Tibetan and Qing Troops in the Gorkha Wars (1788–1792) as Presented in Chinese Sources: A Paradigm Shift in Military Culture*

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Introduction

With the elevation of the status of the Qing *ambans* (imperial residents) over that of the Tibetan council of ministers or *kashag* (Tib. *bka’ shag*, Chinese transcription *gasha* 噶廈) in 1793, the representatives of the imperial court took over political affairs in Tibet, particularly those concerning foreign policy. This field of policy is closely connected to military matters, and it was therefore necessary for the Qing to make substantial changes to the organisation of the military in Tibet. The reform project instituted from 1788 reached from the reorganisation of command structures to recruitment, training, armament, and supply. The plans were so far-reaching that one might say that they constituted a fundamental shift in the military culture of Tibet, in particular in the area of military administration.

This article will scrutinise the reasons why, and in what areas, these military reforms were carried out. By comparing the *modus operandi* of Tibetan troops with that of Qing troops, differences in military administration will become apparent. These variables will be discussed in light of the reforms attempted after the First Gorkha War (in 1788) and then the much more extensive reform programme imposed after the Second Gorkha War (1791–1792).¹ It is clear that from the perspective of the Qing, an effective defence of its borders was only possible by

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¹ This is how the two wars (often summarised to one continuous event) are referred to in modern Chinese sources. They are not to be confused with the Anglo-Gorkha, or Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814–1816. In Anglophone sources, the 1788–1791 wars are known collectively as the Sino-Nepalese, Sino-Gorkha, or Tibet-Gorkha wars.

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overhauling the Tibetan military system, which had shown itself repeatedly ineffective.

The Gorkha wars, and the second war in particular, have been studied by many scholars. General overviews are presented by Dilli Raman Regmi, Leo E. Rose, Rishikesh Shaha and Luciano Petech. Peter Schwieger has focused on the political institution of the Dalai Lama in this period and the significance of the wars to its political relations with Qing China. Two recent studies have made particular use of individual biographies of Tibetan protagonists in the events to approach the Sino-Nepalese war, one written by Franz-Karl Ehrhard, and the other by Li Ruohong. The reform of 1793, usually referred to as the Twenty-nine-article Ordinance or the Twenty-nine Articles, have been studied by several researchers. Fabienne Jagou’s study has focused particularly on the cooperation between Tibetans and Manchus. Its impact on the Tibetan military have been studied by Anne Chayet and Alice Travers. Information on military matters in this period is also found in a contribution by Leonard van der Kuijp on Tibetan jurisprudence. Max Oidtmann’s recent publication analyses the debates within the Qing court over the introduction of the Golden Urn as an institution, described in the 1793 reform. Lin Lei is currently working at a Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University on trans-Himalayan border policy as an outcome of the Gorkha wars, pointing out the “limits of empire”.

The main sources for this study are: the official chronicle of the war Qinding Kuo’erka jilüe (欽定廓爾喀紀略 “Imperially endorsed military annals of the [second] Gorkha war”); published archival sources in

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2 Regmi 1961.
3 Rose 1971.
4 Shaha 1990.
5 Petech 1950a.
6 Schwieger 2015.
7 Ehrhard 2007.
8 Li 2002.
9 Jagou 2013.
10 Chayet 2005.
11 Travers 2015.
13 Oidtmann 2018.
14 Qinding Kuo’erka jilüe 欽定廓爾喀紀略 (hereafter QDKEKJL). 1793, comp. by Fanglüeguan 方略館. This collection is an official account on the war. It belongs to a particular genre of military history called fanglüe 方略, for which specialised and temporary compilation bureaus (fanglüeguan 方略館) were created. The Gorkha annals were compiled in 1793 under the supervision of Bootai (Baotai 保泰) and con-
the Kuo’erka dang (廓爾喀檔 “Gorkha archive”);\textsuperscript{15} the Qingchao zhi Zang fagui quanbian (清朝治藏法規全編 “Complete collection of Qing laws for the administration of Tibet”);\textsuperscript{16} imperial edicts and regulations; as well as secondary sources in Chinese and other languages.

The term “military culture” describes the relationship between war, society, and thought, as military institutions and theory are shaped not just by political, but also by intellectual, civilian, and literary developments.\textsuperscript{17} The framework of “military culture” can also include the mission statement defining the purpose or legitimising the existence of an army; the internal structure of the military (as an embodiment of its institutional norms and assumptions); and the resources required to ensure its survival and functioning.\textsuperscript{18} This last feature is part of a set of subsystems which constitute the network of military administration, encompassing: human resource management (recruiting, sending out for missions); budgeting and finance; training and development including the acquisition of knowledge, skills and capabilities); and pro-

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\textsuperscript{15} Kuo’erka dang 廓爾喀檔 (hereafter KEKD). 1791–1793. Ed. 2006 by Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院. Taipei: Shenxiangting. The Kuo’erka dang is a collection of archival documents consisting of a variety of text types, ranging from reports of commanding generals to the emperor, the latter’s answers and instructions, reports of officers to the generals, records of interviews, lists of marches or transport routes, and the like. The collection was first published in facsimile form in the series Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan diancang zhuang dang’an ji fangliue congbian 國立故宮博物院典藏專案檔案暨方略叢編 (Taibei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院, 2007).

\textsuperscript{16} Qingchao zhi Zang fagui quanbian 清朝治藏法規全編 (hereafter QCZZFGQB), ed. 2001 by Zhang Yuxin 張羽新. Beijing: Xuexuan chubanshe. This five-volume collection consists of extracts from administrative codexes that are related to Tibet. These are Da-Qing huidian 大清會典 “Administrative statutes of the Great Qing” (a general codex from 1899), Lifanyuan shili 理藩院事例 and Lifanbu zeli 理藩部則例 “Precedent cases on administration from the Court of Colonial Affairs” from 1886 and 1906, respectively. These are facsimile versions of contemporary editions. The last part of the collection, Qingchao zhi Zang zhangcheng 清朝治藏章程 “Qing statues for the administration of Tibet” is a new typeset of administrative regulations, enriched by a selection of imperial edicts related to their compilation.

\textsuperscript{17} Di Cosmo 2009: 4.

\textsuperscript{18} Wilson 2008: 17.
curement (purchase of weapons, food, materials, as well as pay, benefits, allowances). Among these aspects of military culture, nearly all parts of the military administration are touched upon by the reform drawn up after the second Gorkha invasion, and therefore constitute the focus of the present research.

The First Gorkha War 1788

The primary context for the invasion of Tibetan border towns by the Gorkhas, or rather the Shah dynasty of the Gorkhas, was their seizure of power over much of present-day Nepal in 1769. This regime change presented a challenge to the long-standing political and economic relations between Nepal and Tibet, notably with regard to tariffs on trans-border trade and the use of currencies. At the time Tibet had no currency of its own, but used Nepalese coins which was possible because of the extensive trade across the Himalaya Range. In particular, Tibetan merchants made use of a Nepalese silver-based currency called “Mehnder-mulli” (mahindra malla), and continued to circulate this type of coin after the takeover of the Nepalese government by the Gorkhas. Yet the latter had introduced a silver coin of higher quality and wanted to replace the older, inferior-quality coins. However such a replacement and the demonetisation of the old copper-silver coins would result in substantial losses for the Tibetans, who refused any exchange rate between the old and the new coins other than parity. For “three or four” (or even up to “eight or ten”) years, the trade between Nepal and Tibet even stopped altogether, after the Gorkhas had lost “lacks of rupees” to Tibet.

Many Chinese sources ignore, in the debate on the reasons for the Nepalese invasion, the inheritance battle over the estate of the late Sixth Panchen Lama. This was a competition between his erstwhile secretary the Drungpa Trülku (Tib. Drung pa sprul sku), and his half-brother (?) the Shamarpa Trülku (Tib. Zhwa dmar pa sprul sku). During his visit to Beijing in 1780 the Panchen Lama had received lavish

20 Stiller 1975.
22 Kirkpatrick 1811: 339. See also Wood 1912.
23 Kirkpatrick 1811: 340, 342. One “lack” (lākh) corresponds to 100,000.
24 Chinese sources use the Mongolian title qutuqtu (Ch. hutuketu 呼圖克圖) that was bestowed on high incarnates. On the role of the Shamarpa Trülku during the first Gorkha invasion, see Li 2002: 142. Concerning the overlapping of family relationship with sacred positions see Oidtmann 2018: 72.
gifts from the emperor, but had died while staying in the imperial capital. This material wealth all went into the hands of the Drungpa Trülku, who had accompanied the Panchen Lama. The Shamarpa Trülku protested, but was overridden and finally fled to Nepal, where he apparently urged the local rulers to take revenge on his behalf.\textsuperscript{25}

A last, rather indirect, issue was the emerging British interest in trade with Tibet. British overtures had elicited only a lukewarm interest from the Tibetan side, even after Samuel Turner had achieved the promise of a trade agreement with Tibet in 1784. But direct trade with Tibet would allow the British to bypass the Nepalese transit tax.\textsuperscript{26} In contrast to the Tibetan reticence, the Gorkhas had taken an active interest in trade relations with the British and themselves initiated negotiations. This relieved the Nepalese regent Bahadur Shah (reg. 1785–1794) from the uncertainty over whether there would be a military threat from the south, allowing him to focus on the problem with Tibet in the north.\textsuperscript{27} A commercial treaty between Nepal and the British was eventually signed in 1792.\textsuperscript{28}

After the settlement of the Zunghar question in 1757 and thus the elimination of the Mongol threat to Tibet, the Qing court assumed that Tibet was a “secure backyard” of the empire.\textsuperscript{29} It seems that they were unaware of the rise of the Gorkhas and their involvement in Tibet and therefore did not initially understand the background of the conflict, believing it to be simply a matter of disputes on tariffs.\textsuperscript{30} For apart from the monetary question, there was also the problem that Tibet raised tariffs on certain Nepalese goods, and that the quality of salt being exported to Nepal was being downgraded by the addition of sand. The Qing government was therefore caught by surprise when they learned of the Nepalese invasion.

The question of when the first border transgressions by the Nepalese occurred remains unclear. Some authors hold that the Gorkhas had “no contact with China” before 1788, yet archival sources prove that the Qing court learned about the border transgressions as early as autumn 1787.\textsuperscript{31} In any case, the Qing did not think about a potential threat from the south. In July 1788, the Nepalese invaded the towns of Nyalam/Nyanang (Tib. Nya lam, Ch. Nielamu 聶拉木), Rongshahr

\textsuperscript{25} Shakabpa 2010: vol. 1, 508.
\textsuperscript{26} Killigrew 1979: 45.
\textsuperscript{27} Dai 2009: 136; Regmi 1961: 171.
\textsuperscript{28} On the development of British-Nepalese and British-Tibetan trade see Camman 1951, Field 1972, Petech 1950b, and Regmi 1961. The reader might also consult Uprety 1996.
\textsuperscript{29} Dai 2009: 135.
\textsuperscript{30} Zhang 2015: 45.
\textsuperscript{31} Zhuang 1987: 429.
(Tib. Rong shar, Ch. Rongxia 绒辖), and Kyirong (Tib. Skyid rong, Ch. Jilong 濟壩 or 濟隆) in Tsang (Ch. Tsang 藏, Tib. Gtsang) or what was known from a Chinese perspective as “Farther Tibet” (Ch. Houzang 後藏) with a force of 3,000 men.32

The standing troops in Tibet were not able to hold off this invasion. According to Chinese archival material they consisted, at the time of the first Gorkha invasion, of 360 Chinese Green Standard troops (lüyingbing 綠營兵) and 800 “Tangutan” (Ch. Tanggute 唐古忒 or 唐古特, i.e. Tibetan) troops in Ü (Tib. Dbus) or “Near Tibet” (Ch. Wei 衛 or Qianzang 前藏), 150 Green Standard troops and 400 Tibetan troops in Tsang, 200 Tibetan troops scattered over smaller posts throughout the country, 200 Mongolian Qošod troops in Damu (Tib. ‘Dam gzhung, Ch. Damu 達木, Dangxiong 當雄, north of Lhasa), and 1,200 Green Standard troops recruited from among the population according to standards varying from place to place, and garrisoned in eastern Tibet.33 This means that the invaders were confronted by a dispersed army of at most 3,400 troops, among whom some 1,800 were Green Standard troops. This situation was as mandated by the (provisional) arrangements of 1751 (Qinding/Zhuoding Xizang shanhou zhangcheng shisan tiao 欽定/酌定西藏善後章程十三條).34 These regulations had reduced, for financial reasons,35 the number of Green Standard troops in central Tibet (as stipulated in 1733) to 500 (exchanged every three years), and those in the relay stations between Lhasa and Sichuan to c. 1,300.36 It can be seen that in 1788, even less Green Standard troops were present in Tibet than the number stipulated in the regulations from the mid-century.

32 Chen and Gao 2014: 89. Concerning geography, the reader may consult Boulnois 1989.
33 KEKD, document dated Qianlong (hereafter QL) 57/8/23 (57/7–8: 197; 3: 1525).
34 The 1751 Statutes, Art. 7, raised the number of Tibetan dapön (Tib. mda’ dpou, Ch. daiben 帶奔) officers from four to five, rearranged their distribution in the jurisdictions of Ü and Tsang (ensuring the security over the region of Tsang), and regulated the quick reoccupation of vacancies; see QCZZFGQB, 5: 1827–1828, based on a memorial by Ts’ereng (Celeng 策楞, d. 1756) from 23 April 1751 (QL 16/3/yichou). Alice Travers 2015 argues that the increase in dapön officers (see also the Chinese translation of the Tibetan version of the 1751 Statutes in QCZZFGQB 5: 1830), each of which commanded 500 soldiers, indicates that the total number of standing Tibetan troops grew, even if the 1751 Statutes do not fix any total number of troops. A synopsis of the two reforms of 1751 and 1793 is presented by Li 2016: 22–23.
35 This regulation was adopted in 1733, see Feng 2007: 44.
36 Ibid.: 45.
The claim reported by the British officer Kirkpatrick, that the Tibetans “have assembled 125,000 men at the border to Nepal” is thus immensely exaggerated. Such large numbers were not even reached in the early 18th century, when there was, according to the book Xizang zhi 西藏志, a total number of more than 64,000 troops in Tibet, including 3,000 cavalry in Lhasa, 2,000 in Tsang, 5,000 in Ngari (Tib. Mnga’ ris; Ch. Ali 阿里), and 1,000 in Keba 格埬. Further troops, it states, may also have been garrisoned in Kongpo (Tib. Kong po; Ch. Gongbu 工布), and 3,000 “Black-tent Mongols” (hei zhangfang Menggu 黑帳房蒙古) in various places, as well as 50,000 infantry all over Tibet.

The amban Čingrin (Qinglin 慶麟, a Mongol bannerman in office 1783–1789) dispatched 500 Green Standard troops, as well as 200 Qošod troops from Chamdo (Tib. Chab mdo, Ch. Chamuduó 察木多, also written 叉木多), 500 Mongols from Damu, making altogether 1,200 troops, to meet the invaders. They were supported by 1,300 Green Standard troops from Sichuan, 500 troops from among the Banner garrison in Chengdu (成都), Sichuan, and 1,200 “trained troops of military colonies” from the “subject” native population (tunlian jiāng-fàn 屯練降番) in western Sichuan. These 3,000 troops were seen as elite soldiers, either because they were veterans and experienced in fighting in mountainous terrain, or brought with them cultures of tactics, weaponry and modes of fighting other than those of China proper.

Troops from Sichuan had been used in the two Jinchuan (金川, Tib. Rgyal rong) wars (1747–1749, 1771–1776) in western Sichuan (or eastern Tibet, Kham). Dai Yingcong has demonstrated that the province

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37 Kirkpatrick 1811: 340.
38 It is not clear what Tibetan toponym this corresponds to. It might be that Keba is not a transcription of a Tibetan place name at all, but rather a translation, meaning “level barley field between hills”. One spot with this name is found for example in Maizhokunggar district (Tib. Mal gro gung dkar rdzong, east of Lhasa), village Tangkya 塘加乡 (Tib. Thang skya) hamlet Naitang 乃塘村, compare Guge Qimeiduoji 古格·其美多吉 and Suolangrenqing 索朗仁青 2014: 87.
39 Xizang zhi, 1, fol. 3a–b. Also quoted in Guo 2010: 31.
40 Qingshilu 清實錄 [Da-Qing lichao shilu 大清歷朝實錄] (hereafter QSLGZSL) [Veritable records of the Qing], part Gaozong Chun Huangdi shilu 高宗純皇帝實錄 [Veritable records of Emperor Gaozong, i.e. Qianlong reign-period, also called Gaozong shilu 高宗實錄]. 1964 [1807]. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1310: 1b (QL 53/8/gengyin). See also Zhuang 1987: 429. The “Veritable Records” are a vast collection of imperial edicts and quotations from the imperial diaries and represent the official version of court documents on which the “orthodox” history books were usually based. Documents related to Tibet are extracted and published in Qingshilu zangzu shiliao. On the Jinchuan wars, see Theobald 2013.
of Sichuan had become the main base for border defence and the pacification of remote territories in the southwest of China. Among these veterans, Manchu Banner troops constituted the most useful contingent. They were well-trained and used excellent weapons, including the bow and the musket, in some cases also cannon. However, these relief troops had to march from Chengdu across eastern Tibet before they could reach the war theatre in Tsang, an arduous journey which would take at least a month. The difficulties were not so much of logistics (as there was an established system of relay stations), but rather sheer distance that had to be covered and the altitude.

In addition to sending relief troops, the Qing court decided to evacuate the young Panchen Lama who resided in Shigatsé. In spring 1789, the Qing troops liberated the border fortress of Dzongkha (Tib. Rdzong kha, Ch. Zongka 宗喀), which was only defended half-heartedly. On March 24, 1789 (Qianlong 54/2/28) the Qing troops reached the border to Nepal.

The main reason for the quick advance of the Qing troops from Ü to the border was that the Tibetan government (namely the Sakya Trülku and the Tsongkhapa Trülku) had reached an “unofficial peace agreement” (sixia jiaoyi 私下交易) with the Gorkhas by “paying them off to vacate the territory [occupied by the Gorkhas]” (xu yin shu di 許銀贖地). The Tibetan government, without consulting the Qing court, had apparently promised to pay the Gorkha court 300 gold bars annually, corresponding to 9,600 taels of silver or 50,000 Rupees. This resolution was quite natural, since it had been mainly economic issues between Tibet and Nepal that had led to the invasion. Yet the Qing court felt bypassed by this decision. They saw themselves responsible for the security of the Tibetan territory, and had sent quite a large body of troops to the Tibetan highland in its defence. The campaign had devoured a tremendous amount of money, and the emperor had even

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42 Dai 2009: 8.
43 QSLGZSL, 1397: 6b (QL 57/2/dingsi); 1400: 28a (QL 57/4/dingwei). Regmi 1961: 173, searches in Nepalese sources “in vain the causes that led them [the Gorkhalis] to withdraw”.
44 Dai 2009: 136. Feng 2007: 45. Wei Yuan’s (魏源, 1794–1857) report Shengwuji (聖武記) 5: 26b speaks of 15,000 “pieces of money” (wan wu qian jin 萬五千金), which Imbault-Huart 1878: 361 translates as “taels”. This figure is adapted by Chen and Gao 2014: 90. Regmi 1961: 172, speaks of 3 lakhs (would be 300,000) of rupees, but says that this were “Tibetan ingots of silver”.
45 Kirkpatrick 1811: 343. The first proposal had been 50 “lacks” (unless Kirkpatrick 1811: 342, is wrong), which would be 5 million rupees.
issued an edict in which he particularly appealed to the local population to support the troops, and force the invaders to retreat.

The truce between Tibet and Nepal had however found support from the Qing commander Bajung (Bazhong 巴忠), who had been amban in Tibet since 1788, spoke Tibetan from prior service there, and therefore knew the local situation better than the Qing court in Beijing. He was sent to Tibet in his function of Vice Minister of the Court of Colonial Affairs (lifanyuan shilang 理藩院侍郎). After the second invasion from Nepal, Bajung would commit suicide, having confessed that the emperor had not been informed about the details of how the initial truce was negotiated and because the minutiae of the agreement between the Tibetan government and the Gorkhas had been kept secret from the Qing court. Interestingly Shakabpa presents an alternative narrative of these events, namely that the Tibetans themselves did not have the intention of seeking a treaty agreement, and that the peace treaty had been initiated by officials on the Chinese side.

The First Proposed Reform of the Military System in Tibet in 1789

After the Gorkhas had been pushed back beyond the frontier, the Qianlong Emperor (乾隆帝) immediately ordered the Banner general of Chengdu, Ohūi (Ehui 鄂輝, d. 1798), to take on the highest command over the armies in Tibet and to prepare, in unison with Cengde (Chengde 成德, serving as Grand Minister Consultant, canzan dachen 參贊大臣) and Bajung, for the post-war arrangements (shanhou shiyi 善後事宜). The “Articles for the Post-war Arrangements in Tibet” (Xizang shanhou zhangcheng shisan tiao 西藏善後章程十三條, hereafter the Statutes), submitted to and approved by the emperor on August 17, 1789 (Chinese date Qianlong [henceforth QL] 54/6/27), and available in the official chronicle Qingshilu 清實錄 “Veritable Records of the Qing”, included thirteen paragraphs aimed at reinforcing the basic defence situation there.

These Statutes made the following stipulations concerning military administration:

47 On the role of the Court of Colonial Affairs, see Jagou 2017.
49 Oidtmann 2018: 52.
50 Shakabpa 2010: vol. 1, 513.
51 QSLGZSL, 1318: 2a (QL 53/12/wuzi).
- 510 Green Standard troops were to be garrisoned in Lhasa under the direct command of the Manchu *ambans* in Tibet, and not the Tibetan government.

- A local contingent of 150 men was to protect Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatsé in Tsang, consisting of sixty Green Standard troops (*lüying guanbing* 緑營官兵) selected (*choubo* 抽撥) from the garrisons in Chamdo under the command of a detached officer (*waiwei* 外委), along with thirty men from Jiangka (江卡, today Markang, Tib. Markhams; Ch. Mangkang zong 芒康宗) in Kham; twenty men from Shuobanduo (碩板多, near Lho rong) under a first captain (*dusi* 都司); and fourty men from Lhasa. Chinese-language officer titles indicate that these Tibetan troops were probably commanded or supervised by Chinese personnel. Among the cavalry officers, two men were to be selected to “hold together” the mounted troops in attacks (*jungong waiwei guanshu bingding* 軍功外委管束兵丁). Between Ü and Tsang, twelve way-stations (*tangxun* 塘汛) were to be built, and staffed by Tibetan troops (*Tanggute bing* 唐古忒兵, *Tanggute fanbing* 唐古忒番兵) in numbers of five or four each, selected from the villages nearby (*tiaoxuan fujin fanbing* 挑選附近番兵). Their provisions were to be paid by the Qing, but through the Tibetan Cabinet (*kalön*, Tib. *Bka’ blon*, Ch. *gabulun* 噶布倫 or *galun* 噶倫). This was to be checked by the captain in Tsang (Art. 1).

- In Lazi (拉子, Tib. Lha rtse), a new garrison was to be created (*tianshe* 添設) with 200 Tibetan troops under the command of “two new *diba* (第巴, Tib. *sde pa*)”. These personnel were to rotate once a year. Thirty men out of the 200 were standing in the border fortress of Shelkar (Tib. Shel mkhar, Ch. Xiega'er 脈噶爾, today Xiege'er 協格爾), and thirty as rotating (*lunfu* 輪赴) patrol troops (*xunshao* 巡哨) in Saka (Tib. Sa skya, Ch. Saka 薩喀 also written Sajia 薩迦) not far away.

- From Art. 3 it can also be learnt that apart from the above-mentioned troops, there were 800 Tibetan troops in Ü, and 400 in Tsang.

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53 Also found in Feng 2014: 7–8.

54 The word *diba* 第巴, also transcribed *dieba* 碼巴, is the usual transcription for *depa* (Tib. *sde pa*), a kind of viceroy, and sometimes confounded with *disi* 第已, i.e. *desi* (Tib. *sde srid*), meaning regent. A commander of 100 troops (*bing tianshe diba er ming guanli* [Lazi difang fanbing erbai ming] 井添設第巴二名管領 [拉子地方番兵二百名]) cannot have held such a high function, however. Unclear.
- In the border districts of Dzongkha, Nyalam and Kyirong, fortified posts with “war towers” (kadiao 卡碉) were to be built, serving as watchtowers and for the defence of these remote, but strategically important spots (Art. 2). Each fortification (zhailuo 寨落) was to be commanded by a diba officer appointed by the Kalön. The latter was ordered to treat the diba candidates all alike concerning appointments and dismissals (yiti bu fang 一體補放), and to see to it that these dibas took personal responsibilities for duties in the garrison, and did not send a substitute person from their family (bu xu shan chai jiading daili 不許擅差家丁代理) (Art. 5).

The stipulations regulating supply and armament were that:
- “Government troops” in Tibet (Xizang guanbing 西藏官兵, i.e. Tibetan troops) were to be supplied with grain cultivated and livestock raised by the garrisons themselves (yi gengmu wei sheng 以耕牧為生).

- The Tibetan troops were to be paid in grain rations by the Kalön, but only during the manoeuvre season. For this purpose the exact number of troops in each village was to be checked in the future (an zhailuo duogua bianding shumu 按寨落多寡編定數目). The payment of rations (or money to purchase them) during manoeuvres was a novelty (xiang wu qianliang 向無錢糧) (Art. 3).

- Another new regulation was (planned to be) issued concerning the Mongols from Dam, who had previously not taken part in any formal military training and should be included now. Their provisions were paid, as before, “by the Dalai Lama”. The reason for this was firstly that the Tibetans could not rely on the supply by the imperial troops, and secondly, to force the Tibetan government to take care for the regular supply of their troops, and not leave them to take care for themselves. All garrisons were to receive an amount of grain of 3,000 dan annually, to be stored in garrison granaries.

- The more than twenty iron cannons of different calibres stored in the Potala Palace were to be registered (bingding shuhao 編定號數) and tested regularly. The Green Standard troops were to take Tibetan troops with them to train them in the use of these guns. This paragraph indicates that until this time, Tibetan troops had not been very familiar with the use of cannon. The instruction in the use of artillery might have had the aim to demonstrate that there were indeed effective means of breaking fortresses occupied by the enemy. The Gorkhas had brought cannon with them and destroyed some Tibetan fortresses with the help of such artillery.

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55 Dan (written 石) is a volume measure corresponding to about 100 litres.
A third group of regulations refers to training and inspection:
- Training was to be carried out (by the Green Standard troops) in autumn, together (yiti lianxi 一體練習) with the Tibetan troops from Ü and Tsang (Art. 3).
- Regular training and manoeuvres were to be part of the schedule for Chinese troops, and the Tibetans were to become accustomed to them.
- As for drills in the use of muskets and in archery, several dozen Green Standard troops with their officers and sergeants (qian-babianbing shu shi ming 千把弁兵數十名) were to be selected to organise this training and establish a schedule for regular practice (zhuri caoyan 逐日操演) (Art. 3).
- Military exercises were to be supervised twice a year by one of the ambassadors in turn, so that each of them was present once a year.
- The Tibetan Cabinet Ministers for their part would inspect the military fortifications in a regular way, sending one of them in spring and autumn, during the farming season (Art. 6).
- The management of local military affairs was left to the Tibetans.

In spring 1791, more troops were sent to Tsang. These were expected to regularly train the local troops in their military prowess. In addition, the border fortress of Nyalam, heavily damaged by the Gorkhas, was rebuilt and reinforced.56

As for these military reforms drafted by Ohūi, Bajung and Cengde, it appears most of them were never implemented. Even if the minutiae of the reforms had been approved and finalised, the reform programme itself was never issued as a public document, even though the leading commanders had been ordered to “draft statutes for discussion” (zhuoyi zhangcheng 酌議章程) or to “fix statutes” (ding zhangcheng 定章程).57

The Second Gorkha War 1791–1792

In autumn 1791, the Gorkhas staged a second invasion of Tsang because the Tibetan government had not met its promises of annual tribute. Only at this point did the Qing government learn that the Tibetans

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57 QSLGZSL 1323: 10a–b (QL 54/2/yisi); 1326: 12a–13a (QL 54/2/jiawu).
had not fulfilled their monetary obligations to the Gorkhas.\textsuperscript{58} Two Tibetan cabinet ministers (\textit{kalön}) were abducted by the Nepalis while trying to renegotiate the truce of 1789 at a place called Kuti.\textsuperscript{59} The border towns of Nyalam, Kyirong, and Dzongkha fell again into the hands of the enemy—apparently without much resistance—and the Gorkhas, “with 18,000 troops”,\textsuperscript{60} advanced as far as Tashilhunpo monastery at Shigatsé and plundered the treasury of the Panchen Lama, where the gold and silver presented by the Qianlong Emperor was being stored. The \textit{amban} Bootai (Baotai 保泰, in office 1780–1783, 1790–1791) evacuated the Panchen and the Dalai Lamas, lured the invaders farther into Tibet, and reported to the emperor, “exaggerating somewhat” the number of enemies.\textsuperscript{61}

This time there was much dispute at the Qing court on how to repel the invaders. Ohūi, for instance, provincial Banner general of Chengdu, resisted the imperial command to once again send more Sichuanese troops to Tibet. He was of the opinion that the problem with the Gorkhas was an internal matter for the Tibetans, and of no concern to the Qing.\textsuperscript{62} Some dignitaries in the Chinese government were likewise reluctant to embark on a war that might prove expensive, would prove an arduous assignment to their troops, and also noted the emperor’s great age.\textsuperscript{63}

Yet the latter, chastising Ohūi for having supported the wrong assessment of Bajung, appointed Fuk’anggan (Ch. Fukang’an 福康安, 1753–1796) Grand Minister Consultant. The latter marched from Beijing to Lhasa, crossed the Qinghai Plateau during the winter season, and by June 28, 1792 (QL 57/5/10) had pushed the Gorkhas back beyond the border at Rasuwa Bridge (Resuo Qiao 熱索橋) and chased them as far as River Betravati (Ch. Palanggu He 帕朗古河?) not far from Kathmandu (Ch. Yangbu 陽布).\textsuperscript{64} The Gorkhas, standing “against 40,000 men” according to Kirkpatrick,\textsuperscript{65} prevented the Qing from

\textsuperscript{58} QDKEKJL 1: 6a (1: 199), QL 56/8/22, no 2. One payment is attested in Chinese sources, see Zhang 1997: 84.

\textsuperscript{59} Oidtmann 2018: 71. Regmi 1961: 174. QDKEKJL 1: 3a (QL 56/8/22a); 8b (QL 56/8/25).

\textsuperscript{60} Rockhill 1910: 51. See also Kapstein 2006: 158, and Kirkpatrick 1811: 346. The first clash is recorded in QSLGZSL 1385: 8b (QL 56/6/30), see also Zhang 1987: 445. The real number of Gorkha troops on Tibetan soil was about 3,000 or somewhat more at that time, see Zhuang 1987: 449–450.

\textsuperscript{61} Imbault-Huart (1878: 362) does not give a number.

\textsuperscript{62} QDKEKJL 1: 9b (QL 56/8/25).

\textsuperscript{63} Kunwar 1962: 289.

\textsuperscript{64} QDKEKJL 35: 4ff. (4: 2095–2096, QL 57/7/14). The course of the battle is described over a dozen of folios, see Zhuang 1984: 466.

\textsuperscript{65} Kirkpatrick 1811: 347; Regmi (1970: 186) says 10,000.
crossing the bridge. Both sides were exhausted. The Qing feared that their retreat across the Himalaya could be blocked by snowfall if they spent any more time in enemy’s territory, and the Gorkhas were being threatened by other hot spots on their borders, so they agreed to end hostilities and on October 4, 1792 (QL 57/8/19), and concluded a truce. The Gorkhas promised to return some of the goods stolen from Tashilhunpo, and to send a tributary mission to Beijing every five years. Significantly, the status of Nepal as a tributary state in the imperial system of the Qing was asserted from this time, meaning that Nepal (from the Qing perspective) had henceforth accepted the suzerainty of the Qing empire, and could in return expect military support from China.

While reports from the Qing side praised the heroic spirit of the Qing troops, other sources demonstrate that the Qing were rather lucky to have got so far. Over-confident because of their quick successes, the Qing were hardly pressed in the battle of Betravati. So much so, that Fuk’anggan (known in Nepali sources as Tung Thang, Tung-Thyang, or Thung Chang Chun) began to kill his retreating troops—as far as Nepali sources say. During the war, Fuk’anggan had tried to establish contacts with the British, not knowing that the latter were siding with Nepal, though without giving them outright support. British troops did not take part in the battles on Nepalese ground, yet some mediators were present. This fact was, in the current state of my knowledge, not observed from the Chinese side.

In early 1792, large military contingents had arrived from Sichuan and other places. Qing chronicles list 300 Manchu Banner and Green Standard troops from Chengdu, 3,000 Green Standard troops from various garrisons in Sichuan. This last contingent included 500 Qošods from Damu, 2,000 Tibetan troops from five military posts (五寨屯番) in the mountainous prefectures (Weizhou, 維州, 茂州, 茂州, etc.).

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66 Sikkim, Limbu (today’s Limbuwan), and Jumla, were perhaps enticed by the Chinese to rebel against the Gorkhalis, to bind their forces, see Regmi 1961: 177.
67 Regmi 1970: 181, 186. Even Wei Yuan, whose book Shengwuji is overly positive towards the military achievements of the Qing, admits that the Qing troops faced huge problems against the Gorkhas, see Shengwuji 5: 28b.
71 The five “military agro-colonies” (屯) in the former region of Jinchuan (new sub-prefecture of Maogong) were the garrisons Maogong 懋功營, Chonghua 崇化營, Suijing 綏靖營, Qingning 慶寧營, and Fubian 撫邊營. On the number of local troops there, see Theobald 2011: 405–406. Weizhou or Maozhou 茂州 was actually part of the sub-prefecture Zagu 雜谷, the former Tsha khog.
Maogong (懋功, i.e. Jinchuan and surroundings) in western Sichuan—among them 500 men from Zhanggu (章谷/Chonghua 崇化), and 1,500 “trained soldiers from the military colonies” (tunlian 屯練), 1,000 local troops (tubing 士兵) from Dergé (Tib. Sde dge, Ch. De’erge[te] 德爾格[忒]); and further contingents of 2,000 local troops from Chögyab (Tib. Khro skyab, Ch. Chuosijiabu 綽斯甲布) and Tzag (Tib. Tsha khog, Ch. Zagu 雜谷). Furthermore a large contingent of 7,500 men, consisting of 2,300 Chinese troops from the military agro-colonies (Han tunbing 漢屯兵) at Batang (Tib. Ba’ thang, Ch. 巴塘) and other places in Kham; 2,000 [Green Standard] troops from the province of Yunnan; 2,000 (Mongolian?) troops from Chamdo (Tib. Chab mdo); 1,200 troops already dispatched immediately after the second invasion; and finally of particular importance from the point of view of logistics and fighting skill, though not large in numbers, were the elite troops sent from northeast China, namely between 600 and 1,000 Solun and Daghir troops from the Mongolian Hulun Buyir League under the command of the General of Heilongjiang (黑龍江), and 100 officers of the type baturu hiya janggin (batulu shiwei zhangjing 巴圖魯侍衛章京). Wei Yuan’s (魏源) military book Shengwuji (聖武記) speaks of 2,000 Solun troops, while documentary sources only testify the use of 1,000 Soluns.

Although Gorkha sources speak of 70,000 Qing troops against their own number of between 20,000 and 30,000 the figures attested in these Chinese sources add up to no more than 17,000 or even less on the Qing side.
Based on Tibetan sources, Shakabpa gives the figures of 10,000 volunteer Tibetan troops from Ü, Tsang and other places, and 3,000 Chinese-trained Tibetan troops (Tib. *rgya sbyong*). Fuk’anggan brought further relief “with 20,000 Chinese and Solun troops”. This latter figure is again somewhat higher than the sum of all soldiers counted in the Chinese sources and secondary analysis.

*The Second Reform of the Military System in Tibet in 1793*

Right at the beginning of the second invasion, the *ambans* Bootai and Yamantai (雅滿泰, in office 1786–1789) had explained that as long as the imperial army was away, the Tibetan troops would avoid engaging the enemy, and would do the same in the future when the imperial army had returned to China. Back in Lhasa therefore, where Fuk’anggan stayed over the winter, he ordered the compilation of revised post-war arrangements, and submitted to the emperor a draft called “Suggestions Regarding Statutes for the Tibetan Army” (*Chouyi fanbing zhangcheng* 筹議番兵章程). These suggestions were then transformed into the “Imperially-Endorsed Statutes for the Internal Post-War Arrangements of Tibet” (*Qinding Zangnei shanhou zhangcheng ershi jiu tiao* 欽定藏內善後章程二十九條) with twenty-nine paragraphs (hereafter the *Twenty-nine Articles*). These were much more detailed than the (preliminary) Statutes from 1789, and laid more stress on the recruitment of officers and on armament. The broader political and commercial arrangements concerning the relation between Tibet and the Qing empire addressed by these *Twenty-nine Articles* will not be discussed here in detail.

While the Tibetan version of the *Twenty-nine Articles* is well-known in two versions, it is still not known whether there was an original Chinese or Manchu version. Zhang Yun has suggested a solution to this problem by arguing that an original Chinese version had not been in the shape of twenty-nine articles, but rather was spread over various documents, for instance, memorials to the throne submitted by Fuk’anggan, Sun Shiyi 孫士毅 (1720–1796), Huiling 惠齡 (1743–1808)
or Helin 和琳 (1753–1796), or rescripts by the emperor. Any Chinese versions in the shape of “articles” are thus (re-)translations from the Tibetan. At any rate, so far no original Chinese source has been discovered. One important Chinese “source” for the Twenty-nine Articles is a memorial suggesting six articles for the creation of a standing Tibetan army and (joint) training (Zhuoding e she Zangbing ji xunlian shiyi liu tiao 酌定額設藏兵及訓練事宜六條, that would become Art. 4–7), submitted and accepted on December 15, 1792 (QL 57/11/2). Another is a memorial suggesting six statutes for post-war arrangements (Wei-Zang shanhou zhangcheng liu kuan 衛藏善後章程六款, which would become Art. 10–13) from January 3, 1793 (QL 57/11/21). And a third source is a memorial pointing at eighteen issues “still to be regulated” by statutes (Shang you ying xing banli zhangcheng shiba tiao 尚有應行辦理章程十八條, corresponding to Art. 14–29) from January 22, 1793 (QL 57/12/11). Most of these suggestions were eventually incorporated into what became known from Tibetan sources as the Twenty-nine Articles. Those articles accepted by the members of the Grand Council (junji dachen 軍機大臣) and the emperor were translated from Chinese into Tibetan on April 4, 1793 (QL 58/2/24), and presented to the Tibetan authorities. The most important Tibetan version of these Articles is the collection of documents from the year of the Water Buffalo/Ox (Ch. Shuiniu nian wenshu 水牛年文書). An abbreviated manuscript

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.: 90. Li (2004: 34) lists furthermore the foundations of Art. 1. (memorial Ni jiang qinban jinping zai Dazhaosi nei gongfeng shi 擬將欽頒金瓶在大昭寺供奉事 “Proposal for the use of gold urns in the Jokhang Temple by imperial regulation”), Art. 2 (memorial Zhoubian guojia shangren zai Xizang maoyi jiaowang xu li fa xicha 周邊國家商人在西藏貿易交往須立法稽查 “The necessity to create a law to control the traffic of foreign merchants in Tibet”), Art. 3 (memorial Xizang zhuoding guzhu qianyin zhangcheng 西藏酌定鼓铸錢銀章程 “Statutes suggested for issuing currency in Tibet”), as well as Art. 8–9 (memorial Zhuoding xicha shangshang shouzhi bing quan yu Dalai Lama juanmian zufu deng shi 酌定稽查商上收支並勸諭達賴喇嘛蠲免租賦等事 “Suggestion for a detailed accounting of revenue and expenditure and ordering the Dalai Lama to decree tax holidays”). Zhang (1993: 45) speaks of eight memorials altogether that have the “character of rules” (faguixing wenjian 法規性文件).

84 An official, modern translation of this version back into Chinese was realised in the early 1950s. It was first published in Ya Hanzhang 牙含章, 1984, Dalai Lama zhuan 達賴喇嘛傳, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 62–71. Zhang (1993: 44) says this translation includes several errors, and recommends her own translation in the propaganda collection Xizang Shehui Kexue Yuan 西藏社會科學院 et al. (eds.) 1986, Xizang difang shi Zhongguo bu ke fenhe de yi bufen (Shiliao xuanji) 西藏地方是中國不可分割的一部分(史料選輯), Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1: 313–322. Another translation is included in Zhongguo Zangxue Yanjiju Zhongxin 中國藏學研
version from 1811 is also included in the collection Xizang lishi dang’an huicui “A collection of historical archives of Tibet.”  

Among the Chinese versions translated back from Tibetan, a different arrangement in the order of paragraphs is found, as seen in the local gazetteer Wei-Zang tongzhi 衛藏通志, compiled under the supervision of the amban Sungyun (Songyun 松筠, 1752–1835). Even though this version is also presented in twenty-nine paragraphs, there are slight differences in details.

In the context of the monetary issue which was one of the reasons for the first invasion, it is worth noting that in the wake of these conflicts the Qing also implemented a currency system in Tibet, with its own mint producing tangka coins (Ch. zhangka 章卡) in a mixed Nepalese-Chinese style (Art. 3).

Regarding military reforms, a standing army (zhenggui jundui 正規軍隊) was to be created, with the aim of strengthening its fighting power, and preventing the maltreatment of the local populace. The army of Tibet was henceforth to consist of 3,000 Tibetan troops, of which 1,000 were garrisoned in Ü, the same number in Tsang, and 500 in Dingri (Tib. Ding ri, Ch. Dingri 定日), and Gyantsé (Tib. Rgyal rtse, Ch. Jiangzi 江孜) each. The troops of Ü were under the command of a Chinese major (youji 游擊), while those of Tsang, Dingri and Gyantsé were commanded by a Chinese first captain (dusi). As such Tibetan troops were henceforth not longer under the overall command of Tibetans, but of Chinese officers. These central troops were also to give protection to the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni (Panchen Lama) (Art. 4).

The Chinese major (youji) of the Green Standard garrison in Ü had a staff of one assistant brigade commander (shoubei 守備), two company commanders (qianzong 千總), two squad leaders (bazong 把總),

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85 Edited by Xizang Zizhiqu Dang’anguan 西藏自治區檔案館, 1995, Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe. This version was also translated into Chinese and English.
86 Xizang tongzhi, 12 (1: 531–567). Sungyun’s arrangement is also included in the collection Xizang difang lishi ziliao xuanji 西藏地方歷史資料選輯, ed. by Beijing daxue lishi xi 北京大學歷史系 et al., 1963, Beijing: Sanlian shuju, where it is called Qianlong wushiba nian qinding Xizang zhangcheng “Tibetan statues from 1793 as endorsed by the Emperor”. Also found in QDZZFGQB 5: 1844–1851.
and five detached officers (waiwei). The brigade comprised 450 Chinese troops. The Green Standard garrison in Tsang was commanded by a first captain (dusi), with 140 men under one bazong and one detached officer. In Gyantsé stood twenty Chinese troops, in Dingri forty, with an additional 680 troops at various military posts (xun 汛) and in Chamdo.\footnote{Wei-Zang tongzhi, 12: 10a-b (1: 551–552).}

The 1793 Articles arranged the system for the Tibetan troops as follows: six Tibetan dapön (Tib. mda’ dpon or “brigade commander”, fourth rank official) commanded 500 men each, and together controlled twelve rupön (Tib. ru dpon or “1st-class company commander”, fifth rank),\footnote{The official ranks are defined in Wei-Zang tongzhi, 12: 7b-8a (1: 544–545). It provides individual names of then-incumbent officers.} who controlled 250 men each (instead of formerly 100).\footnote{Guo 2010: 32, quoting from Zhongguo Zangxue Yanjiu Zhongxin 2007, quite probably commentaries or other documents than the Twenty-nine Articles.} Each rupön was in control of two gyapön (Tib. brgya dpon or “2nd-class company commander”, sixth rank), who headed 125 men each. The lowest officers were dingpön (Tib. lding dpon, Ch. dingben 定本 or 丁本, “platoon commander”, seventh rank) of whom there were five under each gyapön, each leading twenty-five men.\footnote{The book Xizang zhi from the early 18th century renders the ranks of Tibetan officers in the following way: Regional chief commanders (ge di da touren 各地大頭人) were called dieba 傅巴 (the above-mentioned diba). The chief cavalry commander had the title daiben 代奔 (i.e. dapön, Tib. mda’ dpon, also transcribed 代本, daibeng 戴琫 or 戴綳) and commanded 500 men; jiaben 甲奔 officers (gyapön, Tib. rgya dpon) who commanded 200 men, ruben 如奔 (rupön, Tib. ru dpon) with 100 men, officers called laiben 賴奔 (Tib. lding dpon?) with forty-five men, and juben 局奔 (chupön, Tib. bcu dpon, also transcribed jueben 覺琫) with ten men under their command. There was furthermore the rank of “petty leader” (xiao touren 小頭人) called guodu 郭渡. Xizang zhi 1, 2a-b. The order gyapön – rupön might be an error of the author.}

The number of dapön was increased to six (two of them in Tsang), and the number of the other officers were accordingly twelve rupön, twenty-four gyapön, and 120 dingpön (Art. 5). There was a system of promotion if a higher post fell vacant. It worked with the help of registers (mingce 名冊) in two copies, one held by the archive of the ambans, and the other by the kashag.

Tibetan officers (fanmu 番目) were to be recruited from among young lay officials (Tib. drung ‘khor, Ch. dongke’er 東科爾 or zhongke’er 仲科爾) and from the common populace. Noblemen had to begin with the post of dingpön, and could not automatically serve in higher positions because of birth. The traditional glass ceiling for commoners, restricting access to posts higher than dingpön or gyapön to men of the
nobility (guizu chushen 貴族出身), was abolished. All officers had to go through the ladder of ranks, and could not directly be appointed to a higher post. In the older statutes, commoners (pingmin 平民) could only be appointed dingpön. The new reform from 1793 allowed commoners to rise to higher ranks, even to that of dapön, if they were educated, capable, and had gained military merits (zhao qi xueshi jineng ji zhangong 照其學識技能及戰功). The inheritance of military posts was formally abolished (Art. 5, 17).

The Twenty-nine Articles defined precise rules for the number of officers in each place (Art. 3, 4); for their payment (rupön were to be given 36 taels annually, gyapön 20, dingpön 14.8); as well as for their supplies (Art. 6), training, appearance, defence, weaponry, horses, etc. in each of the garrisons in great detail. All food and weapons, including gunpowder (Art. 26), was to be provided by the Tibetan government. The only exception was bullets, perhaps because lead was a rare commodity in Tibet and thus had to be imported.

Art. 6 particularly stressed the need to feed and equip the troops during military campaigns, otherwise they might harass the local population or desert. The annual supply in peace time for each soldier was 2.5 dan (250 litres) of barley (qingke 青稞), making a total required amount of 7,500 dan (750 m³) annually. During military campaigns, one jin 斤 (500 g) of tsampa was to be given out per day and per person. The garrisons were basically supplied in a self-sustaining way, like the traditional Chinese military agro-colonies (juntun). If local granaries were unable to cover the need, then the barley fields of the disgraced Shamarpa and Drungpa trülkus, and the kalön Tenzin Peljor (Tib. Bstan ’dzin dpal ’byor/Rdo ring Pandita, Ch. Danjin Banzhu’er 丹津班珠爾) were to make up any shortfall. The provision of garrisons depended on the produce of the local farmers, for which reason they were at regular intervals to be exempted from corvée (Tib. ’u lag, Chinese transcription wula 烏拉) (Art. 6, 9).

The Twenty-nine Articles also stipulated that fifty percent of fighters be equipped with muskets, thirty percent with bow and arrow, and twenty percent with sword and lance (Art. 7). The Tibetan government was to provide fourteen cannons to Tsang, where this type of armament had not been available before (Art. 26).

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91 Interpretation of Zhuang 1987: 478.
92 More about chances on career after the 1793 reform can be found in the contribution of Alice Travers in this volume.
93 Guo 2010: 32 mentions Banbar (Tib. Dpal ’bar, Ch. Bianba 邊壩) in Chamdo, where lead was produced.
As in the 1789 Statutes, combined training of Green Standard and of Tibetan troops was to be carried out, and the ambans were to inspect the military organisation once a year (Art. 13). Troops were to be billeted in border towns near Nepal in three-year terms, and the local magistrates in these border areas (bianzong zongben 邊宗宗本 Tib. dpal? rdzong rdzong dpon) were to be selected from among local leaders and military officers (Art. 16).

Apart from the Tibetan troops, the 538 households of the Qošods of Damu were also reorganised in eight banners according to the Manchu model. Eighty Qošods were to stay in Lhasa and be rotated twice a year. Like the Green Standard troops, they also took part in annual manoeuvres.

Reasons for these Changes in Military Administration

We will now scrutinise the details of military administration which led to the decision of the Qing court to carry out these reforms. From the list of troops that the Qing sent to Tibet to repel the Gorkhas, it can be seen that the imperial army consisted of a great variety of “ethnic soldiers”, as Dai Yingcong calls them. This indicates that the Qing were already accustomed to managing mixed systems of military administration.

The Gorkhas are usually depicted as ferocious fighters, wearing “deadly kukries” (khukuri, a long, curved knife), but only equipped with ancient matchlocks, and “nothing but their short sturdy legs to carry them”. Yet they were also known for their “merciless looting and pillaging”. On occasion, when overwhelmed by Chinese attack, they also resorted to guerrilla tactics. The Tibetan troops were, according to Chinese documents, “no match for them [the Gorkhas]” (Zangbing bu di 藏兵不敵). They “ran away” (fenfen taocuan 紛紛逃竄) at first sight of the enemy (yu di ji tui 遇敵即退), and “their rank

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95 Feng 2014: 6. The tribes of Mongolia were organised in banners at an earlier point of time.
96 Ayinna 2012: 15.
101 Quoted in Zhuang 1987: 430. Expressions insulting inefficient units of the imperial army or of allied armies are widespread in Chinese documents.
102 Quoted in Zhuang 1987: 449; QDKEKJL 34: 12b (4: 2048), QL 57/6/19.
103 Quoted in Guo 2010: 32.
and file soldiers lack unity” (renxin huansan 人心渙散). They did not dare make excursions outside their fortresses (bu gan chu ji 不敢出擊), and were generally regarded as “wimps and cowards” (Zangbing nuoque 藏兵懦怯, suxing nuoque 素性懦怯, fengqi rounuo 風氣柔懦, mingbin quero 兵民怯弱, and the like).

While such expressions are the usual vocabulary of the Qing to insult lame ducks among their allies and their own officers, there are also some reasons given as to why the Tibetan troops were not able to defend their country. Many soldiers, of the militia type, were not professionals but were recruited from among the common people at the hour of need. As a result, they “did not have any idea of the job of a soldier” (su bu zhi bing 素不知兵), as a Chinese document says. On a higher level, their officers were likewise not trained and made decisions in a rather spontaneous way, and “not according to standards”, when going into battle (zhengdiao yu yiding zhangcheng 徵調無一定章程). And at the most senior level, the central government of Tibet did not distinguish between the civilian and the military sphere, meaning that civilians or even clerics could decide military matters. Cabinet Minister Doring (Tib. Rdo ring) confirmed these observations by the Qing: “The Tibetan people have no training to resist her enemies”. An oft-quoted sentence reports that Tibetan troops launched just one or two volleys with their muskets and then withdrew behind shelters. Though this might have looked like fear, it is not clear whether the Tibetan troops had sufficient ammunition. Moreover, line tactics with repeated firing as used in Europe was unknown in Asia.

However this is not to say that the Tibetans handed the Gorkhas the field without resistance. During the first Gorkha invasion, the fortress of Shelkar was successfully defended for months by 2,000 soldiers and civilians. Baotai soon had the idea to reward the Tibetan troops if they bravely resisted and held their positions, mainly by giving them silks—a tried and tested custom of the Qing to encourage the martial spirit of its allied troops. Yet even without such promises, there were

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104 QSLGZSL 1389: 9a (QL 56/10/xuwu).
105 Quoted in Zhuang 1987: 450.
106 Quoted in Deng 2010: 22, from a memorial of Ohūi.
108 Quoted in Guo 2010: 34, from a memorial of Ohūi.
109 Ibid.
111 Shakabpa 2010: vol. 1, 512.
113 Shakabpa 2010: vol. 1, 511.
114 QDKEKJL 4: 25a (1: 401), QL 56/10/11, no. 2; 5: 28a (1: 467), QL 56/10/22, no. 2.
instances, as in Zongka, when the Gorkhas “fiercely attacked” and climbed the walls of the fortress with ladders, but were effectively repelled by Tibetan defenders and relief troops.\textsuperscript{115}

The derogatory comments made about the Tibetan troops is in contrast to the Mongolian Qošods, who are characterised in Qing sources as fighting with great bravery (\textit{bingding qiangzhuang} 兵丁強壯, \textit{fazheng fenyong} 打仗奮勇)\textsuperscript{116} and in defiance of death, so that half of them died on the battlefield in one instance.\textsuperscript{117} The Mongols were also known as “very unassuming, not demanding provisions or money for such” (\textit{su qu qianliang} 素無錢糧), and were very happy when given material rewards such as silks, tobacco, tea and silver plates.\textsuperscript{118} Nevertheless another document expresses the fear that the Qošod troops at that time did not have sufficient experience in mountain warfare,\textsuperscript{119} and a further report gives evidence that they could not withstand the enemy (\textit{dui di bu zhu} 對敵不住)\textsuperscript{120}

The reason for sending Solun troops from Heilongjiang in the northeast over thousands of kilometers to Lhasa and beyond, was that the Solun cavalry were deemed excellent riders and archers and could bear great cold, if equipped with winter clothing.\textsuperscript{121} Also better than the Tibetans were their “cousins” among the many native tribes of Kham and Jinchuan who were experienced in storming mountain fortresses, and could build multi-storied counter-fortifications (\textit{diaoka} 碉卡) by themselves.\textsuperscript{122} They were rated as brave and reliable,\textsuperscript{123} and had the advantage that they spoke Tibetan dialects and could thus be used as interpreters.\textsuperscript{124}

The Gorkhas advanced on foot and had no cavalry, according to Chinese sources.\textsuperscript{125} The Tibetans, or at least part of them, were mounted and used bow and arrow, and also carried with them lances and swords.\textsuperscript{126} However other sources say—and this is rather probable for an army consisting mostly of ad-hoc recruits, that the majority of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} Zhuang 1987: 449. KEKD 56/10/23 (QL 56/9–10: 144; 1: 140).\textsuperscript{116} Feng 1992: 86; QSLGZSL 1387: 18b (QL 56/9/dingyou).\textsuperscript{117} Zhang 1987: 449; Ayinna 2012: 13.\textsuperscript{118} To be used as markers and conferrals of authority; Feng 1992: 86.\textsuperscript{119} QDKEKJL 1: 23b (1: 234), QL 56/9/12, no. 2.\textsuperscript{120} QDKEKJL 2: 1b (1: 246), QL 56/9/15.\textsuperscript{121} Gao 2013: 18, 20.\textsuperscript{122} QDKEKJL 3: 1a (1: 305), QL 56/9/25.\textsuperscript{123} Cai 1993: 76.\textsuperscript{124} QDKEKJL 1: 20a (1: 227), QL 56/9/11.\textsuperscript{125} Zhuang 1987: 433.\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}: 433, 449.
\end{itemize}
them were infantry. The case is quite clear for the Soluns who were, as cavalry, used to pursuing and striking down fleeing enemies. The native soldiers from Kham finally were used to besiege and assail fortresses, to fight with hand grenades (huodan 火彈) and storm ladders, and to work as sappers to bring down fortifications with explosives.

Without going into further detail, one might conclude that the different “ethnic troops” cooperated in a kind of division of labour. Such cooperation can indeed be observed in the descriptions of several battles.

Standing units of the Tibetan army were, at least according the reforms envisaged in the 1789 Statutes, and quite probably because of the presence of both Tibetan and Green Standard units in most places as stipulated in the 1793 Articles, commanded by a Green Standard officer. Yet it can be seen that the officers of Tibetan units worked in an “ethnically” cooperative way. This is also true for Green Standard troops. Right at the beginning of the second invasion, for instance, a major named Urgungga (Wu’ergong’a 烏爾公阿, quite probably a Manchu) and a Tibetan dapön, whose name is not mentioned, led a joint force of Green Standard troops, Qošods, and Tibetan troops to bring relief to the besieged seat of the governor (guanzhai 官寨) in Sakya (? Valley (Sajia Gou 薩迦溝). On another occasion, the defence of Tashilhunpo was taken over by Qošods under the command of a Chinese captain.

This cooperation between different types of troops can also be observed during the liberation of the fortresses occupied by the Gorkhas. During the attack on the castle of Mt. Pagya (Pajia Ling 帕嘉嶺, Pajia Ling 拍嘉嶺 or 拍甲嶺) under commander Cengde, 100 troops under a Banner colonel (xieling 協領) took up a position at a crucial spot overlooking the theatre. From the northwest, 200 Chinese and “local” (Khampa) troops (Han-tun bianbing 漢屯弁兵) under a Chinese major (youji), a Tibetan colony captain (tunbei 屯備) and the Tibetan vice-chief (fu tusi 副土司) of Batang (in Kham), as well as 70 Tibetan troops under the command of a dapön, crossed the mountain ridge and advanced on the castle. From the southwest, 200 Chinese and native troops under a Chinese first captain (dusi) and a colony captain (tunbei), and 60 Tibetan troops under the command of a diba (dingpön?) crossed another mountain ridge to engage the enemy. During the night, the Qing troops (guanbing) under Cengde’s direct command advanced to the

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127 Guo (2010: 31) compares the figures from Xizang zhi listed further above.
129 Ibid.: 455; QDKEKJL 19: 1b (3: 1174), QL 57/2/3.
riverside close to Mt. Pagya and crossed the river by laying out wooden planks. At dawn, the two contingents liaised and attacked the castle together. The decisive charge was led by the Chinese major, whose troops used hand grenades to break through its gates.132

The conquest of the castle of Nyalam was initiated by a feigned attack of Manchu, Han, and Tibetan troops from the northwest, while the real charge came from the southwest, this time again using hand grenades and other combustibles first to burn down the outer walls, and then, when buildings on the inner side could be reached, to break open the powder magazine, which eventually caught fire and exploded. Meanwhile the Gorkhas barricaded themselves in the northwestern part of the castle. During the night, “strong and brave Tibetan troops” dug a trench and began work on the wall behind which the granary chamber was located. After a week, a breach was created, and the grain ignited. Yet the enemy still resisted. Fresh troops were brought in to support the work of the sappers and shoveled away the snow. Finally, after nearly a month of siege, the 1,200-odd Qing/Tibetan troops ignited forty packs of gunpowder and thereby destroyed the wall of the inner fortification, and forced the surviving enemies to surrender.133 Besides this engineering work, cannons were the most effective siege weapon of the imperial troops. They were usually fired from higher positions.134

One of the aims of the Twenty-nine Articles was to shift military expenditure from the imperial treasury onto the Tibetan government. The cost of the Gorkha campaigns in the remote highland was immense and had mostly been shouldered by the Qing government, at least for the imperial troops. While prior to the Articles there had been some clear regulations for the supply of imperial troops—at least after the issuing of the War Expenditures Code (Junxu zeli 軍需則例) in 1776135—these were not applicable in Tibet, where local troops were not provided with rations for campaigns lasting longer than one month. The troops therefore had to look after themselves, and also had to bring their own weapons (qixie kouliang jun xi ge bing zi bei 器械口糧 均系各兵自備).136 The result was that the Tibetan troops maltreated the local population (zaorao renmin 造擾人民).137 For this reason, Art. 4 of the Articles saw to it that the Tibetan government took care for the regular supply of the garrisons.

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132 Ibid.: 455; QDKEKJL 19: 1b (3: 1174), QL 57/2/3.
134 QDKEKJL 35: 7a (4: 2101), QL 57/7/14.
135 Theobald 2016: 186.
137 Tao 1993: 38, quoting from the 1793 Articles, Art. 4.
Their lack of uniforms and standard-issue weapons also made the Tibetan soldiers “look like a flock of crows” (wu he zhi zhong 烏合之眾) who were “dealing [with war] like a children’s game” (dai tong er xi 殊同兒戲), at least in the eyes of Chinese observers.\textsuperscript{138}

The militia system worked in a manner similar to the corvée system (ula) and operated according to local need, and without central registration. The local authorities decided not only when, but also how to recruit men. In some places, militiamen were drafted according to the size of a household, while in other places, ownership of fields was the criterion by which young men could be drafted or not. For this reason, no figures are available how many militia troops the Tibetan government was able to raise.\textsuperscript{139}

When assembled to fight an enemy, militiamen were not trained in any way, and did not obey central command (wu tong shuai 無統率). Disordered chains of command, bad equipment, and injustices in the recruitment system, together resulted in frequent desertion, especially as soon as there was an occasion for actual combat (cheng jian ji tao 乘間即逃).\textsuperscript{140} The Qing commanders therefore decided to send some officers to the troops defending Kyirong in order to train the Tibetan troops trying to win back the fortress.\textsuperscript{141}

Given such circumstances, it is important to question the mission of the armies involved in these events—the purposes for which they fought and existed. As for the Qing, these two Gorkha campaigns were the last two in a series of conflicts concerning “the pacification of the border regions” which had begun in the late 17th century with the suppression of the Three Feudatories in southwest China, culminated in the fights against the Zunghars, and then spread to the southeast, south, and southwest. These multiple wars had taught the Qing to suppress troublemakers by brute force, with overwhelming manpower, and monetary investment to feed the war machine. The aim was the pacification of the empire.

In Tibet, defence was mainly oriented towards the north, to ward off attempts by Mongol leaders to gain influence over Lhasa.\textsuperscript{142} This orientation was based on past experiences, but ignored the threat posed by new powers from the south, like the Gorkhas, or the British. The reduction in manpower of the Tibetan army since the mid-century

\textsuperscript{138} Guo 2010: 34, from a memorial of Zhang Yintang 張蔭棠.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.: 34.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} QDKEKJL 1: 14a (1: 215), QL 56/9/5.
\textsuperscript{142} Compare the article of Hosung Shim in this volume.
had made it nearly impossible to protect a territory as large as Tibet in case of conflicts in distant regions.

Conclusions

The Statutes of 1789 and Articles of 1793 were aimed at strengthening the Tibetan military system, so that the Tibetan government had no need to turn to the imperial government of the Qing for defence. Through this reform, Tibet was supposed to reorganise her own standing army and to reduce the reliance on the ad-hoc recruitment of militia troops.\(^\text{143}\) This military restructuring in Tibet saved the Qing government both organisational effort and financial cost, and created an administrative apparatus for managing recruitment and training, providing clear-cut budgets and resources, and determining permanent and distinct structures of command and jurisdiction. The primary aim of the military reforms of 1793 was thus to convert the Tibetan military into a small but effective professional army standing under the command of the Tibetan central government. Thereafter, soldiers would receive regular and decent payment, would be trained, and were a body of troops answerable to clearly-defined command structures. Their mission was to defend Tibet against future foreign intrusions.

This analysis of the composition of the joint Tibetan/Qing army during the two Gorkha invasions demonstrates that the imperial forces were composed of military units of varying ethnic provenance, including troops from central Tibet, eastern Tibet, Qošod Mongols, Chinese Green Standard troops, Manchu Banner troops, and Solun from the far northeast. All these contingents had different modes of fighting which could be applied to different specific circumstances. This diversity was a typical feature of armies during the high Qing period, and this type of “ethnic cooperation” was formally encoded into the model of the military administration in Tibet after 1793, by integrating Tibetan units further with the Chinese Green Standard troops standing in Tibet.

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\(^{143}\) Dai 2009: 146.


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