to the last one. One may go astray to start with, learn how to deal with Indians and achieve successful goals.}.

First of all, there are ways to narrate their stay in India, which enable men to put some distance between them and their own experience. For example, no special word is used to talk about the state of being a migrant. No one says “I am a migrant” but sentences like “we are coming and going” (āune-jāne garne),”we are going abroad” (pardeś jāne) are used. The word pravāsī (immigrant) is used by another category of migrants, the ones who are settled on a more permanent basis in India\footnote{For example, one of the biggest Nepalese associations in India, linked to the CPN-UML party, is called Pravāsī Nepālī Saṅgha (Bhārat).}. On a personal
level, men are always reluctant to call themselves workers (lebari\textsuperscript{172} or majdur): they never say “I am a worker” but prefer to say “I am doing the worker” (lebari garne)\textsuperscript{173}. There is a difference between what people feel they are (in our case, being a worker is not valued) and what people do. To work as a labourer does not mean belonging to the proletariat. Migrants act and talk as if they wanted to put some distance between themselves in India and in Nepal. Another practice of managing one’s own identity in India is to change name. It is usual practice for people of lower caste, to change their patronym to be free from discrimination\textsuperscript{174}. Caplan (1972) noticed that cobblers (Sārkī) from Dailekh district changed their name and wore the sacred thread once they were in India. Such practices are still common in Uttarakhand and in Delhi, especially to get into jobs reserved for higher castes. In Pithoragarh, among about ten Indian restaurant owners employing Nepalese workers, at least one owner used to inquire about his future employees’ names\textsuperscript{175}. Adopting new names such as Singh or Thakur helps migrants to secure work in restaurants, sometimes for many years\textsuperscript{176}. Some members of higher castes can also change name, but not for the same reasons. In Dehradun, Dhan Raj Puri explained that he had one name when in Nepal, the one given by his father, and one name under which he is known here, Ram Bahadur Caukidar (as is written on his caukidār card). At the same time he underlines his nepaliness, Bahadur being the name Indians give to any Nepalese, and his work. When Giri K., from Dullu, goes to Gujarat to work as a watchman, he chooses to be called Gaurishankar, a “religious name”. In fact, by adopting new names, both migrants want to keep a distance between their two selves: the farmer, attached to his land in Nepal and the worker (kām garne mānche). Once they return home, they go back to their real identity and leave behind the hated character they are forced to adopt.

At work, migrants adopt other strategies to cope with live in a reverse world. In Pithoragarh especially, some migrants just arriving from Baitadi told me that they were looking for manual work (hātko kām) (i.e. road work) because, as a matter of custom (calan), they “do not carry loads”

\textsuperscript{172} The term comes from the English labour.

\textsuperscript{173} This may partly explain why there is little interest in the Nepalese workers association. Feeling that their stay is only temporary (asthāyī), their condition as worker is rejected rather than asserted.

\textsuperscript{174} The patronym mentioned corresponds to the clan (thar) name.

\textsuperscript{175} To ask a migrant’s patronym is to ask their caste. Moreover, on each side of the Mahakali River, thar names are similar.

\textsuperscript{176} Harish “Joshi” was caught out when his family members, who were not aware of his new name and not cautious enough, stepped into the restaurant and asked for “Harish Ram”, the real and low-caste distinctive name of the boy. Harish was fired on the spot.
(bhārī bokdainan) or “cannot carry loads” (bhārī bokna sakdainan). The western part of Baitadi district is entirely under Pithoragarh’s influence, a town where people go to college, to hospital or to the market. By choosing to work far from it, migrants avoid meeting acquaintances while doing a humiliating and degrading job. A more radical way to get out of the niche assigned to the Nepalese is to change occupation, in particular to leave the porterage work. In Uttarakhand, some dynamic young men manage to escape from their fate and open small restaurants. After years of carrying loads, they have got to know the needs of the Nepalese workers and have been introduced to Indians who trust them. They usually aim at higher goals (buying land, providing their children with education), they have saved some money, seized the opportunity to open a cheap food outlet and invested in basic furniture, plates and dishes. In Pithoragarh, two of the managers are happy to feed their family, who came to India, “thanks to their own business”. Apart from earning money easily (ārāmle), they have also found values of independence that characterize farming.

At last, at varying scales and according to different uses, migrants appropriate space. Creating their own places is a way of making life bearable in a world dominated by Indians. The most common Nepalese places are rooms where migrants sleep and cook. The proximity of their houses in Nepal and the caste to which they belong determine who stays with whom in India. Networks are therefore important to understand at the same time destination, type of work and lifestyle. Rooms are the only places where migrants can re-create a village atmosphere, where they can go at the end of a day’s work and find a “friendly” place, away from the hostile outside world. Rice and clarified butter are brought from Nepal by newcomers, as a way of bridging the distance between their house and their work place. As in small restaurants in Pithoragarh, Pahāḍī language is spoken, whereas dāl bhāt tarkārī is eaten. These restaurants are like Nepalese islands in a sea of Indian shops, even if there are only few signs of nepaliness in the decoration.177 Restaurant names, such as Bajhang-Baitadi, are not written anywhere. They are only frequented by the Nepalese (even Biharis of the labour class do not go there) who gather to eat, but also to exchange information about available work, watch Nepal Television or listen to Nepalese folksongs (lokgīt). However, they are not places of refuge for every Nepalese. Caste discrimination is still strong, as Chetri owners refuse to let people of lower caste from their own village.

177 Contrary to what I noticed in Doha, Qatar, where royal family photographs, paintings of Nepalese mountains or Newar carvings were hanging on the walls of Nepalese restaurants.
come and eat\textsuperscript{178}. The last and least visible places for the Nepalese to fit in to Uttarakhand towns are what we could call small territories. In public space, porters appropriate small places, a town’s outermost abandoned corners. These places, such as curbs, broken benches, abandoned bus stops or the bottom floor of a house never quite finished are occupied by Nepalese porters only. They form landmarks in the town and meeting points which are part of the geography of any migrant. All day long, the Nepalese gather in these places, smoke bidi, talk and wait for clients. Indians seldom join them because for most of them, these spaces are of no use or signification\textsuperscript{179}. But they are of great interest to the Nepalese who can find a refuge in the public space: they are what Foucault (1994) calls “other spaces or heterotopias” in the way that they only exist for a category of people, in particular excluded people, and that they are at the same time closed and open. These places are opposed to every other place. They are in the city but seem to be out of it because people who “inhabit” them are themselves on the fringe of the city.

Conclusion

Although Nepalese men from the far-western region come and go through life and acquire enough knowledge to make their way in India, temporary migration is not highly valued. On the contrary, while away from Nepal, the village and home are highly idealized so that working in India is felt as a reverse ideal situation. India is an upside-world for Nepalese workers from the far-western region, and especially for people of higher caste. Because their social position is low, because people talk to them in a rude way, because their living conditions are miserable, and because migration does not enable them to achieve high goals, they do not value India very highly. However, to be able to cope with their life, migrants create spaces where they abide by their own society’s rules. Whether in public or private spaces, the nature of these places, the way they are invested also shows the degree of migrants’ achievements. The higher the goals achieved, the less the situation appears opposite in India. For a few workers, India can even be called “home” but for the majority of them, the experience of living in a reverse world does not bring a new layer of belonging. Belonging to the working class is out of the question. They consider themselves as farmers (kisān) who only, in an abnormal and normal way, become workers for a limited period of time. Because India is an ulto world, the aim of all migrants is to go back to their village and spend the rest of their life there.

\textsuperscript{178} It seems that people of lower caste do not try to come and eat in these restaurants, knowing that they would be turned away.

\textsuperscript{179} Except some times, to play cards.
Bibliography


CORRESPONDENCE, ANNOUNCEMENTS, REPORTS
RESPONSE TO KAMAL PRAKASH MALLA’S REVIEW OF
HISTORY OF NEPAL\textsuperscript{180}

John Whelpton

The editors of the European Bulletin of Himalayan Research have kindly offered me the chance to respond to Kamal Malla’s review of my History of Nepal. I have known Professor Malla since 1972 when he attended a VSO briefing session in London for my batch of Nepal-bound volunteers, thus becoming the first Nepalese I ever met. Over the intervening years he has been a source of friendly advice and assistance whenever we have met and I have read with both pleasure and profit his published work on Nepalese history. His review is written in his usual forthright manner but I think the overall balance of praise and blame of my book is fair enough so I am not writing in any spirit of complaint. However, I still want to take the opportunity to reply in order to acknowledge some criticism which is fully justified, to point out one or two places where I think he misunderstood what I was trying to say and also to take up some important issues that he raises and which are well worth further discussion.

First, the book’s most obvious failings. It is indeed “punctuated with a number of factual errors, particularly in dates and names”. Although the main chapters were seen in draft by at least one prominent Nepalese or foreign scholar, these academics naturally focussed just on questions of general interpretation while, because of pressure of time, I did not have the biographical notes at the end checked by anyone. I was not sufficiently aware of how easily errors could creep in and should have had the whole book vetted carefully again just for accuracy of detail. I can only apologise and refer readers to the errata list to be published in a forthcoming issue of Himalaya (the former Himalayan Research Bulletin) and also to the reprinting of the South Asian edition, now in progress, which will incorporate all the corrections. Another misjudgement was over the title: the focus is so much on the post-1743 (and particularly post-1950) period that “History of Modern Nepal” might have been more appropriate. In fact, the publisher had originally wanted me to write just on the most recent decades whilst I wanted to cover earlier times also. The resulting compromise was the rather truncated account of the ancient and medieval periods, which other reviewers have also found unsatisfactory. I also resisted the publisher’s suggestion to include “Modern” in the title because I thought it would invite confusion with Rishikesh Shaha’s Modern Nepal: a Political History. Again with hindsight, I should probably have risked the confusion!

\textsuperscript{180} cf EBHR, 29-30, summer 2006: 178-183.
Turning to the apparent misunderstandings, Professor Malla states that I see “the process of political unification and cultural hegemony of Brahmanical values in the central Himalayas mainly as an outcome of the threat of Islam and the rising power of the East India Company on the subcontinent”. In fact, when discussing the origin of the Thakuri rulers in the hills (p.22-23), I gave genuine refugees from Islamic incursions as just one stream, the others being Khas of local origin who falsely claimed Rajput origins and real Rajputs who moved north because of pressure on land in the plains. As for the British factor, I did not give this as a direct cause of the Gorkha conquest of the Valley but simply said that Prithvi Narayan’s establishment of his new kingdom, the East India Company’s seizure of Bengal and China’s assertion of control in Tibet and Sinkiang were all “part of a pattern of state-building and expansion across a wide are of Asia”. (p.27) I specifically rejected the theory advanced by “nationalist” historians of Nepal that Prithvi embarked on his campaigns to forestall British designs on the Himalayas and I suggested instead that the East India Company only became a major element in his thinking after Kinloch’s unsuccessful attempt to come to the aid of the Newar Valley kingdoms in 1767.

Secondly, Professor Malla thinks that I regard the Panchayat decades simply as a freak of history resulting from the Chinese attack on India in 1962 which compelled India to abandon its attempt, then on the verge of success, to force King Mahendra into a compromise with his Congress opponents. I certainly do believe that the outbreak of the Sino-Indian conflict rescued Mahendra from having to make a humiliating climb-down but, contrary to what the review suggests, I also acknowledge other factors that helped the Panchayat regime to endure, including Mahendra’s care not to antagonise major vested interests.

Similarly, the review suggests that the deeper reasons for the system’s collapse in 1990 are neglected and the focus placed instead on a specific individual: “Whelpton seems to blame, of all great men of history, Marich Man Singh and his unpopularity, more naively for his being the first Newar Prime Minister or Mukhtiyar!”. (p.111) The sentence alluded to here in fact came only after I had devoted two pages to detailing factors such as rising education levels, corruption scandals involving the royal palace and the rise of “civil society” organisations – a combustive mix to which the spark was put by the Indian blockade of 1989-90. My point about Marichman Singh’s ethnicity was not that it was a reason for his unpopularity but rather that, contrary to what some might have (naively!) expected, it did not boost his popularity among the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley.

There may also be an element of misunderstanding in the dismissal of my conclusion on the 2001 Palace Massacre. The sentence quoted from
this, read in isolation, might suggest I completely endorsed the official report. In fact I accepted only what was reported by all the royal eye-witnesses — i.e that it was Dipendra alone who mowed down his family members inside the Tribhuvan Sadan. I left open the possibility that Dipendra himself might have been killed in the garden by someone else rather than committing suicide. That still, of course, leaves a real disagreement between us which boils down to an assessment of probabilities: like most foreign observers (though probably a minority of Nepalese ones), I find Dipendra’s guilt less implausible than the various conspiracy theories that are offered as an alternative. To absolve Dipendra, one would have to believe either that the eye-witnesses were lying (and sticking to those lies even now that Gyanendra has been humbled) or that the disguise of the killer was so perfect that it deceived at close quarters so many who knew Dipendra intimately. I do, though, fully agree that the official enquiry was thoroughly unsatisfactory and I believe that even at this late stage a fuller enquiry should be launched. In correspondence after the publication of the review, Professor Malla reminded me of the claim in John Gregson’s book (2002: 207-8) that a specimen of Dipendra’s blood was secretly sent to Scotland. This is certainly something that could and should be looked into after the recent changes in Nepal.

Finally, the complaint that only five of the titles in the bibliography are in Nepali and that the book appears based mainly on “secondary sources in English and other western languages” suggests a misunderstanding of what the book aimed to do. It was not a presentation of original, front-line research but rather an attempt to produce, principally for the international English-reading public, a synthesis of what previous research has revealed.

The first of the really substantial and interesting points that Professor Malla makes is his questioning of the authenticity of the Divya Upadesh on the grounds that its style is so different from that of Prithvi Narayan’s extant correspondence and that the merchantilist economic philosophy advanced in it could not have been conceived by someone from the king’s “rural Gorkha background”. This reminded me of a conversation at six years ago at CNAS with anthropologist Bert van den Hoek. He remarked to me at CNAS that, since Prithvi had lived for some time in the palace in Bhaktapur, he would not have had to have someone identify the valley cities for him as he gazed down upon them from one of the surrounding hills. Neither Malla’s or van Hoek’s arguments are in themselves conclusive. Leaving aside the possibility that the king had a “ghost writer”, variations in style between writing in different genres by the same individual are quite possible and Gorkha had been part of a network of international exchange from long before the conquest of the Valley so
its king was hardly a country bumpkin, particularly as he had himself visited Benares. As for his needing landmarks pointed out to him, even someone who had visited the Valley might have been disorientated when viewing it from an unfamiliar vantage point. There still remains a question mark, however, particularly because the document apparently lay undiscovered for so long. Doubt did cross my own mind when writing the book, but because so many reputable historians had accepted the document as genuine (one of these, Ludwig Stiller, actually centering his first monograph (1968) around it) I decided it was safe to follow an apparent near-consensus among scholars. Professor Malla challenged that consensus in his review and, in our subsequent correspondence, expanded his attack:

the “upadesh” is a literary harlequin’s dress, pieced together by the heroic-nationalist Gorkhali historians such as Surya Vikram Gewali and Baburam Acharya from dusty fragments stored in the Basnet family at Kilagal and Baneswar in the early 1950s. Both stylistically and thematically it falls apart at too many places. It was brought to political limelight by King Mahendra and through the personal efforts of Yogi Naraharinath in the late 1950s as a part of his political campaign to aggrandize the magnanimity of the Shaha monarchy.

Malla also reminded me of his published criticism of Naya Raj Pant’s Shri Panch Prithvinarayan Shahko Upadesh (1968/9) in his 1983 review of Mary Slusser’s Nepal Mandala and again in his 1984 pamphlet responding to Mahesh Raj Pant’s defence of his father’s work. However, on both occasions Malla’s target was not the Dibya Upadesh itself but Naya Raj Pant’s treatment of it and, in the Nepal Mandala review, he praises Ludwig Stiller’s work, which, as mentioned above, does not question the Dibya Upadesh’s authenticity. Clearly then, Malla ought now to publish a full critique of the document (on the lines of his 1992 attack on the attempt to date the Nepal-Mahatmya to the 9th century) and thus allow specialists on the period to consider and respond to his arguments. The alternatives to be debated are not, of course, simply those of a forgery or a speech actually delivered on one single occasion: the Upadesh might conceivably be a compilation of remarks made by the king at different times.

It may be worth adding that a similar question mark has been raised over a key document for the study of early English history. This is the Latin account of the life of King Alfred the Great, the ruler who led resistance to the Viking invasion in the 9th Century A.D. The author identifies himself as Bishop Asser, a confidante of the king, but the document has been denounced as a forgery by one prominent historian of the period (Smyth, 1995). Most Anglo-Saxonists still accept the biography as genuine and I suspect that Malla will equally fail to convince historians of 18th century Nepal, but he ought to go ahead and make an attempt.
A second, much broader issue Malla raises concerns the evaluation of the political strongmen of Nepalese history, and particularly of Prithvi Narayan Shah. His review suggested that I treated them too sympathetically and he made the same point even more strongly in our correspondence: “so much of your narrative reads like an ... apologia for the Shahas and the Ranas”. As regards the Shah dynasty, there is some irony here because one consignment of the book was actually impounded under Gyanendra’s direct rule and, although it was never formally banned, a number of booksellers were unwilling to risk placing it on their shelves. It is true, however, that I think that some of the more extreme denunciations of the ruling families reflect contemporary political agendas rather than sober assessment of their record and that in *History of Nepal*, as in other things I have written, I tried to steer a middle course between such a purely negative view and the hagiographical line taken by royalist historians. To the strongest critics of the Shahas and the Ranas, my approach will thus, inevitably, appear as a defence of their regimes.

Malla is particularly concerned to discount any suggestion of commitment to Hindu ideology for Nepal’s rulers, arguing that they acted out of straightforward personal ambition. Here we are up against a problem when looking at the motives of any actor on the political stage and my own gut feeling is that whilst the political beliefs of major political may in practical effect be self-serving ones they are nevertheless often genuinely held. I think its more likely that, for example, Mao and Stalin were genuine Marxists, and also that Prithvi Narayan Shaha genuinely believed he was fulfilling the *dharma* of a Hindu king in his drive for expansion. To see his actions as simply hunger for land and the revenue from it is too reductionist an interpretation and it is significant that even Mahesh Chandra Regmi, whom Malla cites with approval, eventually retreated from his earlier straightforward economism, and, a year or two before his death, told me personally: “I was wrong to think that the control of land was the only thing that mattered”. My own feeling is that Prithvi Narayan Shaha wanted to be a successful Hindu king, and that meant more land and revenue but also the upholding of the Hindu social order. The case for this interpretation is, of course, strengthened if the *Dibya Upadesh* is accepted as authentic but would still remain plausible even if we accepted Malla’s contention that the document is a later compilation.

Just as he is reluctant to see Hinduism as a motivating ideology for either Shahs or Ranas, Malla also argues that “to call their culture ‘Sanskritic’ is only a parody of the timeless values enshrined in that tradition”. The target of his criticism here is my use of the term “sanskritisation” in the title of the chapter dealing with the period from Prithvi Narayan Shah to the seizure of power by the Shamsher Ranas. As
another reviewer has pointed out (Toffin, 2005), I failed to explain precisely what I meant by this term and so I cannot complain too much if I am again slightly misinterpreted. I was not implying any judgment on the Nepal’s cultural and spiritual standards during this period but thinking of any kind of convergence with high caste norms by a group “lower” in the caste hierarchy whether as a deliberate tactic on the part of members of that group to raise their own status (Sanskritisation in Srinivas’s sense) or because of the enforcement of orthodox Hindu values from above. Both of these mechanisms certainly were operating in 19th century Nepal, though I acknowledge that social change of any sort was slow in the decades after Nepal’s territorial expansion had been halted.

The same chapter heading also uses the term “unification” and Malla, like Kumar Pradhan (1991), prefers to see the expansion of the Gorkha state described as a “conquest”. The problem here rests, of course, on the sense in which “unification” is used. If it implies the bringing together of populations that either already felt a strong common bond, or immediately started to feel one, then it clearly is inappropriate. However, Prithvi certainly did bring the many populations in the central and eastern Himalayas under a single government and we could also understand “unification” in that sense. In any case, unifications in this second sense, which coerce people into accepting a common overlord, may in the long-term result in a real sense of identity with the state so formed. Qin Shi Huang, for example, the man who forged a united Chinese state at the end of the 3rd century B.C., was every bit as ruthless as Prithvi Narayan Shah. As his successors enlarged the areas under their control, and Han Chinese settlers moved into new lands, the treatment of the indigenous population was no gentler than in eastern Nepal: a major reason that in China today janajati groups make up only 10% of the total population as against 30-40% in Nepal is that so many were either physically eliminated or assimilated. Yet the end result has certainly been a strong, shared sense of “Chineseness” among both the Han and even a considerable number amongst the surviving minorities. It also needs to be stressed that even in other cases where there was a strong pre-existing sense of unity, a significant proportion of the population often opposed the process of political unification and the balance between sullen acquiescence and actual enthusiasm for the coming of the new order is difficult to assess. My own feeling is, therefore, that, whatever judgment we may make of Prithvi’s conduct, we can still speak of Nepalese unification; and, indeed, even Pradhan retains the word, without ‘scare quotes’, in the sub-title of his book.

I shall end, as Professor Malla ends, with the book’s front cover, which shows a street scene in Birganj in the early 1970s. This picture was not my own original choice; I had submitted a rather conventional mountain view
(still displayed in error on the Amazon.com page for the book!) but my editor at CUP thought that the Birganj shot, which I had intended only as an illustration within the text, was more suitable because it focused on people rather than just the physical backdrop. I readily accepted this suggestion because, without her having in any way intending it, she had made an important political point: achieving a fully shared sense of identity in Nepal requires that all cultural traditions within the country’s present boundaries be accepted as genuinely Nepalese. Professor Malla, in contrast, complains that the cover “seems to have nothing to do … with Nepal — ancient, modern or in the making”. Evidently, for him “Nepal” still has the primary meaning of “Nepal Mandala”, or, at most, the hill country, and it can never include the Tarai communities who share language and culture with those across the border. Considering Professor Malla’s roots in the Newar culture of the Kathmandu Valley, and his own considerable contribution to elucidating that culture’s history, this feeling is understandable. The implications, though, are disturbing: if it were truly impossible for the Bhojpuri/Hindi culture of most citizens of Birganj to be accepted as genuinely Nepalese then the whole project of building a new, inclusive Nepal within the country’s present borders would be an impossible dream. Would not Professor Malla really prefer to revise his evaluation rather than accept this dismal conclusion?

REFERENCES


On the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} of March 2007, we carried out a seminar entitled “Democracy, Citizenship, and Belonging in the Himalayas” that took place at the International Indian Centre (IIC) in New Delhi. This workshop was the first one in a series of meetings and exchanges carried out within an international and interdisciplinary team of scholars working in the Himalayan region. The entire project endeavour, called “The Politics of Belonging in the Himalayas” is planned for a three-year’s time-period during which our knowledge on the thematic complex of belonging will be expanded through mutual academic debates and through collaborative projects. The first meeting, held in New Delhi, was dedicated to exploring the complex concepts and ties of belonging in the Nepalese, Bhutanese, Chinese and the Indian Himalayas.

During this first seminar, emphasis was put on the interaction between local, indigenous forms of belonging, and new modes of classification and ordering imposed through national integration and governmental modes of politics. The objective was to broaden our understanding of the social, cultural and political processes that have shaped the Himalayan societies and states in the past and to explore how the Himalayan people have experienced their sense of identity and belonging in new, changing contexts.

We focused on four interrelated topics.

The parameters of belonging in local societies

The Himalayan societies have always conceived of their belonging in multi-facetted ways. Every person has experienced, lived through and formed diverse dimensions of belonging: in particular, the membership in kinship groups, in households, in localities, in religious communities, in castes and in ethnic communities. These diverse parameters have evolved over long spans of time. The attachments could shift during a person’s
life-course (especially in the case of most Himalayan women). Collectivities have positioned themselves time and again by selecting from diverse repertoires of membership criteria. Similarly, individual identity markers have been gaining and losing their salience in the course of time. The first session was geared towards exploring these diverse parameters of belonging in the Himalayan life-worlds. Against the backdrop of empirical examples, the dynamic dimensions of belonging and identity formation were explored. We also attempted to strengthen our understanding of the concept of “belonging”. In particular, it was important to capture the specificity of this term vis-à-vis the concept of “identity”.

State building, belonging, and identity
For many centuries, the local Himalayan societies have been subjected to external interference and to externally imposed categorisations and division lines. Subsequent rulers have incorporated the local political systems, by ordering, managing, and imposing rules and regulations. In particular, local society members have been subjected through land-ownership patterns and diverse mechanisms of revenue extraction. For instance, in the course of its formation in the 18th and 19th century, the Nepalese state has included many small political units into a broader political space. State expansion has also instigated processes of ethnogenesis and ethnic differentiation, and it has instigated status differentials within and between ethnic minorities in the case of a number of groups. The modalities imposed by the rulers to define the subjects’ rights and duties have increasingly been imposed and reinforced in manifold encounters and contestations.

Production of new regional identities
Since the mid-20th century, the state administrations and political bodies have decisively expanded their fields of influence over the Himalayan societies and increased their control throughout the territory. The modern understanding of citizenship has come to impinge upon peoples’ lives, to draw or shift social boundaries, and partly to challenge the pre-existing categories of belonging and the derived concepts of (mutual) rights and duties. New spatial orders – such as administrative units – have been introduced. The processes of construction of these new regional territories and their impact on the social organisation have not yet been sufficiently documented. How did drawing of new boundaries and regionalisation come to intersect with ethnicity, locality, and with others forms of “boundedness”? We were especially interested in local reactions to such processes and in local perceptions of these dynamics.
Changing notions of citizenship and governance.

New categories such as “scheduled caste” and “scheduled tribe”, as well as the policy of quotas (e.g. within the Panchayati Raj, in India), have also deeply affected peoples’ sense of collective entitlements. They had an effect on the popular perceptions of the social fabric — for instance, of the increasing scales of social organisation, of translocalisation, and the juxtaposition of diverse social orders, in general. This workshop’s inquiry sought to capture the impact of these new notions, related to good governance and democracy, on the diverse forms of belonging. From a more general point of view, we wanted to explore the relations between the citizens and the others (i.e. who – in the perceptions of the mainstream — do not belong). How are these relations presently defined, contested and negotiated? How are the boundaries between us and them actually drawn and questioned? What kinds of struggles surround the sense of “ownership” and entitlement? Are there particularly efficient modalities for reaching consensus across collective boundary lines? Are the means of negotiation and compromising as well as rhetoric rather those used in previous periods of history (e.g. customary law)? Or do people nowadays tend to rather deploy new democratic devises and arguments (e.g. modern law, new notions of justice) in their negotiations?

We were thus interested in mapping out the emerging uncertainties and contestations observed throughout the Himalayan region and in seeing where the broad and polysemic notion of “belonging” comes into place. We expected to reveal important divisive lines and possible conflict potentials looming in the Himalayan societies. But another perspective led us to suggest that the sense of belonging significantly buttresses peoples’ sense of immediacy and urgency. As a matter of fact, it seems that the stronger the sense of belonging vis-à-vis a collectivity or locality, the higher is the peoples’ readiness to engage in creating collective goods and a readiness to strive for a collective’s well-being. New modalities of belonging that come together with particular rights and entitlements may instigate new forms civic engagement and participation. It was therefore relevant to find out which dimensions of belonging are acquiring nowadays the highest potential of legitimacy and of mobilisation. Does still engagement for the sake of own community prevail? Can we perceive of more engagement for a larger common good? Are there many contestations against aspirations of collectivities considered “alien” or “not deserving”? It was also of interest to see how diverse dimensions of belonging intersect, or challenge each other, and with what implications.

By reflecting upon these and related questions, we intended:
- To gain a better understanding of the notion of belonging, in general, to see how this notion is understood by Himalayan people, and to generally reflect upon its analytical merits;
- to document a number of cases of identity constructions when new parameters of belonging were established by rulers’ and state policies, in the 19th and 20th century;
- to inquire into the tensions between “old” and “new” dimensions of belonging;
- to map out the contemporary dynamics, engaging in comparison across the Himalayan region;
- to inquire into boundary mechanisms (boundary drawing, maintaining, challenging, transgressing, shifting), particularly into conflict potentials as well as modes of peaceful co-existence;
- to capture peoples’ sense of social justice when diverse categories of belonging intersect and / or contest each other;
- to gain a deeper understanding which political means are particularly likely to reconcile diverse dimensions of belonging in pluralist societies, and
- to grasp the understanding of difference, common concerns and mutuality in the Himalayan societies in previous moments of their history and in present-day perspective.

PROGRAMME

Day 1: Monday March 19th, 2007

Opening Session

Welcome Address by Gérard Toffin (CNRS)
Joanna Pfaff (University Bielefeld), On the Notion of Belonging.

Session I Modes of Belonging in the Indian Himalayas
Chair: Balveer Arora (Jawaharlal Nehru University)
William Sax (University of Heidelberg): Ethnicity, Belonging and Statehood: the Case of Uttarakhand.
Discussant: Balveer Arora (Jawaharlal Nehru University)
Day 2: Tuesday March 20th, 2007

Session II Production of Ethnic and Regional Identities
Part 1 Chair: Ravinder Kaur (Indian Institute of Technology)
Krishna Hacchethu (CENAS, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu): Regional Politics in Discourse of Restructuring the Nepalese State: a case Study of Danusha District. (read by Kanak Dixit)
Discussant: Ravinder Kaur (Indian Institute of Technology)

Part 2 Chair: Andre Gingrich (Vienna University)
Sanjay Pandey (Jawaharlal Nehru University): The Naga Identity and State Formation.
Maheshwar Joshi (Almora University): Geocultural Identities and Belongingness in the Ethnohistory of Central Himalaya, Uttaranchal, India.
Discussant: Andre Gingrich (Vienna University)

Session III Religious Identities, State and Nationalism

Part 1 Chair: Ravina Aggarwal (Ford Foundation)
Axel Michaels (University of Heidelberg): To whom belongs the Pashupati Temple Area of Nepal?
Gérard Toffin (CNRS): Being a Member of a Hindu Reformist Sect in the Himalayas; the case of the Krishna Pranami.
Discussant: Ravina Aggarwal (Ford Foundation)

Part 2 Chair: Nirmal Tuladhar (CENAS, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu)
Jessamine Dana (University of Oxford): You Don't Belong here Sister; the Politics of Belonging at a Pilgrimage Site (Muktinath).
Martin Gaenszle (Vienna University): Emergent Nationalism, Citizenship and Belonging: Nepalis in Banaras.
Discussant: Surinder Singh Jodhka (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Day 3: Wednesday March 21st, 2007

Session IV Local Ties
Chair: Patricia Uberoi (Institute of Economic Growth)
Gisèle Krauskopff (CNRS): The weight of places. Houses, villages and belonging in Dang valley (Nepal).
Anne de Sales (CNRS): *Hamro Gaon. Imagination and Reality.*
Discussant: Patricia Uberoi (Institute of Economic Growth)

Session V Conflict, Democracy and Citizenship
Chair: Niraja Gopal Jayal (Jawaharlal Nehru University)
Daniela Berti (CNRS): *Trials, Witnesses and Local Stakes in a District Court of Himachal Pradesh.*
Judith Pettigrew (Lancashire School of Health and Postgraduate Medicine, UK): *Identity, Belonging and the People’s War in Western Nepal.*
Discussant: Bishnu Narayan Mohapatra (Ford Foundation)

Session VI Belonging and the Politics of Territory and Environment
Chair: Amita Baviskar (Institute of Economic Growth)
Joëlle Smadja (CNRS): *Belonging and Protected Areas, the participatory Management Dilemma.*
Ben Campbell (University of Manchester, UK): *Pathways of Place Relation.*
Discussant: Amita Baviskar (Institute of Economic Growth)

Concluding Session
BOOK REVIEWS
The function and duties of the Dharmādhikārin as described in the Mulukī Ain (MA) are the subjects of this book. The MA is a codification of various ancient legal documents promulgated in Nepal in 1854 at the instigation of Prime Minister Jaṅga Bahādur Rāṇā when king Surendra Vikrama Śāha was in power. The Dharmādhikārin or religious judge was one of the most powerful Brahmin official at the court. He was an already well established religious authority by the time the relevant chapter of the MA was compiled, since the position (which might have been taken from the Marāṭhās) had been created at the end of the 18th century when the Śāha dynasty had unified the country. But not much is known of his activities prior to the description given in the original Mulukī Ain (MA 1854) or in a later and more concise version compiled in 1888 (MA 1888).

As Andras Höfer has shown in his classic study, the MA is one of the most important documents for studying the traditional caste society of Nepal. But though other scholars have contributed to retrieve the code from oblivion, it has not yet received all the attention it deserves181. Michael proposes an interesting investigation of some of its sections. It has the advantage of combining an anthropological approach of Nepali religion and society with a first hand knowledge of Nepali language.

The book comprises a long introduction, a critical edition (in Devanāgarī script) of the two chapters on the Dharmādhikārin (chapter 89 of MA 1854 and chapter 32 of MA 1888) with a description of the manuscripts and editions on which it rests, and an annotated English translation of the two chapters.

From all this one gathers that the main duty of the Dharmādhikārin was to grant expiation (prāyaścitta) and rehabilitation (patyā) (or purification cum reinstatement) to those who had contracted impurity or sin through their contact with a person who had violated the rules of purity. In others words, the religious judge did not deal with the main culprit but with

those who, through their contacts with him, had been indirectly afflicted by his offences. It was not until the Dharmādhikārīn (and he alone) had issued a certificate of rehabilitation that they could get fully readmitted into their caste. As for the main culprit, the MA ruled that he was to be punished by the king or by the Prime Minister (MA 1854/89/4, p. 20). The punishments varied according to the gravity of the offence from capital punishment to temporary degradation (life imprisonment, branding, confiscation of one’s ancestral property, pp. 21-23), but they always implied a change in caste status. Moreover, they were heavier if the culprit had knowingly transferred his impurity to others, that is if he had had contacts with them while not ignoring that he was already in a state of pollution. The prescribed duty of the Dharmādhikārīn then consisted in examining whether or not those persons could be rehabilitated and what method was the best. Those most likely to contract impurity through their contact with a polluted or degraded person were the spouses and the children. An important element for the Dharmādhikārīn’s appreciation was what Michaels aptly calls the subjective aspects of the action. Having contacts with an impure person fully knowing (jāni jāni) his condition was held to be different from doing so in ignorance of the same (which was called bhor). For here too, doing wrong intentionally could result in an increase of the punishment. It was moreover expected that the culprit approach himself the Dharmādhikārīn and confess his fault, a condition of rehabilitation clearly prescribed by the ancient (written) Indian law (dharmaśāstra).

It is therefore clear that from the point of view of the MA, impurity has religious (and social) consequences as well as penal consequences and that it is to be punished accordingly. Whereas penal measures such as imprisonment or fines can only be applied by the state, the Dharmadhikārin is required both to administer some form of expiation (prāyaścitt) and to rehabilitate the culprit into his former caste status (patiyā). Michaels is right in stressing the complementary nature of his two functions: while expiation “aimed to remove the evil of sins, either in this life or in after-life”, patiyā “sought to prevent others from the evil consequences of evil deed” (p. 37). However, as Michaels also shows, the MA is not always consistent in its use of the different categories. There are cases were the overlapping of social, religious and penal consequences forbid clear distinctions.

The system of law of which the MA is a codification was traditional in Nepal. It was partly derived from local customary laws and partly from dharmaśāstra, that is from ancient Indian law based on Hindu scriptures. The precise part played by each of its sources in the MA remains somewhat obscure. But one has to recognize that with ancient Indian law too it is difficult to assess the exact relationship between custom and
(written) law, for they kept mutually influencing each other. In other words dharmasāstra was not immutable: it could always be adapted and modified to suit prevailing social circumstances.

There are no direct quotations from the dharmasāstra literature in the MA, but it is natural to wonder to what extent its chapter on the Dharmādhikārin was influenced by ideas taken from it for after all the Brahmin in question was in charge of affairs connected with the maintenance of dharma. May be this subject could have been dealt with in a more systematic manner in the introduction of the book. It seems to me that at least three principles underlying the application of ancient Indian law are to be found in the chapter of the MA under study. Those are 1) State and religion are not separated and the king is required to preserve the socio-religious order; 2) the individual is not separated from his social group; and 3) the law is not applied to a given territory with uniformity but it varies according to castes and ethnic groups.

First, state and religion are encompassed into the same global order called dharma. It explains that, for the sake of maintaining the socio-religious order, offence against the State (or crime), and offence against religion (or sin), should both be punished. The MA reflects this conception. It implicitly recognizes the ancient Indian conception of the king as responsible for maintaining the proper hierarchical relationship between the individual castes when it has the ruler (or other representatives of the state) punish those who transgress their caste observances. It shows that in the 19th century civil and religious law were not separated in the Hindu kingdom of Nepal. Moreover, the MA believes in the necessary cooperation between the king and the Brahmin. It is because, ultimately, royal authority is bound with notions of moral and religious order, that the king has to take necessary steps to have his penalties supplemented by an expiation which only a Brahmin can give. Just as in ancient Indian law the king is invested with special authority in social matters, for he is not only supposed to give a decision in accordance with dharma, it is also his duty to enforce dharma through coercion. Punishment (danda), which enables the king to perform his function, is indeed identified with dharma in brahmanical ideology (Manu VII, 17).

The MA adopts a second principle of ancient Indian law when it considers that every act committed by an individual has a social dimension: there is no such thing as a sphere of privacy. Accordingly, whosoever transgresses the rules of his caste defiles those with whom he interacts. He endangers the purity of his whole caste because impurity is

contagious. This is why the *dharmaśāstra* prescribes measures to suspend polluted persons from their caste status either temporarily (until they are rehabilitated) or permanently. The MA shares a third principle with ancient Indian law when it prescribes measures that vary according to caste and gender — an indication that it too rules out the equality of subjects before law.

But if the MA reflects something of the conceptions of the *dharmaśāstra*, it is not itself a *dharmaśāstra*. On the one hand, it is still steeped into the dharmic order and its impossibility to distinguish between the social and the private sphere of an individual, on the other hand, it makes a distinction between activities of a strictly religious nature and those having a social dimension, as it deals only with the latter. Thus, though it adopts the *dharmaśāstra* classification of evil actions, it does not mention all the offences which the latter records. For instance it does not punish a Brahmin who forgets his Veda. Whereas *dharma* encompasses both the social and the religious order, the MA delimits a religious sphere and removes it from law. It also limits the authority of the religious judge. It allows the king and his all powerful Prime Minister (or the Court Council, where noblemen were in greater numbers than Brahmans) to interfere with the *DharmādhiKārin*’s decisions, and even to disregard the written law. In other words, the MA keeps out of its concern offences of a purely religious nature, and it registers and legitimizes the paramount nature of the political control.

It is an established fact that in the actual performance of his duties the Hindu ruler was not subordinated to Brahmans, rather he was their principal patron and they were dependent upon him for their survival. That he enjoyed the final authority in all social matters was at least clearly the state of affairs in the Hindu kingdoms of India contemporary with the codification of the MA\(^{183}\). It is therefore not only in Nepal that religious judges worked under political control, however Nepal stands alone among all modern Hindu kingdoms in its promulgating a law text codifying and thus regularising the duties of the *DharmādhiKārin* on a given territory. The fact that the text was decreed at the instigation of the Prime Minister explains it. The MA accompanied other State reforms introduced by Jaṅg Bahādur Rāṇā soon after his return from Europe as he laid the foundation of the modern nation-state.

This book is an important contribution to the legal history of Nepal. It tells about the nature of royal authority in a society where religion and law are still closely interwoven but which is witnessing a beginning of secularization. As with all texts of a prescriptive nature, the questions

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naturally arise as to whether its rules were actually observed in daily life or to what extent they inform us about the empirical social reality. But it indicates in any case the norms that were imagined by those in power. As such it is also an important contribution to the social and cultural history of Nepal.
Social Networks and Migration, Far Western Nepalese Labour Migrants in Delhi is the first in-depth study about Nepalese migrants in the Indian capital. This work proves very useful for everyone interested both in socio-economic developments in Nepal (particularly with regards to the marginalised and under-developed far western part of the country) and in international migration from Nepal, which has nowadays become a major social phenomenon. It intends to “close a research gap” (p. 2) and the objective is indeed reached.

Part of the author’s research team, from the Development Study Group at the Department of Geography, University of Zurich, is engaged in village studies in Bajura district. Her study in Delhi focuses on migrants from the very same villages. Her main aim is to understand “the process of migration and its contribution to the livelihoods of people from rural areas in Nepal” (p. 2). The author uses a very vast theoretical background, from the migration theory and Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the concepts of social capital and transnational spaces. The author chooses not to make any difference between temporary or circular migrations and more permanent migrations to Delhi. Seven months’ fieldwork was carried out in Delhi between 2001 and 2005, where meetings with about 500 migrants were held, followed by 128 in-depth interviews and 21 financial self-help group meetings which she attended. Migrants were mainly interviewed at their own homes, sometimes year after year, with the help of a translator and research assistant. Even though Thieme faced difficulties in meeting migrants, she was able to interview women migrants, who are the least known of Nepalese migrants. The average age of migrants is 28.6 years but no statistics are given for the castes to which the sample belongs.

The book is easy to follow thanks to clear introductions and conclusions. It starts with an overview of labour migration from Nepal and rightly underlines the blatant underestimations of the absentee. It then focuses on the theoretical tools and methodology used. The case study starts at Chapter Four, which describes migrant’s villages in Bajhang and Bajura districts. There follows a study of working and housing conditions.

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184 On the same subject, see also Thieme (2003), Thieme et Müller-Böker (2004) and Thieme, Bhattarai et al. (2005).
of migrants in Delhi. The focus is then on saving and loan strategies, with a special interest in saving and credit associations. Before concluding with results, future prospects and practical implications, remittance transfers to Nepal and the use of remittances are discussed. A good use of a bibliography about Nepal and Nepalese migrations and about international migration helps to understand the stakes involved in these movements.

The history of temporary labour migration is difficult to assess as written sources are scarce or nonexistent. The author states that nowadays labour migrations have been inherited from trade and Gurkha mercenary tradition. This is debatable, especially in the case of far western Nepal, which has rarely been an area from which recruits have joined Gurkha regiments. As the author says, some specific groups practised trade but this was never the case for everyone in the Nepalese hills and mountains. The origins of labour migration should thus be sought in seasonal movements from villages to the upper or the lower parts of the country, as part of using the different ecological belts in a complementary way. Seasonal moves in order to barter grain or ghee for salt or money occurred in Baitadi until the 1970s (field observations). “Oppressive land and labour policies and indebtedness” (pp. 12-13) also resulted in the Nepalese fleeing their country to India. As a result, according to the 2001 census, 3.3% of Nepal’s total population live outside Nepal. But, in an interesting analysis taking into account official and non-official figures, the author shows that in 2001 between 6 and 14.7% of the total Nepalese population live abroad. “Taking only the population aged over 15 into account, it is estimated that 10 to 24% of them migrate out of Nepal” (p. 18), particularly from the Western Development Region, which sends 44% of all migrants while only containing 7.3% of the country’s population. Thus, the statement “For many people, migration is not an exception but an integral part of their lives” (p. 21) gives us a clue as to the workings of Western rural areas.

The study of Bajura and Bajhang as poor and marginalised regions in Nepal reminds us that subsistence agriculture in this area only provides food for six months in the year. Therefore, people need to borrow money and grain so that “impoverishment, debt, unemployment, and (more recently) political turmoil are the main factors for large-scale labour migration” (p. 86). It would certainly have been useful to discuss the relations between low density, agricultural production and migration as a way of life. Mechanical links between land and migration need to be evaluated from a livelihood strategy angle, as the author says that in the villages of origin, “today migration has become already a long-standing tradition with well-oiled networks between villages in Nepal and places in India” (p. 86) and “a very important livelihood strategy” (p. 87). Even
though it is indeed a strategy, migration is not described as actually being chosen by individual migrants or their family: it is explained as a direct consequence of the socio-economic situation in far western Nepal. The author recognizes that international migration can be a “status symbol for the younger generation” (p. 11), but individual reasons leading people to go to India are not discussed as such. It is particularly striking that very few migrants explain their migration in terms of positive motivation; to buy land, in the Terai or in the hills or to send their children to school, are goals which are not expressed. Instead, migrants “felt compelled” (p. 96) to come to Delhi. At this point, I think it is necessary to go beyond what people say and try to understand what people do. I personally met migrants in Delhi and in Uttarakhand, who said that compulsion (badhyata) brought them to India, but when asked about the available food or land, they admitted that they did not face any vital problems. It seems that it may be easier to explain migration, which is always depicted as something shameful and sometimes as a form of treason, as an obligation. A kind of official discourse circulates but it does not apply to all migrants. As far as women are concerned, I also think that the reason given for coming, i.e. medical treatment, should be reconsidered. For people from higher castes, and especially for women, living in town is not honourable (baijjat), although it may be easier than village life. Providing medical treatment as a reason for coming is a way of explaining one’s own migration as an obligation, whereas the real motive may be the desire to live in Delhi with one’s husband. More generally, the researcher must be careful not to completely endorse the migrant’s discourses in which the latter often describes himself/herself as a puppet whose actions are governed by socio-economic conditions. There is a real need to acknowledge the migrants’ freedom of action. And it is necessary to differentiate between migrants after two decades of migration: some may have bought land, whereas the majority has simply been surviving.

Social capital and networks make up the thread followed by the author to enter the world of migrants, and especially their working and living conditions in Delhi. According to Thieme, different kinds of capital (human, financial, natural, physical, symbolic and social) are used during “the whole migration process, access to jobs, remittance transfer and management of financial needs” (p. 65). Following theories on the perpetuation of migration, the author states that Delhi is chosen as a destination by migrants thanks to existing networks, even though further away destinations are known. The length of stay in Delhi appears to be highly variable though little is known about how often men actually come and go, depending on their situation in Nepal, their needs or the obligation to be in their village. In Delhi, jobs as night watchmen (caukidār) are always found through kin or friends (āphno mānche). However, the
caukidār niche exploited by Nepalis is like a trap: they all have the impression of not being able to get any other kind of job. They are stuck in the informal labour market (none of them work in private security firms), which means that “all migrants interviewed do not work under contract, lack social security, provident funds and weekend leaves” (p. 112). 60% of migrants interviewed have a second job, which is to clean cars in the morning. The pay for a watchman ranges from 800 to 4,000 Indian Rupees per month, whereas cleaning cars pays 150 IRs per car per month (each worker cleans eight to ten cars). It seems that only those who escape the caukidār niche can expect to earn more. This is the case of a Damai who managed to open a tailor shop and who now even employs four people. There is a strong sexual dimension to work, as women are usually employed as domestic workers in several households at a time. They earn “100 to 300 IRs per household per month, working one to two hours per day for each household” (p. 111). Despite the strong links between men, migrants from the same village are scattered over Delhi. They usually live in huts or slums, where they experience a “lack of sufficient basic facilities” (p. 121). Some more daring migrants may build their own dwelling, but most of the time migrants, who cook for themselves, invest a minimum in their dwellings. Life in Delhi is restricted to work and meeting with other migrants, especially during association meetings. The consumption of alcohol is very high and may restrict savings as it represents up to 10% of their earnings.

As regards caste rules, Thieme says that they are “less strict than in the villages in Nepal” (p. 123) but further on, she observes that, during an association meeting, “low cast people were not allowed to enter the room” (p. 158), and that “Dalits are allowed to enter in a room owned by a Chetri, as long as they are from the same village, and as long as they do not touch the water or sleeping mattress” (p. 123). According to my personal observations, if the city, as a modern place to live in, may bring some changes, radical changes have not been seen in private spaces; caste still determines with whom people live and eat.

As Thieme explores migrants’ living and working conditions in Delhi, she focuses on very rarely studied social practices. Studying “saving and credit associations provides fertile ground for analyzing the role of social capital in the provision of financial capital” (p. 128). The author brings to our attention a very detailed study of 13 financial self-help groups which are used by migrants who “often need more money than they earn per month” (p. 129). The informal credit market is the only way for migrants to have access to ready cash, either to start as a caukidār (this job has to be bought) or to “support their families back home and repay their debts” (p. 128). The author provides us with a very clear understanding of the workings of such groups, namely cīṭ (rotating savings and credit
association) and sosāṭī (accumulating savings and credit association). Once again, Thieme shows the importance of social capital, since “trust based on kinship and village of origin” (p. 157) is needed to become a member of such groups. Having a job (and a salary) and a good reputation is also necessary. Ciṭ is “a group of individuals who have agreed to contribute financially at regular intervals to the creation of a fund” (p. 135). Every month, they meet, pay a fixed amount of money and agree to give a certain amount of money at an auction to the highest bidders. To get the money, one needs a guarantor, who becomes responsible for the payment of the monthly share. Major problems with the ciṭ are indeed defaulted payments: once they get their money, many migrants go back home and do not pay their share. The guarantor and the chairman of the ciṭ may thus become heavily indebted. The ciṭ comes to a formal end when all members have received money. Thieme states that only one out of three ciṭs visited works smoothly. Compared to a ciṭ, sosāṭī is different in that money “is accumulated by earning money with interest on loans” (p. 145). At the beginning of the sosāṭī, each member gives a certain amount of money, which is distributed every month to members, with an interest rate of 2 to 10%. There is no deadline for repayment. At the end of the sosāṭī, when members agree to disband it, money is either distributed to each member or invested in the village. The sosāṭī of Gothpada (Bajura) exemplifies the notion of transnational space as this group is run by both migrants and villagers, and the money earned by the sosāṭī pays the schoolteacher, food reserves and its manager. Links between Delhi and the village are therefore very strong: people borrow rice in the village and pay it back in Delhi. Sosāṭīs are much more successful than ciṭs. Some are even run exclusively by women and by Dalits and migrants may be part of different self-help groups. Even if belonging to such a group allows migrants to have access to credit, it also forces them to follow institutionalised rules and to take on “contractual obligations”. Risks exist but, more than financial support, “ciṭs and sosāṭīs are a way of expressing trust and maintaining social capital between individuals” (pp. 180-182).

Each meeting is a social event, “a focal point” (p. 180) in migrants’ lives, when alcohol consumption is high. At last, self-help groups offer some protection to migrants, who are not able to rely on the Nepalese embassy or are not willing to join Nepalese workers associations.

Even if Thieme recognizes that evaluating the migrants’ savings and remittances is “very challenging”, and because “there is no fixed pattern of sending money home” (p. 169), the author estimates that each migrant sends about 5,121 IRs to his/her village, notwithstanding collective remittances as mentioned in the Gothpada sosāṭī case. With no access to commercial banking, money travels by hand, with the risk of it being stolen or lost. The money is “mainly spent on consumption, e.g., for food
and clothes, to repay debts, and also to provide cash for livestock and fertilizers. Large amounts are also spent on marriages, rituals, religious festivals and funerals for the closest family members as well as the extended family” (p. 170). If some money is left, this is used for children’s education and the purchase of land. Here it would have been interesting to know the exact proportion of migrants who had reached these goals, after years of migration. Concluding on the “pluri-locality of migrants and non-migrating family members’ lives”, when “the household spans between Far West Nepal and Delhi” (pp. 176-177), Thieme insists on the fact that migrants never consider Delhi as “home” (ghar). Attachment to their village remains indisputable. They always expect to return to Nepal, to the hills or the Terai. The book ends with policy recommendations such as the need for accurate statistics about migration from Nepal to India and the necessary control of the use of remittances. For Thieme, migration research should contribute to policy-making at national level, but should also work hand-in-hand with local NGOs (which is what Thieme does with the South Asian Study Center based in Delhi).

At a time when international labour migration from Nepal is considered by Nepalese politicians to be the solution to Nepal’s under-development, this study helps to understand how migrants cope with life in a foreign land, and how mobility is used as a livelihood strategy. The whole book is very edifying and it will certainly remain a reference in Nepalese migration studies, though a few points could be improved. First of all, the lack of general statistics on the migrants interviewed, especially in terms of their caste and socio-economic background, does not enable the reader to fully understand the actual differences between migrants. It is as if all migrants had the same village background, the same objectives regarding migration and as if they had achieved the same goals. A thorough look at their life stories, in a diachronic approach to migration, might have shown that the migrants’ situation can evolve. As the years go by, migrants are gaining experience. For some of them, Delhi can become an attractive place to live. Some even go as far as settling more permanently in the Indian capital (as might be the case for the tailor mentioned on p. 113). I assume that the researcher has to focus on more marginal social facts, such as migrants who move away from the path traced by the older generation and decide to leave their “traditional” niche to fulfill higher ambitions. Some manage to buy land in the Terai, others remain poor throughout their lives. In a more general way, one needs to consider the migrant as an actor who has power over his/her fate, even though he/she often denies it. Secondly, Thieme, as a geographer, could have further developed relations to places, in particular to the urban area of Delhi. Clues are given but they are scattered throughout the book. For example, she stresses that “the longer migrants
live in Delhi, the more ambivalent their attitude is towards life in Delhi” (p. 98): this could have been studied in greater depth. It would have been interesting to compare different discourses about Delhi and practices in Delhi, in relation to personal migration histories. Thirdly, Thieme is right in explaining the migration process through the social capital theory. Nevertheless, I believe that networks do not explain everything. The individual ability to move to a foreign land, personal motivation and the desire to escape one’s own society are useful clues as to how migrants cope in a foreign environment. If networking is almost compulsory if one is not to get lost in a metropolis such as Delhi, one must not forget that, after years of living in a foreign land, one can build one’s own territory which becomes as familiar as the village. Space is appropriated, Hindi is spoken and links are created. Feeling at ease in Delhi also explains why migrants keep coming to the same place to earn their livelihood.

Reviewed by Joëlle Smadja, CNRS, Villejuif

David Zurick and Julsun Pacheco, with Basanta Shrestha and Birendra Bajracharya offer us a beautiful Atlas of the Himalaya that elegantly combines thirty-odd tables and charts, almost 300 maps and photographs, along with analysis and comments. The authors provide a panoramic overview of the Himalaya divided into five parts: 1) The regional setting; 2) The natural environment; 3) Society; 4) Resources and conservation; 5) Exploration and travel.

After fifty years of in-depth fieldwork and research in different places over the chain, following its opening to foreigners, many of us now feel the necessity to work on the scale of the Himalaya as a whole and to compare data. The work done by the authors of this book, which is indeed substantial, is one of the first attempts at such a synoptic perspective. It is worth pointing out that we can at last access reliable data which were, up to now, scattered among different books and papers. For this reason, the volume will be extremely useful for those working in the Himalaya or teaching about particular aspects of the range. Much of the information is original, and was recorded in the field by the authors, while other material is obtained from compiling and cross-checking a wide range of data from different sources: public administration records, atlases of the Himalayan countries etc. The many high-quality maps of the Himalaya, combined with an interesting text on its physical and human features, offer the reader a good idea of environmental problems in the region. The authors stressed the important fact that Himalayan peasants, thanks to their knowledge of their milieu, are not responsible for these problems but, on the contrary, contribute to solving them. They also emphasize issues related to environmental protection that are not often brought to the fore, notably crop damage due to wildlife and the necessity for proper participatory resource management.

Nevertheless, this book is not exempt from criticism. In a way, it is a complement to and at the same time a summary of D. Zurick and P. P. Karan’s earlier Himalaya. Life on the Edge of the World (1999), in which the
maps were already prepared by Y. Pacheco. Although this book is cited in the bibliography of the Atlas, it is surprisingly absent from the main presentation. However, in some respects, some of the comments and maps were better in the 1999 book.

Given the fact that this Atlas received scientific backing from prestigious institutions such as the American Geographical Society, Eastern Kentucky University and the National Science Foundation, and that it was produced by a geographer and a cartographer, we might have expected greater precision. In fact, some of the maps as well as parts of the text contain confusing mistakes, omissions and oversights, suggesting that it was inadequately checked before publication.

First, the fact that many illustrations are not dated means that they cannot be used by other researchers for comparative purposes. This is the case of several maps (such as the town maps) and all the photographs. Likewise, the captions to the photographs are rather insubstantial, lacking the detail that would have added meaning to their evident aesthetic value.

Another point regarding this Atlas is that it only reflects the fieldwork (albeit very extensive) carried out by the authors, and therefore presents a partial view of the Himalaya. Most of the photographs are from areas of Tibetan culture and thus illustrate a Buddhist world, as if Buddhism was predominant in the Himalaya. The book’s 1999 predecessor offers a more accurate picture of the diversity of the Himalaya: for example, there is a photograph of a Hindu temple in Kedarnath, whereas in the Atlas, by contrast, Tibetan flags are to be found on practically every page. Between the high summits, the high dry valleys and the plain, and except for a few towns, we are offered hardly any idea of the landscape of the middle and low mountains or hills.

Moreover, the eastern part of the chain is completely neglected except for Bhutan, and this has repercussions at several levels. The authors have obviously not been to Arunachal or to North-east India; while this is understandable since the area was only recently opened to foreigners, they do not even use studies published on this area, and present it as a totally unknown region. Published information on Arunachal has in fact been available for several decades, most notably perhaps an important book from the G. B. Pant Institute that appeared in 2002. There are photographs neither of the *jhum* (slash and burn shifting cultivation) nor of the *mithun*, the semi-domestic animal present throughout the eastern

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part of the chain. The only two photographs from this area (both by P.P Karan) are related to the Apatanis, who constitute one of the smallest groups in Arunachal. These omissions would not pose a problem if the Atlas were not entitled *Illustrated Atlas of the Himalaya*.

A few more examples of the work’s shortcomings may be cited.

- The first part of the book presents “The Regional Setting”. On several occasions the authors mention Nanga Parbat and Namche Barwa as the northwestern and northeastern limits of the Himalaya. However, up to page 70 (where it is mentioned on a map of the “Major Himalayan Trade Routes”), the location of Namche Barwa remains a mystery, and is given only once in the entire book despite its importance. The mountain does not even appear in the map index. The limits of the Himalaya are a subject of debate. There is general agreement that these are Nanga Parbat and Namche Barwa, which are located where two curves demarcate the range from the north-south oriented ranges of Pakistan/Afghanistan on the one hand, and from the Chinese and Burmese ranges on the other. However, the western and eastern frontiers are not perpendicular to these summits; the angle is wider and, when the authors consider that the “Brahmaputra” is the eastern limit of the chain, they do not take into account part of Arunachal Pradesh: the Mishmi hills, the Dibang and the Lohit valley, which belong to the Himalaya. I would say that Lohit corresponds more to the eastern limit of the Himalaya. Besides, the authors are not consistent since they include the whole of Arunachal State in their statistical data of the Himalaya. Lastly, a few words should be said about the name of the river that is called Tsangpo in Tibet and Brahmaputra in Assam. Where this river passes through Arunachal Pradesh, the authors refer to it as the Brahmaputra, whereas its proper designation in the Himalayan range should be the Siang. The published map of Arunachal gives this name, and not Brahmaputra. This could at least have been mentioned, since the river Siang gives its name to the two districts of Arunachal through which it flows: West Siang and East Siang. Furthermore, it is the name Siang that is used by the people of this area in their myths, tales and history.

Still in the first part of the book, in the fact files, Himachal Pradesh, Nepal and Bhutan are said to be characterised by a temperate to alpine monsoon climate, but neither Uttaranchal, Sikkim nor Arunachal Pradesh are credited with a monsoon climate. Why?

On page 28 we are told: “The middle mountains zone descends in altitude until it forms a line of outer foothills, known in India as the Churia Hills, in Nepal as the Siwaliks”: in fact it is the other way around.
- In part two, “The Natural Environment”, the geology of the range is detailed and accurate. But in the climatic part, page 55, the table related to temperature and precipitation for several stations in Nepal is not very helpful since the altitude of the stations is not given. The amount of rainfall given for Dailekh is surprising, and does not correspond to the mean values from previous years. Besides, the figure is in contradiction with the rainfall maps presented in the book. More importantly, this table leads the reader to imagine that far western Nepal would be rainier than eastern Nepal, which is not the case.

As for Cherrapunji (quoted on page 52), it is not located in Assam but in Meghalaya.

On page 57, the air pressure is not given in millibars as written in the caption, but in inches of mercury which is not at all the same (29.92 inches of mercury being equivalent to 1,013.25 millibars).

Nevertheless, this part offers a fine summary, and the ICIMOD map of Annual Precipitation in the Himalaya, on page 59, will be very useful for those who want to present the general features of the chain. It is a clear summary and illustrates very skilfully the climatic differences from the western to the eastern part of the range. Unfortunately, the lack of dates related to the mean rainfall values used to draw this map diminish its usefulness for scholars.

- The third part, devoted to “Society”, contains numerous mistakes.

On page 70, east and west are inverted: “The Tibetan empire reached its zenith during this period, extending as far east as Turkestan” (sic!).

Some of the mistakes are related to the emphasis laid on the Tibetan world, already revealed by the photographs. Thus, on page 73: “One of the problems faced by modern Himalayan societies is the impact of a burgeoning population. In the past, human numbers were kept in check by high mortality rates and by cultural practices such as polyandry, that acted to limit family size”. Now it is obvious that polyandry only concerns a handful of people in the Tibetan cultural area of the Himalaya as well as a few Hindu communities in Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. This point was well explained in the 1999 book but it no longer features, here, giving a distorted picture of the situation.187 On the same page, the map of the population density in the Himalaya shows high density in Ladakh in

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187 “In some cases, cultural factors also kept the Himalayan population from growing very fast. The practice of polyandry among the Buddhist highlanders, whereby a woman had several husbands — oftentimes brothers — limited household expansion and kept intact the land a family owned. But those practices were restricted to the Tibetan cultures living north of the Great Himalaya.” (Zurick & Karan, 1999, p 136)
1961 (1.5 to 3 persons per hectare)—the same as in the Nepalese Teraï, which is very surprising. One may wonder where these data come from.

Other mistakes related to the eastern part of the chain can be found on the map illustrating the location of different groups (page 75): the Apatanis and the Monpas are wrongly located.

Last but not least, the legend of the map related to ethnic groups in Nepal (page 76) shows a strong Newar presence in north-west Nepal, instead of a strong Bhotia one!

We should add that many legends have not been adapted to the scale of the maps and are not readable. For example, the details of the legend symbolised by different colours cannot be distinguished on the map of land-use on page 102, of soils on page 103 and on the map of cropland distribution, page 104. On this last map, the legend of the “Cereal-based irrigated cropland” has obviously been inverted with the “Dryland Crop”. Moreover, there seems to be little point in distinguishing between “monocrop” and “dryland crop” or “cereal based irrigated cropland”.

In this part, it is regrettable that the authors have ignored the studies related to tree plantations in fields to replace forest resources, a practice that challenges the univocal point of view related to deforestation.

- Part five evokes different kinds of “Explorations and Travels” in the course of the centuries: from pilgrimages and sacred explorations, trade-routes, journeys made by early foreign explorers — thus telling the story of how the chain was discovered — up to modern explorers, trekkers and mountaineers.. This part is well documented and illustrated. We will only note that the map of the Early Explorers (page 160) suggests that Kishen Singh crossed Assam and Arunachal, when in actual fact it was Kintup who did this. This is attested in the text and on another map on page 167 Kishen Singh route took him further north.

To conclude, it seems that many of the mistakes stem from documents being poorly adapted from others, and that the work is not quite complete since it comes across as not having been thoroughly checked or corrected. This may appear to be a very severe review, but aside from the mistakes listed above, whether due to the publisher or to the authors, this book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the region’s complexity, and particular note should be taken of the effort put into compiling such a useful overview. The authors have done a superb job of assembling a good mixture of data. The reader cannot fail to appreciate the beauty of the maps and pictures, as well as the insights provided by this volume. The book is unquestionably helpful, but needs to be used with caution. A future edition in which the errors were corrected would make for a first-rate reference book.
INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

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We would prefer that you send both “hard” and electronic copy of your contribution. Please use author-year citations in parenthesis within the text, footnotes where necessary, and include a full bibliography. This is often called the “Harvard format”.

In the body of your text:
It has been conclusively demonstrated (Sakya 1987) in spite of objections (Miller 1988:132-9) that the ostrich is rare in Nepal.

In the bibliography:

Use of quotation marks:
Use double quotation marks (" ") for quotations of any kind, and for so-called “epistemological distancing”.
Use single quotation marks (’’) for quotations within quotations and semantic glosss, including renderings of indigenous terms.

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