Articles

PADMA Dkar-po on Tantra as Ground, Path and Goal*

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1.1 Introduction

The locus classicus for Tibetan discussion of the word “tantra” is Guhyasamājatantra XVIII.33-34.1 The verses run:

\[prabandhān tantraṃ ākhyātaṃ tat prabandhān tridhā bhavet/ādhyātma; prakṛtiśeśeṁaṁ asamḥārya prabhedaṁ/33///prakṛtiśeśeśeṁaṁ asamḥārya yeśam tathā/ādhyātmatāntupāyaṁcā prabhastaurālayaṁtathā/34///\]

These verses say that tantra (rgyud) is continuity (prabandha; Tibetan usually rgyun-chags, but see notes 17, 23). This continuity is three-fold (tridhā, rnam-pa-gsum); it has three aspects (ākṛti, rnam-pa; cf. ākāra), described by two alternative sets of terms, thus:

- its nature (prakṛti, rang-bshin) is cause (hetu, rgyu);
- its foundation (ādhyātma, gzhi) is means (upāya, thabs);
- it is inalienable (asamḥārya, mi-phrog-pa): its effect or goal (phula, bras-bu).

Tibetans often call these simply “the three tantrás” (rgyud gsum) and identify them with the ground, path and goal mentioned in my title (gzhi, lam,bras-bu). This paper, Part I, is about Padma Dkar-po’s view of this connection in general, while Part II will review the application of these notions of ground, path and goal and their connection to “integration” (yuganaddha, zung-jug).

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Both in India and Tibet the most common way to expose one’s doctrine on any subject was to comment on an authoritative earlier work. (This fact alone accounts for the importance of hermeneutics—the theory of interpretation of texts—in these cultures.) Of course the process of commentary has to begin somewhere, and the word śāstra (bstan-bcos) was used especially of those independent texts1 which were not commentaries on older

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* This is the first of two papers which will appear in successive issues of this journal: the second will be called “Integration (Yuganaddha, zung-jug).” In the present paper, references to “Part II” will be to this second paper.
texts. Not any (independent) text (abhidhāna, rirod-byed) can count as a śāstra; there must be at least a content (abhidheya, brijk-bya), a specific purpose (prayojana, dgos-pa), a more general or distant purpose (prayojana-prayojana, dgos-pa'i dgos-pa or nying-dgos) and a connection between all of these (sambandha, 'brel-ba). The Buddhist tantras were considered to be śāstras in this precise sense, and in the introductions to important commentaries such as the Vimalaprabhā (on Kalacakra) or the Vajragarbha-jākā (on Hevajra), we find these five items listed and their application to the work under discussion specified. The tantras also pose special problems of interpretation (especially the Ghyamsamāja, which hardly mentions the completion stage) and so a special literature grew up on the hermeneutics of the tantras, and was known in Tibet as “methods of explanation (of the tantras)”, (rgyud-kyi) bshad-thabs. Perhaps one of the reasons for the weakness of Western attempts to set out what is to be understood by “tantra” is the almost complete neglect of such Indian and Tibetan ideas on interpretation.

As its title suggests, this article does not offer an historical account of the development of the basic ideas of tantra (I believe that we are not yet in a position to undertake such an account). However Padma Dkar-po’s views on interpretation are not always explicit, and to see what is going on we will quote and briefly review some other Tibetan comments on these fundamental verses of Ghyamsamāja tantra.

Within the field of bshad-thabs (methods of explanation), Sa-skya-pa Bsdod-nams Rtsi-mo (1142-82) was one who drew carefully the distinction between explanation of the words (tshig, rirod-byed) and of the content (don, brijk-bya). With regard to the first, the principal methods of the Sa-skya school are drawn from the “six instructions” (rgags ngag drug): with regard to the second, though the six instructions remain important, the three tantras are the main method. He divides the three tantras into the method itself and its application to the analysis of the tantras. Under the method itself he first quotes the two Ghyamsamāja verses and then says (I summarize quite crudely) that tantra as cause is the teaching which shows sentient beings what nirvāṇa is like by pointing out to them the nature of the skandhas, dhātus and āyatana and of their own body, speech and mind. Tantra as means includes abhiṣeka as the path of ripening, and the stages of generation and completion as the path of freedom. Tantra as effect or goal includes the samādi of understanding (rtogs-pa'i tings-nge-dzin) through which the buddhayāna and buddhajñāna become manifest. His application to the analysis of the tantras contains the remark that when one uses the “three tantras” the content of the text is to be described so that it can be internalized and realized (see note 7), in contrast with the tshig-don and yi-ge'i don methods of the “six instructions” which deal with the words. Sgam-po-pa Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal (1512-87) similarly deals with the “three tantras” under bshad-thabs and applies them to the content, though in the “outer” style of analysis (spyi'i rnam-bshad).

Near the beginning of his Sgron-gsal mchab-grel on the Pariyodadyotana, Tsong-kha-pa quotes the same GST verses and comments:

The literal meaning (sgra don) of tantra is continuity. In the verse, “nature” means the nature of the jewel-like adept (sgrub-pa-po, sādakāya); this is tantra as cause. “Foundation” means tantra as means, the four-part sāvā-sādhanā in two stages. The goal is to enter the unlocalized nirvāṇa as Vajradhāra or as the yuganaddhakāya, these being inalienable. This is Nāropa’s explanation of the threefold division of tantra itself, while Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta explain causal tantra as the dharmatā of mind.

He calls all this the content (brijk-bya) of the tantra which by implication is contrasted with the following explanation of the text by means of the “seven oraments”.

Though continuity (prabandha), twice is conspicuous in the GST verse, the texts so far quoted are equally conspicuous in their failure to say what it is. Why is it continuity which is threefold, etc.? Bu-ston Rinchen-grub (1290-1364) gives a slightly longer account in which continuity is more prominent. After quoting the verses he says: According to these verses the word ‘tantra’ thus introduced means much connected, bound, continuous. This is three: tantra as cause, as means, and as effect or goal.

He then gives two explanations, each involving all three aspects: it seems that the first explanation is mainly from the viewpoint of continuity as the ground while the second is mainly from the viewpoint of the path.

First, the Vajraśekhara says: ‘Tantra is said to be continuous, and sansāra is assigned to tantra.’ This is the aspect of the man of sansāra (khor-ba-pa). By ‘nature’ the verse means that the nature of things (gnas-lugs) is from the beginning that of the radiant light and that it abides continually and eternally, and this is tantra. Since however mind is also by nature radiant light from the beginning, when it is covered by obscuring delusions which do not really exist, one speaks of sansāra. Now, the stage where there are no obscurations at all is that of the buddha. Since it is the case of lacking obscurations it is tantra as cause. The means by which one is freed from obscurations is tantra as means. The ultimate of renunciation and understanding in which there is no obscuration at all is tantra as goal or effect. Here two illustrating quotations are omitted.] Secondly, the main part of tantra as means is the stage of completion, whose preliminaries are the stage of generation, abhiṣeka, and their helpers, the vows and commitments. These are called
the foundation (ādhiṭṭhāna) since they are the ultimate conditions, accompanied by actions, which bring about the setting-up and stability of the goal or effect, just as the earth is the foundation for the establishment of a sprout (from a seed). Once limitless adventitious defilements have been given up, this tantra-as-cause cannot be alienated by obscurations accompanied by karmic traces (viśama). The ultimate, unconquerable renunciation and understanding is tantra as goal, since it always preserves its continuity.

Like Tsong-kha-pa, Bu-ston continues by contrasting these three tantras as the content, with the tantra as a text explained by means of the seven ornaments.

The passages quoted so far all follow the verses in taking the three tantras as cause, means and goal/effect; they do not go on to make an explicit correlation with ground/path/goal (gzhis/laṃbras-bu) though no doubt this is implied. Nor do they resolve the ambiguity of phala, bras-bu between “effect” and “goal.” For while effect is what is naturally contrasted with cause, what is described under this heading looks more like a goal. The remaining writers introduce the ground/path/goal trio right from the beginning, and since in this trio there is no cause I shall translate “bras-bu” as “goal”—though as we will see there are still some reasons for keeping “effect.” Ādhiṭṭhāna does seem to mean “foundation” and of course correlates with “path” (not “ground,” gzhis) in the new trio. Now we go on to Kong-sprul’s account (probably based on Padma Dkar-po’s) which illustrates the point made in note 1, since the verse text is greatly altered. For instance it no longer speaks of continuity (rgyun-chags) but of connection (brel-bu). However, Kong-sprul considers both:

The whole meaning of the anuttarayogatanastras is subsumed under ground, path and goal. However these three are connected and abide continuously like a stream (read rgyun for rgyu) of water. Prokṣhātantra is tantra as cause and is called gzhis dngos-po’i gnas-lugs; ādhiṭṭhāna-tantra is tantra as means and is called a graded path; and inalienable tantra is called tantra as goal: this is the triad of ground, path and goal. Thus inseparable body-mind is tantra as ground, the inseparable generation and completion stages are tantra as path, and the inalienable buddhabodies are called tantra as goal. The purity of inseparable body-mind or awareness is cause since this is the similarity behind the type of the perfect buddhas, and is tantra because it is the unchanging connection and continuity between a sentient being and a buddha. The stages of generation and completion are means since, on account of their substance or lineage, they illuminate the ultimate buddhas, and are tantra because they are connected with the ahīsaka, the vows and the commitments, which are connected with the two graded paths, which are connected to the two buddha-bodies. Of these two tantras the first is the grasping cause and the second is the cooperating condition (of buddha-condition), and though both are unclear, they become clear: but they do not arise after previously being non-existent. Tantra as cause is purified by tantra as means, and their

becoming unobscured and manifest is tantra as goal: for like the sky this cannot be alienated by any cause from its firmness and continuity.

Most of the difficulties in this passage will become clear when Padma Dkar-po’s treatment is considered; however Kong-sprul’s own treatment already provides good reasons for translating the new gzhis (connected with tantra as cause) by “ground.” We have seen Kong-sprul gloss this gzhis with dngos-po’i gnas-lugs; in fact Kong-sprul and Padma Dkar-po both correlate the trios mentioned already with another, viz. dngos-po’i gnas-lugs/bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa which, as we will see, derives from Tilopa. In Kong-sprul’s treatment this feature is fairly peripheral, but in Padma Dkar-po’s it is important. The Tibetan of Padma Dkar-po’s treatment is given in full in Appendix A, but before we go on to consider it (1.2-3) we must discuss more carefully the situations to which it is intended to apply.

Texts entitled rgyud-sde spyi’i nambzhag are concerned mainly with the outer (spyi) analysis or division (nambzhag) of the tantrapitaka (rgyud-sde) section of the buddha-utterance. Padma Dkar-po’s work of this kind, subtitled “which seduces the minds of the learned,” begins with a general discussion involving the word “tantra:” as the opening remark of Kong-sprul’s treatment reminds us, serious discussion of this word is often confined to the narrower context of the anuttarayogatanastras. In this context Padma Dkar-po (like Kong-sprul) frequently glosses “ground” (gzhis) with dngos-po’i gnas-lugs which for him is a technical term meaning, at least very roughly, “things taken in non-dual cognition.” Here and elsewhere it seems that for Padma Dkar-po the normal starting-point of analysis is the cognitive condition of the ārya or the buddha, rather than of the ordinary person, the prthagjana or the sems-can. We will see that not even everybody who practices the anuttarayogatanastras has access to this cognitive condition.

Guenther has made a comparison of Padma Dkar-po with Jaspers, in which dngos-po’i gnas-lugs is somehow connected with “Being-in-itself,” which he glosses as “the transcendent totality of man.” This comparison prefaces one of his translations of Padma Dkar-po’s summary. He says that Being-in-itself has an affinity with Existenz, but the comparison is useless unless we know more about this affinity. Nor do we learn what Tibetan term or notion he is comparing with Jaspers’ Dasein. His claim that “there is a considerable similarity between Buddhist Tantrism and Western existentialist thought” remains pristinely empty, at least for this reader. Though dngos-po’i gnas-lugs may transcend certain dualities it remains, as far as I can see, within experience; that is not to say that it is an object of experience or that it is part of ordinary everyday experience. To say that something is (or is a part or aspect of) an experience other than what we normally enjoy is quite different from claiming that it is beyond experience.
Padma Dkar-po was no doubt both a historian and a mystic, but as a thinker he is both comparatively ahistorical and down-to-earth, concerned with the place, time and condition of those around him. A comparison with existentialism might perhaps be grounded on some common concern with value, but I know of no attempt by Guenther to spell out such a comparison, even in the most vague and nominal way.  

In order to understand Padma Dkar-po it may be more helpful to recall Karl Potter’s typology of Indian philosophies. His main distinction is between “speculative” and “path” philosophy. This distinction is grounded in the claim that the main concern of Indian philosophy is bondage and freedom and the path between the two. Whatever the merits of the general claim, it certainly applies to Padma Dkar-po. Whereas the path philosopher is one whose main concern is to say what the path is, the speculative philosopher tries to establish such a path or paths. Potter distinguishes between those who try to demonstrate that there exists a causal chain of stages leading from bondage to freedom from those who, to the extent that they are interested in speculation at all, deny that such causal chains exist. He calls Nāgārjuna a leap philosopher, as one of the latter class; and I think that Padma Dkar-po partly falls in this class since, though he has a good deal to say about the stages by which the goal is reached (bras-bu skye-ba’i rim-pa) he has little that is systematic to say about how the prthagajana becomes an ārya. In any case, his concern is much more to say what the path is than to show that it is a path; and in this respect too he is like other Mādhyamikas since Nāgārjuna himself, for Mādhyamikas deny that any reductive account can be given of causation, and so for them nothing can constitute a demonstration that any chain of states is a causal chain. So when he says that something is a cause or a condition of buddhahood (as Kong-sprul did in the passage quoted) we must refrain from any expectation (if we have one) that he will justify this claim, otherwise than in a purely descriptive way.

Padma Dkar-po’s great synthesis of Vajrayāna is called Jo-bo Nāropa’i khyad-chos bsre’-pho’i gzhung-grel rdo-ri’-chang-gi dgongs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa. Here the phrase gzhung-grel refers to the literary form, which is that of a commentary (grel-pa) upon the lines of a root-text (gzhung) printed with it, viz. Tilopa’s Bka’ yang-dag-pa’i lsha-ma zhes-bya-ba mkha’-gro-ma’i man-ngag (i.e. the dākini’s instruction called ‘commandment of real knowledge’; this last phrase is in contrast with the merely conventional [uyavahāra] pramāṇa to be found in the text-books). In Padma Dkar-po’s own title, the first part means “the special teaching of the Lord Nāropa, the bsre’-pho (cycle).” Here bsre’-pho is probably short for bsre’-ba dang ’pho-ba dang grong-jug, the division of the practices of the upāya-mārga into three cycles: under bsre’-ba (attunement) come the inner heat, karmamudrā, the illusory body, dream, the radiant light, and the intermediate state(s); transference ’pho-ba and resurrection grong-jug each have their own cycle. The last part of Padma Dkar-po’s title is ornamental and means “clarifying the intentions of Vajradhāra”; dgongs-pa (Skt. often abhirātya) may mean “intention” generally or may mean what is implied by words not meant to be taken literally. Following Padma Dkar-po’s own use, this work will be called gzhung-grel for short. The discussion of its main themes opens with the distinction between two kinds of person, the cig-car-ba and the rim-gyis-pa. The cig-car-ba has accumulated a great deal of merit, is usually an ārya practicing the anuttarayogatantras, is suitable to receive the entire teaching at once, and has moments of insight (darsāna, mthong-bar) which are compared with the sun shining through clouds; it is this insight which is called dagos-po’i gnas-lugs. It forms the ground upon which his path rests and, as far as it goes, does not differ from the cognition of a perfect buddha. By contrast, the rim-gyis-pa has less merit, does not receive the whole teaching at once, and does not have these moments of insight. He may still be an ārya and practice the anuttarayogatantras, but for him there is a different structuring of the upāya-mārga. He will not attain buddhahood in this lifetime, but may do so from the intermediate state between death and rebirth. Since he does not have full insight he cannot take his own defilements as the path. It seems difficult to see how such a person could be on the darśanamārga, but Padma Dkar-po does not seem to explain this. In any case, the cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa distinction is not one of stages (avasthā, gnas-skabs) such as that of the prthagajana, ārya and buddha (also an important distinction for Padma Dkar-po). He recognized a third, intermediate personality type, the thod-rgal-ba, roughly speaking, the three-fold distinction is for mahāmudrā while the twofold one is for the upāya-mārga. Mahāmudrā is related in some ways to rdzogs-chen, which is so important for the Rnying-ma-pas, and, as Guenther has pointed out, the rdzogs-chen tradition connected with Klong-ch’en-pa Drim-med ’Od-zer (1303-63) also recognized a similar distinction, in which the “quick” type is called khregs-chod-pa.

With this group of traditions we may contrast a second group in which this kind of distinction was neglected. Kong-sprul, writing in the Kar-ma Bka’-bgyud tradition, seems to have considered almost everybody to be a cig-car-ba. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Bu-ston, and Tsong-kha-pa seem to have thought that everybody progresses along a graded path throughout.

In terms of Potter’s model, bondage and liberation are different; if not, what is the point of dharma? (And even behaviorally it seems clear that people in India and Tibet treat those whom they see as liberated quite differently from others.) Nobody in Tibet has succeeded in carrying out Potter’s project of constructing a satisfactory causal sequence leading from bondage to liberation; everybody has a break somewhere. Klong-ch’en-pa and Padma Dkar-po have a break connected with the first moment of in-
sight, the entry onto the darśanamārga (for some), and thereafter maintain continual progress to (and not merely towards) the goal, really because the essential feature of the goal is already present (in Padma Dkhor-po’s technical language, precisely this claim is made by saying that sambhārik-satya is the upādānāvṛtti of yukanaddha). In the second group of traditions, including Kong-sprul (sic) and also Padma Dkhor-po’s rim-gyis-pa, the goal either remains something transcendental (perhaps like one of Kant’s regulative ideas) or is attained in a mysterious way after death. Apart from the last feature, the distinction is perhaps parallel to that found in Ch’an and commented upon by Suzuki and others.

Can one see any general feature of the thought of Padma Dkhor-po and Klong-chen-pa which might, as it were, ground the importance they attached to distinguishing the fast type from the slow? The notion of a buddha is not an observational one. It is partly grounded in various cognitive and epistemic concepts (such as the right knowledge, samyakajñana, of the Lankavatāra). For Padma Dkhor-po the cognitive concept is dngos-po’i gnas-lugs; this represents for him the standard of what is to count as proper knowledge. It does not matter particularly whether it is called buddha-knowledge or not (and cf. note 27), just as the sūtras say that buddhas appear or not, the dharmatā of dharmas continues unchanged and provides the path to liberation. According to this line of thought, the person who (even though sometimes and impermanently) exercises a correct cognition is able to recognize his own remaining confusions and cure them, while another person cannot. What will be the path for the first type of person will be poison for the second, and vice-versa. As to the question whether there are people who possess such a cognition to a sufficient degree, Padma Dkhor-po regards it as simply a matter of fact that there are, since he mentions well-known persons as cig-car-ba or thed-rgal-ba in several places. We may perhaps feel that this analysis has not removed all the obscurity surrounding the distinction, but I think enough has been done to make it at least plausible that Padma Dkhor-po did not need to see it as a problem.

The rest of this article will be concerned only with the cig-car-ba. (The special features of the thed-rgal-ba have been treated elsewhere. For the present purposes, directly or indirectly related to the upāya-mārga, he may be regarded as a rim-gyis-pa.) Within the oeuvre of Padma Dkhor-po this choice is natural, since his writing about the cig-car-ba is (or seems to us) clearer and more intelligible than that about the rim-gyis-pa. But there is a further point, perhaps particularly relevant to the interpretation of these texts in the West, rather than in the cultural context for which they were written. The path of the cig-car-ba does not normally extend beyond one lifetime and does not force us to decide what we are to understand by the doctrine of reincarnation; and this is just as well, since the coherence and intelligibility of the latter doctrine seem to be a matter of dispute in the West.

Padma Dkhor-po divides the subject-matter of the gzhaṅ-grel into two (see Appendix B): the person who is to be introduced (‘jug-pa) and the path (lam) into which s/he is to be introduced. Here “path” is to be understood in the broadest and most general sense; more on this below. The part about the person makes the cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa distinction just reviewed. Naturally, the part about the path is divided into their two paths. To refine what was said in the last paragraph: the cig-car-ba’s path is the main topic of both the gzhaṅ-grel and this article. This path is itself divided into ground, path and goal. “Path” here seems to have the same sense in both cases; the reference changes, not because there are two items (two paths) in the world, as it were, but rather the same thing as viewed in a different aspect (ngos). Later on some parts of this path are themselves divided into ground, path and goal (see Appendix B). Though Padma Dkhor-po does not say so explicitly, it seems to me that there are not a multiplicity of grounds, paths and goals. It seems much more plausible that the same ground, path and goal are being viewed in different ways (some evidence will be presented for this belief). Indeed ground, path and goal are themselves aspects of a single whole, rather than separate things, as Kong-sprul has noted and Padma Dkhor-po (and Prof. Guenther) observe.

Still, it will do no harm to introduce a notation to distinguish these possibly different (though not separate) paths: at worst, redundancy will result. Let us say that the path, is divided into ground, path, and goal. As is well-known (Appendix B) the path, is itself divided into two phases, the path of ripening (smin-lam, vaipākika-mārga) mainly concerned with abhiseka, and the path of freedom (grol-lam) which contains the standard practices of the upāya-mārga. The term grol-lam is not especially characteristic of the upāya-mārga: it refers rather to mahāmudrā, which forms part of the ground. The stage of generation (bskyed-rim) is taken in common for all these practices: they are distinguished at the stage of completion (rdzogs-rim): the inner heat (gtum-mo), karman mudrā (las-rgya), the illusory body (sgru-lus), dream (rti-lam), the radiant light (od-gsal), the intermediate state(s) (bar-do), transference (pho-ba), and resurrection (grong-’jug). The divisions of the goal section will be discussed in Part II. The division of the ground section into branches of dngos-po’i gnas-lugs and sens dngos-po’i gnas-lugs (and their various subdivisions) are very important but need not occupy us here. All these points are seen much more clearly with the aid of a sa-bcads such as that given in Appendix B. The sa-bcads of course tells us in the first place the structure of the text (and often its most interesting features are seen best by omitting the finer subdivisions). If the writer is in control of his material, the structure of the text will reveal something of the structure of his thought: I have certainly found this to be so with Padma.

The rim-gyis-pa’s path is not thus divided into ground, path and goal, but has a structure related to the five stages of the Pañcakrama.
In what sense do these heterogeneous lists of items form paths? As far as I can see, there is no reason to think of them as forming a single unit of some kind. Each path is simply a collection of methods, the explanation and practice of which no doubt descend from Nāropa, and which can conveniently be carried out on different occasions (gnas-skabs). Many distinct methods of mahāmudrā, and each of the different techniques of the upāya-mārga just listed, may by themselves lead to the goal; in this sense they are independent of one another, but it can still be convenient to combine them in various ways. An explanation of what the individual techniques consist of is beyond the scope of this paper; so, therefore, is an account of how they may be combined.

Returning now to the full path, of the cig-car-ba, we are to enquire into the relation between ground, path, and goal as different aspects of tantra, continuity. And now we see the point of continuity: it unifies the discrete states of development. As Kong-sprul and Bu-ston have hinted and Padma Dkar-po will explain more fully, the continuity is provided by the unchanging awareness of gnos-po'i gnos-lugs, having the nature of the radiant light and remaining the same throughout all the stages of progress from that of a sentient being to that of a buddha. Guenther’s misunderstanding of the key sentence in which Padma Dkar-po expresses this point is one of the reasons why his accounts of this topic, in spite of the many useful points which they make, remain so obscure to this reader.

1.2 Padma Dkar-po’s summary on ground, path & goal for the cig-car-ba

It is called gnos-po'i gnos-lugs because it is the nature (rang-bzhin, prakrti) of everything, or the way everything is (gnas-tshul), from forms (rūpa) to the cognition of all modes (ākāra). Since it abides continuously like the unchanging sky (during a person’s progress) from sentient being to buddha it is called tantra as nature. Since this nature abides as a self-established radiant light and is unobscured from the beginning by the defilement of karmic traces it is called suchness, and this has many synonyms such as ‘cause’ Vajradhara, ‘ground-mahāmudrā,’ ‘born-together by nature,’ ‘original buddha,’ dhātusgata-garbhā &c. If in itself it were not the radiant light, it could not become stainless, just like coals when washed. For this reason, Maitreya has said 'though sentient beings are encaused in defilement, this does not inhere in them from the beginning. So it is said that from the beginning, the nature of mind is stainless.'

Although in this way it does not transcend this nature, it is established as indestructible thig-le through its appearances and its determinate transformations by which it becomes the ground of ji-sned-pa things such as the skandhas, dhātus and ayatanas of impure samsāra and also, when these are purified of obscuration, of the inexhaustible patterning of one’s life as the body, speech and mind of a tathāgata, and so it is called ‘type’ or ‘all-characteristics’ or ‘all-faculties.’

Since this (tattva or gnos-po’i gnos-lugs) is the grasping cause of buddhahood, the Mahāsiddha Lavapa’s remark that tantra as cause is a person who accomplishes that which is difficult to attain must be taken to mean that this is the person’s subtle self. Nāropa has sometimes said that such a person is like a precious jewel, and just as such a person is said to belong to the “definite” type of (those who achieve a) great realization, it must be the subtle self which from the beginning belongs to this “definite” type. The coarse person may be called a coarse self: fools see the skandhas &c. and take them for a subject since for them there is nothing to be taken for a person apart from the perceived skandhas &c. Thus the Madhyamakāvatāra (VI.124) says: Since nothing outside the skandhas can be shown to be a subject... But no difference is observed between the person and the skandhas. How then does the idea of a person arise when the skandhas are perceived? A person is imputed on the basis of the skandhas. The same work says (MMV VI.138-9): The Muni has shown that the self (bdag) depends on the sixth dhātus earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness, on contact with the eye and other senses, and on the grasping of dharmas by mind and mental events.

The coarse self is called the inferior person, the subtle self is called the great person. Here one may wonder whether, in speaking of a subtle self, there is not some similarity with the views of the Hindus. This is not the case. Although the subtle person is here called a “self,” if it is intuitively understood as in the intuitive understanding of cittavivāka, this understanding is the best possible antidote to the Hindu view of a self.

In the Mahāyānasamāgraha, Asaṅga says that on the path of an ordinary person one does not see the ālaya, but once one has attained the bhūmis one sees it in prabhūtalabdhaśūlāna. And in the Bṣang-sknyon-gis chos-pa it is claimed that when satya is not seen, there is no understanding of the viśītān-dhātu. This must mean (dongs-pa ste) that one does not see in the manner established as indestructible by the wind (rūpa) of illusion which is beyond transformation(s), since this is the field of perception for those āryas who have attained the bhūmis. So the Rdo-rje ’phreng-ba says: ‘In the three worlds there is nothing other than my life to become the essence.’ Through the wind of illusion the three worlds appear like visions in a dream.
We speak of a path because one has to travel on the basis of the means of ripening and freedom just within this stainless gnas-lugs; and it is a graded path because there is a continuity from the stage of accumulation right up to the vajra-level. This (gnas-lugs) is also the ground on which all qualities grow and rest, and so we speak of tantra as ground; and since it is also the cooperating condition (sahakāri-prayāya) of rising into Buddhahood, we speak of tantra as means. The goal is to become Vajradhāra, the source of benefit for others, untainted by adventitious defilements arising from causes and conditions. As long as there remain sentient beings (limitless) like the sky, the (process of) enlightenment will continue without interruption. This is a graded emergence, and so we speak of the goal arising in stages or of tantra as goal. Since it overcomes obstacles by means of the (very) defilements of sânāta, and since, even though it is as if one had entered a nirvāṇa in which cognition was interrupted, there is a continuing concern with the needs of others, it is called inalienable tantra.

Thus the Guhyasamāja-uttaratantra (XVIII.33-4) says: 'Tantra is said to be continuity, and this is threefold: its foundation, its nature and its inalienableness. Here “nature” is cause, “foundation” is means, and “inalienableness” is the goal: these three summarize the meaning of tantra.' But why does the explanation in terms of dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs &c. apply only to the path, of the person of sharp senses? Does it not also apply to the path of the rim-gyis-pa? (But) the non-dual cognition of specific things (lus dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs), which is wholly comprehended by the two satyas, fully brings about purposes without limit; and the manifest joy in the best goal of Sukhāvatī is the cig-car-ba.

1.3 Reconstruction of an argument from Padma Dkar-po's summary

Our next aim is to extract and lay bare the general line of the argument which is sometimes clearly expressed and sometimes perhaps implied by Padma Dkar-po in the passage, printed in Appendix A, of which the previous section contains my attempt at an English rendering. Padma Dkar-po himself describes the passage as a summary (beslurs-don), and we must remember that it is only about 1% of the length of the full version; it is not surprising that much of what is carefully argued in the full version appears to be just dogma in the summary.

In making such a reconstruction, as in reading one, we must bear in mind the necessary limits of such an enterprise. It is not possible to mirror the Tibetan text in, or into, English. This is why on the whole I have avoided the word “translation” with its unfortunate connotation of neutral, value-free, culture-independent mirroring. My English rendering inevitably contains a considerable element of interpretation already. But in spite of this, in the previous section I tried to let the text “speak for itself” as much as I could, and to acknowledge my interpretative contribution as explicitly as possible by using brackets, footnotes &c., even while remaining conscious that there can be no hard-and-fast distinction between the text as interpreted and what is supplied by the interpreter. I have also tried strenuously to make accessible to the reader the raw materials on which my judgments are based. The text is printed in Appendix A, the structure of the work in which it appears is summarized in Appendix B, and as far as possible, interpretation is based on Padma Dkar-po's own works, to which careful references are given. While similar principles will apply to the reconstruction, I propose to give much freer play to my own judgments about Padma Dkar-po's general purposes and how to argue for them. I have no privileged access: the reader who thinks he can do better is free to have a go. These standards are commonplace in many areas of enquiry, and I see no impediment, and every good reason, why they should be taken seriously in Vajrayāna studies.

The gzhung upon which Padma Dkar-po is commenting sums up the path, of the cig-car-ba in the famous lines

/dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs lam dang ni/ /bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa'o/

which just list the ground (dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs), the path (lam) and the goal, or rather what is correlated with it, viz. 'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa. The Guhyasamāja verses, of course, contain and comment upon the words “tantra is continuity, and this is threefold.” In his summary, Padma Dkar-po sets up a correlation between the two sets of verses, so that each can be seen as an illustration of the other. The main stages in setting up this correlation are:

I. The GST verses apply to the cig-car-ba (and not to the rim-gyis-pa)
II. The cig-car-ba (not the rim-gyis-pa) has the capacity for dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs.
III. dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs is the continuity mentioned in the GST verses.
IV. dgongs-po'i gnas-lugs, in different aspects, is ground, path and goal.
V. Ground, path and goal are correlated with the other two sets of three categories introduced in the GST verses.

Point I is not dealt with in the summary. Point II is almost a definition: something less than it, forming perhaps a basis for it, is found in the discussion of a “determinate type” (especially in the obscure remark in which Padma Dkar-po interprets the quotation from the Bzang-skyong-gis zhus-pa). Point III is made in the very beginning of the summary. Point IV is dealt with in the final section of the summary beginning with “We speak of a path because . . .” What there is of point V is also found there.

I. THE GST VERSES APPLY TO THE CIG-CAR-BA, for the Guhyasamāja as a whole applies to him, according to old arguments in the grub-sde-bdun literature. In any case, the path of the cig-car-ba makes direct use of his defilements, and so the verses sarvakāminopahogyasita &c. of the tantra apply to him, and not to the rim-gyis-pa. The result is also obtained by combining II with III.

II. THE CIG-CAR-BA HAS THE CAPACITY FOR DNGOS-PO'i GNAS-LUGS. This section of the summary is awkwardly interpolated into
the main argument, is loosely and elliptically worded, and comes over very weakly in N.

Padma Dkar-po first introduces the notion of “type” (rigs) for the cig-car-ba in connection with the idea of mi-shigs-pa’i thig-le as the capacity for both samsāra and nirvāṇa: but he does not tell us what the connection is. He continues by discussing “type” in the most general sense, as in apoha-avāda. The point seems to be that the type of the cig-car-ba, though of course a particular type, does not belong to any special kind of type, so that nothing can be said about its being a type other than what holds for types in general. However, the type-idea is explicitly applied to those destined for a great realization of non-duality. This type is determined from the very beginning, and so must include everybody destined to attain buddhahood, not only the cig-car-bas; the connection between the two classes is not explained. In any case, what makes a person so destined is not part of the five skandhas, on the basis of which there is only the (illusion of) the coarse self. It is found in the subtle self and this is not visible until one reaches the bhūmis (presumably the first, pramūdita). Normally this happens on the svādhīsthānakrama. However, it is on the previous stage, the cittaviśuddhi-krama, that the experience of cittaviśvika shows one that the Hindu notion of the ātman in inappropriate; so presumably this stage includes a partial knowledge of the subtle self.

Again, it is when one sees satya that one understands the vijmānadhātu and/or the ālaya and/or the subtle self: one sees indestructibly (mi-shigs-pa), one sees the field of perception of the āryas. In the Guhyasamāja system one sees satya on the cittaviśuddhi-krama and this may well be what Padma Dkar-po has in mind here, though this (saṃvṛti) satya is not purified by the radiant light until the next krama, and on other grounds he would certainly object to such a division. In any case, it is this mode of seeing which is dngos-po’i gnas-lugs, and since the capacity to understand the vijmānadhātu &c. is found in the subtle self, there too is the capacity for dngos-po’i gnas-lugs. All in all, it seems most likely that Padma Dkar-po does have the svādhīsthānakrama in mind here. And in spite of all the talk about a “determinate” type, it seems that any description (let alone argument) specific to the cig-car-ba is going to rest on some distinction, as yet unspecified, in the subtle self.

There seem to be two possible ways of looking at this section of the summary. The first is to see it as an attempt to ground the cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa difference in a distinction within what we might call the mind (more narrowly, within the subtle self), followed by an account of how the right kind of subtle self has the capacity for dngos-po’i gnas-lugs. Evidently this attempt fails because we do not know enough about the subtle self. The second possibility is to regard it as a descriptive strengthening of something we know already, perhaps because the cig-car-ba is defined as somebody with the disposition to dngos-po’i gnas-lugs and we do know that such people exist, but we want a fuller account of what these claims come to. I think Padma Dkar-po probably saw the matter in this second way, for if he had seen it in the first way, he would surely have given such an account not in the bs dus-don, but in the section about the distinction of persons (gang ’jug-pa rt en-gyi gang-zag). (Kong-sprul is not faced with this particular problem since [so it seems] he does not want to make the distinction. But he faces the problem of explaining the verses sarvakāmopabhogā &c. and the poison/cure verses.)

III. DNGOS-PO’I GNAS-LUGS AS CONTINUITY. For the purpose of this argument, to Padma Dkar-po’s opening remark that dngos-po’i gnas-lugs is the nature or mode of being of everything we must add the gloss that that nature is its being cognised non-dually. There is a tension in this conception: sometimes it is taken somewhat ontologically, emphasizing the things: which can be cognised by anyone, whether sentient being or buddha (but in the former case not in this mode), and sometimes the emphasis is epistemic, on its non-duality or on its subjective quality as the radiant light. The same tension crops up again in the claim that the nature of things as the radiant light remains unchanged under obscuration (note 54). The best way with this difficulty is probably to abandon the sentient beings and start with the āryas. The non-dual aspects are called just suchness (de-kho-nar-yid &c.). In any case the ontological aspect does not imply commitment to objects of any particular kind (so if this is an “ontology” it is very weak). Though not everyone can see things in this mode, it is their nature so to be seen, and this nature (prakṛti) is what is referred to in the phase prakṛti-tantra. (Padma Dkar-po implicitly denies the connection between this and tantra as cause asserted in the verse.) This prakṛti becomes the source of both samsāra and nirvāṇa, and its capacity to manifest in a manifold of appearances is given names such as g dangs and mi-shigs-pa’i thig-le; but of course there is no ontological separation between this prakṛti and its appearances. Another sense of “continuity as causality” is just the continuity or identity of the prakṛti underlying both samsāra and nirvāṇa.

IV. DNGOS-PO’I GNAS-LUGS, IN DIFFERENT ASPECTS. AS GROUND, PATH AND GOAL.

Ground-continuity: the summary says that all desirable qualities arise out of the cognitive experience of dngos-po’i gnas-lugs, which is therefore the ground. The point about continuity is obvious: the point that desirable cognitive qualities arise has already been made. As in other parts of the discussion it seems difficult to see how ethically desirable qualities arise.

Path-continuity: the attitude (lta-ba) towards abhiseka and the upāyamārga is gnas-lugs (in its aspect of ground-mahāmudrā), and the preparations, rituals, practices and actions for and of abhiseka and the upāyamārga take place within this attitude, which is therefore the continuity of the path.

Goal-continuity: Padma Dkar-po’s treatment surely rests on an equivocation with different applications of “goal” (bras-bu, phala). One’s own goal
is to become Vajradhara, but this has nothing to do with continuity. He says that *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs* is causal Vajradhara (*rgyu rdo-rje 'dzin*) but this is continuity in general or perhaps ground-continuity, but not goal-continuity. The goal for others is that they too should become Vajradhara. Now if "goal" is taken collectively this is a continuous process, since people attain enlightenment individually and not all at once. From the point of view of a bodhisattva concerned with this collective process, no doubt there is a continuity; but it seems artificial to say that this is tantra or *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*. On the other hand, if one goes back to looking at the process from the point of view of the individuals involved (rather than collectively) one is again left only with continuity in general. It might be better to say merely that goal-continuity is the gradual emergence of the goal (*'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*) but Padma Dkar-po is certainly trying to squeeze more out of the idea than this. He says in the summary that *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa* is the gradual emergence of the goal-for-others; yet if we look at what the *gzhung-grel* actually says under the heading *'bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa*, this claim too seems like an equivocation. It seems clear that that section deals with the emergence of the goal seen from the point of view of each individual traversing the path. To this it might be replied that the individual goal, to become Vajradhara, cannot be achieved unless all sentient beings achieve the same state too, so that the distinction between the individual and the collective goal is an illusion. But I am certain that Padma Dkar-po would repudiate this line of defence, for he saw the attainment of buddhahood as something that can occur within ordinary historical time, and has occurred to individuals whom he names. The purpose of the *cig-car-ba/rim-gyis-pa* distinction revolves about this belief; whereas of course the collective process, as he says himself, is endless.

*Dngos-po'i gnas-lugs as linking ground, path and goal*: about the linking of ground and path enough has been said already, and the close connection of ground and goal is well-known (and does not depend especially on the use of the term *dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*). But Padma Dkar-po has something interesting to say about the causal links of path and goal. In the summary he says that *gnas-lugs* is the cooperating condition (*sahakārī-pratāpaya*) of buddhahood and so is tantra as means. He also says that it is the grasping cause (*upadāma-hetu*) of buddhahood. Clearly these remarks, unless they are merely slogans trading on shifting and perhaps metaphorical uses of such words as means (*thabs, upāya*) and path (*lам, mārga*) demand to be filled out with some kind of account of the causal connection, even though, for general reasons mentioned in my introductory remarks to this reconstruction, one must not expect more than a description.

Padma Dkar-po's definitions of this *hetu* and *pratāpaya* are:112 "The grasping cause is what causes the effect to arise from its own essence; the cooperating condition is what causes the effect to arise from something else." He gives examples, one of which provides the basis for the fuller account which we seek:

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The distant grasping cause (*nye-bar len-pa'i rgyu*) of rising (*ldang-ba, uttāhāna*) into *yuganaddha* is *sānvrī-satyā*, is māyā there perhaps short for māyādeha, and the (corresponding) cooperating condition is the radiant light. The close grasping cause is the three poisons (*snang-ba’i gsum*) taken in the reverse order (*lugs-las bzig-pa, pratilaṃsa*), and the cooperating condition is the wind of the five (*t-car coloured lights* (*od-zer lnga-pa’i rlung*).

Now we know that *dngos-po’i gnas-lugs* contains within itself both the satyas.113 So the claim that it is both the cooperating condition and the grasping cause expands exactly into the first pair of examples (apart from the word "distant" which I will not pursue). Both examples illustrate another important theme: *sānvrī-satyā*, the illusory body, the three poisons &c., far from disappearing when yuganaddha or buddhahood is attained, continue in the sense that this effect has them as a cause *having the same essence* (*ngo-bo*). For example, the illusory body becomes the *rūpakāya*. This aspect of continuity will be dealt with in Part II.

V. CORRELATION OF GROUND, PATH AND GOAL WITH THE G U H Y A S M Ā J A V E R S E S

The last section of the summary deals with the identification of tantra as goal with inalienable tantra. Earlier in the same passage tantra as means is said to be the cooperating condition of rising into buddhahood; this claim was just explained, and seems to run counter to the usual identification of tantra as means with the path (since the radiant light is the ground); so the immediately preceding remark about tantra as ground (*gzhis'i rgyud* means as I took it in IV above) ground as in ground/path/goal, and not the *ādhatā* equated with *upāya* in GST XVIII.34c. Concerning tantra as cause, Padma Dkar-po quotes Lavapa who says it is the adept (this is also Tsong-kha-pa’s view), but then interprets this as the adept’s subtle self. Tantra as nature, however, is said to be the radiant light in the opening passage, and this again is clearly the ground in the ground/path/goal sense. The effect of all this is that the first trio in v. 33, Padma Dkar-po ignores *ādhatā* while treating *praktī* and *asamāhārya* as one would expect, while in the second trio in v. 34, he changes the verse’s identification of *praktī* with *hetu*, identifies *upāya* with the path (still saying nothing about *ādhatā*), and identifies *asamāhārya* and *phala* with the goal as one would expect. It seems not too much to say that he takes the remark that tantra is threefold continuity and applies it directly to the ground/path/goal division, as in point IV, while treating the two trios mentioned in the GST verses as a subsidiary matter on which he is not bound to follow them.

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Thus in the summary as a whole, Padma Dkar-po’s main objectives have been to clarify what is meant by talking of tantra as continuity, to exhibit
the threefold continuity of ground, path and goal, and to say what he could about the connection of these with the cig-car-ba. If the two unfamiliar terms cig-car-ba and dngos-po'i gnas-lugs are regarded as closely connected, then they can be jointly explained by means of more familiar vocabulary drawn mainly from Mahāyāna and from the radiant light doctrine. I feel that this explanation (one might call it a reduction) is successful. A more ambitious project would be the independent definition of the new terms and the exhibiting of their connection at what might be called a psychological level (in terms of the subtle self), followed again by an explanation in terms of Mahāyāna and the radiant light. Padma Dkar-po seems not to have been attempting a reduction along these more ambitious lines, but seems to have regarded the suggestion more as an illustration. Though the present section is, of course, my own reconstruction of the summary, I think I have also demonstrated (albeit in crude outline) what Padma Dkar-po understood by these objectives, how he carried them out, and with what degree of success.

We have seen Padma Dkar-po making considerable use of the notions of a person being potentially a buddha, and of the purity of mind by nature in contrast with the adventitious quality of defilements. These ideas might be said to be shared by the radiant light doctrine and the tathāgatagarbha theory. It is noteworthy that Padma Dkar-po wrote nothing on garbha theory and the notion plays no part in his doctrinal scheme; so far as I know this holds for the whole Brug-pa tradition. It may be worth hazarding a guess as to the reasons for this absence.

My guess would be that, for Padma Dkar-po, the garbha doctrine adds nothing but ontology to the doctrines he does use. The capacity to become a buddha becomes a separate item in the catalogue of items which go to make up a person; but this new item has no separate function, since even in ordinary persons it is just natural cognition (tha-mal-gyi shes-pa) or the radiant light which is obscured by the defilements. In any case, the transcendental character of the garbha, which the texts hint at when they stress how hard it is to see, how it resembles space, &c., is unsympathetic for Padma Dkar-po.

Even writers such as Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan, who make much use of the garbha doctrine, seem to see it mainly as an aid to faith and devotion and a belief in the possibility of liberation. It is not very useful in describing the path, which is Padma Dkar-po's main interest. For instance, Dol-po-pa in his Ri-chos rgyes-don rgya-mtsha uses the garbha doctrine a lot, with extensive quotations from the Mahāparinirvāṇa śāstra, in the opening chapter describing the starting-point of the path, but hardly at all in the two chapters dealing with the path itself. In any case the garbha doctrine can have no explanatory power to explain the path and goal, since like Molière's virtus dormitoria it was invented specifically to have the required properties.

The main point of Padma Dkar-po's introduction of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is to provide a genuine explanatory power of the kind absent in the garbha notion. To ensure this, we must of course think of dngos-po'i gnas-lugs as defined without reference to the notion of a buddha; if anything, the latter must depend on the former. In this way the cognitive, psychological, logical and other parts of the doctrine can be seen in some degree of isolation from the buddhological aspects. (It can also be desirable to underpin this way the doctrine that the appearance of buddhas in the world is a purely contingent matter, so that people are encouraged not to be lazy.) Now unless the vocabulary is specially constructed for the purpose, there is no a priori reason why a single account of the whole path having this sort of explanatory power should be available in a form applying universally to every- (The variousness of the Tathāgatas' skilful means is a constant theme of the buddha-utterance, especially in the tantras.) So there is no reason why there should not be a "natural" division of people into types suitable for different styles of explanation, such as that used by Padma Dkar-po. It will then be a purely contingent matter that for any particular person there should be an explanation of the type discussed by Padma Dkar-po. (It will be contingent, say, on his being a cig-car-ba.)

In the summary, the explanation of continuity as the graded emergence of the goal (bras-bu skye-ba'i rim-pa) rests mainly on the ethical aspect of buddhahood (working for the benefit of others, not entering nirvāṇa, &c.). Now Padma Dkar-po's explanations of the radiant light and of yuganaddha are in the main independent of the notion of buddhahood and of these ethical considerations. In principle it would be desirable to explain how such capacities as effortlessness (anabhogacārya, lhun-gyis grub-pa'i spyog-pa) for the benefit of others stem from the radiant light or from yuganaddha. In a sense, this is unnecessary, since it is affirmed so plainly in the tantras, and at first sight Padma Dkar-po's use of these quotations might give the impression that it is simply a matter of brute fact that once defilements have been expunged and wrong views corrected, these socially desirable effects will manifest all by themselves. Really, an answer to this question should be sought elsewhere. Just as ita-ba (attitude, point of view) is the province of works on mahāmudrā, the cultivation (sgom-pa) of this attitude is the province of the bsre'-pho works on which this article has mainly drawn. The next stage is that of action (spyod-pa), and it is really here rather than on the cultivation level that the ethically significant capacities for acting for the good of others are developed, and so one will seek an account of the process not in the works of the bsre'-pho cycle, but in those on ro-snyoms. They, however, are beyond the scope of this paper. Nor can we deal here with various other matters on which the summary seems most immediately to require supplementation, such as the notion of the subtle self, the radiant light doctrine, &c.
Part I of this paper has been on tantra in general as ground, path and
goal; Path II will consist of the application and illustration of these ideas in
an account of yuganaddha (zung-jug), which is the notion unifying the
goal section of the gzhung-grel. There seem to be good reasons for taking
the goal section before the path section. First, since the path is directed to-
wards the goal, its purpose cannot even be set out until the goal has been
described. Secondly, Padma Dkar-po’s own conception of the path does
not seem to have been underpinned by any single unifying conception oth-
er than those of its ground and goal; by itself the path is rather heterogene-
ous. Thirdly, the graded emergence of the goal (’bras-bu skye-ba) rim-pa)
is itself divided into ground, path and goal; these seem to be the same
ground, path and goal, viewed from the viewpoint of yuganaddha. This
gives us an outline for the application of the ideas already developed. We
will proceed by considering first yuganaddha in general, and then its
ground, path and goal aspects in detail. Finally we will be able to use the
details of these three aspects to bring Padma Dkar-po’s general picture of
yuganaddha more sharply into focus. This second part of the paper will ap-
pear in the next issue of this Journal.
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References: 8a4::SaS means gzhung-’grel 8a4, khrid-yig SaS; x = absent

(The sections marked * contain especially useful summaries of the reasons why the sections following them are organized as shown here.)

[For Appendix C, see Part II of this paper.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDIAN WORKS

ADK: Abhidharmakośa
BCA: Bodhicaryāvatāra
BCAP: Pañjika on BCA by Prajñākaramati, ed. Vaidya
GST: Guhyasamājatantra, ed. Bagchi
HT: Hevajra-tantra, ed. and trans. Snellgrove
Lahnk: Lankāvatārastūtra, ed. Vaidya
MK: Madhyamakakarikas
MMV: Madhyamakavatāra
PK: Pañcakrama, ed. Poussin
PPD: Pradipoddyotana, Derge
PSP: Prasannapadā, Skt. ed. Poussin
PSPD: Derge trans. of PSP
(For Tilopa’s Āhu-pramaṇa samyag-nāma dākinī-upadeśa, see gzhung under Padma Dkar-po in the Tibetan section.)

TIBETAN WORKS

(The works are grouped by author. The full title, where given, is prefixed by a sobriquet or short title in italics, by which the work is identified in the footnotes. The different rgyud-sde spyi’i tanm-gzhag are also identified there by author.)

Sa-skya-pa Bson-nams Rtses-mo
Rgyud-sde spyi’i nam-bzhag, Sa-skya bka’-bum, vol. 2

Dol-po Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan
Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho
Rgyud bla-ma’i ’grel-pa Legs-bshad nyi-ma’i ’od-zer

Klong-chen-pa Dri-med ’Od-zer (from vol. 1 of the Bla-ma yang-tig)
Khregs-chod-kyi rgyab-yig nam-mkha’ dri-med, 28b - 45a
Thod-rgal-gyi rgyab-yig nyi-zla gza-skar, 45a - 74a

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Bu-ston
Gsang-'dus bshad-thabs: Gsang-ba ’dus-pa’i rgyud-'grel-gyi bshad-thabs-kyi yan-lag gsang-ba’i sgö-byed, gsung-bum vol. 8
Pradipoddyotana-tīkā, ibid.
Tsong-kha-pa (from the 18-vol. bka’-bum)
Sgroṅ-gsal mcham-'grel, vol. nga
Rim-higa rab-gsal sgron-me, vol. ja
Rigs-pa’i rgya-mtsho, vol. ba

Mi-bskyod Rdo-rje
Dugs-brgyud grub-pa’i shing-rta: Dbu-ma-la ’jug-pa’i rnam- bshad dpal-ltan Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa’i zhal-lung
Sgam-po-pa Bkra-shis Rnam-rgyal
Nor-bu’i ’od-zer: Gsang-sngags rdo-rje theg-pa’i spyi-don mdor-bsdus-pa
Nyī-ma’i ’od-zer: Dpal Kye’i rdo-rje rgyud-kyi rgyal-polegs-par bshad-pa
Padma Dkar-po (except where otherwise stated references are to the 24-vol. reproduction of the Gnam-brug Par-ma)
Tshad-ma Jam-pa’i dgongs-rgyan, vol. 1
Tshad-ma rigs-pa’i snying-po, vol. 1
Nges-don grub-pa’i shing-rta: Dbu-ma’i gzhung-lugs gsum gsal bar byed-pa, vol. 8
Rgyud-sde spyi’i rnam bzhag Mkhas-pa’i yid-phrog, vol. 11
Yid-phrog: Dpal kye rdo-rje’i spyi-don grub-pa’i yid-phrog, vol. 15
Gsang-'dus rgyan: Gsang-ba ’dus-pa’i rgyan zhes-bya-ba Mar-lugs thun mong ma yin-pa’i bshad pa, vol. 16
Rnal-byor bzhis ndzub-tshugs: Rnal-byor bzhis bshad-pa don-dam mdzub-tshugs-su bstan-pa, vol. 21

Bsre’-pho:
gzung: Bka’ yang-dag-pa’i tshad-ma mkha’-’gro-ma’i man-ngag by Tilopa (cf. Indian section); references are to the version in Rare bKa-brgyud-pa texts from Himachal Pradesh. (Also in Gdams-ngag mdzod, vol. 7)
gzung-’grel: Jo-bo Naro’pa’i khyad-chos bsre’-pho’i gzhung-’grel rdo-rje ’chang-gi dgon-pa gsal-bar byed-pa, Rtsi-bri ed.
khrid-yig: Jo-bo Naro’pa’i khyad-chos bsre-pho’i khrid rdo-
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC ADDENDUM

The following materials came to my attention too late for inclusion in the body of this paper:

(a) Padma Dkar-po’s rgyud-sum NGOs’dzin-gyi yi-ge phyin-ci-ma-log-pa’i gtam (gsung-sum vol. 24), an account of the “three tantras” more elementary and less compressed than the summary around which Part I of this paper is organized. It also contains extra interesting material, and I hope to publish a lightly annotated translation in some future issue of this Journal.

(b) Khregs-chod-pa and thod-rgal-ba: Klong-chen-pa contrasts these two personality types at thod-rgal-gyi rgyab-yig (see above) 57b2; Padma Dkar-po does so at rdzogs-pa chen-po’i snying-po dril-ba padma snying-tig (gsung-sum vol. 20), 4b3 ff.

NOTES

1. Numbered as in GST: p. 153 in the GOS ed. Guenther (N 114 n.2) points out that in 44a, Tib. ram-pa suggests ákṛtir for ākṛter. The Tibetan is given (following Padma Dkar-po) toward the end of Appendix A; see note 23 for Kong-sprul’s variant. Though variations like this may reflect or be the basis of doctrinal variations between different authors, I do not take this into account here. But quotations in texts of various periods are likely to contain important information about translation history.

2. Works commonly described as bston-bcos in Tibet include e.g. the Madhyamakārikās of Nagārjuna and the Ratnagotravibhāga-uttaratantra (Rgyud bla-ma) attributed to Maitreyā.

3. In Tibet this collection of five items was called dgos-brel (see Broido (1983c)).

4. For a general review of Tibetan methods of explaining the tantras, see Broido (1981). Padma Dkar-po’s views in this area are discussed in Broido (1983b).

5. Compare the sections “What is Tantra?” in Guenther (N 112) and “Some fundamentals of the Tantras” in Wayman (YG, 62). Whereas Guenther ignores bshad-thabs completely, Wayman has attempted to take it into account, e.g. in his article “Twilight language and a tantric song” in W. Unfortunately this is not as easy as he seems to think (see Broido (1982)).


7. rgyud-sum-gyi don nyams-blang-gi mongon-rigs-su sbyar-te byed-pa, bshad-thabs-ki gsto-bo yin-no, ibid. 68a5.

8. The section on the three tantras is headed Sems-kyi rgyud rgyung-chags-la dgon-gnas rgyud-sum-du bshad-pa (ibid. 67b3) but this “implication of contingency” is not taken up here by Bsd-nsams Rtsi-mo. The method itself is described as bshad-thabs-ki man-ngag-gi tshul, 67b4.
9. des rgyud ji-ltar 'chad-na, ibid. 68a4.
10. Bbra-shis Rnam-rgyal, Nor-bu'i 'od-zer 15a2; Ngyi-ma'i 'od-zer 13a4, 14a7. This latter passage explains how when using the "three tantras," one may either treat separate passages each by one "tantra," or individual words by all three, according to the purpose of instruction. He uses gzhung-gi-skabs for the sections of the text. Bsd-med rTsre-mo seems to make a similar distinction, op. cit. 68a4, if this is right, the obscure (to me) phrase kha-ra-por bshad-pa must mean something like "to explain in separate sentences."
11. Sgron-gsal mchen-',grel, 2b5. This forms part of Tsong-kha-pa's comment on Candakriti's introductory verse /dPal-'ldan rgyud . . . , PPD 1a2.
12. GST XII.60; see YG, sevii s.v.
13. mi-gnas-pa'i myang-'das rdo-rje-'chang, 2b6.
14. don-gyi rgyud-la gsum-du phyre-ba, ibid.
15. The word "tantra" (rgyud) upon which these remarks comment comes at the beginning of the introductory verse (see note 11) which, inter alia, also announces that the work (PPD) will be about the application of the mthu-drug (i.e. of bshad-thabs) to the tantra (GST). After a brief verse summary of the six kramas, Candakriti launches into his famous verses on the "seven ornaments" of bshad-thabs (2a3-3b6).
16. Tsong-kha-pa's account has been discussed by Guenther in his well-known style (N. 114-6). I would comment only that Padma Dkar-po's account is not at all "essentially similar" (117.4). Something like this passage of Tsong-kha-pa is also behind the opinion attributed to his pupil Mkhhas-grub-rje by Wayman in the section "Definitions and varieties of tantra" (YG, 61). But no evidence is given by Wayman for the claim that "Those explanations clarify the definition of 'Tantra' as 'continuous series';" on the question of continuity, Tsong-kha-pa's explanation adds nothing to the verse.
17. Monier-Williams, s.v. prabandha, stresses "connection, band, tie . . . an uninterrupted connection, continuous series, uninterruptedness, continuity;" obviously the second group of words corresponds to rgyun-chags (continuity, continuous), while the first group would sanction the translation by 'brel-ba' (note 23).
18. PPD-tikā, 4a1.
19. rgyud ni rab-tu 'brel cing rgyu chags-par 'jug-pas . . . , ibid.
20. The Tibetan for this quotation is in Appendix A.
21. The colloquial sense of gnas-legs is "the nature of things," "the way things are," and may be contrasted with Padma Dkar-po's technical use of the term, for which see Brodio (1979). Bu-ston's remark is consistent with either use.
23. Kye-rdo spyi-don, 20a2:
/rgyud ces-bya-ba 'brel-ba'i don//brel-ba-la yang nam-gsun ste//
/gzhi dang rang-bzhin 'bras-bu dang//mi-phrog-pa-yis phe-ba-nyi/  
33. See, however, his accounts of the attainment of nisprapaṅca (spros-bral) e.g. in the mna-byor bzhī renowned mdzugs-tshugs, 9a3-14b1 (quoted, translat-
ed and discussed at some length in Broido (1983a).
32. See Broido (1983b).
33. The three avasthā have been well-discussed by Guenther in his essay “The levels of understanding in Buddhism” (Pers., see pp. 61-3): Phyang-chen gan-mdzod, 30a3.
34. Really what is involved here is two different concepts of the relation between mahāmudrā and the upāya-mārga; see Broido (1983a).
35. The relation between mahāmudrā and rdzogs-chen is discussed by Padma Dkar-po in ch. 5 of the Phyang-chen gan-mdzod.
37. The Vimalamitra’s snying-thig and its cognates are codified by Klong-chen-pa in the Snying-thig ya-bzhi.
38. Ci. Khregs-chod-kyi rgyab-yig...
39. Kye-rdor sphyi-don, 20b3-4. The work is used nowadays in this tradition as an elementary text on vajrayāna theory. Its general structure derives mainly from Padma Dkar-po’s Gzhung-grel and Yid-p’ho (these however are advanced works). Yet if everybody is a cig-car-ba, either Kong-sprul uses this word differently from Padma Dkar-po, or he has a different and more optimistic view of human capabilities. I suspect he uses the word differently, since the general style of his Bka’-rgyud-pa works (not only the Hevajra works but also his commentary on the Zab-mo nang-gi-don) is more like a lam-rim or the Rim-gyis ‘jug-pa’i lam of the Gzhung-grel.
40. See the vajrayāna chapter of the sdom-gsum rab-dbyes.
41. This seems to be the conception underlying the Rim-inga dmar-khrid, but it is difficult to be certain because of Bu-ston’s reluctance to commit any view of goal-attainment to paper. It seems to be more explicit in the following remark from the PPD-tīkā, 6b3:
   de-kho-na-nid ni bdom-gnyis dbyer-med-pa’i zung-jug-gi tshing-rje-dzin yin-la/  
   de-la ge-stig-car bshad-par mi-nus-pa’i skyes-bu ‘phrog slob-pa’i dpe rim-gyis  
   bshad-par bya’o/  
42. The idea is well-known but has been reviewed briefly in the context of Padma Dkar-po’s thinking in Broido (1983a).
43. Compare the bka’ yang-dag-pa’i tshad-ma 1b, quoted gzhung-grel 10ab:
   /rim-gyis-pa’i sman-chen ’di’/ cig-car-ba-yi dug-tu ’gyur/  
   /cig-car-ba-yi sman-chen ’di’/ rim-gyis-pa’i dug-tu ’gyur/.
44. Of course the idea is developed considerably further by Padma Dkar-po in his commentary.
45. E.g. Phyang-chen gan-mdzod, 23a ff. There are also three cycles of books about the three types (titles and brief contents, ibid. 19a2). This is part of a more comprehensive scheme of arrangement of the Brug-pa literature of mahāmudrā and related topics, which goes back to Gtsang-pa Rgya-ras (ibid. 4a1).
46. bshad-bya’i lugs-la/ gang ’jug-pa’i gang-zag dang/ gang-du ’jug-pa’i lam (Gzhung-’grel 7a3, 8a4).
47. For the rim-gyis ’jug-pa’i lam, see Gzhung-’grel 387b3 and especially Padma Dkar-po’s writings on the yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum, e.g. Snayan-rgyud rgyal-mtshan.
48. Roughly speaking there is a vajrajāpakrama, a cittavīṣuddhikrama, and a svādīṣṭhānakrama; the latter has subdivisions called mgon-par rtags-pa’i rim-pa (corresponding roughly to the abhisambodhikrama), and a stage of goal-attainment laying out the various methods of rising into buddhahood (tshang-rgya-ba) from transference, the dream state, the various intermediate states, &c., and called rang-nyid lhag-par gnas-pa’i rim-pa. Though the word zung-’jug is still used, it does not have the weight attached to it in the cig-car-ba’i lam.
49. N, 118.6; TVL 3.29.
50. This first sentence appears in Guenther’s version in TVL, but has disappeared in N, where the phrase dngos-po’i gnas-lugs is taken as part of the second sentence and translated by “the concrete fact of Being.” We may perhaps agree that the phrase is difficult and better left untranslated (see Broido 1979); but what does this English phrase tell us about it? What does it mean? Surely Being (whatever that may be) is not a fact of some kind? And what is a concrete fact, if not a fact about particular things, while surely Being, whatever it is, is not a particular thing? I don’t want to reject out of hand the possibility of an existentialist/transcendentalist interpretation (preferably supported by some facts) but surely we are entitled to know what the proposed interpretation means? Here, what was perhaps a problem in Tibetan has been replaced by a problem about Guenther’s own idiolect.
51. This second remark, which is the key to the whole passage, has been butchered in both of Guenther’s versions (n.49). The phrase rgs- Blo-’dus sngags-rgyas-kyi bar-du is about the progress of a person from the level (gnas-skabs) of an ordinary person to that of a buddha (cf. note 33). In order to speak of a progress, something must remain unchanged, and this is dngos-po’i gnas-lugs, here said quite literally to “abide unchanging like the
sky because of continuity” (nam-mkha'-ltar ‘gyur-bo-ma-par gnas-pas rgyun-chags-pa-niyid-khyi phyo’ri). In both versions Guenther assimilates this sentence to the one before it which is on the different matter of gnas-lugs as the nature of everything making up the world. Thus he reinforces the mistake (in N) by adding the gloss “encompassing everything” and by replacing the phrase “unchanging like the sky” with “like the serene sky.” (The TVL version at least has “unalterably present, like the sky” but is just as bad in the other respects.) The theme of tattva or dngos-po'i gnas-lugs as the continuity from samsara to nirvana is an ancient one, and is expressed in similar language in the Vimalaprabha: “Thus the non-duality of depth and clarity is called samsara are samsara. This is because it abides without changing as much as a hair’s breadth from beginningless samsara to endless nirvana” (de-lta-bu'i zab-gsal gnyis-med de-niyid thog-ma-med-pa'i 'khor-ba-nas tha-ma-med-pa'i mya-ngan-dus-khyi bar-du spu-ris mi-'gyur-bar gnas-pa'i phyo'ri samsara are samsara. This is because it abides without changing as much as a hair’s breadth from beginningless samsara to endless nirvana) (de-lta-bu'i zab-gsal gnyis-med de-niyid thog-ma-med-pa'i 'khor-ba-nas tha-ma-med-pa'i mya-ngan-dus-khyi bar-du spu-ris mi-'gyur-bar gnas-pa'i phyo'ri samsara are samsara. This is because it abides without changing as much as a hair’s breadth from beginningless samsara to endless nirvana). (Gzhung-grel 1186b6); this is the very reason why Padma Dkar-po quotes the passage.

52. rang-bzhin here and in most other places discussed in this article corresponds to Skt. prakṛti. These words seem to mean "nature" (as "it is the nature of things to fall"), in a straightforward, pre-critical sense. I cannot understand either why Guenther uses "actuality" and "Being-itself" in this context or why he oscillates between the two. In prakṛti-tantra, "tantra" means both a soteriological genre and tantra-as-continuity (cf. Khrid-yig 62b).

53. ngo-bo-niyid-khyi grub-pa. The idea appears in MK XVIII.7: /gzhon-las shes-min zhi-ba dang'i/. Less clearly in Skt. aparapiyayam sāntam. Of course this niyid-khyi is not a svabhāva, by means of which paramārtha-satyā (here the radiant light) is precisely nētāstablished (MMV VI.23 and bhāṣya). The idea is rather that the subjective factor in experience contains a self-reflective component (cf. Kant): the radiant light is known in the act of knowing (things), if one's cognition is clear enough. Padma Dkar-po's point could have been made by the phrase rang-niyid-khyi.

54. The idea of this distinction, which is well-known e.g. in garbhā theory, is that though the radiant light (or dngos-po'i gnas-lugs) itself may be obscured, its nature remains the same beneath the obscurity. One may feel that this is not very happily put by saying "its nature remains obscured," but I feel the idea is confused. It is the radiant light itself which is obscured and remains the same under the obscuration.

55. ngo-bo-niyid-khyi, cf. notes 53, 54.

56. The idea of the simile is that the nature of coal is to be black, and so, as Padma Dkar-po explains more fully at Phya-chen gan-mtzo '93a1, “it is like coals which do not become white even though washed in a stream of milk” (sol-ba' o-ma'i rgyun-gyi kyang dkar-por mi-'gyur-ba ita-bu'o/). Another related use of the simile is found at Nges-don grub-pa' shine-rta 66b5.

57. sems-kyi rang-bzhin dri-medi (corr. to Skt. cittapraṇāṇa vāimala, e.g. Ratnagotravibhāga I.49). The phrase "the mind is stainless by nature" might seem more natural (and is how the Chinese translated the Ratnagotravibhāga verse: Takasaki 233 n. 251), but does not fit Padma Dkar-po's Tibetan: it corresponds rather to something like sems ni rang-bzhin-gyi dri-medi. Here sems is similar to yid (manus) and stands in contrast to sems-niyid (similar to sems-kyi rang-bzhin). Guenther's translation misses this, translating sems by "Being" which on his own view should be sems-niyid. (He has given several conflicting accounts of Bka'-brcya-pa views of sems and sems-niyid, the best being perhaps that in ch. 4 of TVL.)

58. Guenther misses the point of this remark, viz. that it refers back to the immediately preceding quotation from Maitreya (cf. n. 60).

59. 'das-pa

60. rang-bzhin (prakṛti). The point of this and the following remarks is just the connection of sems, yid &c. with their nature as sems-niyid, as the radiant light &c., in spite of the impurity of the appearances with which they are normally associated. Guenther's translation of rang-bzhin here by "its Being-itself" completely obscures this connection (especially as sems was just translated by "Being" (see note 57)).

61. mi-shigs-pa' thig-ler grub-pas. Guenther's "creative potentiality" here seems perfectly reasonable for thig-le (bindu, tilaka) in this context. This word gives rise to difficulties which are well-known in the case of its companions tādi and tāyu, and which are not circumvented by the literal translations "vein," "wind," "drop" &c. Guenther rightly stresses that for Padma Dkar-po the radiant light, though mere nothingness (sūnya-tā) in itself, is capable of manifesting as anything. The word usually used by Padma Dkar-po for this capacity is gtags, a word I have discussed elsewhere (1983a).

62. gzhis here means "ground" in the specific sense explained in the Introduction. Though the more literal "foundation" would work too, Guenther's "causal situation" is wrong. Part of Padma Dkar-po's point is that tathātā, dngos-po'i gnas-lugs &c. can become samsāra or nirvāna. No one thing can be the "causal situation" for both of these.

63. ji-snyed-pa' choes means roughly the things of the world of samsāra as seen by a buddha. He sees them (perhaps) by the faculty of ji-snyed-pa mkhyen-pa' ye-shes. Tsong-kha-pa is both unclear about what this faculty is, and doubtful about its existence (Rigs-pa' rgya-mtsho '95a1). For the full luxuriom of Tibetan speculation on this topic, one should consult the commentaries on Ratnagotravibhāga II.7, especially those connected with the Jo-nang-pa tradition (e.g. Shes-rab Rgyal-mtshan's Legs-bshad nyi-ma'i 'od-zer and Kong-sprul's Rgyud-bcia'i tshig-grel).

64. de-dag-niyid sgrib-pa dag-pa-na. Guenther's translation "when it is purified of its former stains" misses the point that it is these (de-dag) skandhas which are to be purified.

65. bkod-pa zad mi-shes-pa. The phrase "inexhaustible patterning" is due
to Guenther and seems a happy choice. More loosely, one might say that tathā &c. may become the foundation for establishing a person's body, speech and mind (lus, ngag, yid) as the body, speech and mind (sku gsung, thugs) of a buddha. Less happy is his translation of this last phrase by "a buddha's existential, communicative and spiritual significance." The connection between bkod-pa (vyūha) and thig-le (bindu), which is the basis of this sentence as a whole, can be seen by combining the well-known connection of thig-le and one sense of byang-sems (bodhicitta) with the connection of the latter to bkod-pa expressed in Nāropa's verse (quoted N 254): gnas-pa rtsa-la g.yo-ba rlungen//bkod-pa byang-chub sems-su shes/. 66. rigs, a word with several uses. The most general is "class" (Guenther) or "sort" or "type" (exactly as opposed to "token"). More specifically it can mean "race" (as in "the human race," mi-rigs), or "caste" (Skt. varna, e.g. brahmin, ksatriya &c.), or "lineage" (Skt. gotra), or "family" (Skt. kula, as in the buddha-families of the vajrayāna, e.g. khaḍgakula, ral-grī'i rigs). Here the application will be to the type of the cīg-car-ba or more generally of the person "of definite type" (rigs nges-pa). Here "type" has the advantage that it preserves the ambiguity between the more general uses of rigs and the more specific ones. While the immediately following definition is of the most general use, the later application suggests a more specific one. 67. rnam-pa thams-cad, sarvākāra 68. dbang-po thams-cad, sarvendriya. These two phrases are not mentioned further in the sequel, so it is not clear whether Padma Dkar-po is taking dbang-po in the sense of "faculty" or the more specific sense of "sense-faculty" (e.g. mig-gi dbang-po, sense of sight, &c.). See ch.2 of ADK for the sense in which sight &c. are taken as specific faculties, distinct from the organs which house them. 69. HT II.iv.73 (the next lines: Gzhung-grel 115b5). The quotation illustrates the continuity between sentient beings and buddhas (see note 51), as is clear both from Padma Dkar-po's use of the lines and from their context in IIT. Guenther's translation "Neither buddha nor sentient being, not even an ontological one" misses this point, apart from the questionable details (e.g. "ontological"). 70. dngos-po rigs-mi-nthun-pa-mams. The remark seems to be a slogan-like summary of the apohaavāda theory, which is why riggs is apparently taken very generally; yet cf. the next note. 71. rigs-de-la zhes dang bcos-na gdung nga'am rus zhes kyang btags-so/. It is difficult to translate this directly since the language is so ambiguous and there are various logical confusions. A slightly more direct translation would be "and so one calls it a type, just as one speaks of families or clans." As Michael Aris (1979, esp. pp. 97-8) has shown in his valuable analysis of Bhutanese clan-lineages, the term rus and gdung are the technical terms used to describe familial lineages, and denote what is transmitted from father to son down the lineage. (In a matrilineage, what is transmitted is called sha, flesh.) The literal sense of both rus and gdung is "bone," and Guenther's translation assumes that Padma Dkar-po had this literal sense in mind. That would require an implausible coincidence, especially since Padma Dkar-po will have been aware of the ambiguity, which can be removed easily by using other examples if the specific technical sense is not just what is needed. Aris points out (loc. cit.) the extreme ambiguity of rigs (family) in contexts like this one. Padma Dkar-po has certainly made a type-error in the sense of Russell. The argument should run something like this: the worldly person says that this or that thing is of this or that type because there is a similarity. Thus, just as members of a family or clan (gdung, rus) are related by descent and so receive the name of their particular family because of this particular relationship, so things related by a particular similarity are given the name of a particular type. (Nothing here needs to be named "type" or "family.") The quoted remark is irrelevant to this argument, but would be relevant to the following higher-order argument: just as families or clans in general are related by a similarity on account of which they are called families or clans, so types in general are related by a similarity on account of which they are called types. (While this argument is a special case of the previous one, not to distinguish them leads straight to Russell-type paradoxes.) Padma Dkar-po confuses calling something a clan (rus zhes 'dogs-pa) with naming a clan (Khyung-po, Rgya &c.). 72. sangs-rgyas-kyi nye-bar len-pa'i rgyu, see note 115. 73. shin-tu tneyed-pa dka'-ba'i sgrub-pa-po'i gang-zag. Guenther translates by "an individual who is rarely met with," ignoring the phrase sgrub-pa-po'i ("of one who practices or accomplishes"), and reads Lavapa as saying that it is the person, rather than the accomplisher, who is qualified by the phrase "rarely met with" (i.e. shin-tu tneyed-par dka'-ba, lit. "very difficult to attain"). Guenther's omission of sgrub-pa-po'i makes it impossible to follow Padma Dkar-po's point. In any case, the remark is easier to understand as taken to mean that it is the accomplishment which is difficult, and so I have taken it (my translation would be strictly right if dka'-ba'i were read dka'-ba). Since [dngos-po'i gnas-lugs] is the grasping cause of Buddhahood, in saying that tantra as cause is a person who accomplishes that which is difficult to attain, the Mahāsiddha Lavapa implied or suggested (dngongs-so) that it is this person's subtle self. Straightforward inference would yield only the conclusion that dngos-po'i gnas-lugs is the person: that it is the person's subtle self seems to be added by Padma Dkar-po on the basis of his own understanding of Lavapa. For Padma Dkar-po's views on dngongs-pa (abhijnātā) and on what is implied, rather than explicitly stated, by a text, see my (1983b). 74. It is well-known that Nāropa was an important figure in the transmission history of the Guhyasamāja (e.g. BA 361). As part of the methods of explanation (bshad-thabs) for that tantra found in PPD, among the "seven ornaments," we find the division of those who practice the tantras into five types, of which the best is the "jewel-like" (rin-po-che lta-bu) type, identi-
fied with the *cig-car-ba* by Padma Dkar-po earlier in the *Gzhung-*grel (9a6; noted by Guenther, N 115 n.2). For more detail and references on the "ornament of the five types of person" (*gang-zag lnga'i rgyan*) see Broïdo (1981).

75. *rigs nges-pa.* Guenther translates with "determined by class" but (in spite of some equivocation) "of determinate class" makes better sense and seems to correspond better with the Skt. *nityatākula* given by Guenther. (In Tibetan, grammar alone will not separate the two phrases.)

76. *rnal-byor chen-po,* lit. "a great yoga." Guenther rightly points out that this has little to do with what the West understands by yoga and that Padma Dkar-po himself takes *rnal-byor* as the non-duality of prajñā and upāya (Pers. 85). I shall follow the spirit of Padma Dkar-po's view by using "a great realization" or "a great non-duality" according to context. Here however Guenther has modified the text, in effect, to read *rnal-byor-pa chen-po,* lit. "a great yogin," and has avoided the problem just mentioned by changing this to "a great philosopher." But Padma Dkar-po is no more talking about what we understand by a philosopher than about what we understand by a yogin.

77. In order to make sense of this argument, we must understand Padma Dkar-po to be including the *cig-car-ba* in the definite type, rather than identifying the two types: for surely since the *rim-gyis-pa* too can attain buddhahood he is *ipso facto* determined by type to attain a great realization.

78. *dzin-pa*

79. Apparently the foolish person (*byis-pa, bala*) does not see the subtle person. (But the later discussion will make it clear that the *rim-gyis-pa* may see it; cf. note 77.)

80. *gang-zag-tu dzin-pa med-pas*

81. *gzung-ba,* the idea seems to be that the skandhas are perceived as objects, as it were, and the illusion arises of a perceiving subject distinct from the perceived objects. This part of the argument is very familiar in Western thought. Both in the West and in India people have gone on to claim that one *experiences* this perceiving subject (as an immaterial thinking substance *(Descartes,* or as an *ātman* (orthodox Indian thought)). Kant in the West, and the Mādhyamikas in India and Tibet, have replied that this idea finds no application to anything. However Padma Dkar-po's line of argument will be based on other experiences which conflict with the experiential claim.

82. *btags-so*

83. *nyer-bzung*

84. *sens dang sens-byung* (*cittacaita*)

85. *skyes-bu dman-pa'i gang-zag*

86. *skyes-bu chen-po'i gang-zag*

87. i.e. with the view described in note 81 as orthodox or Cartesian.

88. *phra-ba'i gang-zag*


90. *sems rnam-par dben-pa*; Guenther omits this word, wrecking Padma Dkar-po's point. It is the experience of the *cittavīśuddhikrama,* the second of the *Pañcaakra.*ma's five stages. The word *vīśukta* (*rnam-par dben-pa*) literally means "isolated, detached, solitary" and so a natural translation for *kāyaviśukta, vāgviśukta,* *cittaviśukta* seems to be "detached body, speech, mind" rather than Wayman's "arcane body, speech, mind."

91. *bdag-lta,* Skt. *ātmadārśana* (if one agrees with it), *ātmadṛṣṭi* (if one thinks it is a dogma).

92. *so-skye'i lam-du,* i.e. on the *sambhāra-mārga* and *prayaoga-mārga,* implicitly contrasted with the *ārṇava-marga* and those above it.

93. *rjes-thob-kyi ye-shes,* the ārya's' cognition of objects in a dualistic sense but as purified by the preceding *samāhārya* (mṇyam-gzhag-gi ye-shes); it is the ārya's counterpart to *ji-nṣved-pa mṛkhyen-pa'i ye-shes,* cf. notes 30 and 63.


96. *sgyu-ma'i rlung-gis*

97. *rnam-'gyur-las*

98. *spyod-pa'i yul* (Skt. *gocara*)

99. This passage needs considerably more work; my rendering is fairly literal but not very informative. Guenther's version is mainly fancy, especially his "openness to new possibilities," "noetic performance," "chance-producing acts."

100. Probably the Vajramāla.

101. *snying-po,* Skt. probably *sūtra.*

102. *smin-byed, vipāka.*

103. *grol-ba* (*muktis*), more often *grol-byed.*

104. *thabs-kyi rgyud.* Guenther's "operational process continuity" is not only incomprehensible in itself, but has little to do with the Tibetan. (What happens if we substitute "operational process" into *smin-byed-kyi thabs* or *grol-ba'i thabs* in this passage?)

105. Guenther's rendering of this passage is incomprehensible, especially his "out of the causal situation and its process character" and "not tainted by spurious impulses to do good," neither of which correspond to anything in the text.

106. This passage starting from *gnas-lugs dri-ma-med-pa* has been translated by Guenther not only in N (to which notes 104-5 refer, but also in TVL (3-4), a version which is somewhat more sober, if still full of peculiarities.

107. *bag-chags,* karmic traces. Guenther's "experientially initiated potentialities of experience" is not bad for this difficult phrase.

108. The general idea seems to be ethical: the good of others (*gzhun-don*) is to the fore, in spite of appearances to the contrary.
The text has *lus drungs-po'i don ma-lus-pa*, surely ellipsis for *lus drungs-po'i gnas-lugs don ma-lus-pa*.

10a. Especially the Guhyasiddhi and Jñānasiddhi: see Phyang-chen gan-mdzod 4a6, 7a5, 161a2 (quoting Jñānasiddhi, as p. 53 of the GOS Ed.)

11. *gzhung-'grel* 18a5 describes the subtle self of the *cig-car-ba* and gives information on mi-shigs-pa'i thig-le.

12. PPD. introduction

13. Here I have deliberately maintained the noun/verb ambiguity in “being.”


16. See Broido (1979, 1983a)

17. See e.g. the quotations from the Tattvasaṅgraha and the Jñānasiddhi at Phyang-chen gan-mdzod 162ab.

18. Padma Dkar-po’s works contain innumerable references to zung-'jug (yuganaddha) including at least three systematic treatments. The most elementary of these is in the Rim-Ingar 'khrid-pa (Lam-bsdu 161a5-163b1); most of this is general, but the modes of the *cig-car-ba*, thod-rgal-ba and rim-gyis-pa are reviewed separately at 162a4. The treatment in the Phyang-chen gan-mdzod (159b6 ff.) is also general. The most advanced treatment is found in the Gzhung-'grel (370a4 ff.) and the Khrid-yig (136a4, much briefer): it applies mainly to the *cig-car-ba*, and as expected is the only one divided into ground, path and goal (a division he does not make for the other two types). The Rim-gyis 'jug-pa'i lam section of the Gzhung-'grel does not give a systematic discussion of zung-'jug. These bibliographic points lead us to expect that the gzhung-'grel/khrid-yig account is the one which will best illustrate the themes of this part of the paper; but it will turn out that the other treatments will provide helpful elaborations on certain points.

**MANCHU PATRONAGE AND TIBETAN BUDDHISM DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE CH’ING DYNASTY**

A REVIEW ARTICLE

Samuel M. Grupper


From the latter half of the seventeenth century the series of reincarnations known as the Lcha skya Qutuqtus served as an important link between the Manchu court and the Mongol, Tibetan and Chinese elites. Rol pa’i rdo rje, the second Lcha skya Qutuqtu, stemmed from an illustrious Tibetanized-Mongol family of western Kansu province whose members assumed prominent roles as scholars and administrators of the Dge lugs pa. As a novice, Rol pa’i rdo rje learned Tantric practices from the most prestigious scholastic of the day, the Abbot of Dga’ ldan monastery, Khri chen Blo bzaṅ bstan pa’i nī ma. At once a distinguished scholar and a celebrated teacher—he tutored the Ch’ien-lung Emperor in Tibetan Buddhism and Sanskrit—the Lcha skya Qutuqtu also wrote prolifically on philosophy and hagiography. In fact, a review of his achievements indicates he played a more prominent role in Ch’ing cultural life than is commonly supposed. As editor and philologist he brought together and supervised the translation commissions for the Tibetan *Tanjur* into Mongolian and the Chinese *Kanjur* into Manchu, compiled a Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary, the *Mkhas pa’i ’byun gnas*, and wrote a commentary to Thon mi Sambho’a’s grammar. He authored words on *Thags pa Lama*, the Seventh Dalai Lama Blo bzaṅ bskal bzaṅ rgya mtsho, and his former teacher, the Abbot of Dga’ ldan. But he is perhaps best known for the diplomatic negotiations he conducted with the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and Rje btsun dam pa Qutuqtu concerning the tumult caused by the Žungar-

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