SHORT REVIEWS

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
By Herbert V. Guenther.

The present reviewer has been told on a number of occasions by Western students of Buddhism, including some members of university faculties, that Guenther's works are incomprehensible or useless to them. I know that this is a rather harsh judgment to repeat and prefer that a milder evaluation would be possible for the work under review which should be, and will be, judged on its own merits. After all, Guenther in the present book takes up a subject which has been studied for centuries in Tibet—the four systems of Buddhist philosophy (the four siddhānta, Tib. grub mtha') which are the Vaibhāsika, Sauteurāntika, Yogācāra (=Cittamatra), and Mādhyamika. Since a number of Tibetan works of this genre are now available in reprints made in northern India by the Tibetans themselves, it is relatively easy to check upon Guenther's methodology and standards. Unfortunately, he does not provide much cause of praise. It would be the better part of politeness to simply not review such a book, but then a reviewer with control of the sources would have abnegated his responsibility to the readers. Another consideration is that Guenther himself has displayed in print a rather virulent antipathy toward the scholarly approach in the scope of his interests. Therefore, the reviewer must take up the somewhat unpleasant task of evaluating this book.

The title is the first occasion for perplexity. How indeed is "philosophy" to be found in both "theory" and "practice"? Guenther himself states (p. 18): "In philosophizing we travel the path to the primal source of our being. As a methodical reflection it can be subsumed under three questions: What do I know? What is authentic or true? How do I know?" Also (p. 19): "Hence 'path' and 'knowledge' and 'awareness' are synonymous in Buddhism." He thereby clarifies that the title of the book does not conform to the contents, which are concerned with theory and not with practice. This judgment is further certified by Guenther's own main sources for this book, two of the native Tibetan siddhānta works, a Gelugpa one by Jigs-med dbangpo—his Jewel Garland—and a Rṣiṇg-ma-pa one by Mi-pham J'am-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho—his Summary. Consultation of the references to the path shows that it is the view toward the path that is meant rather than the drawn-out practical instruction on the path which is a favorite topic of Buddhist scriptures.

The author does not mention, presumably because he does not know, that it is Atiśa—according to the initial folios of Tsong-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo—who, at the outset of the second diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet, brings with his arrival
in 1042 A.D. the study of Buddhist philosophy in the form of the four *siddhānta*. It is Guenther's misrepresentation to suggest (preface, x) that the Rñing-ma-pa work by Mi-pham constitutes a teaching that stems from the eighth century (the time of Padmasambhava).

Guenther's procedure has been to separate out in chapters devoted to each of the four *siddhānta* relevant material from each of the two texts, along with his own introductory remarks. Thus he does not give a full translation of the two treatises, at least not of the one by Dkon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po, the *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba žes bya ba* (the “Jewel Garland”). In this Gelugpa work, available in a north India reprint, I have compared his treatment of the Svātantrika Mādhyamika school attributed to the appropriate section of this treatise, with the Tibetan section itself in the edition accessible to me.

There is a remarkable failure in what can be called the translator's integrity or conscience. That is to say, we suppose of a translator, when he indicates to the reader that he is rendering a section of the Tibetan book, as does Guenther (pp. 130-136) with the heading “From the Jewel Garland, Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam-par bzhag -pa jin-po che'i phreng-ba, fol. 12a,” that what he give there is a translation of the Tibetan text. We suppose that if he does not give the translation in entirety, or changes the order, summarizes and paraphrases at pleasure, that he would so inform the reader. But Guenther makes these modifications without informing the reader.

In Guenther's exposition of the “Jewel Garland,” section on the Mādhyamika Svātantrika, he first makes introductory remarks about the Mādhyamika school culled from the text. He follows with subsections “Contents of the Philosophical Faith of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas” (pp. 131-135) and “Contents of the Philosophical Faith of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas” (pp. 135-136). His content does not always follow the order of the text. It would take too long to detail all his vagaries, but an incredible example should be mentioned. What first aroused the suspicions of the reviewer was noticing on Guenther's page 132 under the Yogācāra subsection the remark, “The ultimately real is further divided into sixteen types of nothingness which can be subsumed under four headings.” Consultation of the Tibetan text failed to turn up this remark in the given subsection, but the remark (I reserve judgment on his rendition) was found in the second subsection on the Sautrāntrika. What the Yogācāra subsection states (p. 50 in my booklet edition of the Tibetan) is as follows (in part)—my translation followed by the original Tibetan in transcription: They (the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika–Svātantrikas) held that the special natures of the four Truths, to wit, the sixteen, impermanence, etc. as well as the personality’s void of accomplishment by permanence, singleness, or independence, are the coarse kind of *pudgala-nairātmya* (non-self of personality); while the personality’s void of any self-sufficient substance is the subtle kind of *pudgala-nairātmya*.
/bden bźi'i khyad chos mi rtag sogs bcu drug daṅ/gaṅ zag rtag cig raṅ dbaṅ can gyis grub pas ston pa gaṅ zag gi bdag med rags pa daṅ/gaṅ zag raṅ rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyis ston pa gaṅ zag gi bdag med phra mo yin la/

It is obvious that Guenther has omitted not only this passage but other important materials concerning this sub-school, while including under this heading materials that the Tibetan author did not include. Guenther has so mixed up the respective contents of the two sub-schools that it is useless to read these pages of his book to get information on the topic. And observing his performance here, it does not seem worthwhile to investigate his representation of the other schools treated by this Tibetan author.

Besides, Guenther admits that the “Jewel Garland” work follows the Indian tradition. Therefore, it is fair to notice the translation of terms in the light of the fact that this school (the Gelugpa) ordinarily uses Buddhist terms in the contextual meanings of the translations from Sanskrit of the Tibetan canon (the Kanjur and Tanjur). Referring again to a passage, his p. 133, included under the Yogācāra subsection of the Svātāntika—which is actually in the Sautrāntika subsection in the original Tibetan—he renders it as follows:

Traversing the Path. Belief in the absolute status of the self is for them wishfulness and emotivity, and belief in the absolute status of the entities of reality other than the self is intellectual fog. The latter is of two kinds: coarse, insofar as it is the belief that the objective and the subjective are of different material; and subtle, insofar as it is the belief that the psychophysical constituents and other entities of reality exist in truth.

This is the Tibetan for the foregoing:

/gñis pa lam giy bya ni/gaṅ zag gi bdag 'dzin ſon sgrib daṅ/ chos kyi bdag 'dzin šes sgrib tu' dod ciñ/ šes sgrib la yaṅ gzuṅ 'dzin rdzas 'gžan du 'dzin pa lta bu žes sgrib rags pa daṅ phuṅ sogs kyi chos bden grub tu 'dzin pa lta - bu žes sgrib phra mo gñis su'dod do/.

Now translating the same passage with fidelity to the well-established Sanskrit-Tibetan correspondences, we have;

Second, they claim that among the things to be eliminated on the path, the imputation that there is the self of personality (padgala-atman) is the obscuration of defilement (kleśa-āvaraṇa) and the imputation that there is the self of nature (dharma-ātman) is the obscuration of the knowable (jñeya-āvaraṇa). Furthermore, they claim in regard to the obscuration of the knowable that there is a coarse kind of obscuration of the knowable, to wit, the imputation that apprehended and apprehender are a different substance; and that there is a subtle kind of obscuration of the knowable, to wit, the imputation that the natures (dharma) in the personality aggregates (skandha), etc. happen by reason of their truth (bden grub).
I cite this one example to show how Guenther’s penchant for such terms as “wishfulness” and “emotivity” is more important for him than is faithful translation of a passage. Even if we should give him the benefit of the doubt and allow that he may have understood the original Tibetan, it is even more serious that he should convert the well-written Tibetan into English sentences that continually fail to communicate the original sense of the Tibetan. To present more examples from this portion of his book would entail unwarranted space.

A final consideration is Guenther’s obvious intention to set forth a kind of superiority for Mi-pham’s text, e.g. (p.142):

While the Prāsangikas are traditionally held to represent the climax of Buddhist philosophy, Mi-pham ‘Jam-dbyangs rnam-rgyal rgya-mtsho makes it abundantly clear that they merely represent the climax of Buddhist epistemology and that the next step in the philosophical quest is the one from epistemology to Being.

Therefore he is the only one who deals with Tantra in his Summary, while The Jewel Garland lets philosophy end here with epistemology.

Guenther seems not to know that the Gelugpa tradition, in which The Jewel Garland was written, also places the Tantric attainment higher than non-tantric Māhāyana Buddhism. This is made clear in a brief work of Tsong-kha-pa (founder of the Gelugpa) included in my “Observations on Translation from the Classical Tibetan Language into European Languages,” Indo-Iranian Journal, XIV, 3/4 (1972), stating at p. 178: “It is well known that the Mantra path far surpasses the Pāramitā path, like the sun and moon”. Furthermore, after a masterful exposition of the Prāsangika position in the last section of his Lam rim chen mo, Tsong-kha-pa concludes with a brief introduction to Tantra. Therefore, the superior status of Tantra in Tibetan Buddhism is not a bone of contention here, although Westerners may wonder why Tantra is accorded such an exalted place. Rather, it is a question of whether such Tantric materials belong in a siddhānta work. Guenther tries to justify the inclusion in Mi-pham’s work by claiming it to be “the next step in the philosophical quest,” suggesting to the reader that Tantra is justifiably included in the category of philosophy. However, students of Buddhist Tantra can easily determine that the Tantra involves procedures for body, speech, and mind known as gestures (mudrā), incantations (mantra or dhāraṇī), and intense concentration (samādhi). This is scarcely to be termed “philosophy.”

The authors of the siddhānta treatises that summarize the main non-Buddhist as well as the Buddhist philosophical positions, were well advised to exclude Tantric material, even though such authors themselves—certainly in Tibet—were also generally followers of the Tantras and frequently authors of works in this latter field.

In conclusion, it is a pity that a fine class of Tibetan treatise, the grub mtha’ (siddhānta), should be introduced to Western readers in such a garbled fashion. I hope that some competent translator will accurately render the entire text of the Jewel Garland into a European language, with notes and introduction appropriate for this text.

Alex Wayman
The scholarly limitations of the traditional *Festschriften* have long been recognized. The editors of these elegant volumes are therefore to be commended for choosing to honor Giuseppe Tucci with the republication of a selection of his own works rather than the usual *Mélanges*. In two volumes totaling over six hundred pages, the *scritti minori* ("minori per mole, non per valore" as Luciano Petech puts it in his brief introduction) of this great scholar are presented, and there is virtually no one in the field of Himalayan studies to whom these works will not be of great use.

There is no way to review such works as these except to list the contents. I have incorporated the changes mentioned in Petech’s *avvertenza* (p. ix) so that readers will be aware of the differences between the articles as presented here and their original versions:

Part I: 1. Note sulle fonti di Kālidāsa
2. Note ed appunti sul *Divyāvadāna*
3. Linee di una storia del materialismo indiano (pp. 48-156): complete re-working of the third chapter; appendixes of the original text omitted (pp. 687 -713)
4. Note sul Saudaranandaka Kavya di Aśvaghoṣa
5. The *Vādavidhi*
6. Is the *Nyāyapraveśa* by Diśnāga?
7. A visit to an ‘astronomical’ temple in India
8. Bhamaha and Diśnāga
9. Animadversiones Indicae
10. A fragment from the *Pratītya-samutpādavyākhyā* of *Vasubandhu*
11. The *Jātinirakṣi* of Jitāri
12. Note indologiche
13. Notes on the *Nyāyapraveśa* by Saṅkarasvāmin

Part II: 1. The sea and land travels of a Buddhist Sadhu in the sixteenth century (pp. 305-320): important changes and corrections.
2. The *Ratnāvali* of Nāgārjuna
3. Some glosses upon the *Guhyasamāja*
4. On some bronze objects discovered in Western Tibet
5. Indian paintings in Western Tibetan temples
6. Nel Tibet Centrale: relazione preliminare della spedizione 1939
7. Travels of Tibetan pilgrims in the Swat valley (pp. 369-418): many corrections and additions; the appendix containing the Tibetan text has been omitted (pp. 85-103 of the original edition).
8. Alessandro Csma (sic) de Koros
9. Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñāpāramitā
10. The validity of Tibetan historical tradition
11. Preistoria tibetana
12. Tibetan Notes
13. Buddhist Notes
14. Ratnākaraśānti on Āśraya-parāvṛtti
15. Earth in India and Tibet
16. The sacral character of the kings of ancient Tibet
17. The symbolism of the temple of bSam-yas
18. The Fifth Dalai-Lama as a Sanskrit scholar
20. A Hindu image in the Himalayas
21. The wives of Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po

At the beginning of part one appears a bibliography of Tucci’s works from 1911 to 1970. It numbers almost three hundred items and gives testimony to the enormous breadth of interest of this great scholar. T.R.